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After Empire: Xenophon's *Poroi* and the Reorientation of Athens' Political Economy

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After Empire: Xenophon's *Poroi* and the Reorientation of Athens' Political Economy

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In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in Xenophon as a historian, literary artist, and political philosopher. However, scholarly research on the *Poroi*—the only work of political economy to survive from antiquity—has been minimal. To date, no book-length, synoptic analysis of the text exists. This dissertation contributes significantly to filling this lacuna in the scholarship while also serving to enhance our understanding of fourth-century Athenian political discourse and ideology, finance, and economics.

I argue that the *Poroi* is a unique anti-imperialistic discourse that aims to demonstrate the ways in which the Athenians can maintain themselves financially without exploiting other states. While Xenophon's objectives of alleviating the poverty of the Athenians and increasing their revenues are conventional, the means by which he intends to achieve these goals are innovative. Unlike his contemporaries, Xenophon recommends employing financial resources derived not from empire but rather from

peaceful economic activities. Specifically, I contend that the *Poroi* boldly challenges the parasitic, consumer-based orientation of Athens' imperial economy by proposing practical measures meant to transform Athens into a center of silver mining, manufacture, and free commercial exchange. Xenophon's vision for Athens' new economy, I submit, even displays features of modern rational capitalism. To advance this argument, I adopt a contextualist approach that situates Xenophon's ideas both in the immediate historical milieu of fourth-century Athens and within the history of economic and political thought. I am therefore able to highlight the points of contact between the *Poroi* and subsequent developments in the history of ideas and thus to underscore the groundbreaking aspects of Xenophon's political economy.

My study parts company with previous interpretations in two fundamental ways. First, Xenophon's attempt to improve the financial condition of the Athenians stems from a desire not to promote or to retard the political activity of the people but to eliminate the injustice of Athenian imperialism. Second, his program to stimulate the Athenian economy necessarily entails the development of the productive forces of Attica. In brief, such a radical transformation of Athenian fiscal and economic practices represents nothing short of a "reorientation" of Athenian political economy.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

ATL	*The Athenian Tribute Lists*. B.D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor eds. Cambridge, MA. 1939-.
DK	*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. H. Diels and W. Kranz eds. 12th ed. Dublin. 1966-67.
FGrH	*Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. F. Jacoby ed. Berlin. 1923-.
GHI	*A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions.* M.N. Tod ed. Vol. 2. Oxford. 1933-48.
GHI^2	*Greek Historical Inscriptions: 404-323 BC.* P.J. Rhodes and D. Lewis eds. Oxford. 2003.
IC III	*Inscriptiones Creticae*. M. Guarducci ed. Vol 3. Rome 1942.
IG I^3	*Inscriptiones Graecae I: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores*. D. Lewis and L. Jeffery eds. 3rd ed. Berlin. 1981, 1994.
IG II^2	*Inscriptiones Graecae II et III: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno posteriors*. J. Kirchner ed. 2nd ed. Berlin. 1913-1940.
IG XII (5)	*Inscriptiones Graecae XII,5. Inscriptiones Cycladum*. F. Hiller von Gaertringen ed. 2 vols. Berlin. 1903-1909.
IG XII (8)	*Inscriptiones Graecae XII,8. Inscriptiones insularum maris Thracici*, C. Friedrich ed. Berlin. 1909.
IK Iasos	*Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien. Die Inschriften von Iasos.* W. Blumel ed. Bonn. 1985-.
I Priene	*Inschriften von Priene*. F.H. von Gaertringen ed. Berlin. 1906.
IScM II	*Inscriptiones Daciae et Scythiae Minoris antiquae. Series altera: Inscriptiones Scythiae Minoris graecae et latinae.* I. Stoian ed. Vol. 2. Bucharest. 1987.
LGPN	*A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names.* Vol. 2, Attica. M.J. Osborne, S.G. Byrne, P.M. Fraser, and E. Matthews eds. Oxford. 1994.

LSJ	*A Greek-English Lexicon.* Compiled by H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H.S. Jones. 9th ed. Oxford. 1968.
Milet	*Milet: Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899*. W. von Theodor Wiegand ed. Berlin. 1906-.
ML	*A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C*. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis eds. Oxford. 1969.
OCD	*The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, eds. 3rd ed. Oxford. 1996.
OGIS	*Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae*. W. Dittenberger ed. Leipzig. 1903-1905.
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*. Vols. 1-11, J. Hondius ed. Leiden. 1923-1954. Vols. 12-25, A. Woodhead ed. Leiden. 1955-1971. Vols. 26-41, H.W. Pleket and R. S. Stroud eds. Amsterdam. 1979-1994. Vols. 42-44, eds. H.W. Pleket, R. S. Stroud and J. H.M. Strubbe eds. Amsterdam. 1995-1997. Vols. 45-49, H.W. Pleket, R. S. Stroud, A. Chaniotis and J.H.M. Strubbe eds. Amsterdam. 1998-2002. Vols. 50-, A. Chaniotis, R.S. Stroud and J.H.M. Strubbe eds. Amsterdam. 2003-.
SIG^3	*Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum*. W. Dittenberger. 3rd ed. Leipzig. 1915-24.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Preface: Text and Context

"Sir, At length the War, which has been carry'd on for so many Years, with such Expense of Blood, and Treasure to the Nation, is at an End; and we have the fairest Prospect imaginable of a lasting Peace…"[1] So begins Walter Moyle's preface to the first English translation of Xenophon's *Poroi* (1697), a work dedicated to the gifted economist Charles Davenant (1656-1714), who served as England's Commissioner of Excise (1683-1689) and Inspector General of Exports and Imports (1705-1714). The war to which Moyle refers is the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-97), which had bankrupted the exchequer and brought English commerce to a virtual standstill for nearly a decade. For Moyle, the time had come for the country to enjoy a "lasting peace" and to become "Rich and Happy, by the improvement of…Navigation, and the increase of Trade: For tis to Trade we owe the Rise and Progress of the *English* Greatness…"

> To this End, I present you [Davenant] with a Translation of the Discourse of *Xenophon* upon the Subject of *Revenue and Trade*…one of the greatest Men that Antiquity ever produc'd, and the only ancient Author upon this Subject, which is now extant. You will admire the Force and Solidity of his Observations, the Exactness of his Calculations, the justness, and freedom of his Thoughts, not confin'd to the narrow Notions of Parties and Factions, and the vigour of his Judgment and Eloquence at so great an Age. The general Rules for the Increase of Riches and Trade, are either directly advanc'd, or may be very naturally deduc'd from this Discourse. That admirable Maxim *That the true Wealth and Greatness of a Nation, consists in Numbers of People*, well emply'd, is every where inculcated throughout the whole Course of the Treatise. And I believe Xenophon was the first Author that ever argu'd by Political Arithmetick, or the Art of Reasoning upon things by Figures, which has been improv'd by some able

[1] Moyle 1697: 3-4. The translation was also appended to Devanant's *Discourses on the Publick Revenues and on the Trade of England* (1698).

> Heads of our own Nation, and carry'd to the highest Perfection by your successful Inquiries.[2]

As we learn a year later from Davenant's *Discourses on Public Revenues and on the Trade of England*, Moyle actually translated the *Poroi* at the economist's request: Davenant desired "to shew the public, how ancient the true notions were, concerning public revenues and trade" so that whatever he himself advanced in his treatise could "be examined and tried by this standard."[3] Davenant was so thoroughly impressed with Moyle's translation, which includes a short but still-useful commentary, that he offered the text as an "example" to the young aspiring statesmen of his day in the hope that it would incite them "to study the business of trade, and the revenues of their country."

To the best extent of our knowledge, this was the first and only time since Xenophon originally published the work in 355/4 B.C. that the *Poroi* was invoked seriously as a model for improving the financial and economic situation of a state. Though separated by two millennia of history replete with radical political and economic changes, Davenant and Moyle found common cause with Xenophon. They considered the *Poroi* a useful text in the promotion of a new economic policy in the golden age of mercantilism. As it had been for Xenophon in the aftermath of the Social War, financial and economic exhaustion, brought on by years of grievous war, suggested the need to pursue peace and to develop trade and commerce for the betterment of both private and public fortunes.[4] For Davenant the *Poroi* is not so much a practical guide or template for

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[2] Moyle 1697: 7-8.

[3] Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 149.

[4] For example, in a direct allusion to *Poroi* 5.12, Davenant remarks "how much the national stock encreases in time of peace, and impairs and grows less in time of war" (Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 347); cf. "for as war consumes wealth, so peace restores it" (353).

his own ways and means of augmenting state revenues and stimulating trade; nowhere in his work does he advocate any of Xenophon's proposals in the *Poroi*.[5] Rather, Davenant found in Xenophon a farsighted thinker with similar ideological proclivities who helped him articulate a rejoinder to some of the most pernicious mercantilist trade policies of the day.[6]

While some scholars deem Davenant a moderate mercantilist, he in fact appears to be one of the earliest advocates of free trade. To quote just one salient example of his free trade tendencies: "Trade is in its nature free, finds its own channel, and best directeth its own course: and all laws to give it rules and directions, and to limit and circumscribe it, may serve the particular ends of private men, but are seldom advantageous to the public."[7] At one notable point in his *Discourses*, he cites *Poroi* 3.2 to demonstrate how out of touch his contemporaries' views were concerning trade:

> It is strange, Xenophon, so long ago, should see that exportation of bullion, in the way of Traffic, could not be prejudicial to a country; and yet that we, who are a trading nation, should startle at it, to whom experience should have given better lights. His words are, "And whereas in other trading cities merchants are forced to barter one commodity for another, in regard their coin is not current abroad; we abound not only in manufactures and products of our own growth, sufficient to answer the demands of all foreign traders; but in case they refused to export goods in return for their own, they may trade with us to advantage, by receiving

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[5] It should be noted that Davenant does generally support the construction of merchant marines, which Xenophon recommends at 3.14 (e.g., Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 357). However, unlike Xenophon, he does not advocate the public ownership and leasing of these ships as a way to increase public revenues.

[6] In the mercantilist worldview, the wealth of a nation was determined strictly by the current stock of gold and silver bullion and/or coined money a country had in its possession. Any reduction in that stock, especially through the exportation of money abroad to pay for imports, was considered deleterious, whereas the importation of money through the selling of domestic goods was thought to be beneficial. Trade was perceived as zero-sum—one country's gain was another's loss—a view that frequently led to costly wars as countries struggled to get the upper hand in the balance of trade (see, e.g., Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 352-3).

[7] Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 98; cf. Vol. 1, 345-393.

> silver in exchange for them, which transported to any other market, would pass for more than they took it for at Athens."[8]

Though Athens had a distinct advantage over other countries in its possession of silver mines, thus affording some latitude in the exportation of its bullion abroad, Davenant nonetheless intimates that what made the city exceptional was its possession of export "manufactures," which balanced losses of specie suffered through the importation of goods and necessities. The lesson of the *Poroi* therefore is simple: the export of bullion to pay for imported goods, which are put into the service of production and manufacturing, is ultimately advantageous for a country.

To many contemporary historians and classicists, whose views on the ancient economy are informed by the Weber-Hasebroek-Finley model, Davenant's understanding of the *Poroi* as a kind of free-trade manifesto may seem to embody the worst kind of anachronistic tendencies of the old modernist school of thought.[9] Yet Davenant wrote the *Discourses* almost two centuries before the Bücher-Meyer controversy, which henceforth focused the study of the ancient economy on institutions rather than on ideas.[10] Both substantivist and formalist historians continue to frame the debate in terms

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[8] Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 2, 107.

[9] I borrow the locution "Weber-Hasebroek-Finley" from Runciman 1991: 351, who uses it to refer to the largely homogenous views these scholars held concerning the ancient economy—"that is, that the *poleis* had no economic policies as such and that their economic institutions, such as they were, were inextricably bound up with and subordinated to their political institutions (and attitudes)." See note 11 below.

[10] The debate began when Karl Bücher (1893) claimed that the Greeks never transcended their "closed household economy" and progressed either to the "city economy" of the Middle Ages or to the "national economy" characteristic of the modern world. Ed. Meyer countered by arguing that the idea of a "closed household economy" was an apropos description only for the early Greeks and that later periods in Greek economic history did correspond to those of modern Europe: "the seventh and sixth centuries correspond to the fourteenth and fifteenth in the modern world, the fifth corresponds to the sixteenth" (Meyer in Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 5). Hasebroek termed Bücher's position the "primitivist view" and Meyer's the "modernizing view" (Hasebroek in Pearson et al. 1957: 4). The relevant texts of Bücher and Meyer are collected in Finley 1979. For brief discussions of the controversy and the primitivist-modernist debate, see Will 1954: 9-11 and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 3-5.

of institutions, that is, the question of the existence or non-existence of an economy with integrated price-regulating markets.[11] Indeed, the two camps agree on little else in spite of the sharp divide between them over the admissibility of applying economic concepts, theories, and models derived from the study of the modern, free-market economy to the ancient world. However, the example of Davenant cautions against an excessive emphasis on institutions. I argue that not all ideas have a "material existence" or are embedded in social, political, and economic practices and institutions.[12] Long before free-market capitalism, price-regulating markets, and the industrial revolution, political philosophers and statesmen formulated ideas and concepts that were instrumental in occasioning the emergence of those very institutions. Free trade, laissez-faire, the division of labor—to name only a few—all have a long history predating the triumph of capitalism in the western world. Indeed, some of these ideas can be traced back to the ancient world, and as Davenant's *Discourses* suggest, directly to Xenophon's *Poroi*.[13] Davenant's interest lies not in understanding the nature of the ancient Athenian economy, but rather in establishing "how ancient the true notions [of Xenophon] were." For him,

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[11] Cartledge 2002a: 15 offers a succinct summary of the debate: "For the formalists, the ancient economy was a functionally segregated and independently instituted sphere of activity with its own profit maximizing, want-satisfying logic and rationality, less 'developed' no doubt than any modern economy but nevertheless recognizably similar in kind. Substantivists, on the other hand, hold that the ancient economy was not merely less developed but socially embedded and politically overdetermined and so—by the standards of neoclassical economics—conspicuously conventional, irrational and status-ridden. It is crucially important that this much more interesting and important substantivist-formalist debate should not be confused, as it often is, with the primitivist-modernizer debate." Integrated price-regulating markets—that is, markets that are not only linked but also integrated to such a degree that prices are set according to the laws of supply and demand—is also crucial to the debate (see Saller 2002: 254). For introductions to the two approaches and recent developments in the modeling of the ancient economy, see also Vidal-Naquet 1977: 5-18, Hopkins 1983, Burke 1992, Davies 1998, Morris in Finley 1999: ix-xxxvi and 2002, and Andreau 2002.

[12] The notion that all ideas and ideology have a "material existence" in the social, economic, and political practices of a people is the thesis of Althusser 1971: 165-70.

Xenophon's ideas transcend time and place because they speak to his project of redirecting England's commercial policy away from mercantilism to free trade. Davenant's reading therefore encourages us to consider the *Poroi* from an ideational perspective and treat it as a serious work that addresses some of the perennial issues of political and economic thought.

In this dissertation, I often go "beyond the text" and explore the points of contact between Xenophon and subsequent developments in the history of ideas to underscore the innovative aspects of Xenophon's political economy. At the same time, however, this dissertation is not merely a study of the *Poroi's Nachleben* or of political theory, which treats texts in isolation of the historical factors that contributed to their production.[14] Rather, it is largely a work of intellectual history, which aims to elucidate Xenophon's motives for composing the *Poroi* and to determine how this text functions within the political and intellectual culture of fourth-century Athens. To that end, I adopt a contextualist approach, drawing on the work of historians from the Cambridge School, whose major exponent is Quentin Skinner.[15] Unlike traditional contextualist approaches, which seek to establish the meaning of ideas by identifying the immediate political, economic, and social circumstances from which they originate, Skinner claims that ascertaining the "linguistic" conventions through which ideas are communicated also contributes significantly to determining the meaning of ideas. Following the speech act

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[13] For the contribution of the Greeks to the history of economic thought, see Spengler 1980, Meikle 1979 and 1985, Lowry 1987 with full bibliography of previous scholarship.

[14] E.g., the approach of Leo Strauss, whose studies on Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus*, and *Hiero* make no attempt to understand them in the context of fourth-century Athenian political thought.

[15] Skinner's seminal writings are collected in Tully ed. 1988; for a concise instruction to his methodology, see Tully's essay in Tully ed. 1988. For an application of Skinner's approach in classical scholarship, see Ober 1998.

theory of the linguist John Austin, Skinner argues that all texts of a given period, to a greater or lesser extent, share the same linguistic commonplaces, such as vocabulary, grammar, syntax, and more importantly, assumptions, conceptions, and ideas about the world. Once the historian has identified these shared ideological commonplaces, he/she is then able to argue *why* something was written and to ascertain the extent to which an author "[was] accepting and endorsing, or questioning and repudiating, or perhaps polemically ignoring, the prevailing assumptions and conventions of political debate."[16]

As a methodology, the "linguistic contextualism" pioneered by Skinner has much to recommend it, but a caveat is in order. If "ideology is the language of politics," as Skinner maintains, then it follows that all ideologies are reducible to their political contexts, a formulation that easily succumbs to the fallacy of reductionism.[17] As stated above, not all ideas are embedded in contemporary institutions and practices. Intelligent, perspicacious thinkers may subvert, innovate upon, and even transcend the conventional constraints of language and ideology. Interestingly, Xenophon's ideational "freedom" from the determinism of his political environment is what so impressed Moyle, who points to "the Force and Solidity of his Observations, the Exactness of his Calculations, the justness, and freedom of his Thoughts, not confin'd to the narrow Notions of Parties and Factions." If we were to overlook the *Poroi's* place in the history of economic and political thought, we would potentially run the risk of missing some of Xenophon's most ambitious and revolutionary ideas. My contextualist methodology therefore entails going "beyond the text" to include the study of ideas outside the purview of an author's

16 Skinner 1978: xiii.

17 See the critique of Diggins 1984

immediate historical context. This nuanced approach yields many interesting discoveries for readers lacking specialized expertise in the ancient world, who may be struck by Xenophon's prescience and imagination.

1A. Review of Scholarship

The esteem in which Moyle and Davenant held the *Poroi* was not contagious, for within a generation after their floruit Xenophon's pamphlet was no longer a practical guide for statesmen and economists but a relic of the past—read for antiquarian purposes and appreciated only for the light it shed on fourth-century Athenian economic and fiscal policies.[18] August Boeckh's short but contentious study in *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener* (1817) was the first scholarly treatment of the *Poroi*. For the renowned historian of Athenian public finance, Xenophon's recommendations are "airy speculations" "without foundation in reality."[19] He contends that it would have been "impossible" for them to achieve their purpose, which incidentally is a good thing in his opinion, because had the Athenians implemented Xenophon's plan, "the prosperity of Athens would have been in imminent danger of being destroyed."[20] The only suggestion that is not "entirely objectionable" is Xenophon's exhortation to peace. Yet this idea is Isocrates', which

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[18] The *Poroi* is cited a few times in Hume's antiquarian essay *On the Populousness of Ancient Nations* (1742) and once in *On Civil Liberty* (1752). Like Davenant's *Discourses on the Publick Revenues*, the *Poroi* was appended to the 1751 edition of William Petty's *Political Arithmetik* (Lowry 1987: 49). The only references I can find to the work in any major economist or political philosopher of the 19th century is in Says' *Treatise on Political Economy* (1803) and in Marx's *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (1857-61) (see, for example, his sections on money). However, this work was never meant to be published, as Marx wrote the manuscript as preparation for *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) and *Capital* (1867). In the published edition of the latter work, all references to the *Poroi* were removed. This lack of interest in the *Poro*i contrasts sharply with Xenophon's other works, especially the *Oeconomicus* and *Cyropaedia*, which were still being read with great interest throughout the 19th century.

[19] Boeckh 1976: 605.

[20] Boeckh 1976: 603.

calls into question Xenophon's originality as a thinker. In fact, Boeckh maintains that Xenophon composed the work not due to his own initiative but under the direction of Eubulus, whose welfare policies catered to "the pernicious tendencies of the Athenian people."[21] His interpretation has been very influential, informing in one way or another all subsequent negative assessments of the *Poroi* down to this day. For a number of commentators, Xenophon's proposals are impractical and utopian.[22] Some have followed Boeckh's lead in viewing them as ill conceived and even potentially dangerous to Athens.[23] Still others have traced his ideas to Isocrates, reasserted Eubulus' influence, and deemed Xenophon a conventional, "foolish," and "naïve" thinker.[24]

These opinions, however, are not widely accepted, as a majority of classicists and historians hold the *Poroi* and its author in high regard. To one group of scholars, Xenophon's prescriptions are practical measures designed to usher in real political, economic, and fiscal change.[25] Within this camp, many contend that Xenophon inspired Eubulus and not the other way around: for example, in the words of Cawkwell, "what

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[21] Boeckh 1976: 608.

[22] Beloch 1967: Vol. III[2] 1, 452: "contains no single idea which could have been practically realized;" Pöhlmann 1984: 245: "the entire project is utopian" and "an ideological daydream;" Oertel in Pöhlmann 1984: 532: "castles in the air;" Breitenbach 1967: 1760: "in many respects illusionary and partly utopian;" Bolkestein 1923: 126: "a utopian plan;" Glotz 1920: 248: "a chimerical project."

[23] Schwahn 1931, Andreades 1933: 388-9, and Gauthier 1976: 164-7. The comments of Mahaffy 1880: 283-4 betray the influence of Boeckh: "It is hard to conceive a more dangerous and mischievous theory of finance…There is nothing commendable in the policy of the tract…"

[24] For Xenophon's indebtedness to Eubulus, see Meyer 1884: Vol. 5, 280, Luccioni 1947: 281, and Delebecque 1957: 470-66; Schwahn 1931: 258-9 even argues that Eubulus was the author. That Isocrates' views on peace preceded Xenophon's is maintained by Mathieu 1925: 181-5, Luccioni 1948: 205-6, 283, Delebecque 1957: 474-5, Bringmann 1965: 73, and Breitenbach 1967: 1754. For expressions of Xenophon's lack of originality and intelligence, see, for example, Müller 1971: 198-9: "feeble pamphlet;" Kanitz 1873: 19: "a boastful and foolish fellow;" Hopper 1961: 139: "In matters of economics this writer was more than a little naïve;" Gauthier 1976: 22: "[Xenophon] did not pass for having had intelligence or an exceptional imagination;" Sealey 1993 114: "Xenophon did not have an original or distinct mind."

[25] E.g., Von der Lieck 1933: 4-5, 53, Andreades 1933: 390, Hasebroek 1965: 25, Frolov 1973: 188, Runciman 1991: 351, and Doty 2003: 5-9.

Xenophon proposed, Eubulus enacted."[26] Some even posit the influence of Xenophon's ideas on Lycurgus' program for financial and economic recovery after Chaeronea and on the economic and fiscal changes of the Hellenistic era.[27] Others are loathe to relegate Xenophon to an inferior status vis-à-vis Isocrates and stress Xenophon's originality as a thinker.[28] Even substantivist historians of the ancient economy see the *Poroi* as exceptional.[29] Numerous commentators go still further in their acclaim for the work, heralding Xenophon as a genuine economist who anticipated many modern developments in economic theory and practice. A few quotations will illustrate these accolades. Charles Bastable, whose 1892 text on public finance continues to be relevant today, claims that of all classical works the *Poroi* comes the closest to a "scientific" treatment of finance.[30] Jaeger calls Xenophon a "talented economist" whose recommendations are "entirely logical."[31] Though "Xenophon [is] no Adam Smith," according to Runciman, he likewise agrees that his proposals are "eminently sensible in economic terms."[32] Bresson too is convinced that Xenophon is "by no means ignorant of economic

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[26] Cawkwell 1963: 56. Cf. Andreades 1933: 390, de Romilly 1954: 340-6, Giglioni 1970: lvii-lviii, Frolov 1973: 188, Gauthier 1976: 229-31, Burke 1984: 113-8 and 1992: 208, Garland 1987: 43, and Engen 1996: 376-8.

[27] For the influence of Xenophon on Lycurgus, see Faraguna 1991: 289-380; that some of Xenophon's ideas anticipate Hellenistic developments is noted by Préaux 1966, Breitenbach 1967: 1754, Austin-Vidal-Naquet 1977: 362-3, Humphreys 1978: 138, and Finely 1999: 164.

[28] Thiel 1922: xxvi, Giglioni 1970: xxiii-xxiv, xxvi, xxviii, Higgins 1977: 138, Schütrumpf 1982: 53-65, Tuplin 1993: 33-4, and Cartledge 1997: 167.

[29] Austin-Vidal-Naquet 1977: 362-3: "the work seems to be something exceptional; it is one of the very few works of antiquity which gives the impression that the notion of economic development was not completely foreign to ancient thought." These authors also view Xenophon's proposals as "subversive." Polanyi 1977: 196 admires the *Poroi* for its originality in respect to "the thought that wealth, power, and security can be the product of peace rather than war." Finley 1999: 163 remarks that Xenophon's measures were "bold in some respects."

[30] Bastable 1927: 17.

[31] Jaeger 1944: 270 and 1938: 55; cf. p. 53: "the voice of a really experienced political economist."

[32] Runciman 1991: 351.

principles."[33] Contrary to Schumpeter and Finley, who assert that Greek economic thought never progressed beyond simple observation, Samuel argues that Xenophon's discussion in the *Poroi* evidences real "economic analysis."[34] Millett declares the *Poroi* to be "perhaps the most inventive piece of economic theorizing to survive from antiquity."[35] For Cartledge, "the analysis and recommendations in the *Ways and Means* are offered in a spirit of goal-oriented economic rationality."[36] Lastly, Doty believes that Xenophon—not Adam Smith—is most deserving of the title "father of economics" and touts the *Poroi* as "the first treatment of macroeconomics."[37]

Yet for all this admiration of the work, a surprisingly small amount of scholarship has been devoted to the *Poroi* in the last quarter century. With the exception of the translations of Audring (1992), Waterfield (1997), and Doty (2003), only three original articles (two of which focus strictly on the dating of the text) and one short study (Schütrumpf 1982) were written during this period.[38] This deficit is even more puzzling considering the recent resurgence of interest in Xenophon's works, which has yielded scores of monographs, commentaries, and books expressly devoted to the resurrection of his status as a political theorist, philosopher, historian, and literary artist.[39] The first-ever international conference dedicated entirely to Xenophon in Liverpool in 1999 and the

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[33] Bresson 2005: 55.

[34] Samuel 1983: 21-9; cf. Schumpeter 1959 and Finley 1970.

[35] Millett 2001: 37.

[36] Cartledge 1997: 166. Cf. Lowry 1987: 46-81 who locates the *Poroi* in the Greek "administrative" tradition, which contributed to the development of rationality within public finance.

[37] Doty 2003: 9.

[38] I say "original" because Gauthier 1984 and Schütrumpf 1995 are simply restatements of their positions in Gauthier 1976 and Schütrumpf 1982. The three articles are those of Cataudella 1984, Dillery 1993, and Bloch 2004.

[39] See the bibliographies in Vela Tejada 1998 and Tuplin ed. 2004: 13, n. 1.

recently published accompanying volume, *Xenophon and his World* (2004), has failed to produce one paper on or sustained discussion of the *Poroi*.[40] If we consider research on the *Poroi* from the last century, the situation improves somewhat, for here we find the important commentaries of Thiel (1922), Giglioni (1970), and Gauthier (1976). Invaluable as these works are for understanding the *Poroi*, they nonetheless are no substitute for a book-length, synoptic analysis. With this dissertation, then, I aim to fill this lacuna in the scholarship by reexamining this much-appreciated yet understudied text.

One of the major consequences of this dearth of scholarship is a lack of consensus about Xenophon's motives in composing the *Poroi*, which has led to many different interpretations, especially among the three most prominent contemporary scholars of the work: Gabriella Bodei Giglioni, Philippe Gauthier, and Eckart Schütrumpf. Most scholars read the *Poroi* as a work largely about *trophe*. For in the prologue, Xenophon asserts simply that he intends to relieve the poverty of the Athenian citizens by providing *trophe* ("food" or "subsistence") from the domestic resources of Attica, a "most just solution" according to Xenophon because the poverty of the masses had compelled the Athenians to act rather unjustly toward their allies (1.1). Later he identifies this *trophe* with a three-obol payment, which the state is pay to every Athenian citizen (3.9-10; 4.17, 33). However, within this camp disagreement over the meaning of *trophe* has yielded diametrically opposed interpretations of the work. For some *trophe* is just a synonym for *misthos* ("pay"), suggesting that Xenophon considers the three-obol payment from the state specifically as remuneration for participation in civic functions, such as jury duty

[40] See Tuplin ed. 2004.

and sitting in the assembly.[41] Based on this reading of the *Poroi*, Xenophon is a consummate democrat, as his measures seek to support participation in the political process.[42] For Gauthier, the most avid supporter of this political interpretation, Xenophon's only concern is to promote the interests of Athenian *homines politici*, who are to live like *rentiers* at the expense of non-citizen workers (metics, foreign traders, and slaves).[43] His measures in support of this system therefore are strictly fiscal in nature since he intends not to enhance domestic economic activity but to increase revenues from these outside sources: "Xenophon only wants the public coffers to be full and is uninterested in the development of the Athenian economy." [44]

Other commentators consider the three-obol payment to be a kind of state-subsidized alimony designed to eliminate poverty without imposing heavy financial burdens on the rich.[45] The major advocate of this interpretation, Schütrumpf, contends that this *trophe* payment would have been insufficient to support the carefree, *rentier*-like existence that Gauthier envisions. Rather, the daily three obols are designed to supplement the personal incomes of Athenians having difficulty making ends meet due to

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41 Herzog 1914: 473-4, Wilhelm 1932: 38-40, and Gauthier 1976: 20-32, 242-53 and 1984: 191, 198.

42 In addition to the authors cited in the previous note, Schwahn 1931: 253 and Luccioni 1947: 280-303, esp. 283, 300-1 stress the democratic aspects of the text, though they do not endorse the *trophe*-as-*misthos* interpretation. In his review of Gauthier 1976, Cawkwell 1979: 18-19 points out that Gauthier makes Xenophon "a believer in democracy." Gauthier 1984 countenances this reading and restates his thesis even more forcefully.

43 Gauthier 1976: 239-41, 251; cf. Pöhlmann 1984: 242, 244, von der Lieck 1933: 23, and Hasebroek 1965: 35, who also liken Xenophon's proposals to the rentier ideal, though Gauthier 1976: 248-51 criticizes their application of the concept.

44 Gauthier 1976: 19.

45 Thiel 1922: 55, Pöhlmann 1984: 240-3, Andreades 1933: 381-391, von der Lieck 1933: 13-19, Frolov 1973: 187, Schütrumpf 1982: 65-72 and 1995: 293-300, Vannier 1988: 183-96, Schmitt-Pantel 1992: 174, and Azoulay 2004: 221-9.

the effects of the Social War.[46] In fact, according to Schütrumpf, the daily three-obol payments are to supplant entirely *misthoi* for the courts and assembly—traditionally the only regular form of state assistance to poor Athenians—whereas remunerations for public officials and the council are to be retained.[47] Contrary to scholars of the *trophe*-as-*misthos* school who see Xenophon as a democratic sympathizer, Schütrumpf argues that the *Poroi* espouses an oligarchic conservatism akin to that of Isocrates and Aristotle, who advocate keeping the people just poor enough to discourage them from leaving their jobs to participate in politics but not so poor that they force elites to pay for additional, costly subsidies.[48] Thus, while Schütrumpf at first seems to advocate a socio-economic reading of the *Poroi*, like Gauthier he ascribes to Xenophon purely political motives. In the final analysis, "Xenophon is not concerned with the establishment of productive industry so that the maintenance of the population is guaranteed with necessary goods or that Athens has something to give in exchange for its imported wares…His interest is in political finance, not political economy, in finance, not economics."[49]

A third group of scholars, however, does not think that Xenophon's primary objective is to provide the Athenian masses with *trophe*, but rather to stimulate the

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[46] Schütrumpf 1982: 32-3, 38-42 and 1995: 297.

[47] Schütrumpf 1982: 22-3 and 1995: 294, 298-9.

[48] Schütrumpf 1982: 45-65 and 1995: 294, 299. Recently, Azoulay 2004: 224-5 has pushed Schütrumpf's thesis even further, arguing that Xenophon's plan "favored the emergence of a depoliticized civic society," in which the demos was to become a "subject animal." Cf. 223: "In accord with the conservative political orientation of the author, the *Poroi*…perhaps can be viewed even as encouraging the passivity of the demos." Citing *Oeconomicus* 13.9, he also likens the role of the demos vis-à-vis the elite to the slave/master relationship (226-7).

[49] Schütrumpf 1982: 4-5; cf. von der Lieck 1933: 20-1, 37 and Samuel 1983: 27.

Athenian economy.[50] Giglioni, the most ardent proponent of this economic interpretation, argues that *trophe* is only a subsidiary aim, for without an "economic rebirth" it would have been impossible to supply the Athenians with a daily triobolon in the first place.[51] Xenophon's proposals for increasing the number of metics, improving commerce, and exploiting the mines are thus designed to occasion just such an economic revival. Then, once Athens puts the miseries of the Social War behind it and becomes a "rich" city again, all Athenians will receive sufficient *trophe*, which assures not a workless existence but a "much easier [life], in which the state through an increase of revenues either equal to or greater than the glory days of imperialism, guarantees a widespread well-being, promotes public work, conciliates the interests of the rich and the indigent, and transforms Athens into a hardworking center of commerce and supporter…of peace."[52] But unlike previous economic readings of the *Poroi*, especially Pöhlmann's controversial thesis that the *Poroi* seeks to establish "state socialism" in Athens, Giglioni does not think that Xenophon has any interest in developing the productive forces of Attica beyond the silver mining industry, the improvement of which is necessary to create a viable export currency to pay for imports.[53] In this one important respect, Giglioni, Schütrumpf, and Gauthier agree.

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[50] Cawkwell 1963: 63-5, Doehaerd in Gauthier 1976: 265, n. 31, Giglioni 1970: xi-xv, xxxiii, lxii, lxx, lxxxviii, cvii, cxxx-cxxxii, Whitehead 1977: 125, 128, Lowry 1987: 49, Burke 1992: 208, and Sealey 1993: 113.

[51] Giglioni 1970: lxxxviii.

[52] Giglioni 1970: cxxxiv.

[53] Giglioni 1970: lxix-lxx. Pöhlmann 1984: 240-1 contends that if Athens is to realize a full measure of the blessings of peace, it must "develop the *productive forces* (*die Productivkräfte*) of Attica, organize them, and distribute the proceeds derived from them so that all citizens in the land find sufficient livelihood" (emphasis mine). For criticism of Pöhlmann's thesis, see von der Lieck 1933: 51-4, Oertel in Pöhlmann 1984: 566-7, Giglioni 1970: cxxx, and Schütrumpf 1982: 12, n.50.

At present, these three interpretations are the extent and embodiment of nearly two hundred years of research on the *Poroi*. As will become apparent to the reader, the studies of Giglioni, Gauthier, and Schütrumpf have left an indelible mark on this dissertation; without them I would have been unable to enrich my analysis with such a myriad of historical data. Nevertheless, they also have left many questions unanswered and drawn uncompromising conclusions from both questionable evaluations of the evidence and groundless assumptions about Xenophon. Giglioni's economic interpretation, to which I am particularly sympathetic, is problematic since it belies any real knowledge of Greek economic theory and praxis, especially with respect to metics and the mining industry. While Schütrumpf's comprehension of the Athenian intellectual and political milieu is often profound, his reading of the *Poroi* as an oligarchic manifesto rests on a hackneyed and uncritical view of Xenophon as an anti-democratic thinker. It is also troubling that he denies outright an economic reading of the *Poroi* when he does not even discuss the state of the Athenian economy in the fourth century. In fact, one would be hard pressed to find a single reference to a piece of documentary evidence, without which any understanding of the workings of the Athenian mining industry is impossible. Gauthier, on the other hand, considers a wide range of evidence, including a rich body of epigraphic comparanda from the Hellenistic era, making him a reliable guide on many particular details of the *Poroi's* relationship to Athenian economic and fiscal practices. However, his theoretical conclusions, which are rooted in the controversial Weber-Hasebroek-Finley model of the ancient economy, are often misleading.

1B. Argument and Outline of the Work

My interpretation of the *Poroi*, while building on the work of the aforementioned scholars, seriously calls into question their conclusions. I argue that the *Poroi* is largely but not exclusively about *trophe*, as Xenophon also endeavors to augment revenues so that the polis can meet all of its expenses and effectively deliver public services. However, on the question of *trophe*, which I interpret strictly as a payment for food, I do not ascribe to Xenophon any motive other than the one he himself gives in the prologue: to maintain the poor using Attica's domestic resources and not at the expense of the allies. Thus, Xenophon tries to alleviate the poverty not to promote (Gauthier) or to retard (Schütrumpf) the political activity of the demos but to eliminate the injustice of Athenian imperialism. To achieve these ends, Xenophon directly challenges the Athenians' employment of imperialism and war as the dominant modes of production by proposing measures that are to transform Athens into a center of manufacture, silver mining, and free commercial exchange and thus reverse the parasitic, consumer-based orientation of the Athenian imperial economy. Contrary to the view of Giglioni, my interpretation stresses that Xenophon's attempt to stimulate the Athenian economy does entail the development of the productive forces of Attica. I contend further that Xenophon's vision for Athens' economy displays many features of the modern capitalist enterprise. In brief, such a radical transformation of Athenian fiscal and economic practices represents nothing short of a "reorientation" of Athenian political economy.

The term political economy is not in vogue among ancient historians, as evidenced by Gauthier and Schütrumpf's reticence to use this designation to characterize

Xenophon's project in the *Poroi*.[54] This however is a mistake, for political economy as an analytic concept describes not only the intersection of politics and economics—which is beyond question in the ancient world—but also the moral obligation of the state to provide for its citizens and to augment private and public wealth.[55] Such is the understanding of Adam Smith:

> Political oeconomy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first, to provide a plentiful revenue or *subsistence* for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.[56]

People today tend to think of Smith as the progenitor of laissez-faire, non-interventionist economics; however in his time he was also known as a great moral philosopher who saw himself working within an ethical tradition dating back to the ancients.[57] Despite the efforts of neo-classical economists to divorce all ethical, political, and social questions from the study of economics, Smith was unwilling to assign the state a morally neutral role vis-à-vis the support of its citizens.[58] In fact, the 1998 Nobel Prize winner in

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[54] For exceptions, see e.g., Meikle 1979 and Cartledge 2002b. To my knowledge, Frolov 1973: 189 and Cartledge 1997: 166 are the only historians that refer to the *Poroi* as a work of "political economy."

[55] For a concise introduction to modern theories of political economy, see Caporaso and Levine 1992.

[56] Smith, *Wealth of Nations* IV, Introduction = Smith 1981: 428 (emphasis mine).

[57] Before Smith wrote the *Wealth of Nations* in 1776, he was professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. For the influence of the classics on Smith's thinking, see Vivenza 2001. I do not mean to suggest that Smith's ideas do not lend themselves well to the neo-classical worldview. However, it is certainly a biased reading of Smith to deny outright the ethical dimension of his economics. The French economist Simonde de Sismondi, writing shortly after David Ricardo, recognized both aspects of Smith's thought and noted how Ricardo and his followers completely abandoned his ethical doctrine (69). He astutely noted that there are two "Adam Smiths." Today, scholars refer to the janus-faced nature of Smith's economics as the "Adam Smith problem."

[58] By neo-classical economists, I am referring to those who identify with and support the general movement in economics since 1871 (the year of William Stanley Jevons's *Theory of Political Economy* and Carl Menger's *Principles of Economics*), which has made the marginal theory of value a significant basis of economic analysis as opposed to the labor theory of value, as advocated by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. For a concise introduction to neo-classical economics, see Weintraub 2002.

economics, Amartya Sen, acknowledges Smith as a source of inspiration for his own groundbreaking work in development and welfare economics.[59] The example of Sen and others like him should serve to remind us that the stark dichotomy between "ethics" and "economics," such as the one that figures prominently on the opening pages of Finley's *Ancient Economy*, is problematic.[60] Indeed, it ignores the longstanding and ongoing debate between neo-classical economists and those working within the classical tradition of political economy, whose origins can be traced back to Greeks. This at least is opinion of John Ruskin (1819-1900), a notable early proponent of social welfare who criticized the neo-classical revolution in economics as "[having] no connection whatever with political economy as understood and treated of by the great thinkers of past ages."[61] Ruskin's own approach to political economy, he freely admits, "is literally only the expansion and explanation of Xenophon's."[62]

Though Xenophon himself does not employ the term political economy (οἰκονομία πολιτική), his mission in the *Poroi* corresponds exactly to the goals of the science outlined by Smith: to provide the Athenians with plentiful revenues so that all

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59 Sen 1987: Chapter 1, esp. 22-7 and 2000: 24-5.

60 According to Finley, ancient economic thought—indeed, all economic thinking up through Hutcheson's *Introduction to Moral Philosophy* (who incidentally held the chair of moral philosophy at Glasgow before Adam Smith)—was solely concerned with "ethics" (17-18). Modern economics, on the contrary, develops "rational" principles based upon "scientific" methods. "There was no road," Finley exclaims, "from the 'oeconomics' of Francis Hutcheson to the *Wealth of Nations* of Adam Smith, published twenty-four years later" (20). For two good treatments of the ethical basis of classical political economy and its foundation in the classical world, see Spengler 1980 and Petrochilos 2002.

61 Ruskin 1907: Vol. 17, 147.

62 Ruskin 1907: Vol. 37, 550; cf. Vol. 34, 547 and Vol. 37, 381. Ruskin's succinctly defines political economy in *Munera Pulveris*: "As domestic economy regulates the acts and habits of a household, Political Economy regulates those of a society or State, with reference to the means of its maintenance." By "maintenance," Ruskin means "the support of its population in healthy and happy life" (Vol. 17, 147-8). For Xenophon's influence on Ruskin, see Henderson 2000: 64-85.

Athenians have sufficient *trophe* and ample funds to perform public services.[63] Moreover, Xenophon is keenly aware that his measures will enrich not only the state but also private citizens and non-citizens alike (e.g., 3.1-2, 9-10, 4.31-32, 50). This latter objective vitiates completely against Gauthier and Schütrumpf's view that Xenophon's perspective lies solely within the realm of "political" or "public" finance."[64] I do not mean to suggest that Xenophon was the world's first political economist. In truth, Xenophon's aims were not unique: Athenian statesmen and politicians for at least a century had been vying with each other to provide the city with the most revenues in order to lavish it with sumptuous festivals and monumental buildings, to feed the poor, and to enrich the fortunes of individuals who struggled on its behalf. Yet what is completely revolutionary about Xenophon's political economy are the *means* by which he attempts to achieve these ends. Under Xenophon's stewardship, the Athenians are to become prosperous by rejecting the economics of empire and turning their energies to the cultivation of peaceful commerce and productive industry. To quote Polanyi, the originality of the *Poroi* "lies in the thought that wealth, power, and security can be the product of peace rather than war."[65] Thus, while Xenophon's political economy is at once firmly rooted in the traditions of his native Athens, it also offers something radically new: a viable alternative to empire.

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63 For more on οἰκονομία πολιτική and Xenophon's choice of Πόροι as the title of his work, see Addendum below and Appendix 1.

64 Andreades 1933: 81-2 objects to the use of the term political economy, which he considers the "science" that "treats of the economics of the community or the people," in favor of "public finance." While I agree that the outlook of thinkers like Pseudo-Aristotle in the *Oeconomica* is almost exclusively fiscal in character, the wholesale application of the term "public finance" discourages one to explore the ways poleis might have promoted the economic interests of their citizens. My interpretation of the *Poroi* suggests that some Greeks did in fact advocate the notion that the state had a role in stimulating the economy and thus in augmenting private wealth.

Before we can begin to appreciate the novelty of Xenophon's ideas, it is necessary to determine the genre in which he communicates those ideas and to establish some basic facts about his biography. Thus, in Chapter 2, I briefly analyze the *Poroi's* authorship, since some have denied this to be a genuine work of Xenophon. After a careful review of the evidence, I support firmly the notion that he is indeed the author of the *Poroi*. I then offer a biographical sketch of Xenophon's later years, building the case that he returned to Athens shortly after the Athenians rescinded his exile sometime between 366/5 and 362. Consequently, I argue that he composed the *Poroi* while living in Athens. I also uphold the traditional dating of the work to 355/4 and suggest an even more precise date in the summer months before the Amphictyonic League voted for war against the Phocians. The bulk of the chapter examines the genre and intended audience of the text. While the *Poroi* exemplifies the discursive properties of both epideictic and deliberative oratory, I contend that it is best understood as a deliberative discourse of the private or *bouleutic* variety, which Xenophon circulated as a pamphlet among a small reading audience of politicians and financial specialists responsible for policy formulation at Athens. I suggest that the prologue supports the notion that Xenophon had been philosophically engaging some of these politicians in the hopes that they would recognize the injustice of imperialism and the benefits of peace.

In Chapter 3, I set out to substantiate Xenophon's claim that the "poverty of the masses" was the primary cause of Athens' imperialist policies in the fourth century. To this end, I devote a significant portion of this chapter to examining Athenian foreign policy in light of such demographic pressure. One of the main reasons for a detailed

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65 Polanyi 1977: 196.

treatment is that some respected historians have questioned the idea that Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century was imperialistic. This school of thought maintains that the Athenians learned from the mistakes of the past and did not actively pursue a policy to reconstitute their fifth-century empire. Athens' objectives overseas were largely defensive, and whenever they did intervene in allied states, the Athenians respected their freedom and autonomy. I dispute this view, however. Adducing a rich variety of evidence, I demonstrate that Athens sought to recover its fifth-century empire and pursued imperialistic policies throughout the century, which fomented resentment and ultimately revolt among the allies. Moreover, given that historians debate the causes of Athenian imperialism, I examine the evidence pertaining to Attica's grain supply and conclude that domestic sources were inadequate for their needs and that the Athenians were unable to pay for imported grain without the proceeds from empire. Consequently, my findings support the view that Xenophon's plan to provide every Athenian with sufficient *trophe* (*viz.* a daily payment of three obols) is one strictly about food. I therefore underscore the socio-economic orientation of his domestic program.

The nature of Xenophon's anti-imperialistic political economy is the subject of Chapter 4. I show how his program to expand domestic industry and to promote commerce—through which significant amounts of revenue are to be created for the purchase of imported grain—directly challenges the economics of empire. This plan to pay for imported grain with the annual proceeds generated from Attica itself, I submit, marks a great transformation in Athens' orientation away from a consumer-based to a producer-based economy. In this chapter, however, I do not examine the specific details of his proposals, a task I reserve for Chapter 5. Rather, here I explore the ideological

import of his views on war and peace and explain how his arguments have a unique anti-imperialistic flavor. One prime example of his anti-imperialistic rhetoric I consider is his use of a providential argument to justify his new peaceful world order. According to Xenophon, during the creation of the universe the gods purposefully allotted to the Athenians both native goods particular to Attica and a geographic position suitable for exchanging these goods for needed imports. In my judgment, he advances this argument to counter providential notions of Athenian imperialism, which ascribe Athens' hegemonic position to divine will. For Xenophon, the ordering of the universe suggests that the Athenians should trade with the world and not wage war upon it. Moreover, I also demonstrate that Xenophon's worldview flies in the face not only of Athenian imperialists but also of traditionalists like Plato and Aristotle, who aspire to the ideal of economic self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*). In short, this chapter explores Xenophon's attitude toward empire and situates his anti-imperialistic views in the context of Athenian political and intellectual culture of the fifth and fourth centuries. I build a case that, unlike his contemporaries, Xenophon is a true anti-imperialist: in addition to opposing the imperial practices of his day, he objected to the very *idea* of empire.

As noted previously, Xenophon advances a number of proposals that challenge Athens' imperial economics. In Chapter 5, I delve into the specifics of his program for improving the conditions of the metics, trade and commerce, and the silver mines at Laurion. I make two broad interpretive claims. The first is that Xenophon's recommendations, especially those concerning metics and commerce, have as their aim the liberalization of economic relations between Athenians and foreigners, resulting in the (partial) breakdown of the status divide separating citizens from non-citizen outsiders.

Xenophon's progressive attitude is simply that outsiders whose economic activities promote the welfare of all Athenians should partake in many of the same honors and privileges that citizens enjoy. Second, and more significant for the history of economic thought, Xenophon frames his proposals for the creation of the capital fund and the mines in accordance with income-maximizing instrumental rationality. This thesis calls into question one of the central tenets of substantivist historians, namely, that *homo economicus* did not exist in the ancient world because the predomination of politics in the lives of Greeks and Romans rendered him incapable of expressing himself rationally in economic matters. Xenophon's proposals, I maintain, presuppose that both he and members of his audience not only valued income maximization as a desirable end but also tried to achieve that end in an instrumental rational manner. In particular, Xenophon endeavors to mitigate risk so that the risk-reward balance may become acceptable to Athenian investors and entrepreneurs whose money and participation are indispensable for the creation of the capital fund and the exploitation of the mines. After all, these are the ingredients contributing to the success of his entire financial program for maintaining the poor and increasing revenues.

Addendum: The Title Πόροι

The title of the work, Πόροι, is best rendered in English as "Ways and Means" (cf. German: *Mittel und Wege*; French: *voies et moyens*). According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, "ways and means" refer generally to "the methods and resources which are at a person's disposal for affecting some object" (1.a), but in a legislative sense to "methods of procuring funds or supplies for the current expenditure of the state" (2.a).

In Greek the word πόρος is etymologically cognate with the verb πείρειν, "to pierce," and thus originally denoted any means or way (ferry, bridge, path, etc.) of gaining passage over land or water (cf. English "pores"). Later it was used to describe any *means* that enabled one to cope with a difficulty or to overcome financial straits and other deficits in resources.[66] Thus, as Gauthier demonstrates convincingly, a *poros* is not a revenue (*prosodos*) but rather a *means* of obtaining revenue or a source of revenue.[67] For instance, a two percent harbor tax is, technically speaking, a *poros*; the money collected from this tax is the *prosodos* proper. Moreover, Gauthier distinguishes between two general types of *poroi*: 1) *poroi* as ways and means of creating new or augmenting existing *prosodoi*, which the polis applies to its regular expenses, such as infrastructure, festivals, and defense; and 2) *poroi* as ways and means of acquiring money to pay for unexpected or emergency expenses. In the *Poroi* Xenophon is concerned exclusively with the former kind of ways and means because he advises the Athenians to create new sources of revenue (e.g., hiring out publicly owned slaves) and to augment already existing revenues (e.g., taxes derived from trade) so that the state can meet its regular expenses and execute public services.

Despite Xenophon's focus on the sources of revenue rather than on the revenues themselves, many translators erroneously entitle the *Poroi* "On Revenues," "*De Vectigalibus*," "*Einkünfte*," etc., in part because all the manuscripts save B (which does not begin until 1.5) include the addition of ἢ περὶ προσόδων. Cobet long ago suggested its deletion, submitting that the accretion was the result of a scribal gloss, and a

66 Dover 1980: 141

number of scholars have followed suit in their editions of the text.[68] However, Breitenbach and Giglioni, citing the authority of Busolt and Swoboda, interpret this addition differently, suggesting that it was a remnant of what had been the original title: πόροι προσόδων.[69] Gauthier has argued vehemently against this interpretation, calling the locution "barbaric as well as uncommon."[70] However, in his effort to distinguish sharply the two words, about which he argues persuasively, he overstates his case against Breitenbach and Giglioni. First, Gauthier commits an egregious error when he asserts boldly that "the expression is found nowhere."[71] Not only do later parallels exist for πόροι προσόδων but Xenophon himself employs the expression in the *Cyropaedia*, albeit in the singular προσόδου πόρον.[72] Furthermore, πόρος followed by a noun in the [objective] genitive case is good Greek, as evidenced by the more common expression πόρος/πόροι χρημάτων.[73] In fact, πόροι προσόδων, which can be translated as "the ways and means for [increasing/creating] revenues" or better yet "sources of revenue," actually confirms Gauthier's basic interpretation: a *poros* is not a revenue but rather a way or mean to create or augment revenue.

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67 Gauthier 1976: 8-18

68 Cobet 1858: 755-6 followed by Marchant 1920 and 1961 and Gauthier 1976: 7.

69 Breitenbach 1967: 1753; Giglioni 1970: xi, n.22; cf. Busolt and Swoboda 1926: 1147: "With their [Eubulus and Lycurgus] task is connected the care for the welfare and increase of revenues [i.e. *prosodoi*] and the development of ways and means [i.e. *poroi*] necessary to that end."

70 Gauthier 1976: 7.

71 Gauthier 1976: 8.

72 Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 1.6.10; cf. Necephorus Gregoras, *Historia Romana* vol. 1, p. 397.12 and vol.2, p.696, 21.

73 Breitenbach 1967: 1753. See, for example, Ps.-Xenophon, *Athenaion Politeia* 3.2; Euripides, *Suppliants* 777; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.6.12.

The question then is whether the addition of ἢ περὶ προσόδων is due to a scribal error in the transcription of what might have been the original title, πόροι προσόδων, as Breitenbach and Bodei would have it, or to a scribal gloss on the word πόροι, as argues Cobet. The latter interpretation is probably the correct one for two reasons. First, we find similar glosses on other titles of Xenophon's works. For example, appended to the title Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους we find πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς and to Ἱέρων is added ἢ τυραννικός. Both additions are so pedestrian it is difficult to imagine they came from Xenophon's hand and not from a scribe.[74] Secondly, the ancient testimonia are undisputedly certain on the matter: Menander, Diogenes Laertius, Athenaeus, and the author of the *Etymologicum Magnum* all cite the work as Πόροι.[75] Thus ἢ περὶ προσόδων should be deleted, which leaves Πόροι as the likeliest title for the work.

[74] Of course, there is the possibility that Xenophon did not entitle the work himself, and that Πόροι is a later addition of an editor. Yet, according to Diogenes (2.48), Xenophon himself seems to have been responsible for entitling at least one of his works, the *Memorabilia*, and therefore it is plausible that he affixed titles to all his works.

[75] Marchant 1920 and Gauthier 1976: 7.

Chapter 2: Biography, Genre, and Audience

"This [the *Poroi*] is a work of a friend of Athens…"[1]

Introduction

Given the wealth of information the *Poroi* provides about the economy and society of fourth century Athens, it is only natural that scholars have studied this text mainly for historical purposes. However, unlike many of Xenophon's other works, such as the *Anabasis*, *Hellenica*, and *Cyropaedia*—all of which have immense historical value and yet have sustained considerable philological interest over the years—not one literary analysis of the *Poroi* exists. Of the *Poroi's* three major commentators, Thiel, Giglioni, and Gauthier, only Thiel examines the text philologically, albeit principally to establish Xenophon as the author.[2] In this chapter, I seek to enrich our appreciation of the *Poroi* by analyzing, among other things, its place of composition, literary antecedents, style, genre, and intended audience.

My intent is not so much to fill a lacuna in the scholarship but to situate the *Poroi* in its proper philological and biographical context in order to understand better its historical meaning and significance. As I discuss in the Introduction, it is commonplace among historians to assert that Xenophon's ideas are conventional, whereas classicists generally maintain that Xenophon is a literary pioneer, whose works do not cohere to the literary conventions of the day. However, if Xenophon's ideas are conventional, why does he choose to express them in such unconventional ways, especially considering that their acceptance depends on how readily an audience identifies their mode of delivery?

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[1] Croiset 1947: 357.

[2] Thiel 1922: xiii-xxx; only pages xxviii-xxx explicitly concern the form of the text.

One of the main methodological assumptions of this study is that to assess whether Xenophon's ideas are conventional or unconventional we must first understand the *Poroi* in all its literary and ideological aspects. This chapter, therefore, is foundational for the rest of the dissertation.

I begin in Sections 2A-B by arguing that Xenophon is indisputably the author of the *Poroi*, and that he returned to Athens after the Athenians rescinded his exile sometime between 366/5 and 362 where he composed the work. Section 2C concerns the date of the *Poroi's* composition. I uphold the traditional date of 355, which one scholar has recently disputed, and suggest an even more precise date in the summer months before the Amphictyonic League voted for war against the Phocians. In Section 2D, which is the longest and most important of the chapter, I examine the *Poroi* in respect to its genre and intended audience, arguing that both topics must be analyzed in conjunction with each other. I first contend that the *Poroi* partakes in the discursive properties of epideictic and deliberative oratory, though my discussion privileges the latter as the text's primary mode of discourse. This finding leads to a comparative analysis of the *Poroi* with the only surviving deliberative speech that deals with ways and means, Demosthenes' *First Philippic*. Ultimately, I argue that the *Poroi* is a deliberative discourse of the private or *bouleutic* variety, and was circulated as a pamphlet among a small reading audience of politicians and financial specialists who were responsible for policy formation at Athens. In the final section (2E), I explore further the identity of these individuals and the nature of Xenophon's relationship to his audience. The opening paragraph of the work, I argue, reveals that Xenophon had been critically engaging and

instructing some of Athens' leading politicians to adopt a more just foreign policy toward the allies.

2A. Authorship

The question of authorship is a relatively recent one. No one in antiquity to the middle of the nineteenth century ever doubted that Xenophon was the author of the *Poroi*. It is almost impossible to reject the genuineness of the work on linguistic and stylistic grounds, especially since the diction of the *Poroi* corresponds entirely to that of the *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia*, which, as L. Gauthier maintains, represent the "true written language of Xenophon."[3] Rather, the scholars who argue against Xenophon's authorship rest their cases on perceived differences in the *Weltanschauung* of the *Poroi* and the rest of Xenophon's works. The arguments tend to be impressionistic, stereotypical, and hardly systematic. Take, for example, the terse remark of Jaeger: "It seems to me that the mentality and interests of the author of Πόροι do not fit Xenophon."[4] Above all, what does not "fit", according to this view, is Xenophon's fondness for war, horses, hunting, and household management (pursuits befitting a gentleman), on the one hand, and, on the other, the interest of the "author" of the *Poroi* in trade and manufacturing (which are allegedly anathema to gentlemen).[5] Such dichotomies are difficult to maintain when one examines the full extent of evidence from fourth century Athens: many citizens engage in both commercial *and* traditional liberal

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[3] L. Gauthier 1911: 135, n. 2. For detailed analyses of the language and style in the *Poroi* and arguments for the genuineness of the work, see Zurborg 1874: 18-32, Richards 1907: 89-104, Thiel 1922: xvii-xxiii, and Marchant 1961: *Praefatio*; cf. Giglioni 1970: ix and Gauthier 1976: 1.

[4] Jaeger 1938: 219, n. 14; cf. Rostovtzeff 1941: 74

[5] See the references in Gauthier 1976: 1-2; I would also add to his list Hopper 1961: 139 and 1979: 178.

activities. Furthermore, it is patently false to think that Xenophon is disinterested in commercial and money matters in works other than the *Poroi*. Socrates' conversation with Glaucon in the *Memorabilia* (3.6.1-12) should adequately dispel this notion, especially considering that Socrates adumbrates many topics of interest that Xenophon himself treats more fully in the *Poroi*.[6]

Finally, the *Poroi* contains a host of ideas and expressions particular to Xenophon, which proves his authorship beyond a reasonable doubt. I will restrict myself to two examples.[7] First, in the two concluding sections of the *Poroi*, Xenophon twice employs the phrase εἰ λῷον καὶ ἄμεινον, which, incidentally, is part of the official oracular formula of question and answer in Athenian decrees.[8] Outside of Xenophon's works, where the expression occurs three other times, and a few fourth century Attic inscriptions, Plato is the only other classical author to make use of the phrase (*Laws* 828a3). Secondly, while Xenophon shares many ideas with his contemporaries, the system of rewards and incentives to achieve a variety of desired outcomes, such as "competition" (φιλονικία), is unique to Xenophon, especially as he indiscriminately applies it to various spheres of activity, both liberal and commercial: practice of cavalry maneuvers and horsemanship (*Hipparchicus* 1.26; *Hellenica* 3.4.16; *Hiero* 9.6); hoplite and light infantry maneuvers (*Hellenica* 3.4.16; *Cyropaedia* 1.6.18, 2.1.22-24); courage

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6 Rightly noted by Gauthier 1976: 3

7 Richards 1907: 89-104, Thiel 1922: xvii-xxiii, and Marchant 1961: *Praefatio* have collected most of these ideas and expressions. In respect to the latter, I have corroborated the comments and observations of the aforementioned authors by searching the digital version of *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*.

8 For example, in an Attic decree of 352/1 concerning the restoration of boundary stones on sacred land belonging to the goddess Demeter in Eleusis (*IG* II^2 204), the Athenians send an embassy to Delphi to enquire "*if it is more desirable and better* for the Athenian demos to lease out" sacred land currently being

on the battlefield (*Hiero* 9.6); household management (*Oeconomicus* 12.6); business contracts, agriculture, and trade (*Hiero* 9.6-10). Although the bestowal of rewards make perfect sense in military contexts and, without a doubt, was practiced long before Xenophon endorsed it, his transference of it to commercial and business activities was not necessarily obvious. Thus, when we read in the *Poroi* about recommendations to apply this system of rewards to polis finance (2.5; 3.3), we have good reason to assume that the same individual is responsible for them.

2B. Place of Composition

Unfortunately, the ancient biographical tradition concerning Xenophon, of which Diogenes Laertius is the primary source, is extremely vague and, at times, contradictory, and Xenophon himself does not provide us with much autobiographical information except for what he says of his service in Asia. A brief review of the latter half of Xenophon's life is in order.[9]

The Athenians exiled Xenophon sometime between 399-94 for reasons that are uncertain, but two explanations are commonly proffered: laconism and/or friendship with Cyrus.[10] Xenophon served with Agesilaus in Asia and returned with the king to Greece

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worked (24-6); lines 49ff. contain Apollo's response: "The god responded that *it is more desirable and better* for the Athenian demos…" For more examples, see Gauthier 1976: 219.

9 For biographies of Xenophon, see Delebecque 1957, Breitenbach 1967: 1571-1578, Anderson 1974, Laforse 1997: 7-92, and Humble 2003.

10 See Delebecque 1957: 117-23, Breitenbach 1967: 1575, Anderson 1974: 146-49, Rahn 1981, Tuplin 1987, Green 1994, and Laforse 1997: 62-70. Higgins 1977: 24 suggests that the real reason was Xenophon's connection to Socrates, a provocative idea, but one Humble 2002: 80, n. 59 rightly dismisses. Along similar lines, Green 1994: 224-6 argues that Xenophon was preemptively exiled by the restored democracy, which feared that Xenophon would take the remnant of the 10,000 back to Athens in support of an oligarchic coup; Laforse 1997: 65-6, who accepts Green's thesis, thus dates the exile to 399, between the time when Xenophon left Seuthes and Anaxibius sent him back to the Bosporus. I find this hypothesis problematic because the evidence Green cites (*Hellenica* 2.4.43) concerning the oligarchs' hiring of mercenaries at Eleusis in 401 leads to the murder of all the oligarchic generals involved. Even if a desire to

in 394. Some speculate that he fought with the Spartans at Coronea (Diogenes 2.51; Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 18). He seems to have accompanied Agesilaus back to Sparta, where he lived awhile with his two sons, Diodorus and Gryllus. According to Plutarch, Xenophon enrolled them in the *agoge* (*Agesilaus* 20.2). The Spartans subsequently gave him an estate at Scillus, where he probably lived until c. 371/0 when the Eleans recaptured the city from the Spartans (*Anabasis* 5.3.7; Diogenes 52).[11] From there Xenophon fled with his sons (his wife Philesia is not mentioned) to Corinth where he "took up residence" (αὐτόθι κατοικῆσαι) (Diogenes 2.53).

Now sometime when Xenophon's was living in Corinth the Athenians rescinded his exile. All Diogenes says, on the authority of the third century B.C. historian Istrus, is that Xenophon "was banished by a decree of Eubulus and recalled by a decree of the same man" (2.59). Most scholars reject the former claim because Eubulus, born c. 405, would have been too young to have effected Xenophon's exile between the years 399-94.[12] Whoever proposed the original decree, it seems reasonable to believe that Eubulus

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hire mercenaries still existed two years later, who would have paid for such a large force? Furthermore, this incident precipitates the amnesty about which Xenophon says, "still to this day both parties live together as citizens and the demos remains by their oaths [sc. not to bear ill-will against the oligarchs]" (ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ τε πολιτεύονται καὶ τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος). Though it is impossible to fix a date denoted by the phrase ἔτι καὶ νῦν, it most certainly post-dates 399. Thus, the Athenians would have contravened their oaths by exiling a man whom they perceived to be associated or who had sympathies with the oligarchic conspiracy of 401, and therefore Xenophon could not have written that they remained by their oaths "still to this day."

11 Diogenes does not date this incident, but scholars take Xenophon's comments at *Hellenica* 6.5.3 about the Eleans' refusal to swear an oath granting independence to the Scilluntians in 371/0 as a terminus post quem for the capture. The story in Pausanias (5.6.6) that claims Xenophon was tried by the Olympic Council for accepting the estate from the Spartans, was acquitted, and then allowed to live the rest of his days at Scillus is a fiction; Breitenbach 1967: 1573 is probably right to see this account as Elean propaganda.

12 Cawkwell 1963: 63, n. 89 and Green 1994: 218. Breitenbach 1967: 1575 offers an interesting solution by proposing that Istrus originally wrote something like "Xenophon was banished in the archonship of Euboulides" (394/3), and thus Diogenes carelessly conflated the names.

was responsible for Xenophon's recall.[13] Generally, historians have proposed two groups of dates, both of which rest on the assumption that laconism was the original cause for Xenophon's exile. The first is 387/6, the year of the King's peace that ended the Corinthian war.[14] The problem with this date, however, is that the Athenians did not subscribe to the peace willingly, and it is difficult to imagine them immediately recalling all their "pro-Spartan" exiles at this time.[15] A period of more concerted Athenian efforts at reconciliation begins on the eve of the battle of Leuctra in 371 (*Hellenica* 6.3.1-17) and shortly after the brokering of the common peace in 370/69 (*Hellenica* 6.5.1).[16] Diogenes' reference to Xenophon's sons serving in the cavalry on behalf of the Athenians at Mantinea (362) is the commonly accepted terminus ante quem for the repeal of Xenophon's exile. Thus, sometime between 370/69-62 the Athenians lifted Xenophon's decree of banishment.[17] Unfortunately, neither Diogenes nor any ancient source says that Xenophon ever returned to Athens. A majority of scholars, connecting Diogenes' statement about Xenophon taking up residence in Corinth with his later claim (citing Demetrius of Magnesia) that Xenophon died in the same place (2.56), conclude that Xenophon never returned to Athens (though some speculate that he may have visited

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[13] Historians often stress the link between Eubulus and Xenophon; see, for example, Cawkwell 1963: 56, who argues that much of "what Xenophon proposed [sc. in the *Poroi*], Eubulus enacted; cf. Andreades 1933: 364. Gauthier 1976: 223-31, 260ff, however, is much more sanguine on the matter; cf. Higgins 1977: 178, n. 68: "the fact that Euboulos may have been responsible for securing Xenophon's recall from exile does not imply anything about their political friendship. It can simply be seen as the act of an up-and-coming politician trying to gain some publicity by sponsoring a measure involving a prominent person."

[14] Cawkwell 1972: 15, n. 3 and Cartledge 1987: 61.

[15] Laforse 1997: 86.

[16] Breitenbach 1967: 1576, Anderson 1974: 192, 198, Higgins 1977: 128, and Laforse 1997: 86-7.

[17] Delebecque 1957: 339-40 perceives a noted increase in the level of detail in *Hellenica* 7 surrounding Athenian affairs for the year 366, and therefore has specifically dated Xenophon's recall to this year. However, detail should not always be taken as a sign of autopsy, as Xenophon produces many vivid

the city on occasion).[18] Nevertheless, this is only one inference among other possible alternatives. Although there is no direct evidence for his return to Athens, in the following pages I examine six areas of evidence that strongly support the conclusion that Xenophon not only returned to Athens but also took up residence there and had an active role in the intellectual and political life of the city.[19]

First, the less than friendly relationship between Athens and Corinth in the mid to late 360s calls into question the idea that Xenophon kept his abode in Corinth after the Athenians lifted his exile. Despite significant Athenian support against the Theban invasion of Corinth in 369/8, which resulted in a rather humbled Theban retreat (*Hellenica* 7.1.19, 25; Diodorus 15.69), Corinth soon after (366/5) ordered the Athenians to remove their garrisons from the city under the threat of force (*Hellenica* 7.4.4). According to Xenophon, this dismissal stemmed from the Corinthians catching word of an Athenian decree ordering their generals "to see to it that Corinth be secure for the Athenian demos" (ὅπως καὶ Κόρινθος σῴα ᾖ τῷ δήμῳ Ἀθηναίων). The Corinthians were, no doubt, correct in interpreting this phrase as a euphemism for an Athenian plot

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accounts for events he could not have possibly witnessed (e.g., Battle of Nemea at *Hellenica* 4.2.8); see Anderson 1986: 37-8, and Humble 2002: 75-6.

[18] E.g., Zurborg 1874: 42-3, Underhill 1900: lxxxi, Marchant 1925: xxvi, Luccioni 1942: 269-70 and 1953: 162, Schaeffer 1966: I, 170, Breitenbach 1967: 1573, Anderson 1974: 192-3 and 1986, Gauthier 1976: 64, Cawkwell 1979a, 14, n.12 and 1979b: 17-9, and Pomeroy 1994: 4.

[19] With the exception of Delebecque 1957: 334-41, no one has systematically argued for Xenophon's return to Athens on a permanent basis, though many have asserted this view; see, for example, Grote 1869: 481, Jaeger 1944: 158-9, Rose 1964: 306, Higgins 1977: 128ff., Tuplin 1993: 31-2, Laforse 1997: 88-92, and Humble 2002: 83-4. My arguments differ from Delebecque's, who claims that Xenophon's vivid narrative of Athenian events in *Hellenica* Book 7 evidences his return to Athens in 366/5 (see note 17 above).

against the city, for Chares soon arrived in Corinth with a fleet of warships (7.4.5).[20] They did not allow Chares' fleet to enter their harbor and sent it away along with all the Athenian hoplites present in the city. Consequently, both cities were now hostile to each other, and Corinth pursued its own foreign policy with the help of mercenaries (7.4.6). In the same year, the Corinthians made peace with Thebes, though they rejected a Theban offer of alliance (7.4.6-12); this peace treaty essentially marked the end of the Peloponnesian League.[21] The key question is, if the Athenians had lifted Xenophon's banishment by 366/5, would the Corinthians have allowed Xenophon, an Athenian and a former general, to remain in the city while the Athenians were seeking to master the place?[22] The prospect seems highly unlikely, and thus the idea that Xenophon was recalled before 366/5 should be rejected.[23]

However, supposing for a moment that Corinth was nonetheless willing to extend asylum to Xenophon whether he was an exile or not, an event in 362, which is also the terminus ante quem for Xenophon's recall, surely compelled him to leave the city. In his account of the battle of Mantinea, Xenophon admires the gallantry of the Athenian cavalrymen, among whom was Gryllus, who died in battle. One of the reasons Xenophon cites for the cavalry's outstanding conduct was its utter disregard for a recent loss suffered at Corinth (καὶ ἐν Κορίνθῳ δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν οὐδὲν τούτουἐπελογίσαντο) (*Hellenica* 7.5.16). It would be a mistake to

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[20] Cf. *IG* II^2 123, 9, an Athenian decree of 356, which similarly commands that the island of Andros "be secure for the Athenian people"; the text explicitly mentions military intervention. For more on this "safe" clause, see Chapter 3, Section 3C.

[21] For the controversy surrounding Corinth's neutrality, see Salmon 1984: 427-8.

[22] Rightly noted by Higgins 1977: 128.

conclude that the Thebans were responsible for this defeat at Corinth, though Epaminondas did wish to intercept the Athenians on their way to Mantinea (7.5.7), because Xenophon explicitly asserts that Epaminondas stopped his march not at the Isthmus but at Nemea to await the Athenians, and that the forces he hoped to engage were not the cavalry but the hoplite contingent. Thus, the cavalry defeat of which Xenophon speaks must have resulted from an engagement between the Athenians and Corinthians when they tried to harass the Athenians as they passed through their territory.[24] At this time, Timophanes was probably tyrant of Corinth, who may have found it politically expedient to abandon temporarily neutrality by ingratiating himself to Epaminondas and the Thebans.[25] Given that Xenophon's sons were among these riders

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[23] Delebecque 1957: 339 is the primary proponent of the 366/5 date; however, most scholars date the recall to ca. 371-69; see, for example, Breitenbach 1967: 1576, Anderson 1974: 192, 198, and Higgins 1977: 128

[24] So Breitenbach, cited by Underhill 1900: 304, who also endorses this interpretation. It is puzzling that Anderson 1986 fails to mention any of these events in his piece "Xenophon at Corinth." Needless to say, I have not taken seriously his claim that Xenophon stayed in Corinth because of his "failure both to establish himself in Athenian intellectual circles and to come face to face with the realities of Athenian finance and politics" (39).

[25] Scholars have dated Timophanes' stint as tyrant to 366/5 for reasons that seem very dubious to me. Plutarch claims that after his murder of Timophanes, Timoleon did nothing of public concern for "nearly twenty years" (εἴκοσι σχεδὸν ἐτῶν) because of his grief (*Timoleon* 7.1). The event that brought him out of his depression was the offer to command an army to liberate Syracuse, which Diodorus (16.65.2) dates to 346/5 but most likely occurred the following year in 345/4 (Bicknell 1984). Scholars have found Plutarch's twenty-year remark convenient because his account of Timophanes' seizure of power (*Timoleon* 4.4) corresponds nicely with Xenophon's narrative of the Corinthian dismissal of the Athenian garrison in 366/5 (*Hellenica* 7.4.4-6). There, it may be recalled, Xenophon claims that after the Athenians left the city, the Corinthians began to pay mercenaries for the protection of their city. According to Plutarch's account, Timophanes was put in command of a mercenary force for the protection of the city in the context of a battle between Corinth and Argos/Cleonae (4.4; cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 1306a20-25). Thus, the two events concerning mercenaries of which Plutarch and Xenophon speak are one and the same, and therefore Timophanes' seizure of power and murder at the hands of his brother occurred sometime in 366/5 (Westlake 1952: 59-61; Salmon 1984: 384-6). There are numerous problems, however, with this interpretation. First, Plutarch does not say "twenty years" but "*nearly* twenty years." Therefore, a date of 366/5 for Timophanes' tyranny and murder cannot be maintained. If one takes "*nearly* twenty years" to include nineteen through seventeen years from the time of Timoleon's acceptance of his command in 345/4, then the date of Timophanes' murder must have taken place sometime between 364/3-362/1 (his actual seizure of power probably occurred in the same year judging from the accounts of Plutarch and Nepos, *Timoleon* 1). Moreover, Aristotle says that Timophanes' seizure of power is a perfect example of when oligarchs, distrusting the people during a state of war, vote to entrust a mercenary army to a leading

whom the Corinthians attacked, it is difficult to imagine that this event did not precipitate a break between Xenophon and his host city. If this interpretation is correct, then the obvious question arises as to why Xenophon returned to Corinth at the end of his life. Though the chronology of events at Corinth in the 360's is often confused, Timophanes' assassination must have occurred shortly after Mantinea, and therefore the moderate oligarchy that originally had welcomed Xenophon was restored by the mid 350's.[26] Perhaps Xenophon was visiting the city in some private or public capacity.

Secondly, as already mentioned, Xenophon sent his two sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, to fight among the Athenian contingent at Mantinea in 362. This event indicates that the Athenians not only had recalled Xenophon by this date, but that the two parties were completely reconciled. Gryllus served in the cavalry, but Diodorus may

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man who then becomes tyrant. This comment dovetails with Plutarch, who says Timophanes became tyrant during a state of war: "But when the Corinthians, fearing that they would lose the city and suffer the sorts of things they had *previously* at the hands of their allies, voted to maintain four hundred mercenaries and place Timophanes' in command of them" (ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ Κορίνθιοι δεδιότες, μὴ πάθοιεν οἷα καὶ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀποβαλόντες τὴν πόλιν, ἐψηφίσαντο τρέφειν ξένους τετρακοσίους καὶ τούτων ἄρχοντα Τιμοφάνην κατέστησαν). If one follows the traditional chronology, then Plutarch's πρότερον makes no sense, because the only abuse we know that Corinth suffered from their allies was that committed by the Athenians in 366/5, when Chares and the garrison tried to take over. Indeed, Xenophon mentions that the Corinthians began to employ mercenaries after this plot had been exposed, but his remarks must be taken to refer to a general ongoing policy in the years following this event. Lastly, the war with Argos and Cleonae does not fit the period 369/8-366/5, because these are the years when the Athenians occupied Corinth. We do learn of an Argive plot, under the leadership of some Corinthian exiles, to take over the city in the period after Leuctra (Diodorus 15.40.3 with Salmon 1984: 374, n. 15), but the attempt failed and the conspirators were put to death. A more serious attempt to take over Corinth occurred in 369/8 during Epaminondas' second Peloponnesian invasion. The result of this particular attack on Corinth, however, demonstrated to all would-be conspirators that, as long as the Athenians were entrenched in the city, Corinth could not be taken without great losses. Thus, a joint Argos/Cleonae attack on Corinth makes sense only after the Athenians had been kicked out of the city in 366/5. This chronology is preferable because it not only makes Plutarch's πρότερον comprehensible but also explains well the oligarchs' "fear" (Plutarch) and "distrust" (Aristotle) toward the demos. As Salmon 1984: 379, 385, n. 73 argues persuasively, the oligarchs feared not so much a "democratic revolution" but a demos that did not accept the foreign policy of the oligarchs (traditionally pro-Spartan but now in the late 360's perhaps pro-Theban). Thus what the oligarchs really feared was the Corinthian demos inviting the Athenians back into the city. According to Plutarch (4.1), Timophanes was the cavalry commander during the battle against Argos/Cleonae; could he have been personally in command of a mercenary contingent of cavalry that attacked the Athenian cavalry on the way to Mantinea?

have fought as a hoplite, though his service in the cavalry cannot be ruled out (Ephorus 70 F 85; Diogenes 2.54).[27] Laforse points out that even if one accepts the tradition that Gryllus and Diodorus trained in the Spartan *agoge*, the two could not have learned more than the most basic horsemanship skills in Sparta, for cavalry training was not part of the regular curriculum.[28] It is likely then that Xenophon's sons trained as riders only when they arrived in Athens. Once there, they must have been admitted to the citizen registers; only Athenian citizens could serve in the cavalry, and Xenophon's presence in Athens would have been necessary to attest to their age and legitimacy before his native demesmen of Erchia.[29] Naturally then it must be inferred from this that Xenophon's patrimony was not only restored (that is, of course, if his estate was even confiscated in the first place) but was also substantial enough to support one, if not two, cavalrymen.[30]

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[26] See previous note.

[27] Diogenes only mentions that "Gryllus was posted with the cavalry" (ὁ δὲ Γρύλλος τεταγμένος κατὰ ἱππέας) (2.54); yet, practically everyone since Grote 1869: vol. 8, 481 states uncritically that both served in the cavalry; see, for example, Delebecque 1957: 360, Breitenbach 1967: 1576, Tuplin 1993: 32, and Laforse 1997: 88.

[28] Laforse 1997: 83

[29] Breitenbach 1967: 1576, citing an early article by Wilamowitz. There is little chance that his sons were registered prior to their arrival in Athens, because Gryllus, the eldest, was born no earlier than ca. 398-7 (Delebecque 1957: 126-7) but probably after 392 (Laforse 1997: 81). However, if one accepts the 394 date of Xenophon's exile, then it is entirely possible that Xenophon returned to Athens sometime after his campaign in Asia (for which there is no ancient evidence) and had his son(s) registered in his *phratry*, which would have offered some indication of their age and legitimacy to Xenophon's fellow demesmen (Rhodes 1981: 499).

[30] Delebecque 1957: 360 and Laforse 1997: 88. As Davies 1981: vi puts it: "…service in the cavalry …can and should be used as an objective index of wealth closely comparable, in the level of wealth it presupposes, to membership of the trierarchic panel of 1200…" even though the polis gave cavalry members in the fourth century a fodder grant (*sitos*) of 4 obols a day and a capital loan (*katastasis*) for the purchase of a mount (horses averaged 5 mina in 4th c.). The latter had to be paid back to the state at retirement (see Kroll 1977: 97-100 and Rhodes 1981: 303-4, 565); and as Kroll 1977: 98-9 notes well, even if it is assumed that the state remitted the rider's loan in case of a loss in war, he was probably required to make up the difference between the purchase price and the evaluation at the time of loss due to depreciation, which could amount to a mina per year (according to 3rd c. figures).

Given these considerations, neither financial nor political obstacles would have discouraged Xenophon from returning to his homeland.

Thirdly, the aftermath of Mantinea provides tantalizing clues regarding Xenophon's whereabouts and status among his fellow citizens. Diogenes states on the authority of Aristotle that "innumerable authors wrote encomia and funeral orations for Gryllus, some, in part, to gratify his father" (ἐγκώμια καὶ ἐπιτάφιον Γρύλλου μυρίοι ὅσοι συνέγραψαν, τὸ μέρος καὶ τῷ πατρὶ χαριζόμενοι) (2.55; Aristotle, Fg. 68 Rose). Diogenes, citing the Peripatetic Hermippus, claims that even Isocrates wrote an encomium of Gryllus. In fact, Aristotle entitled an early anti-rhetorical dialogue *Gryllus* (Quintilian 2.17.14; Fg. 69 Rose), which some interpret as a polemic against Isocrates and his brand of rhetoric.[31] Apparently, this panegyrical movement surrounding Gryllus extended to the visual arts as well. Not only did the painter Euphranor depict Gryllus conspicuously in a painting in the stoa of Zeus Eleutherius but he actually portrays Gryllus himself mortally wounding Epaminondas (Pausanias 1.3.4; 8.9.8; 8.11.6; 9.15.5; Plutarch, *Moralia* 346b-e; Pliny, *Natural History* 35.129).[32] Euphranor placed this scene

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[31] Chroust 1965; cf. Tuplin 1993: 32, n.79. What may have been so objectionable is that Gryllus figured predominately in the funeral oration itself; judging from surviving examples (Pericles, Lysias, Plato, and Demosthenes) specific individuals are never named: rather it is the larger group of fallen that anonymously receive praise. Demosthenes implicitly criticizes this new movement toward individual praise in his funeral oration written for the fallen at Chaeronea in 338: "I believe also that if someone were to ask those in the opposite ranks whether they thought they had won by their own deeds of valor or by a startling and cruel turn of fortune and by the skill and daring of their own commander, not one of them would be so shameless or audacious as to claim credit for what happened" (60.21). The only parallel to the *epitaphion* of Gryllus is Hyperides' funeral oration, written in 322, which gives pride of place to the general Leosthenes. Interestingly, Xenophon, who is not adverse to giving individuals their due in the *Hellenica*, praises the fallen cavalry of Mantinea in the most reserved fashion, as if to distance himself rhetorically from the hyperbole surrounding his son's name: "of these good men died" (αὐτῶν δ′ ἀπέθανον ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί) (7.5.17).

[32] Pomeroy 1994: 8, 265 notes the possibility that Xenophon set the conversation between Ischomachus and Socrates at the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherius in the *Oeconomicus* (7.1) in order to honor Gryllus; if true,

opposite the paintings of the twelve gods and the hero Theseus, thus elevating the cavalry skirmish to epic proportions.[33]

Aristotle says these encomia and funeral orations were written, "in part to gratify his father" (τὸ μέρος καὶ τῷ πατρὶ χαριζόμενοι).[34] As Tuplin rightly notes, there is no reason "to impugn the historicity of [this] motivation or to deny the conclusion one would otherwise naturally draw, that Xenophon was a figure of some standing in (at least some) Athenian circles in the late 360s and, in the absence of countervailing evidence, presumably later as well."[35] Though we do not know exactly what Aristotle means here by χαρίζεσθαι (commonly translated as "to gratify," "to show favor," or "to do a favor"), the verb, as it was commonly used in classical Athens, implies the existence of a nexus of social and political relationships between the person doing a favor and the recipient.[36] Though Xenophon had been in exile for thirty some years, it is not improbable that he maintained ties with friends and family in Athens as many notable Athenian exiles had done in the past, men such as Themistocles and Alcibiades. That

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then the *Oeconomicus* must have been published after 362, a date that is not at variance with Delebecque 1957: 376.

[33] Vasic 1979: 345-8.

[34] The addition of τὸ μέρος presumably means that the main reason many wrote encomia and *epitaphion* was to praise Gryllus, but we cannot rule out other motives. For one thing, the Athenians were proud of the cavalry's performance at Mantinea, which was viewed as a victory of sorts—one which was not seen since the days of the Decelean war—and it would have been only natural that the *hippeis* wished to play up this popular perception (Bugh 1988: 150 and Laforse 1997: 89). However I do not agree with Ollier 1959: 428, who suggests that the eulogies were only ostensibly in honor of Gryllus and more a means of defending Callistratus' aggressive foreign policy than anything else. This interpretation flies in the face of the visual evidence, which, under the influence of these encomia, gives pride of place to Gryllus himself.

[35] Tuplin 1993: 32; cf. Giglioni 1970: xi, n.23, Laforse 1997: 89-90, and Humble 2002: 84.

[36] For Aristotle's discussion of *charis*, see *Rhetoric* 1385a15ff; cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1133a1-5. For the meaning of *charis* in its political and social contexts, see Hewitt 1927, Connor 1992: 35-54, Dover 1974: 202-3, 276-8, and Ober 1989: 226-30. It is interesting to point out that Aristotle says that those who are in exile have some of the most pressing "needs" for *charis* (*Rhetoric* 1385a24-5); though Xenophon was

Xenophon had sent his only two sons to fight and die for Athens, when he had only just been recalled, was a mighty token of his *charis* for his native city, and for this gift many Athenians felt obliged. One well established way of "showing favor" in the Greek world was through literary enterprise.[37] Indeed, in the *Gorgias*, Socrates even defines rhetoric as the "ability to gratify people" (χαρίζεσθαι ἀνθρώποις) (462c).

Xenophon's writing of *Hipparchicus*, *On Horsemanship*, and *Poroi*—the fourth area of evidence—is another indication Xenophon's *charis* for the Athenians. While *Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus*, and *Symposium*, for example, are Athenian, not only in respect to their setting and characters but also in their themes and ideals, it is significant that Xenophon shifted his literary focus at the end of his life to include didactic and advice-driven works addressed directly to his fellow citizens.[38] In the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon counsels a would-be Athenian cavalry commander on how best to organize, train, supply, and discipline the cavalry corps.[39] The work cannot be dated with absolute precision but it must belong to the years between 360 and 358, that is, several years after Xenophon's exile had been lifted.[40] A concerted effort on behalf of the cavalry, as

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probably recalled by the time these encomia were composed, some may have felt obliged to gratify Xenophon as a kind of back-payment for his past services.

[37] See, for example, Kurke 1991: Chapter 4 and MacLachlan 1993.

[38] For the Athenocentric interpretation of Xenophon's Socratic works, see Croiset 1947: 402, Luccioni 1953: 101-9, 161-3, and Higgins 1977: Chapter 7, esp. pp. 131-2.

[39] Much like the *Poroi*, the *Hipparchicus* is rich in details concerning Athenian customs, institutions, history, and topography (e.g., 1.2, 8, 9, 19, 26; 2.2; 3.1-3, 6-7, 10-14; 7.1-4; 9.3-6).

[40] Originally, scholars were content to date *Hipparchicus* to the mid 360s because at 7.1-3 Xenophon claims that Athens "has rivals on its borders in the shape of cavalry as numerous as its own and large forces of infantry"; he then goes on to name Thebes explicitly: "And remember, the Athenians are as proud of their ancestry as the Boeotians." This reference to Thebes, it is thought, is a warning to the Athenians on the coming storm before Mantinea in 362 (see, for example, Marchant 1925: xxviii and Higgins 1977: 131, 177, n.27). Ekman 1933: 31ff., on the other hand, argues that the text was written in two stages: 1) pre-Mantinea, in which Xenophon instructs Gryllus on how to take command of the Athenian cavalry; and 2) post-Mantinea, in which Xenophon turns his attention to the general reader. Little commends either of these dating schemes. First, Xenophon's phrase, "cavalry as numerous as its own," makes no sense before

Mantinea had demonstrated well to all observant Athenians, could be counted upon to help the city significantly in achieving its military objectives. Therefore, the job of the *hipparch* was crucial, especially since his task was to see that the cavalry remain 1,000 riders strong, a number fixed by law.[41] However, numbers were not everything (again demonstrated by Mantinea, at least according to Xenophon in *Hellenica* 7.5.16-17), and thus Xenophon goes to great lengths to show the *hipparch* how to make the cavalry the best fighting force possible.[42] Who is this would-be *hipparch* to whom Xenophon counsels? *On Horsemanship*, the companion piece to the *Hipparchicus*, provides an answer to this question.

At the end of the work, Xenophon alerts the reader to the existence of the *Hipparchicus*, which indicates that *On Horsemanship* must post date the *Hipparchicus*: "I have written these notes, instructions, and exercises for the private person; those things

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Mantinea considering the Athenian cavalry was greatly outnumbered by the Boeotians and Thessalians at Mantinea (*Hellenica* 7.5.16; Diodorus 15.84.4); but Xenophon's comment fits well to the period after Mantinea, when the Athenians successfully broke the Thessalians away from the Boeotian alliance in 361/0 (*GHI*^{2} 44). Yet, it is important to note that the threat of Thebes was not neutralized after Mantinea. As late as the *Poroi*, which dates securely to 355 (see below, Section 2C), Xenophon still mentions the Thebans by name as a hazard to their territory (4.46). Furthermore, in 357 the Boeotians invaded Euboea, which precipitated an Athenian counter-attack and invasion of the island (Demosthenes 8.74-5; Aeschines 3.85; Diodorus 16.7.1: note that Diodorus dates the invasion to 358/7, but he is mistaken since Diocles, the commander of the expedition, was general in 357/6 (see *SIG*^{3} 190, 23; cf. *IG* II^2 124, which is the text of the peace treaty between the Euboeans dated under the archonship of Agathocles = 357/6). As Delebecque 1957: 430 rightly notes, there is no hint in the *Hipparchicus* of such events. Thus, 357 is a convincing terminus ante quem for the work, "a time when the Athenians perceived the Thebans ready for war before they knew whether they would come against Euboea or Attica, or against Euboea by passing through Attica" (430-1). However, Delebecque's arguments for dating the work firmly in 357, based on perceived similarities with Aeneas Tacticus, cannot be maintained (see Appendix 1). I therefore propose a date sometime between 360-58.

[41] Rhodes 1981: 303-4 and Bugh 1988: 76. Kroll 1977: 97-8, n. 36 argues persuasively that Xenophon's reference to a 40-talent a year expenditure on the cavalry should not be used to support the idea that the number of Athenian cavalry had dropped to about 650 in Xenophon's day; as Kroll notes, the *sitos* payment at this time was 4 obols a day (and not one drachma), which, when divided into 40 talents, yields nearly 1000 riders who are able to be maintained by the state.

[42] Naturally, Xenophon's talents lent themselves well to this enterprise; after all, he "had a long experience of service in the cavalry" (*On Horsemanship* 1.1). See Breitenbach 1967: 1573, Anderson 1974: 15-18, 55-

which are appropriate for a cavalry commander to know and do have been explained in another work" (καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ ὑπομνήματα καὶ μαθήματα καὶ μελετήματα γεγράφθω ἡμῖν. ἃ δὲ ἱππάρχῳ προσῆκεν εἰδέναι τε καὶ πράττειν ἐν ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ δεδήλωται) (12.14). The "private person" of which Xenophon speaks is, in fact, the same individual(s) he addresses at the outset; there Xenophon says he wishes to explain the art of horsemanship "to his younger friends" (τοῖς νεωτέροις τῶν φίλων) (1.1).[43] Though Xenophon may seem to be making an implicit contrast in these two works between the private individual, on the one hand, who rides horses as part of some idle aristocratic pastime and, on the other, the politically engaged *hipparch* who is always ready for war, nothing could be further from the truth. In *On Horsemanship,* not only do the learning of horsemanship and service in the cavalry go together but horsemanship and a career in politics intersect as well.[44] Accordingly, when Xenophon points his younger *philoi* in the direction of the *Hipparchicus*, he is telling them not where they may learn how to become a good and competent *hipparch* in any state but a good and competent *hipparch* in Athens specifically. For Xenophon, helping friends advance their public careers, a primary duty of a "good friend" according to Socrates (*Memorabilia* 2.4.6), relates directly to his program of benefiting and serving the polis. As Higgins puts it, Xenophon is "not the man who hunted and farmed abroad in Skillous,

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57, and Laforse 1997: 16-31 for the arguments, which are not always persuasive, concerning Xenophon's possible service in the cavalry during the latter half of the Peloponnesian war and under the Thirty.

43 The view of Delebecque 1957: 243 that τοῖς νεωτέροις τῶν φίλων refers to Xenophon's sons is quite a stretch and is rightly rejected by Breitenbach 1967: 1764.

44 2.1-2; 11.8-13; 12.1-13; cf. *Memorabilia* 3.3.3-4 and *Oeconomicus* 11.17, where Xenophon has Ischomachus spend his private time on his estate practicing cavalry maneuvers for war.

much less the man who fought for Cyrus, but the returned Socratic advising his fellow Athenians…what he thinks best for the city."[45]

The fifth area of evidence concerns Xenophon's relationship to his contemporaries. Xenophon did not restrict his post-exile literary activity to advice-giving treatises but wrote many different kinds of works that seem to be in dialogue with the leading Athenian intellectuals of the day.[46] On the one hand, there is the ancient biographical tradition, which mentions, for example, the rivalry between Xenophon and Plato or how Xenophon achieved great fame by publishing Thucydides' *History* (Diogenes 2.57-8; 3.34; cf. Athenaeus 504e-505b). However, many of these anecdotes only serve to highlight the points of contact and allusions in the works of Xenophon and his contemporaries, and these allusions are likely to be the source of the anecdotes themselves.[47] For example, Aulus Gellius' claim (14.3) about Plato's *Laws* being a response to the *Cyropaedia* no doubt stems from a passage in the *Laws* where the Athenian stranger criticizes Cyrus' "education" (694c-695b).[48] For the most part, scholars have tended to assert Xenophon's indebtedness to what they perceive to be the "greater minds" of the era; naturally, Plato, Aeschines Socraticus, Antisthenes, and Isocrates influenced Xenophon but not the other way around.[49] Caution is needed,

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[45] Higgins 1977: 132; cf. Luccioni 1953: 163.

[46] Scholars have yet to establish satisfactorily the chronology of Xenophon's works, but *Hiero*, *Hellenica* 6-8, *Memorabilia* 3-4, *Agesilaus*, *Oeconomicus* 6-21, and *Cyropaedia* likely postdate Mantinea. In general, see Delebecque 1957. Higgins 1977 overstates the unitarian thesis and goes too far in rejecting Delebecque's analytic approach, but he is perhaps right to point out that there is no evidence that makes it incumbent upon us to date any of Xenophon's works prior to the mid 360s.

[47] Münscher 1920: 1-35 is still the best introduction to Xenophon's influence in the fourth century.

[48] Higgins 1977: 58 and Tatum 1989: 226.

[49] The bibliography on Xenophon's relationship to Plato is extensive, especially because of their connection to the figure of Socrates; see, above all, Gray 1998: 1-25 for an introduction to the key issues and previous scholarship; for specific works, see Delebecque 1957: 388-9, Tatum 1989: 38-41, 225-34,

especially because the works of Xenophon's contemporaries cannot always be dated with precision.[50] Moreover, the "influence" model is not always the best way of addressing textual similarities between authors; I prefer to see Xenophon and his contemporaries in dialogue with one another, responding to and "correcting" each other's views. This scholarly debate over influence and indebtedness underscores the main issue at hand: does Xenophon's treatment of his contemporaries' ideas and theirs of his indicate that Xenophon was just an accidental tourist of Athens during the last part of his life or a serious intellectual whose presence in Athens precipitated vigorous responses, especially from his fellow Socratics?

The foregoing arguments, as inferential as they may be, suggest strongly that Xenophon returned to Athens shortly after Mantinea in 362 as a man of social standing and prestige. No one argument enjoins this interpretation, but taken cumulatively they are more persuasive than the arguments (or rather, the lack of arguments as is often the case) put forward in support of the idea that he resided in Corinth until his death.[51] Surprisingly, scholars have not fully exploited all the evidence on this issue, largely

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Gera 1993: 12-14, and Humble 2002: 74-5 for *Republic*, *Laws* and *Cyropaedia*; for the two *Symposiums*, Thesleff 1978; the two *Apologies*, Danzig 2003; the *Meno* and *Memorabilia*, Mitscherling 1982. For Xenophon's indebtedness to Thucydides, see Henry 1967: 54-89 and Hornblower 1995: 50-51. See Pomeroy 1994: 72-3, 229, 233-4, 260, 264 for the shadowy figure of Aeschines Socraticus and the relationship between his *Aspasia* and the *Oeconomicus*. The connection between Xenophon and Isocrates is perhaps the most controversial; see Mathieu 1925: 181-5, Luccioni 1948: 205-6, 283, Delebecque 1957: 474-5, Bringmann 1965: 73, Breitenbach 1967: 1754, Giglioni 1970: xxiii-xxiv, xxvi, xxviii, Higgins 1977: 138, Schütrumpf 1982: 53-65, Tuplin 1993: 33-4, Dillery 1993: 6-7 and 1995: 54-8, and Gray 2000.

[50] This is especially the case with Isocrates' *On the Peace* and *Areopageticus*—two works that are often dated before the *Poroi*, in part, because the similarities between the two authors are assumed to evidence Xenophon's indebtedness to Isocrates; see Norlin 1931, Jaeger 1940, Bringmann 1965: 59, and Wallace 1986.

[51] See Anderson 1986, who fails to address any of these six areas of evidence in support of Xenophon's return to Athens. Strangely, he rests much of his case on what he sees to be the "impracticality of some of the advice offered in the *Poroi*," which is "due to the fact that the author was writing from a distance" (36).

ignoring the textual clues Xenophon himself provides in the *Poroi*.[52] This is the sixth and final area of evidence. Xenophon's use of deictics is particularly insightful in this regard. Deictics, from the Greek δείκνυμι, "to point out," are words that specify identity, spatial location, or temporal location relative to the speaker or hearer in the context in which communication occurs; they usually include but are not restricted to demonstratives, pronouns, tense, and aspect.[53] As indexical signs, deictics generally point to referents outside the text or, if performed, outside the utterance of the speaker; they bring a reader or listener to the *origo* of a utterance, a nexus of "here"/"now"/"I."[54] The examination of deictics, therefore, can provide valuable insights into the context or location of a given text or speech act.

Xenophon richly contextualizes his utterances for his audience (and for us, for that matter) with many spatial and temporal deictics. First, Xenophon's repeated use of locatives such as Ἀθήνησι (1.1; 2.6, 7; 5.4) and place names like Ἀθήναι (1.6, 8; 3.2; 5.2, 10), Ἀττική (1.2), Πειραιεύς (3.13), etc. clearly situate the audience and, more importantly, the speaker squarely in Athens. Xenophon's employment of the spatial deictic ἐνθάδε, "here," twice at the beginning of the *Poroi* confirms this interpretation: "The extreme mildness of the seasons *here* is evidenced by the very products of the land.

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[52] Thiel 1922: xxv and Delebecque 1957: 475, 496, n. 28 are the two notable exceptions but they mention these textual clues only in passing.

[53] For discussions of deictic theory and its application to classical literature, see Felson 1999 and Bakker 1999, who cites his previous work on the subject.

[54] Felson 1999: 3 paraphrasing Bühler, *Theory of Language* 137-57. As will be clear from the following discussion, I am arguing that Xenophon's use of deictics is "literal," that is, he employs them as a *demonstration ad oculos* not as an "imagination-orientated *deixis* (Felson 1999: 3, n.8). The latter is more common in fictional narratives and is the subject of Felson's and Bakker's work on Greek poetic narrative. While Xenophon is not adverse to using focalization in his historical writing, I think it would be a stretch to

At any rate products that cannot even grow elsewhere in the world grow *here*" (οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τὰς ὥρας ἐνθάδε πρᾳοτάτας εἶναι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα μαρτυρεῖ· ἃ γοῦν πολλαχοῦ οὐδὲ βλαστάνειν δύναιτ' ἂν ἐνθάδε καρποφορεῖ) (1.3). This adverb of place in Xenophon always means "here," from the point of view of the speaker, and contrasts sharply with ἐκεῖ, "there."[55] Interestingly, when Xenophon talks about the mining district of Attica, which was situated about 40 miles southeast of the city center of Athens, he uses ἐκεῖ instead of ἐνθάδε (4.26, 49) Accordingly, the deictic center or orienting point of the text is Athens itself with Xenophon firmly situated in its midst. This is strong evidence that Xenophon composed the *Poroi* while living in Athens.

While one may object that place of composition and permanent place of residence are two distinct issues, the proem demonstrates that Xenophon composed the *Poroi* over a period of several years, which therefore indicates that his return to Athens was more or less permanent.

> Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεί ποτε νομίζω, ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθήνησι προεστηκότων ἔλεγόν τινες ὡς γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἔφασαν ἀδικώτεροι εἶναι περὶ τὰς πόλεις…

argue that Xenophon's extensive use of deictic markers suggests he was writing the *Poroi* in Corinth and not Athens. The deictics of the proem point in the direction of a face-to-face dialogical context.

55 See, for example, *Cyropaedia* 1.3.15-16; *Memorabilia* 2.9.3; 3.3.14; *Oeconomicus* 7.2.3; *Hellenica* 2.3.24; 2.3.37; 6.5.45; cf. the locution οἱ ἐνθάδε, "men here" (*Cyropaedia* 8.6.6; Plato, *Symposium* 182c5; *Phaedo* 109e4, 110e4; *Theages* 122e9) versus οἱ ἐκεῖ, "men there" (*Thucydides* 6.11.4; Plato, *Apology* 41c4). See also the comments of Richards 1907: 95 and Frisch 1942: 91-98, who claims the distinction between ἐνθάδε and ἐκεῖ is generally maintained in Greek after ca. 400 BC.

> I have always held the opinion that states' constitutions are determined by the character of its leading politicians. However, *when* some of the leading politicians at Athens kept saying that they understood justice no less than other men, but on account of the poverty of the multitude they felt that they were compelled to be rather unjust in their treatment of the allied cities… (1.1).

Xenophon's use of the deictic adverb ἐπεί, "when," which modern translators usually ignore, brings us to a time and situation that make intelligible the remarks of both Xenophon and the *prostatai*.[56] On the one hand, ἐπεί points generally to a time when Athens' unjust treatment of the allies was a point of contention, that is, to the period before the Social War, which began in 357.[57] On the other hand, ἐπεί points also to a discursive context in which certain *prostatai* were saying that they "understood justice no less than other men." This discursive context was dialogic in nature, involving numerous exchanges between Xenophon and the *prostatai*, as indicated by the imperfect tense of ἔλεγον (another deictic marker). As Gauthier rightly observes, the expression γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων is Socratic and therefore points directly to the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon has Socrates converse with certain Athenian *prostatai* about τὸ δίκαιον.[58] It is important to stress that these conversations occur in Book IV, which dates generally to the period after Mantinea.[59] While the setting and characters belong to the fifth century, the ideas and sentiments that

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[56] In Xenophon, ἐπεί with the indicative often means "when," but "since" cannot be ruled out (Richards 1907: 89). To my knowledge, only Moyle 1697 and Giglioni 1970 translate ἐπεί in its causal sense. However, the two sentences are connected syntactically by the μέν...δέ construction, and therefore ἐπεί should be taken as a temporal follow-up of ἀεί.

[57] Gauthier 1976: 37 and Thiel 1922: 3.

[58] Gauthier 1976: 37-8, citing *Memorabilia* 4.2.20; cf. 4.4.1-25 and Luccioni 1953: 163.

the characters express are thoroughly grounded in the experiences of the late 360s and 350s. It would seem then that Xenophon not only returned to Athens but that he actively engaged certain Athenian *prostatai* about the injustice of the Athenian empire and the nature of justice more generally.[60]

2C. Date of Composition

According to the traditional dating scheme, to which I subscribe, Xenophon finished the *Poroi* in 355/4 and probably circulated it immediately afterwards.[61] First, in his discussion of the amount of money obtained from slave labor in the Attic mines before the Spartan occupation of Decelea in 413, Xenophon exhorts his readers to corroborate his figures, that is, he asks, "if there are still some old enough to remember" (εἴ τινες ἔτι εἰσὶ τῶν μεμνημένων) (4.25). This phrase implies that the generation to which he himself belongs (those born ca. 430-25) was quickly dwindling. Thus, scholars posit reasonably a terminus ante quem of ca. 350-45, for there would have been very few octogenarians left at this time. Xenophon's references to the campaigns of Lysistratus and Hegesilaus to aid the Arcadians in 364 and 362 respectively (3.7) provide a terminus post quem. Moreover, Xenophon twice refers to recent wars just concluded (4.40; 5.12). Given the upper and lower dating parameters, there are only three possibilities: Mantinea (362); the Social War (355/4); and the war against Philip and the Third Sacred War (346).

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59 Delebecque 1957: 476-95; cf. Luccioni 1953: 104.

60 As I argue in Section 2E, Xenophon's relationship with these *prostatai* must be understood "Socratically," which for Xenophon entails the active and direct involvement in the affairs of one's *philoi* for their benefit.

61 "Traditional," because Moyle 1697: 57-62 was the first to offer a scholarly treatment for dating the text, which more or less corresponds to the arguments of the following: Zurborg 1874: 2-17, Thiel 1922: viii-xiii, Giglioni 1970: vii-viii, Gauthier 1976: 4-6, 171, 209-10, and Bloch 2004.

Mantinea can be ruled out, because Xenophon qualifies the recent war with the phrase κατὰ θάλαττα, "by sea" (5.12). Besides, Xenophon says the war greatly affected Athenian finances: "if someone examines the question, he will find out that even now in the present circumstances because of the war many of our revenues have ceased and what did come in were exhausted on all kinds of expenses" (γνώσεται δ′, ἢν σκοπῇ, καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ διὰ μὲν τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τῶν προσόδων πολλὰς ἐκλιπούσας καὶ τὰς εἰσελθούσας εἰς παντοδαπὰ [πολλὰ] καταδαπανηθείσας). This kind of financial devastation is not only unattested after Mantinea but is also improbable given the nature of Athens' income, which was derived from the "contributions" of coastal and island allies and taxes on sea-born commerce. Thus, only two possible dates fit the evidence: 355/4 or 346.

Historians have favored 355/4 for a variety of reasons, but two are particularly convincing. First, Xenophon says that there are "some Athenians who wish to recover the hegemony" (ἡγεμονίαν βουλόμενοί τινες ἀναλαβεῖν) (5.5; cf. 5.8: ἀνακτᾶσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας). Xenophon's subsequent narrative makes it certain that he is referring to the political milieu in the aftermath of the Social War. He describes how the Athenians first acquired the hegemony over the Greeks in the Persian Wars and subsequently lost it when "the city was stripped of its empire" after the Peloponnesian War (5.6). Nevertheless, argues Xenophon, Athens' allies were still willing to offer it "the leadership of the fleet again" (a reference to the formation of the Second Athenian Sea League in 378/7), and Thebes "placed itself under the hegemony of the Athenians" (that is, when the two cities formed an alliance in 379/8 after the Spartan seizure of the

Cadmea) (5.6-7).[62] Thus, sometime after 379/8 the Athenians once again lost their hegemony over the Greeks, and the only time this occurred was in 355 at the end of the Social War. Considering that Isocrates echoes similar sentiments in *On the Peace* (355) for recovering the lost hegemony (6, 138, 142, 144), Xenophon's comments fit better to the period immediately after the termination of the Social War than in 346, when concern for Philip was the primary foreign policy topic of the day.

Second, Xenophon also alludes to the Phocian capture of Delphi, which precipitated the Third Sacred War:

> εἰ <δὲ> καὶ ὅπως τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερὸν αὐτόνομον ὥσπερ πρόσθεν γένοιτο φανεροὶ εἴητ' ἐπιμελούμενοι, μὴ συμπολεμοῦντες ἀλλὰ πρεσβεύοντες ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲν ἂν οἶμαι θαυμαστὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὁμογνώμονάς τε καὶ συνόρκους καὶ συμμάχους λάβοιτε ἐπ' ἐκείνους, οἵτινες ἐκλιπόντων Φωκέων τὸ ἱερὸν καταλαμβάνειν πειρῷντο[63].
>
> Moreover, if you were openly trying to make the Delphic shrine autonomous just as it was in the past, not by joining in war but by sending embassies up and down Greece, I think that it would be the least bit surprising if you found all of the Greeks of one mind, joined in oaths, and

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[62] Zurborg 1874: 3-4, Thiel 1922: viii, and Gauthier 1976: 207.

[63] Scholars have long made too much fuss over this line, and the manuscript reading ἐπειρῶντο should probably be restored. Boeckh 1976: 600-1, n. 503, Cobet 1858: 761-3, Zurborg 1874: 37-8, and Thiel 1922: xi-xii were all troubled by the imperfect tense of the verb ἐπειρῶντο, which they felt obliged them to take the genitive absolute ἐκλιπόντων Φωκέων as referencing an event that had already happened: "because the Phocians have abandoned…"—an apparent reference to the events of 346; Holzapfel 1882: 243ff. makes much of this in his arguments in favor of dating the *Poroi* to 346 (more below). Madvig 1871: 364, who got caught up in this confusion, found a way out by emendating ἐπειρῶντο to πειρῷντο: "If the event to which Xenophon refers has already happened, then πεπείρανται should have been written. But he is refering to an uncertain future event (οἵτινες): πειρῷντο." This emendation has been universally accepted in all modern additions of the *Poroi*. Yet, as the manuscript sentence reads, we have a normal past general condition (protasis = optative; apodosis = imperfect) with the exception that the indefinite relative pronoun ὅστις introduces the apodosis, a usage, though uncommon, is elsewhere attested (see, for example, Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.1.5; cf. Smyth 2569). The sentence can be translated as follows with no distortion in meaning to the traditional interpretation: "I think that it would be the least bit surprising if you found all of the Greeks of one mind, joined in oaths, and allies against those, whoever they are, that would *ever* try to seize the shrine if the Phocians one day abandoned it."

> allies against those, whoever they may be, that would try to seize the shrine if the Phocians abandon it (5.9).

Although the chronology of the Third Sacred War is confused and a source of scholarly controversy, the Phocian seizure of the shrine, under the leadership of Philomelus, dates generally from spring/summer 356 to spring 355, with the latter date being preferable.[64] The Locrians immediately sent forces against the Phocians but were defeated handily. They then appealed to the Thebans, who voted for war and sent delegates to members of the Amphictyonic League, whose biannual meeting met in the fall of 355. Meanwhile Philomelus too sent his own embassies to Athens, Sparta, and many other Greek cities to plead his case before the meeting of the Amphictyonic League. Philomelus secured an alliance with Athens, Sparta, and a few other cities, whereas the Amphictyonic League voted for war against the Phocians. Accordingly, Xenophon's suggestion to send embassies throughout Greece indicates that the hostilities had reached a temporary lull, and therefore it is reasonable that the *Poroi* dates between the spring and fall of 355 as these negotiations were taking place.[65] Because the peace ending the Social War was most likely concluded in midsummer, and that Xenophon refers to the war as the "recent war" (4.40), the *Poroi* should be dated squarely to late summer or early fall 355/4.[66]

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64 For the chronology of the Third Sacred War and the main issues, see Hammond 1937 and Sealey 1976: 444-8, 463-8; Hammond advocates for spring/summer 356, whereas Sealey for spring 355. The main ancient source is Diodorus 16.14.3-5; 16.23-33; 16.35-8.

65 Gauthier 1976: 210 notes well that Xenophon's idea of sending an embassy suggests a "pause" in hostilities, but, following Thiel 1922: xi-xii and Giglioni 1970: vii-viii, Gauthier assumes incorrectly that this pause was between the Amphictyonic League's declaration of war in fall 355 and "Onomarchus' grand offensive in spring/summer 354;" thus all three scholars place the *Poroi* in the winter 355/4. However, it is significant that both Hammond and Sealey place Onomarchus' campaigns in spring/summer 353, and thus a winter 355/4 date does not fit chronologically.

66 Hammond 1937: 74-5, 78; cf. Cawkwell 1963: 52-3.

The arguments against 355/4 in favor of 346 are feeble and do not need to be rehearsed here, especially because Zurborg and Thiel have addressed them adequately.[67] However, over two decades ago Cataudella resurrected this old position and added one new argument to the mix, which recently has elicited the response of Bloch, who reaffirms the dating scheme for 355/4.[68] Let me briefly summarize Cataudella's new argument and then Bloch's reply. Cataudella maintains that Xenophon's reference to at least two *eisphorai* levied during the recent war (4.40) cannot be corroborated by the evidence for the period 357-55, which, he claims, attests to only one. The key passage is from Demosthenes, *Against Androtion*, written on behalf of Euctemon (22.48-9):

> οὗτος Εὐκτήμονα φήσας τὰς ὑμετέρας ἔχειν εἰσφορὰς καὶ τοῦτ' ἐξελέγξειν ἢ παρ' αὑτοῦ καταθήσειν, καταλύσας ψηφίσματι κληρωτὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ, ἐπὶ τὴν εἴσπραξιν παρέδυ. δημηγορίαν δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις ποιούμενος, ὡς ἔστι τριῶν αἵρεσις, ἢ τὰ πομπεῖα κατακόπτειν ἢ πάλιν εἰσφέρειν ἢ τοὺς ὀφείλοντας εἰσπράττειν, αἱρουμένων εἰκότως ὑμῶν τοὺς ὀφείλοντας εἰσπράττειν.
>
> He [sc. Androtion] said that Euctemon was retaining your taxes, and he undertook to prove the charge or pay the sum out of his own pocket. On that pretext he got you to vote for the dismissal of an official appointed by lot, and so wormed his way into the office that collects the *eisphorai*. He delivered sundry harangues on the subject, telling you that you had a choice of three courses, whether to break up the sacred plate, or to impose another *eisphora*, or to squeeze the money out of the defaulters; and you naturally chose the last (trans. Vince, slightly adapted).

Euctemon delivered this speech in 355, which shows that Androtion was indicted in this year. From this Cataudella reasonably assumes (as have most historians) that Androtion must have served as councilor in the previous year (356). Since the Athenians voted that

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[67] See, for example, Hagen 1866, Holzapfel 1882, and Sealey 1955: 76.

[68] Cataudella 1984 and Bloch 2004; cf. Tuplin 1993: 32, n.81, who responds briefly to Cataudella.

Androtion collect the unpaid *eisphorai*, Cataudella argues that the Athenians could not have imposed new *eisphorai* either in 356, because they decided to collect arrears instead, or in 355, because this would be the year Androtion was to collect the tax. Following Thomsen's rather confused account of this speech, Cataudella supposes Euctemon was similarly engaged in collecting arrears in 357, and infers from this that no *eisphora* was levied in this year either. Thus, Xenophon's reference to multiple *eisphorai* in 4.40 cannot be maintained for the years 357-5; but since two *eisphorai* were known to be collected in 347/46, Cataudella dates the text to 346.

Against these rather tortured arguments, Bloch rightly points out that among Demosthenes' alternatives, the orator states "imposing another *eisphora*" (πάλιν εἰσφέρειν), which even Thomsen takes to be an indication that the Athenians levied an *eisphora* in the first year of the Social War.[69] Furthermore, Bloch takes issue with the logic of Cataudella, who reasons that *eisphora* cannot be levied when arrears were being collected; voting for collecting arrears does not necessarily exclude choosing one of the other two alternatives.[70] I would also add that very little is known about the collection and payment of *eisphorai* at this time, and there is no evidence to my knowledge that *eisphorai* were collected in the year following their authorization—a point Cataudella takes for granted. Lastly, and more convincingly, Isocrates in *On the Peace* also speaks of *eisphora* in the plural: "if we make peace…each day we shall advance in prosperity, relieved of *eisphorai*…" (καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ τὴν ἡμέραν πρὸς εὐπορίαν ἐπιδώσομεν, ἀναπεπαυμένοι μὲν τῶν εἰσφορῶν) (20). Cataudella may be correct

69 Bloch 2004: 13 and Thomsen 1964: 230.

in viewing this sentence not as a statement of fact but of general truth, but as Bloch contends, Isocrates' arguments for peace would be severely weakened if the Athenians had not been subject to at least some *eisphorai* during the Social War; why else should they vote for peace if the war had not been financially taxing? Given these troubles with Cataudella's interpretation and the very persuasive arguments in favor of 355/4, we must reject 346 as the *Poroi's* date of composition.

2D. Genre and Audience

The *Poroi* is a unique document of ancient political and economic discourse. No other work from antiquity is akin to it, and like many of Xenophon's works, it is very difficult to determine its literary antecedents and genre. The only extant work that treats financial matters at length and with any kind of profundity is the second book of the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica*, which is undoubtedly the work of an author different from that of the first book and dates reasonably to the last quarter of the fourth century.[71] In *Siegecraft* Aeneas Tacticus speaks of a book of his on procurement (ἡ Πορισικὴ βίβλος) in the context of a chapter on how to promote *homonoia* among the citizens of a besieged city (14.1-2).[72] The work is lost, and nothing is known about it apart from what Aeneas says in passing. As I explain in Appendix 1, both *Oeconomica* and *Procurement* have little in common with the *Poroi* and therefore are not useful *comparanda*. Besides these, no other works on finance from antiquity are either mentioned or alluded to in the

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70 Bloch 2004: 14.

71 Van Groningen 1933: 34-7, 41-7.

72 The Loeb edition translates Πορισικὴ as "Finance", which seems to me to be a bit misleading. Though finance was an important part of providing supplies for an army, it was not the only consideration;

works of other authors. This is certain, at least for the period before Xenophon composed the *Poroi*, because when Aristotle was writing Book 1 of the *Politics* no such work existed: "A collection ought to be made of the scattered accounts of methods according to which some people have had success in making money…as it is also useful for statesmen to be acquainted with these financial schemes [sc. government monopolies], for many states are in need of money-making and the ways and means of acquiring money" (ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην, δι' ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματιζόμενοι, δεῖ συλλέγειν…χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς. πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων πόρων) (1259a4-6, 33-35).[73] While there are instances of works written on personal finance and household management during the fifth and fourth centuries, the *Poroi* was undoubtedly the first devoted to polis finance.[74]

It is interesting that historians and writers of Greek literature textbooks have labeled the *Poroi* variously as an "essay," "tract," "treatise," "pamphlet," and "brochure," terms which imply that the *Poroi* not only belongs to a specific genre but to a genre that

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hence *LSJ* cites this title under the entry for πορισ τικός, translating it as "treatise on supply"; cf. Whitehead 1990 whose excellent translation bears the title *Procurement*.

[73] The date of the *Politics* is controversial. Most date it generally to Aristotle's Lyceum period 335-23. My own feeling is that Aristotle wrote Book 1 late as a second attempt at an introduction to the work (the original beginning being what is currently Book 2; see Jaeger 1934: Chapter 10).

[74] For works written on household management in addition to Xenophon's own *Oeconomicus*, see Pomeroy 1994: 7-8, 46-50. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 1096a6-10 Aristotle may be speaking of actual "works" on the subject of the money-making life (ὁ χρηματιστική) or of "arguments" in favor of money being the end for which humans seek: "The life of money-making is one of compulsion, and wealth is clearly not the good we are seeking…yet many arguments/works have been laid down in support of them (καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται)." Unfortunately, *LSJ* confounds that matter even more under the entry for καταβάλλω (*s.v.* II. 7); while they cite Diogenes (9.13) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.1) in support of the definition, "to be the author," "to commit to writing," they also include this passage as an example of the metaphorical definition: "fundamental." At any rate, whatever these λόγοι were, their orientation was clearly toward personal/household and not state finance, as the context of Aristotle's remarks suggest.

more or less corresponds to a modern type.[75] While the ancients made generic distinctions among their writings, their categories do not always correspond to those of the modern period. This is particularly true of short-to- moderate-length prose work in the classical period. In general, the Greeks referred to them simply as "compositions" (συγγράμματα/συγγραφαί) and made no further generic distinctions as we do today with designations like essay, tract, treatise, etc. With the exception of 'pamphlet', to which I return at the end of this section, these modern terms are of limited value for the present analysis of the *Poroi*.

In light of the *Poroi's* subject matter, it is expedient to look to genres more appropriate to the expression of political views, and in Athens political discourse was essentially public in nature and the province of oratory. Indeed, researchers have detected many rhetorical features in the *Poroi*, even arguing that the work specifically takes the form of a public speech. First, there is the view of Thiel, who argues that the *Poroi* specifically belongs to the genre of *epideictic* or "display" rhetoric.[76] Thiel does not elaborate, but the idea has merit. Chapter 1, in fact, is a veritable panegyric of Athens, its climate, geography, and products of the earth. Here Xenophon employs many of the *topoi* found in epideictic speeches and discourses. For example, Loraux notes the similarity between Pericles' praise of Athens as a commercial center in the Funeral Oration with *Poroi* 1.7: "Moreover, though not entirely surrounded by the sea, just like an island all the winds bring to Athens the goods that it needs and sends out whatever

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[75] Essay: Fowler 1923: 292, Rose 1934: 308, Jaeger 1944: 159, Murray 1957: 322; treatise: Mahaffy 1880: 285, Jebb 1890: 114, Croiset 1947: 403, Doty 2003: 4; pamphlet: Müller 1971: 198-9, Jaeger 1938: 73, Giglioni 1970: xii, Anderson 1974: 193, Finley 1999: 163; brochure: Marchant 1923: xxv.

[76] Thiel 1922: xxx; cf. Andreades 1933: 382, n. 12: "In literary style it is akin to the epideictic speeches."

exports it wishes; for Athens has sea on both sides. And the city imports many goods over land as well; for it is on the mainland" (καὶ μὴν οὐ περίρρυτός γε οὖσα ὅμως ὥσπερ νῆσος πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεταί τε ὧν δεῖται καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἃ βούλεται· ἀμφιθάλαττος γάρ ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπορίᾳ· ἤπειρος γάρ ἐστιν).[77] Interestingly, Menander Rhetor, in his work on the classification of epideictic speeches, cites the *Poroi* in a chapter entitled, "How one must praise a country," as a notable example of how to extol a land partaking in the advantages of land and sea.[78] Earlier, Isocrates expressed similar sentiments: "For Athens established the Piraeus as an emporium in the middle of Greece, an emporium having such an abundance that goods, which are difficult to get from other countries (usually one thing from each country), are easily able to be procured at Athens" (ἐμπόριον γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατεσκευάσατο, τοσαύτην ἔχονθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὥσθ' ἃ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν παρ' ἑκάστων χαλεπόν ἐστιν λαβεῖν, ταῦθ' ἅπαντα παρ' αὑτῆς ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πορίσασθαι) (*Panegyricus* 42). The idea that the Piraeus is the center of Greece is one Xenophon echoes at *Poroi* 1.6, and judging from Libanius' criticism, it had become hackneyed in epideictic speeches and discourses by

[77] Loraux 1986: 86 citing Thucydides 2.38.2: "Because of our city's greatness all things from all parts of the earth are imported here, and it so happens that we enjoy the products of other nations with a familiarity no less than our own" (ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρᾳ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων). Loraux notes well the affinities between deliberative oratory and symbouleutic speech (78).

[78] Menander, *Διαίρεσις τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν* p.345, ll.20-21 (Spengle).

late antiquity.[79] One such discourse is the *Panathenaicus* of Aelius Aristides, who exploits these and other epideictic *topoi* to the fullest in his praise of Athens. As Brinkmann and others have shown, chapters 13-17 of the *Panathenaicus* have striking parallels to *Poroi* 1.3-8.[80]

Furthermore, the style of the *Poroi* at times is surprisingly rhetorical. I say "surprisingly" because, among ancients and moderns, Xenophon is known best as a master of the simple, unaffected Attic style, though the appellation "rhetor" he receives in some of the manuscripts would seem to contradict this view.[81] Generally, he avoids long periods, preferring the running style to balanced cola, but on occasion, he does employ the long period for rhetorical effect (e.g., 4.21) and even *paromoeosis* in the Gorgianic manner: οὐχ οἱ πολύσιτοι, οὐχ οἱ πολύοινοι οὐχ οἱ ἡδύοινοι; τί δὲ οἱ πολυέλαιοι, τί δὲ οἱ πολυπρόβατοι, οἱ δὲ γνώμῃ καὶ ἀργυρίῳ δυνάμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι (5.3).[82] In respect to figures of speech, Xenophon displays his usual fondness for assonance, variation, and anaphora, often in combination with one another.[83] Interestingly, in the nineteenth century, before scholars began to analyze seriously the style of Xenophon's works, some took the rhetorical features of the *Poroi* as indications

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79 Libanius, *Orations* 11.14: "I shall not be persuaded to comply with the usage of most orators, who strain themselves to show whatever particular place they are praising is the center of the earth" (trans. Downey).

80 Brinkmann 1912: 135-37, Thiel 1922: 4-5, Oliver 1968: 95, and Gauthier 1976: 52-3.

81 For ancient criticism, see Diogenes Laertius 2.57; Hermogenes, *On Types of Speech* 2.12; Aelius Aristides, *Art of Rhetoric* 2.13.1, 2; Quintilian 10.83; Tacitus, *Dialogus* 31; among modern criticism, see the references in Pomeroy 1994: 10-15 and note 85 below.

82 For Xenophon and Gorgias, see L. Gauthier 1911: 111-12, Thiel 1922: xvii, and Gauthier 1976: 120-1.

83 E.g., 3.5; for a collection of these figures of speech, see L. Gauthier 1911: 111-129 and Thiel xvii-xix. Aristotle notes how repetition of words (anaphora) produces a "dramatic effect" (*Rhetoric* 1413b21). However, I would not go so far as to say that the *Poroi* is meant to be read aloud because it evidences rhyme, anaphora, etc. (see Cole 1991: 78-9). I tend to agree with Richards 1907: 11 and Thiel 1922: xxx, who view the *Poroi* as a reading text (more below).

that Xenophon was not the author.[84] Thanks to the efforts of Schacht, Norden, L. Gauthier, and many others, Xenophon's rhetorical ability is no longer in question.[85]

However, while many of these rhetorical devices are certainly common in epideictic speeches, they abound in forensic and deliberative oratory as well. Isocrates, for example, employs the Gorgianic figures of antithesis and *parisosis* in all his speeches, albeit to a varying degree. Moreover, the diction of the *Poroi* is characteristically Xenophon's, that is, it displays those particularities, and peculiarities for that matter, of language unique to Xenophon. His penchant for poetic and rare words, non-Attic forms, idioms rarely found in classical prose, and particles like μήν, καί...δέ, καί...γε, τε consequential, and ἀτάρ would have been exceedingly jarring to an Athenian audience that had grown to expect an epideictic orator's innovation to come in his style and arrangement not necessarily in his diction.[86] Similarly, Xenophon's unwillingness to avoid hiatus and to make use of any recognizable prose rhythms would have confounded the audience's generic expectations. Lastly, and more importantly, beyond the encomiastic sections of Chapter 1, the rest of the *Poroi* is antithetical to the goals of epideictic oratory. Whereas Aelius Aristides, for instance, mentions the mines of Attica as a display (*epideixis*) of Athens' greatness, Xenophon discusses mining at length as a proof (*apodeixis*) of Athens' economic potential to solve its financial woes. Concern with the future and the giving of advice is not appropriate to epideictic oratory, which, in

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[84] Most notably Hagen 1866 and Beckhausen cited in Thiel 1922: xvi

[85] In general, see Schacht 1890, Norden 1971: 101-3, L. Gauthier 1911: 109-29, and A. and M. Croiset 1947: 367-72; for analysis of individual works, see Lange 1931 for *Anabasis*; Ekman 1933 for *Hipparchicus*; Pomeroy 1994: 15-17 for *Oeconomicus*.

[86] In general, see L. Gauthier 1911; for *Poroi*: Richards 1907: 89-94 and Thiel 1922: xxi-xxiii.

theory, concerns present time and praise and blame.[87] Given these traits, it is best to conclude, contrary to Thiel, that the *Poroi* is not epideictic in form but rather a text that shares in some of the discursive and generic properties of epideictic oratory.

In that Xenophon assumes the role of the city's financial and political advisor, the *Poroi* has distinct *protreptic* and deliberative qualities, and thus Hagen long ago suggested that the *Poroi* generally takes the form of a political speech but specifically of two speeches that were actually delivered in the assembly.[88] Hagen's primary reason for thinking the *Poroi* an assembly speech is Xenophon's repeated use of the second person plural as a mode of address. The problem with this interpretation, as Richards and Thiel point out, is that Xenophon uses the second person plural in the *Hipparchicus* as well to address the *hipparch* and his men, and no one assumes this work an assembly speech.[89] Furthermore, nowhere in the *Poroi* does Xenophon employ common formulae such as ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, "oh Athenian gentlemen"—a *topos* Demosthenes, for instance, includes in the exordium of every one of his deliberative speeches. The political

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87 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1358b11-20; in general, see Kennedy 1963: 152-73.

88 Hagen 1866 followed by Mahaffy 1880: 284-5. Hagen specifically argues that the *Poroi* is comprised of two separate speeches, which were delivered not by Xenophon but by two different speakers on two different occasions. His view rests on two erroneous assumptions. First, he thinks the diction of the *Poroi* is not Xenophon's—a view that no longer has any traction given the research of Richards 1907: 89-94 and L. Gauthier 1912: 135, n.2 and passim. Second, Hagen claims that the peaces mentioned at 5.12 and 4.40 are different; the latter referring to a peace on land and sea, the former strictly to a peace on the seas (Zurborg 1874: 13-18, Thiel 1922: ix-x, and Bloch 2004: 9-11 demonstrate convincingly that the notion of two peaces cannot be maintained). Moreover, Hagen contends that the second oration begins at 4.34, which is very difficult proposition to accept considering that 4.34 is connected to 4.33 both syntactically (by a μὲν...δέ construction) and in logically (Thiel 1922: xxix). To get around this obstacle, Hagen argues that the beginning of the second speech had fallen out of the text by citing *Etymologicum Magnum*, p. 644, 4. There the lexicographer glosses the rare word ὀφειλή with a reference to the *Poroi*, where the word, in fact, does not exist in any surviving manuscripts; so Hagen assumed that the *Etymologicum Magnum* had a different text of the *Poroi* that contained a prologue to this part of the text, which is no longer extant. The absence of this word from our text of the *Poroi*, however, is better ascribed to an error of the lexicographer (so Thiel 1922: xxix).

speeches of Isocrates, which are deliberative in nature but not actually composed for delivery, are excellent examples of how the pretenses of an actual assembly speech are maintained throughout. At the beginning of *On the Peace* we find Isocrates generalizing about orators like himself who come before the audience (οἱ παριόντες ἐνθάδε) to counsel the Athenians (συμβουλεύσειν); on this particular occasion, says Isocrates, "we come here to the assembly to deliberate about war and peace" (ἥκομεν γὰρ ἐκκλησιάσοντες περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης) (8.1-2). In the *Poroi* nothing commends itself to the idea that it was actually delivered before an assembled civic audience, and thus Thiel and Richards are certainly correct in rejecting Hagen's idea. However, Thiel, in particular, is much too quick in dismissing the *Poroi's* relationship to deliberative oratory, failing to realize that a study of genre must extend far beyond a text's outward form.[90] In the following pages, I contend that the style, subject matter, mode of argumentation, and the ultimate aims of the *Poroi* correspond to those found in deliberative oratory.

Aristotle's discussion in the *Rhetoric* provides a useful point of departure. Though his analysis tends to be normative, Aristotle's prescriptions are not entirely divorced from the praxis of everyday rhetoric.[91] Aristotle divides rhetoric into three

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89 Richards 1907: 95 and Thiel 1922: xxviii.

90 Thiel 1922: xxx.

91 Trevett 1996 argues that Aristotle's rhetorical examples derive entirely from oral tradition, as he apparently does not cite specific speeches from deliberative and forensic oratory; specific examples from epideictic rhetoric, on the other hand, are ubiquitous. From these observations, Trevett draws the conclusion that forensic speeches and deliberative speeches in particular were not frequently circulated let alone written down in the first place. Hudson-Williams 1951 argues similarly that political speeches were not written down in the fifth and early fourth centuries and notes that forensic speeches were probably written out in advance. I generally agree with Trevett's interpretation, but I find it curious that he makes no mention of Aristotle's citation of Isocrates' *On the Peace*, which is deliberative in form (Aristotle actually

distinct types according to category of listener, who acts as a "judge" or "spectator" of the speech: deliberative (συμβουλευτικόν/δημηγορικόν), forensic (δικανικόν), and epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν).[92] The judges of deliberative speeches are people in the assembly who decide about future events, whether a particular action should (τὸ προτροπή) or should not be taken (τὸ ἀποτροπή).[93] If the speech is *protreptic*, the orator aims at convincing the audience that the proposed course of action is expedient or advantageous (τὸ συμφέρον); if *apotreptic*, the speaker tries to persuade the audience that the proposed course of action will bring harm (τὸ βλαβερόν). Aristotle claims that other considerations such as justice and injustice (δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικαιον) or the honorable and dishonorable (καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν) should be introduced only as subsidiary aids to the argument (1358b21-29).[94] Expediency, however, is not the aim or end of a deliberative discourse but only the means of achieving the end, and for Aristotle, the ultimate or final end is "happiness" (εὐδαιμονία).[95] Moreover, in respect to the topics

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refers to it as *Symmachikos*, 1418a30). While it may be correct to view *On the Peace* as an epideictic speech, Aristotle certainly did not, as he includes it in a discussion concerning the difficulty of "deliberative speaking" (τὸ δημηγορεῖν; cf. καὶ γὰρ <u>συμβουλεύειν</u> κατηγορεῖ).

92 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1258b1ff´; cf. *Politics* 1298a4. For similar tripartite divisions, see Anaximenes, *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1421b10; Dionysius, *Lysias* 16; Cicero, *On Invention* 1.5.7; Quintilian 3.4.12-15.

93 It should be noted that at 1366a18 Aristotle seems to include the "present" as a consideration for deliberative oratory; cf. Cope 1973: I, 53, who cites Demosthenes *On the Crown* 192 : "No one proposes deliberation about the past; it is the present (τὸ παρόν) and future that call the statesman to his post."

94 Cf. Anaximenes, *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1436b10. Kennedy 1959 argues persuasively that 1) the deliberative speeches of the fifth century tend to focus on one kind argument only, either that of expediency or justice but not of both and; 2) that the fourth century practice was generally one of combing arguments around the themes of justice, expediency, and honor. It would seem then that Aristotle is speaking in normative terms here.

95 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1362a15-20 and 1360b1ff; cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1112b11: "We deliberate not about the ends but the means to attain ends." Aristotle does not define *eudaimonia* here as he does in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7 as "an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence" but in its sundry popular

on which deliberative orators speak, Aristotle claims that they must be in the realm of the possible (δυνατά) (1359a28-1359b1). By "possible," Aristotle means actions that are "practicable" through human agency.[96] He then lists five main matters "on which all men deliberate and on which deliberative speakers make speeches": "*ways and means*, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and legislation" (περί τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, καὶ νομοθεσίας) (1359b19-21).[97] Though the total number of topics appropriate to deliberative oratory varies among different authors, the inclusion of *poroi* seems to have been conventional. Anaximenes and Demosthenes both include *poroi* among the kinds of topics upon which all statesmen deliberate.[98] In a not too dissimilar passage from the *Memorabilia*, which, it has been suggested, may have served as the model for Aristotle's own division, Socrates encourages Glaucon to examine the city's "sources of revenue" (i.e. *poroi*) so that he may become a better

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senses (see Cope 1973: I, 73): e.g., "well-being with virtue," "independence of life," "the pleasurable life combined with security," and "the abundance of possessions and slaves."

96 This definition is implicit in the *Rhetoric* but explicit in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1112b27-35 and 1112a31.

97 Aristotle's understanding of *poroi* goes beyond contemporary notions. On the one hand, he talks about *poroi* as ways and means to acquire new and increase existing revenues; but, on the other hand, he includes *poroi* in a discussion about reducing excessive expenditures and eradicating needless expenditure: "for cities become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by reducing their expenditure" (οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστιθέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίγνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων). Neither Anaximenes nor Xenophon say anything about the reduction or abolition of expenditures in their discussions of *poroi*, though Xenophon includes it in a general conversation about state finance in the *Memorabilia* 3.6.4-13.

98 Anaximenes, *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1423a25 and 1446b17; Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 309. Both use the phrase περὶ πόρου χρήματων, which can have the more specific sense of "source of funding," usually for some specific, emergency measure (cf. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.6.12; Demosthenes 4.29; *IG* I^2 5, 1000.1), but as the context of both passages suggest, they should be taken in a more general manner (see Gauthier 1976: 11).

statesmen (*Memorabilia* 3.6.4-13).[99] Ways and means, therefore, was a special function of deliberative oratory, and as will be seen in more detail below, an important concern of statesmen.

Aristotle's discussion of deliberative oratory affords interesting points of comparison to the *Poroi*. First, while Xenophon is largely concerned with finding new and expanding existing revenues, it is noteworthy that he explicitly discusses all of Aristotle's deliberative topics: imports and exports and trade more generally (Chapters 2 and 3); national defense (4.41-48); war and peace (Chapter 5); and legislation (3.6).[100] In fact, Xenophon envisages that legislation will be necessary to implement most of, if not all, his proposals (3.6), and therefore the work evidences the first step in the legislative process. The legislative character is particularly conspicuous at the end of the work: "If you should decide to implement these plans, I would *advise* you to go to Dodona and Delphi and inquire of the gods…(εἴ γε μὴν ταῦτα δόξειεν ὑμῖν πράττειν, συμβουλεύσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πέμψαντας καὶ εἰς Δωδώνην καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐπερέσθαι τοὺς θεούς)" (6.2). The phrase ταῦτα δόξειεν ὑμῖν evokes the enactment formula of Athenian decrees and leaves the impression that Xenophon

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[99] Gaisford cited by Cope 1973: I, 63. Socrates: "Now tell me, from what sources are the city's revenues currently derived and what is their total? For it is clear that you have considered this in order that you raise them if any revenues are deficient and provide in addition any that are lacking?" Though Xenophon uses the word *prosodoi* and not *poroi*, the sources of those revenues he speaks of, properly speaking, are the *poroi* (see Chapter 1, Addendum).

[100] The themes of the surviving deliberative speeches from the fifth and fourth centuries are generally singular in nature, but some overlap is common. For example, in Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs* and *Philippics* the topics of national defense and war/peace bleed into one another; and, on occasion, as *Philippic* 1 demonstrates well, war, national defense, and the ways and means to pay for them are intimately connected.

views his proposals as *probouleumata* to be enacted in the assembly.[101] Consequently, the presence of the verb συμβουλεύειν leaves no doubt that Xenophon is casting himself in the mold of the deliberative orator. Persuading his fellow citizens to adopt his proposals was a task to which he was particularly well suited. Dio Chrysostom appreciates Xenophon's rhetorical ability, as he encourages his readers to emulate his *protreptic* speeches (e.g., those in the *Anabasis*), "whether for speaking before the assembly or in the council chamber" (εἴτε ἐν δήμῳ λέγων εἴτε ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ) (*Oration* 18.14.4).

Moreover, Xenophon's proposals are concerned with the future. The past occasionally comes into play, but only when Xenophon brings in historical evidence as exempla in order to argue that his proposals are feasible (3.7; 4.14-16, 25, 40; 5.5-8). In fact, Aristotle says "historical exempla are most appropriate in deliberative oratory" (ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτατα) because the future is unknown and inferences drawn from the past afford the only means of demonstration.[102] Appropriately, Xenophon continually stresses the expediency of his schemes (2.1-2, 4; 3.4, 13; 4.13; 4.35-6).[103] For the moment, it is irrelevant that historians have branded

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[101] On *probouleusis*, see Rhodes 1972 and 1998: 11-15, 21-23 and de Laix 1973. In these two concluding sections of the work, Xenophon twice employs the phrase λῷον καὶ ἄμεινον, which is part of the official oracular formula of question and answer in Athenian decrees (see note 8 above). Such official language further contextualizes the *Poroi* in a legislative context.

[102] *Rhetoric* 1418a1; cf. *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1439a1. The first orator to articulate the use of historical exempla in deliberation rhetoric seems to be Andocides, *On the Peace with Sparta* 2, 29 (although Harris 2000 has questioned the authenticity of this speech); cf. Isocrates 1.34-5; 2.35; Lysias 2.6.

[103] Although appeals to expediency seem to be Xenophon's primarily mode of argumentation, it is important to note that his whole discussion of increasing Athens' revenues is embedded in the theme of justice. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Xenophon's motivation for writing the *Poroi* stems from the injustice of the Athenian empire and the need to bring about the "most just" solution to Athens' inability to take care of its poor.

Xenophon's ideas "utopian."[104] The important point is that Xenophon thinks his proposals are practicable, asserting frequently that his ideas are in the realm of the "possible" (δυνατόν, οἷόν τε ἐστί, etc.) (e.g., 3.14; 4.18, 21, 32; 6.1). Furthermore, what ultimately concerns Xenophon is making Athens peaceful and "prosperous with security" (μετ' ἀσφαλείας εὐδαιμονοῦσαν) (6.1). Eudaimonia is thus the *telos* of the work properly speaking. Interestingly, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle offers many different popular definitions of *eudaimonia*, and among these, he includes the idea of possessing "wealth" (πλούτος):

> πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος <καὶ> γῆς, χωρίων κτῆσις πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ἔτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτῆσις καὶ ἀνδραπόδων καὶ βοσκημάτων πλήθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα οἰκεῖα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα. ἔστιν δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ κάρπιμα, ἐλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν κάρπιμα δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι…
>
> Wealth consists in abundance of money and of land, ownership of land and properties, and further of moveable goods, cattle, and slaves, remarkable for number, size, and beauty, if they are all *secure*, liberal, and useful. Property that is productive is more useful, but that which has enjoyment for its object is more liberal. By productive I mean that which is a source of income (1361a11-16; trans. Freese, slightly modified).

Aristotle's definition of *eudaimonia* is not necessarily one to which Xenophon subscribes in every point of detail, but there are points of contact (e.g., the abundance of money and slaves, which are both productive and secure). More importantly, however, it exemplifies a notion of *eudaimonia* that would have been agreeable to audiences of deliberative speeches, and therefore the capping of the *Poroi* with a promise of making Athens

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104 I address this question in Chapter 5, Section 5D; cf. Gauthier 1976: 260-6.

"prosperous with security" serves to highlight Xenophon's manipulation of the generic *topoi* of deliberative oratory.

The argumentative style and rhetorical arrangement of the *Poroi* evidence further its relationship to deliberative oratory. The *Poroi* conforms to a basic two-part arrangement of thesis (ἡ πρόθεσις) or problem (τὸ πρόβλημα) and proof (ἡ πίστις) or demonstration (ἡ ἀπόδειξις) (*Rhetoric* 1414a35). At 1.1 Xenophon states clearly the "problem" for his audience: the poverty of the masses has led Athens to treat its allies unjustly; therefore, ways and means need to be found to alleviate the condition of the masses, and for Xenophon this can be achieved entirely through the effective exploitation of its domestic resources (1.2). The rest of the discourse, properly speaking, is devoted to "proving" or "demonstrating" the validity of this thesis (*apodeixis*). Moreover, considering that Xenophon ends his discussion with a kind of recapitulation (6.1), not of the specifics of his plans but of their benefits more generally, one could make a case that the *Poroi* also has an epilogue of sorts (1419b10). Indeed, Anaximenes recommends ending the epilogue with an "exhortation" (προτροπή) (1439a34-39): Xenophon ends notably with three! "I should advise you to send to Dodona and Delphi and to inquire of the gods…I would say to ask what gods…for with god helping us in our activities it is likely that they will proceed in a manner that is better for the state (συμβουλεύσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πέμψαντας καὶ εἰς Δωδώνην καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς_ἐπερέσθαι τοὺς

θεοὺς…φαίην χρῆναι ἐπερωτᾶν τίνας θεῶν…σὺν γὰρ θεῷ πραττομένων εἰκὸς καὶ τὰς πράξεις προϊέναι ἐπὶ τὸ λῷον καὶ ἄμεινον ἀεὶ τῇ πόλει).[105]

The *Poroi's* argumentative style is also characteristic of deliberative oratory. Anaximenes, for instance, commends certain rhetorical strategies for combating hostility toward a speaker and his proposals. In particular, he advises that a speaker employ προκαταλήψις, that is, the "anticipation" of possible objections (rhetoricians later called this figure of reasoning *hypophora*), especially when prejudice exists against certain subjects of deliberation such as taxation or peace proposals (1437b19-40; 1439b1-11). In fact, Rufus of Perinthus claims that the use of *hypophora* is most appropriate in deliberative speeches for this very reason.[106] In that some of Xenophon's ideas are controversial, one would expect Xenophon to employ this rhetorical strategy, and, indeed, he does with great frequency.[107] To this I would also add Xenophon's employment of the other so-called figure of thought, the rhetorical question (e.g., 4.16, 21, 42; 5.4-7).

Concerning the deliberation of *poroi* more specifically, Xenophon utilizes the very rhetorical tactic with which Anaximenes concludes his discussion on way and means: "When introducing proposals about ways and means it is necessary to say that they are applied equally to all citizens, permanent, and significant" (δεῖ περὶ πόρων

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105 Compare, for example, the epilogue of Demosthenes' *On the Symmories*: note the presence of the verb συμβουλεύω in the first line and the use of conditionals in conjunction with the exhortations (cf. 9.76).

106 Rufus of Perinthus, *Art of Rhetoric* p. 469 (Spengel).

107 See 4.10, 19, 22, 28, 34, 46, 48; 5.5, 11, 13. This compares to only one other usage in his minor works (*Hipparchicus* 5.4). The fact that these instances coalesce in his chapters on mining and peace support Anaximenes' claim; it must be remembered that, in order to implement his plans for the intensification of the mines, Xenophon envisions the levying of *eisphorai*.

εἰσηγούμενον ἀποφαίνειν αὐτοὺς ἴσους τοῖς πολίταις καὶ πολυχρονίους καὶ μεγάλους ὄντας) (1425b29-30). Along these lines, Xenophon emphasizes repeatedly how his schemes will generate large revenues for the benefit of *all* citizens (2.7; 3.6; 4.40), because Xenophon demands that all Athenians will contribute to the capital fund (3.9-10). Xenophon also assures his audience that his plans for economic rejuvenation will produce not fleeting prosperity but long-term growth and stability (4.3, 26-7; 5.2; 6.2-3). Interestingly, on one occasion, Xenophon actually employs Anaximenes' adjective πολυχρονίος in the superlative to describe how the permanence of the polis will guarantee regular monetary returns to the citizens who invest in it (3.10).[108] This analysis could be taken even further, but I think I have demonstrated sufficiently Xenophon's utilization of the discursive and generic *topoi* of deliberative oratory in the *Poroi*.[109]

A reasonable conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that Xenophon is addressing a wide civic audience comprised of those who would go to the assembly to vote on his proposals. In this case, when Xenophon addresses his audience by "you all"

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[108] Cf. Hyperides, *In Defense of Euxenippus* 37: "The good citizen, gentleman of the jury, is not a man to make some small additions to the public funds in way which cause ultimate loss, nor one who, by dishonestly producing an immediate profit, cuts off the city's lawful source of revenue. On the contrary, he is the man who is anxious to keep what will be profitable to the city *in the future* (εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον)…" (trans. Burtt).

[109] For example, I would remind the reader of Xenophon's frequent use of the second person plural in addressing his audience (e.g., 4.1, 32, 40; 5.9, 10; 6.2). As mentioned above, this usage in and of itself does not qualify the *Poroi* as a deliberative speech (as Hagen thought), but taken in conjunction with the other *topoi* just outlined, it certainly enhances the deliberative character of the text. By way of contrast, in the *Athenaion Politeia* Ps.-Xenophon never addresses his audience with the second person plural; rather we find him employing the second person singular (1.8, 9, 10, 11). Such a usage is common in elegy, where the single addressee represents a larger group of real or imagined readers/listeners, and it may be reasonable to assume that the work was read at a symposium (so Kalinka in Frisch 1942: 202 and Richards 1907: 58-61). Contrast, for example, the public elegies of Solon (Fg. 4 and 4c) and Mimnermus (Fg. 1),

(ὑμεῖς), he is referring to the entire Athenian demos. However, there are two obstacles to this interpretation. First, if the discursive properties of the *Poroi* fit so decisively into the mold of deliberative oratory, why did Xenophon not compose it in the form of an assembly speech? Certainly Xenophon was quite capable of writing a speech of this kind. As mentioned above, Dio Chrysostom praises Xenophon for his *protreptic* speeches and urges his readers to use them as models in the assembly or council.[110] The argument that Athenian politicians did not circulate their deliberative speeches because there was no interest in them as literary works holds no weight because Isocrates' *On the Peace* and *Plataicus* take the form of assembly speeches.[111] Secondly, the *symbouleutic* rhetoric of the *Poroi* would have been appropriate not only in the assembly but in private situations as well. Indeed, Aristotle says deliberative oratory is for "those who give advice *in private* and those who speak in the assembly" (γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες) (*Rhetoric* 1358b9-10). Anaximenes describes deliberative oratory similarly but situates "private" counsel specifically in "council-chambers" (ἔν τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις) (*Rhetoric to Alexander* 1423a15), a point that fits with Dio's claim that Xenophon's speeches were well suited to the assembly *and* council-chamber. In that Xenophon explicitly claims the necessity of legislation to implement his proposals, it would have been essential first to convince the council, whose approval was required before measures went to the assembly for a vote. By the

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where the second person plural is the common form of address, with the *sympotic* elegies of Theognis, where the singular is preferred.

110 *Oration* 18.14-16; cf. the speeches of Euryptolemus (*Hellenica* 1.7.16-33); Polydamas of Pharsalus (6.1.4-16); Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus (6.3.4-17).

111 So Trevett 1996.

time Xenophon was composing the *Poroi*, finance was already becoming the province of specialists who worked closely with the council, and the assembly generally deferred to them on all matters of finance, "trusting" them to administer practically the entire state.[112] Before progressing any further, perhaps it would be useful to review what we know specifically about the legislative process at Athens involving ways and means.

Generally speaking, evidence suggests that ways and means were treated as a separate topic of discussion before the assembly.[113] Any Athenian citizen probably had the right to introduce proposals on ways and means to the assembly in the form of a motion, but there seems to have been a formal process involved as evidenced by the existence of an official office charged with such matters. We learn from Antiphon and Aristophanes of the ποριστaί, who, as their name would suggest, made up a board of financial officers responsible for *poroi*.[114] It is unknown when this office was created

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112 Aeschines 3.25: "on account of the trust that you had for Eubulus, those who were elected superintendents of the Theoric fund…administered practically the entire state" (διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς Εὔβουλονγενομένην πίστιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν κεχειροτονημένοι ἦρχον μέν…καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν ὅλην διοίκησιν εἶχον τῆς πόλεως). Of course, there is some hyperbole here (Rhodes 1981: 515), but it is important to note that, with the exception of the military offices and the overseer of the wells, only the financial positions in the state were elected (Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 43.1). On these changes in general, see Andreades 1933: 372-81, Buchanan 1962, Cawkwell 1963, Mossé 1973: 26-29, and Rhodes 1972: 102-8, 1980: 309-15, 1981: 513-17, and Davies 2004.

113 Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Plato's Alcibiades* 33: "It is said that at a time when the Athenians were meeting in the assembly about ways and means, Alcibiades of his own accord gave ten talents from his own estate" (λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι ποτὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκκλησιαζόντων περὶ πόρου χρημάτων αὐτεπάγγελτος οἴκοθεν ἐπιδέδωκε δέκα τάλαντα). The specific occasion referred to is unknown, but Olympiodorus' testimony seems correspond to the call for an *epidosis* ca. 425 (Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 10.1 with Bresson 1983: 121-2 and 1992: 10-11). Cf. Scholia in Aristophanes, *Plutus* 169 and Epictetus, *Dissertationes* ab *Arriano digestae* 3.22.84.

114 Antiphon 6.49; Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1505; *LSJ* s.v. 2; cf. Aeschines 3.9. In general, see Boeckh 1976: 166, Beloch 1884, Rogers 1919: 228-9, and Andreades 1933: 369, 375-6. The only other official of a similar title in the Greek world known to me is the "superintendent of ways and means" (ἐπιμελητὴς πόρων) attested on a dedication to Zeus Olympios from the Roman period (?) (*SEG* 41, 1376, 3-4).

but the evidence points to a date before 419.[115] Considering the financial straits in which the Athenians found themselves during the mid to late 420s, the creation of the office was likely a wartime measure. The anonymous author of the *Lexica Segueriana* glosses ποριστάί as "a certain office in Athens, which investigated ways and means" (ἀρχή τις Ἀθήνῃσιν, ἥτις πόρους ἐζήτει) (p. 249, line 19). Their number is uncertain but ten is likely on analogy with other financial officials, such as the *apodektai* and *poletai*, and it is reasonable to infer from Antiphon 6.49 that they had secretaries to assist them. Only the scholium to Aristophanes' *Frogs* offers some insights into the nature of their position, which refers to ποριστάί as "those who introduce proposals about sources of revenue" (τοὺς περὶ πόρου χρημάτων εἰσηγουμένους).[116] The verb εἰσηγεῖσθαι in classical prose is the standard word for "making a proposal" or "introducing a motion" in the assembly, whether by an individual or a body of officials (*LSJ s.v.* 1, 2). However, evidence from the Hellenistic period indicates that the verb was commonly used to describe individuals or groups of individuals who introduced proposals to the council for

115 A terminus post quem of 419 is certain because Antiphon 6 is firmly dated to this year. Blamire 2001: 110, n.77 suggests the office was the brainchild of Cleon, and perhaps Aristophanes, *Knights* 773-6 strengthens this identification: "O Demos, how could there be any citizen who loves you more than I? / In the first place it was I who, when I gave counsel, made much money for you / in the treasury, torturing and strangling some and demanding money from the rest, / not caring a bit for the citizens, as long as I gratified you" (καὶ πῶς ἂν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλόν σε φιλῶν, ὦ Δῆμε, γένοιτο πολίτης; ὃς πρῶτα μέν, ἡνίκ' ἐβούλευον σοὶ χρήματα πλεῖστ' ἀπέδειξα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοὺς μὲν στρεβλῶν, τοὺς δ' ἄγχων, τοὺς δὲ μεταιτῶν, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδενός, εἰ σοὶ χαριοίμην); cf. Rhodes 1972: 88 who takes ἡνίκ' ἐβούλευον as an indication of Cleon's stint as *bouleutes*.

116 Scholia in Aristophanes *Frogs* 1505. The source of the gloss probably originates with the second century C.E. lexicographer Aelius Dionysius, who comments on Thucydides' use of ποριστάί at 8.48.6: οἱ τοὺς πόρους εἰσηγούμενοι.

preliminary consideration.[117] This interpretation is probably the correct one given Ps.-Xenophon's testimony that the council deliberated "on many issues concerning sources of revenue" (πολλὰ δὲ περὶ πόρου χρημάτων) (*Athenaion Politeia* 3.2). Thus, it seems that the πορισταί had two separate but related duties: 1) the investigation of sources of revenue; and 2) the formal introduction of their findings to the council who ultimately decided whether to send their proposals to the assembly in the form of a motion.

Unfortunately, it is unknown whether the office of the *poristai* existed in the fourth century. Some have inferred from Demosthenes' metaphorical usage of πορισταί in the *First Philippic* that the office was still functioning in 352/1: "and if you make yourselves treasurers and providers of the funds" (τῶν μὲν χρημάτων αὐτοὶ ταμίαι καὶ πορισταὶ γιγνόμενοι) (4.33).[118] A better indication comes from Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* (391).[119] Late in the play the Dissident scoffs at Praxagora's introduction of communism because, in his opinion, such financial measures were commonplace and ultimately ineffective. He mentions two notable examples: a mysterious measure concerning salt and a decree that sanctioned the use of silver-plated bronze coins (812-

[117] Rhodes 1997: 558-60. If the interpretation in the previous note is correct, that the gloss of the *scholium* to Aristophanes ultimately derives from Aelius Dionysius, it is almost certain that the verb εἰσηγεῖσθαι is being used not in its strict classical sense of introducing proposals to the assembly.

[118] Boeckh 1976: 166, however, is skeptical. Thucydides perhaps employs πορισταί metaphorically (8.48.5), though I am inclined to take this literally, and Aristotle mentions how pirates in his day euphemistically refer to themselves as πορισταί (*Rhetoric* 1405a25).

[119] For a useful summary of the debate over the dating of the *Ecclesiazusae*, see Sommerstein 1998: 1-8. Sommerstein's arguments for a 391 production date (cf. Seager 1967: 107, n. 110) is more convincing than those of Rogers 1919 and Ussher 1973, who put the play in 393.

23). He then cites a recent example of a financial proposal that initially looked fruitful but turned out to be a bust.

> **Αν**. τὸ δ' ἔναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὤμνυμεν / τάλαντ' ἔσεσθαι πεντακόσια τῇ πόλει / τῆς τετταρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ' Εὐριπίδης; / κεὐθὺς κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην. / ὅτε δὴ δ' ἀνασκοπουμένοις ἐφαίνετο / ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ' οὐκ ἤρκεσεν, / πάλιν κατεπίττου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.
>
> **Dissident**: And just recently, didn't we all swear that the city was going to get five hundred talents from the two-and-a-half-per-cent tax that Heurippides *had devised*—and straight away everyone was covering Heurippides with gold? Then, when they examined it closely and it turned out to be the same old story and the thing failed to yield enough, everyone turned around and started covering Heurippides with pitch! (824-29; trans. Sommerstein; my emphasis).

The identification of this Heurippides with the Heurippides, son of Adeimantus of the deme Myrrhinus, is almost certain; he appears to have been an active politician at the end of the fifth century and in the 390s.[120] The fact that the whole city was caught up in the proposal would seem to indicate that Heurippides' two-and-a-half-percent tax was an *eisphora* or "property" tax, which only the assembly could decree.[121] After its introduction to the assembly, the proposal went to the council to be thoroughly examined,

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[120] The mss. read "Euripides," but Sommerstein 1998: 210 identifies him with Heurippides, the son of Adeimantus of the deme Myrrhinus; see *LGPN* Euripides 11 (*PA* 5949 = 5955 = 5956).

[121] Boeckh 1976: 493-4, Rogers 1919: 128, Ussher 1973: 189, and Sommerstein 1998: 209. Rogers and Ussher cite the gloss of the scholiast: "This man wrote a two-and-a-half-percent tax to be paid as a property tax into the treasury" (Οὗτος ἔγραψε τεσσαρακοστὴν εἰσενεγκεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας εἰς τὸ κοινόν). Thomsen 1964: 184-5, however, argues that the tax cannot be an *eisphora*: "The whole context shows that Euripides [sic] had found quite a new source of taxation, certainly some indirect tax or other, which did not, however, yield very much" (185). I am unaware of what this "indirect tax" could have been though (Rogers 1919: 128). Raising the duty on imports and exports from 2 to 2 ½ percent would not have even come close to raising 500 talents, as the income from the 2 percent in 401/0 brought in only 36 talents (from this number Isager and Hansen 1975: 51-2 calculate the total foreign trade at 2300 talents per annum). The only other possibility is the *eikoste*, that is, the 5 percent tax the Athenians levied on all goods carried on the sea in 413 (Thucydides 7.28.4; in general, see Kallet 2001: 123-6, 195-226 and Appendix 2), which was revived around this time, perhaps by Thrasybulus (*IG* II^2 24, 4-6 and *GHI*^{2} 18, 7-8; cf. Diodorus 14.94.2).

as indicated by the participle ἀνασκοπουμένοις. The council, or a committee within the council, rejected the propsoal on gounds that it did not yield the amount of revenue it purported. The fiasco appears to have ruined Heurippides' career.[122] The key question is in what capacity did Heurippides propose this tax: as a private citizen or as a member of the *poristai*? The phrase ἦν ἐπόρισ' Εὐριπίδης is suggestive, possibly indicating that Heurippides was serving as a *poristes*. In fact, Ussher explains the verb πορίζειν along these lines: "raised as a πορισταῖς."[123] Aristophanes' history of poking fun at inept and corrupt *poristai* (*Frogs* 1503-5) strengthens this interpretation. However, πορίζειν also has the sense of "contriving" or "inventing" (*LSJ s.v.* II), and may only indicate that Heurippides "had devised" the tax, as Sommerstein translates. Perhaps it is best to remain agnostic on this issue, especially since the author of the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* fails to mention the *poristai*, which is probably the best indication that the office died out sometime in the fourth century.

At any rate, by the middle of the fourth century it appears that politicians and statesmen became intimately involved in the investigation and proposal of ways and means—a development that in all likelihood rendered the office of *poristai* irrelevant. I have already noted the general relationship between finance and statesmanship at Athens, so it is not particularly surprising to find politicians investigating sources of revenue and introducing their proposals to the assembly (presumably in consultation with the council). In fact, "discovering" sources of revenue is a mark of great statesmanship. For instance,

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[122] So Sommerstein 1998: 210.

in *On the Crown* Demosthenes attacks Aeschines for not speaking on any matters that bring "advantage" (συμφορή) to the polis:

> καίτοι ταύτης τῆς μελέτης καὶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας, Αἰσχίνη, εἴπερ ἐκ ψυχῆς δικαίας ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντα προῃρημένης, τοὺς καρποὺς ἔδει γενναίους καὶ καλοὺς καὶ πᾶσιν ὠφελίμους εἶναι, συμμαχίας πόλεων, πόρους χρημάτων, ἐμπορίου κατασκευήν, νόμων συμφερόντων θέσεις, τοῖς ἀποδειχθεῖσιν ἐχθροῖς ἐναντιώματα. τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἄνω χρόνοις ἐξέτασις, καὶ ἔδωκεν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος πολλὰς ἀποδείξεις ἀνδρὶ καλῷ τε κἀγαθῷ, ἐν οἷς οὐδαμοῦ σὺ φανήσει γεγονώς, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, οὐ τέταρτος, οὐ πέμπτος, οὐχ ἕκτος, οὐχ ὁποστοσοῦν, οὔκουν ἐπί γ' οἷς ἡ πατρὶς ηὐξάνετο.
>
> Yet if all that assiduous practice [i.e. of speaking], Aeschines, had been conducted in a spirit of honesty and of solicitude for your country's well-being, it should have yielded a rich and noble harvest for the benefit of us all—alliances of states, *new ways of financing*, development of commerce, useful legislation, measures of opposition to our enemies. In days of old those services afforded the recognized test of statesmanship: and the time through which you have passed supplied to any upright politician many opportunities of showing his worth; but among such men you won no position—you were neither first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, nor anywhere in the race—at least when the power of your country was to be enlarged (18.309-19 trans. Vince, slightly modified).

Interestingly, Demosthenes divides political speech into separate categories not unlike Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*, but for Demosthenes, these categories also serve as a kind of "test" according to which one can examine whether politicians are benefiting the polis or not. Perhaps these categories should also be understood as spheres of action since Demosthenes considers an orator's speech and his ability to translate words into action as two sides of the same coin. A good orator not only speaks on matters of war and peace,

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123 Ussher 1973: 189; cf. Rogers 1919: 118: "It seems to me that Euripides…was one of the officers (πορισταί) whose duty it was both to devise and levy taxes."

finance, and legislation, but he also *makes* alliances, *discovers* new sources of revenue, and *passes* laws. In a word, politicians must perform ἔργα for the benefit of the polis. The statesman Lycurgus, in contrast to Demosthenes' depiction of Aeschines, is remembered precisely because of his ἔργα. In a fragment of a speech on behalf of his children, Hyperides imagines what people would say about Lycurgus as they pass by his grave: "This man lived his life in moderation, who, when appointed as administrator of finances, discovered new sources of revenue, built the theater, Odeum, docks, and triremes, and constructed harbors as well" (οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως· ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὗρε πόρους, ᾠκοδόμησε τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ᾠδεῖον, νεώρια, τριήρεις, ἐποιήσατο λιμένας) (Fg. 118). This veritable epitaph of Lycurgus not only accentuates his discovery of ways and means but also elevates this activity to that of the *erga* themselves. In an honorary inscription from 196/5, the Athenians memorialize the statesman Cephisodorus for his life-long service to the state, and among the deeds for which he is praised, "he gave advice about new sources of revenue that were both fair and just" (καὶ πόρους χρημάτων ἴσους καὶ δικαίους συμβεβουλευκώς).[124]

In sum, the preliminary investigation of ways and means was the special function of the *poristai*, who probably worked in close consultation with a politician or statesman. They introduced their proposals to the council who took the initial action on whether to

[124] Meritt 1936: 419-28, Inscription 15, ll. 16-17; cf. Pausanias 1.36.5 and *SEG* 51, 786, 7ff. The idea that citizens who enrich their cities deserve praise and glory is as old as Xenophanes' elegy on the futility of Olympic victors (*DK* B2) (as Jack Kroll has reminded me). There Xenophanes complains that his "wisdom" has more practical value to the city because it "enriches the city's store-chambers [treasuries]."

reject or approve them before their formal introduction to the assembly. Although no deliberative speeches explicitly concerning *poroi* survive (most deal with matters of war and peace and defense in general), many of Demosthenes' orations indirectly address ways and means, especially those dealing with offensive and defensive actions against Philip of Macedon. In the *First Philippic* in particular, Demosthenes is predominately interested not only in galvanizing support against Philip but in providing the Athenians with the necessary tools to wage a successful war in the first place, and for Demosthenes, adequate financing is fundamental to this enterprise. A thorough examination of this speech, therefore, will shed significant light on the deliberative process of ways and means, confirming many details of my interpretation outlined above.

After spending the first twelve chapters narrating Philip's crimes and arguing that war is both necessary and unavoidable, Demosthenes proceeds to discuss his plan of action:

> Ὡς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν ἐθέλοντας ὑπάρχειν ἅπαντας ἑτοίμως, ὡς ἐγνωκότων ὑμῶν καὶ πεπεισμένων, παύομαι λέγων· τὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς παρασκευῆς ἣν ἀπαλλάξαι ἂν τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων ὑμᾶς οἴομαι, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὅσον, καὶ <u>πόρους οὕστινας χρημάτων</u>, καὶ τἄλλ' ὡς ἄν μοι βέλτιστα καὶ τάχιστα δοκεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι, καὶ δὴ πειράσομαι λέγειν, δεηθεὶς ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοσοῦτον.
>
> Well, assuming that you are thoroughly convinced that you must all be ready and willing to make this necessary effort, I say no more on the point. But as to the nature and size of the force which I think adequate to relieve the situation, the *ways and means* of defraying the costs, and the best and speediest method of providing for its equipment, I shall now endeavor to state my views, making just this appeal to you, Athenians (4.13 trans. Vince, slightly modified).

From here on, Demosthenes elaborates for the Athenians (1) the nature and size of the force and how best to equip it (16-27) and (2) the costs involved (28-29). Demosthenes then turns to the ways and means to acquire money for the war, stating that his investigations into sources of revenue have culminated in specific plans that are ready to be put to the vote:

> πόθεν οὖν ὁ πόρος τῶν χρημάτων, ἃ παρ' ὑμῶν κελεύω γενέσθαι; τοῦτ' ἤδη λέξω.
>
> ΠΟΡΟΥ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ
>
> Ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεδυνήμεθ' εὑρεῖν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐπιχειροτονῆτε τὰς γνώμας, ἂν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ, χειροτονήσετε, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις.
>
> I will now tell you the sources from which we will finance the war and which I urge you to provide:
>
> Schedule of Ways and Means
>
> These are the plans, Athenians, which we have been able to discover; when you vote on these motions, if they are acceptable, you will be voting to wage war against Philip not only with decrees and letters but with deeds as well (29-30).

Although Demosthenes' specific financial plans have fallen out of the text, the immediate context allows us to draw a number of conclusions.

First, because Demosthenes refers to his plans as γνῶμαι, the document from which he reads contained at least two separate but related motions upon which the assembly was to vote.[125] As Grote notes, these financial proposals "must have been more or less complicated in [their] details; not a simple proposition for an *eisphora* or

[125] It is almost certain that these motions would have been introduced in the assembly separately from the main question at hand, which is whether to go to war against Philip, and therefore the speech as we have it is composite of at least three different speeches.

property tax, which would have been announced in a sentence of the orator's speech."[126] This implies that the sources of revenue of which Demosthenes speaks involved some research and prior consideration.[127] Furthermore, Demosthenes mentions that these plans were "discovered" in conjunction with other individuals, because he never uses the word ἡμεῖς to refer to himself alone.[128] According to Sandys, these other individuals are "certain financial officers" or "political friends."[129] While the latter cannot be ruled out absolutely, the fact that Demosthenes speaks of his "plans" specifically as "motions" (γνῶμαι) gives credence to the idea that these were drafted, in part, by a special committee of financial experts or the *poristai* themselves, that is, if this board still existed in the fourth century. Demosthenes introduced his γνῶμαι as *probouleumata,* and thus prior consultation with the council would have been required.[130] Given that Demosthenes' plans are drafted in the form of motions to be introduced to the assembly for a vote, it is curious that the lemma does not read γνῶμαι Δημοσθένους on analogy

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126 Grote 1869: XI, 117. E. Müller in Sandys 1924: 101 points out that λέξω, "I will relate" is not synonymous with ἀναγνώσομαι, "I will read," "as Demosthenes doubtless accompanied the reading of the items of his 'statement of ways and means' with explanatory remarks." At 21.130 Demosthenes explicitly distinguishes between these two verbs.

127 In fact, Demosthenes says that in the lead up to war the Athenians "investigate ways and means" (περὶ χρημάτων πόρου σκοποῦμεν) as a matter of course (36).

128 Sandys 1924: 101.

129 Sandys 1924: 101; cf. Vince 1930: 85.

130 Accordingly, ἡμεῖς probably include councilors as well (so Seebeck in Schaefer 1966: II, 68). Interestingly, Demosthenes seems to take a large amount of the credit for these proposals, as he claims to have written the document himself: "what is necessary for you to do, *I* have written in my resolution" (ἃ δ' ὑπάρξαι δεῖ παρ' ὑμῶν, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγὼ γέγραφα) (33). Though there are exceptions (e.g., *IG* I^3, 89, 55; 92, 5; 127, 6-7), most decrees were introduced by a single person, who "made the motion" (εἶπεν). Even though his financial schemes were formed in consultation with other people, it would not be unusual for Demosthenes to refer to them strictly as his own, as he, in fact, does here. Moreover, even if Demosthenes had introduced his motions as *nomoi* and not *psephismata*—a procedure which during the middle of the fourth century would have required consultation with the *nomothetai*—the same argument

with ψήφισμα Δημοσθένους or γνώμη βουλῆς found elsewhere in Demosthenes (e.g., 18.21, 116). The presence of πόρου ἀπόδειξις, therefore, suggests that the phrase is a technical term used to label specific kinds of financial documents in deliberative speeches. Considering that this document is the only text outside the *Poroi* to contain πόρος in the title, it is essential that we examine its nature more closely.

The phrase πόρου ἀπόδειξις has been translated variously as "a memorandum of ways and means" (Vince), "statement of ways and means" (Sandys), "exposition of ways and means" (Jaeger), and "schedule of ways and means" (Pickard-Cambridge). While Jaeger's translation comes closest to the sense of the Greek, Pickard-Cambridge's is preferable in that, originally, a schedule is "an appendix to an Act of Parliament...containing a statement of details that could not conveniently be placed in the body of the document."[131] As argued above, Demosthenes' financial schemes were probably too complex to introduce in the assembly without a separate written document from which he could draw in his oral presentation. Although we are missing the substance of the document, it spelled out in detail not only the sources of revenue but ultimately how the new system of revenues would be put into practice, for Demosthenes emphasizes that voting for his financial *gnomai* will be sufficient for waging war against Philip (cf. 33). The specific locution πόρου ἀπόδειξις occurs nowhere else in the

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holds true. For instance, the *nomos* concerning silver coinage from 375/4 was "resolved by the *nomothetai*" but on the motion of Nicophon (Stroud 1974: 157).

131 *Oxford English Dictionary s.v.* 2b. Given that Demosthenes speaks of his financial schemes in the plural, one would expect to find the title πόρων ἀπόδειξις. However, authors in the fifth and fourth centuries seem to use πόρος in the singular and plural with no apparent difference in meaning. Moreover,

Greek Corpus, but there are two examples of the periphrastic construction ἀποδείκνυμι + πόρος, which denotes at one and the same time the acts of creating sources of revenue *and* exhibiting them publicly by written notice.[132]

In his panegyric of Herod the Great, Josephus praises the king for his contributions to the Olympic Games:

> τούτους γὰρ δὴ καταλυομένους ἀπορίᾳ χρημάτων ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ μόνον λείψανον τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἑλλάδος ὑπορρέον, οὐ μόνον ἀγωνοθέτης ἧς ἐπέτυχεν πενταετηρίδος εἰς Ῥώμην παραπλέων ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ διηνεκὲς πόρους χρημάτων ἀπέδειξεν, ὡς μηδέποτε ἀγωνοθετοῦσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν μνήμην ἀπολιπεῖν.
>
> For seeing that the games were in decline due to a lack of funds and that this unique relic of ancient Hellas was sinking into decay, he not only became president of the games for the quadrennial celebration at the time when he was sailing to Rome, but he endowed the games with permanent funds to the end that he left behind an everlasting memorial of his presidency (*Jewish War* 1.426-27).

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the singular and plural is employed interchangeably in conjunction with the noun χρημάτα. In the *First Philippic*, Demosthenes uses both πόρος χρημάτων (29, 36) and πόροι χρημάτων (13).

[132] Generally speaking, when ἀποδείκνυμι, "to point out," "exhibit," "publish," "demonstrate," etc. takes a direct object, it often has the particular sense of "to render," "make," or "create" (*LSJ s.v.* II, 1). However, the verb generally retains its primary sense of "to exhibit." For example, in Lysias' *Against Nichomachus*, the speaker implicates the defendant Nichomachus in the Thirty's persecution of the demagogue Cleophon. Fearing that they could not gain a conviction in the law court, the Thirty turned to Nichomachus, who had been *anagrapheus* for the republication of Solons laws, "to *produce* a law that required the Boule to partake in the trial" (νόμον ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς χρὴ καὶ τὴν βουλὴν συνδικάζειν); "and so it turned out that on the day of the trial he *produced* the law" (ὥστε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ ἡ κρίσις ἐγένετο ἀποδεῖξαι τὸν νόμον) (30.11). Considering the speaker intimates that Nichomachus "forged" this law, ἀποδεῖξαι has the idiomatic sense of "to create." Yet Nichomachus clearly produced the law by means of a public demonstration, that is, by exhibiting it in court, and thus ἀποδεῖξαι simultaneously means both "he made" and "exhibited." Elsewhere in Lysias the verb has this double sense (Adams 1905: 303, commenting on Lysias 32.17: τοὺς δ' ἐμοὺς ἀδικεῖς, οὓς ἀτίμους ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας ἐκβαλὼν ἀντὶ πλουσίων πτωχοὺς ἀποδεῖξαι προθυμεῖ; "ἀποδεῖξαι: often nearly equal to ποιῆσαι; here it combines the idea of *making* the children beggars with that of *exhibiting* their sad condition to the world." Cf. Herodotus' use of ἀποδείκνυμι + λόγος (2.18.1; 7.118, 119.1).

According to Josephus, Herod seems to have found a permanent solution to the financial woes of the Olympic Games, but the historian does not elaborate the nature of Herod's financing. In that this passage occurs in the context of Herod's "benefactions" (εὐεργεσίαι), it may be assumed that he made a personal gift of money to the treasury of the Eleans, who were administering the games at this time. In the parallel account in *Jewish Antiquities*, Josephus says that Herod "made the games more honorable by establishing revenues" (τιμιώτερον ἐποίει χρημάτων προσόδους καταστήσας) (16.149; cf. *Jewish War* 1.423-4). While there is no dearth of evidence concerning the interest of Hellenistic monarchs in managing a city's revenues, the most likely explanation here is that Herod made an endowment.[133] Such foundation documents abound during this period, thus providing the necessary background to elucidate Josephus' account.[134]

These monetary gifts are commonly referred to as "revenues" (προσόδοι) because the cities that received them usually lent the money back out to the public at interest, and thus the gains accrued from this enterprise were, properly speaking, revenues.[135] For instance, we learn from a decree concerning the administration of the Dionysian cult at Athens (176/5 BCE) of a certain benefactor named Dionysius, who "increased the treasury's revenues" (τὰς τε κοινὰς προσόδους ἐπηύξησεν) by

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133 For the interest of Hellenistic monarchs in arranging revenues in general, see Diogenes Laertius 5.75; *SIG*^{3} 344, 109ff.; for earlier revenue programs: Plutarch, *Lysander* 3 and Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.8.

134 See, for example, *OGIS* 763, 51-59; *SIG*^{3} 672, 13-87; 577, 9-80; 578; *SEG* 1.366, 36-54; in general, see Jones 1940: 222-31 and Veyne 1990: 102-7.

135 *OGIS* 763, 55; *SIG*^{3} 672, 7-14; 1100, 22-4; cf. *SEG* 1.366, 36-54.

donating to the cult.[136] The text then goes on to state: "and concerning [the use of] these monies for the future, clear accounts were provided by the man through public documents" (καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων ὑπά[ρ]χουσιν αἱ ἀποδείξεις ὑπὲρ τ′ανδρὸς σαφεῖς διὰ τῶν χρηματισμῶν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον).[137] There is little doubt that αἱ ἀποδείξεις διὰ τῶν χρηματισμῶν are written documents outlining the regulations of the endowment, and Dittenberger is probably correct to maintain that these documents would have been preserved in the archives of the cult.[138] This particular decree offers no specifics about these regulations, but other documents exist that contain detailed accounts (σαφεῖς αἱ ἀποδείξεις), specifying every aspect of the financial management of the endowment down to the minutest detail.[139] In many cases, these documents were published on stone. Once in the public domain any citizen could have examined the document and made sure that the endowment and the revenues that were accruing from it were being administered properly. If the endowment were included in a decree or law, then certain legal actions and fines could be initiated for any malfeasance against those administering the revenues.[140]

These parallels suggest strongly three aspects of Herod's contribution to the Olympic Games: 1) he presented a gift of money in the form of an endowment; which 2)

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136 *SIG*[3] 1101, 12-19; cf. 1100, 23-4.

137 *SIG*[3] 1101, 19-21; cf. Andocides 2.3: "and when I reported these things to the councilors with clear and secure evidence" (καὶ τούτων ἀποδεικνύντος μου τοῖς βουλευταῖς σαφεῖς τε καὶ βεβαίους τὰς ἀποδείξεις).

138 Dittenberger 1920: 254, n.8 with *LSJ s.v.* III, 4.

139 See, for example, *SIG*[3] 577, 578, and 672.

140 See, for example, the entrenchment clauses in *SIG*[3] 577, 24-6, 64-68; 578, 39-60; 672, 13-21; 976, 86ff.

included a written account specifying the regulations for the management of the fund; and 3) this account was most likely published. A one-time monetary gift for the construction of, say, a wall, portico, or stoa would not have required a written statement prescribing the management of the fund since most, if not all, of the monies would eventually be expended. Perennial games, rites, sacrifices, etc., on the other hand, required long-term planning, and it was the prerogative and in the best interest of the benefactor to specify in writing how his/her money should be preserved in perpetuity. Thus, when Josephus specifically claims that Herod πόρους χρημάτων ἀπέδειξεν, he is indicating that Herod not only "created sources of revenue" for the games by means of his endowment, but that he also produced an account of how the Eleans should manage the endowment for the future.

The second example of the locution ἀποδείκνυμι + πόρος is from Cassius Dio's account of how Augustus solved the financial problem of maintaining and rewarding the legions through the creation of the military treasury (τό ταμιεῖον στρατιωτικόν).[141] The funding of the treasury was precarious though, and thus Augustus set out to find new ways and means (πόροι) to keep the coffers filled with money. Augustus accomplished this through a decree of the Senate:

> δι' οὖν ταῦτ' ἀπορῶν χρημάτων, γνώμην ἐς τὴν βουλὴν ἐσήνεγκε πόρον τινὰ διαρκῆ καὶ ἀείνων ἀποδειχθῆναι, ὅπως μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν μηδὲν λυπουμένου ἀφθόνως ἐκ τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ γέρα λαμβάνωσι. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐζητεῖτο…

[141] Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 55.24.9-55.25; cf. *Res Gestae* 17.2; Suetonius, *Augustus* 49.2; Tacitus, *Annals* 1.78. According to Brunt and Moore 1967: 60, Cassius Dio is mistaken about the treasury paying soldiers' wages in addition to rewards.

> Now because Augustus lacked funds for all these troops, he introduced a proposal in the senate that a way of raising money in sufficient amount and continuing from year to year should be *created*, so that the soldiers might receive in abundance from the taxes levied their maintenance and bonuses without any outside source being put to annoyance. The means for such a fund were accordingly being sought (55.24.9).

Interestingly, Cassius Dio begins in a similar manner to Josephus by noting the general lack of funds available (ἀπορῶν χρημάτων; cf. ἀπορίᾳ χρημάτων). Due to this funding problem, Augustus introduces a bill in the Senate so that "a way of raising money in sufficient amount and continuing from year to year should be created." Again, the similarities to Josephus' account are stark: both not only use the expression ἀποδείκνυμι + πόρος but they also note the long-term goal of Augustus and Herod's programs (ἀείνων; cf. τὸ διηνεκὲς).[142]

Moreover, according to Dio Augustus proceeded at first in the manner of a Hellenistic monarch: "because no source of revenue was discovered that satisfied anyone, even though the matter was being investigated, practically all were distressed" (ἐπειδὴ μηδεὶς πόρος ἀρέσκων τισὶν εὑρίσκετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ πάντες ὅτι καὶ ἐζητεῖτο ἐβαρύνοντο); and so "Augustus made contributions himself to the fund and promised to do so annually, and he also accepted voluntary contributions from kings and certain communities (55.25.1-3). However, as Cassius Dio goes on to relate, endowments proved to be a feeble means of financing the military treasury, so Augustus

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142 Cf. the Cyrenaean honorary decree for Apollodorus (*SEG* 28, 1540, 37-41): "...writing that there was an insecure fund of money, he offered a fund; for he established for all men an immortal demonstration of…" (ὑπογράφων ὅτι χρημάτων μὲν κτῆσ[ιν] ἀβέβαιον ἐπέχ[ει] κτῆσιν, διέτελε γὰρ ἅπασιν [ἀν]θρώποις ἀθάνατ[ον] ἀπόδει[ξιν...).

ordered all senators "to seek out sources of revenue, each independently of the others, to write them in books, and give them to him to consider" (βουλευταῖς ζητῆσαι πόρους ἰδίᾳ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστον, καὶ τούτους ἐς βιβλία γράψαντας δοῦναί οἱ διασκέψασθαι) (55.25.4). In the end, Augustus rejected the proposed schemes of the senators, introduced his own plan, a five percent inheritance tax, and "thus increased the revenues in this way" (τὰς μὲν οὖν προσόδους οὕτως ἐπηύξησε) (55.25.6). In fact, Cassius Dio declares that Augustus "found this tax written down in Caesar's memoranda" (καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Καίσαρος ὑπομνήμασι τὸ τέλος τοῦτο γεγραμμένον εὑρών). Although the funding proved to be difficult, in the end Augustus discovered a permanent and sufficient way of raising money that met the stipulations of his motion in the Senate. The bill became a *senatus consultum*, which presumably outlined in detail the inner workings of the tax: its scope, collection, management, etc.[143]

In light of these, albeit non-classical, parallels, πόρου ἀπόδειξις appears to have been a written document that outlined in detail and in some public fashion sources of revenue and specified how the state should administer those revenues. In fifth-century Athens, this document would have been drawn up by the *poristai*, but during the fourth century, by a politician or statesman, who submitted it to the council for preliminary approval, and then to the assembly as a *probouleuma* or *probouleumata*. If the motion(s) passed and became a decree or law, it was either inscribed on a white tablet and placed in

[143] Much like Demosthenes' proposals, the schemes of the Senators and Augustus' final solution appear to have been complex, because in the former case Augustus ordered that their proposals be "written in books," whereas Augustus' own plan was discovered in Caesar's memoranda.

the archives or formally published on a marble stele.[144] If the assembly rejected the motion, however, the original document most likely disappeared from the historical record. Given this dynamic, it is no wonder that no examples of this financial document exist in the surviving deliberative speeches. Generally speaking, such documents are what Aristotle calls "unartful persuaders" (ἄτεχνοι πίστεις), that is, "proofs" or "evidentiary material" that "have not been furnished by ourselves but were already in existence," such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, laws, and oaths.[145] "Artful persuaders" (ἔντεχνοι πίστεις), by contrast, are modes of persuasion which the speaker must "invent" (εὑρεῖν; cf. *inventio* in Latin) through his own effort. Though Aristotle says unartful persuaders are "particular to forensic oratory" (ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται τῶν δικανικῶν), they also apply to deliberative oratory as well.[146] Cole speculates that

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144 Of this latter category there are many examples, though most are from the fifth century and concern imperial revenues; see, for example, *IG* I^3 34, 52, 60, 68, 71. The Athenians always considered tribute (φόρος) to be a part of their revenues (προσόδοι) (Thucydides 2.13.2-3; Xenophon, *Anabasis* 7.1.27), and therefore deliberations about imposing new imperial taxes, for instance, were couched in terms of ways and means. In the fourth century, a notable example is Agyrrhius' grain tax law of 374/3 (Stroud 1998).

145 *Rhetoric* 1355b35-40, 1375a22ff; cf. *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1428a16ff. I have taken the translation "unartful persuader" from Cole 1995: 89-90, which is compatible with Grimaldi 1988: 20, who argues that πίστεις should be translated as "evidentiary material" in that Book 2 opens with the phrase "From these [sc. ἄτεχνοι πίστεις] one must make arguments for persuading and dissuading…" (cf. Gagarin 1990: 24, n.8); for "unartful persuaders" in general, see the notes of Cope 1973 and Grimaldi 1988, Gagarin 1990: 23-26, and Mirhady 1991.

146 Aristotle mentions how citing laws are useful for "both persuading and dissuading" (καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα) (1375a25-27), from which commentators (Cope 1973: I, 270 and Grimaldi 1988) infer that Aristotle considered unartful persuaders to apply also to deliberative oratory. Mirhady 1990: 394-6, however, argues against this wider application, claiming that all καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα indicates is an acknowledgement on Aristotle's part of the potential for political terminology to enter the courtroom. Nevertheless, at the beginning of Book 2 Aristotle states explicitly that ἄτεχνοι πίστεις must be employed in "persuading and dissuading, praising and blaming, and accusing and defending" (καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι)—the very definitions of deliberative, epideictic, and forensic rhetoric given by Aristotle at 1358b7-12!

these unartful persuaders may have been originally "extratextual persuaders"—materials presented during the course of a trial by someone else other than the speaker, which therefore had a tendency to be excluded from the text in the first place, or evidence too specific and particular to a given case that would not be useful to future speakers.[147] Cole even suggests that economic material in deliberative orations was a kind of extratextual persuader.[148] This may explain why Demosthenes' financial plans mentioned under the heading πόρου ἀπόδειξις were not included in the published version of the text—they were quite literally "outside" the speech itself, composed on a separate piece of papyrus.[149]

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147 Cole 1995: 90, 107.

148 Cole 1995: 107. Cole bases this claim on Thucydides 2.13.3-6, where the historian has Pericles address the Athenians about the finances of war in indirect speech. This choice suggests to Cole that such economic material did not usually enter into an orator's deliberative speech (cf. Kallet-Marx 1994: 234, n. 30). Interestingly, at 2.13.9 Thucydides concludes this section by claiming, "Pericles also said many other things that was his custom to *demonstrate* that the Athenians would win the war" (ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἷάπερ εἰώθει Περικλῆς ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ). Given this sentence follows Pericles' *demonstration* about the salutary state of the Athenians' financial and military resources, it would seem, then, that Thucydides is using ἀπόδειξις here in the specific sense of a demonstrative discourse of a technical sort. As I argue below, such discourses were different from non-technical deliberative speeches in that the speaker probably delivered his speech by adumbrating a technical document he read in the council or assembly.

149 Jaeger 1938: 120 makes the provocative suggestion that Demosthenes omitted the πόρου ἀπόδειξις when he republished the speech because the economic proposals in this section "no longer satisfied Demosthenes and had in the meantime been outdistanced by more effective measures [i.e. using the Theoric money]." Trevett 1996: 427-8 argues against the republication of Demosthenes' speeches, contending that 1) the section could have been cut out by an editor who "judged it to be of no literary interest;" 2) that it may have never appeared in the speech in the first place because it would have been read by the clerk of the assembly; or 3) that if the section was read by Demosthenes, it probably was "written on a separate piece of papyrus, and subsequently became detached from the rest of the speech." Of these possibilities, only the last holds up to scrutiny. Demosthenes' complex financial schemes in *On the Symmories* 14-22, for instance, should caution against the view that such material was of little literary interest to future readers. Furthermore, the fact that Demosthenes says, "If, men of Athens, you first provide these funds of which *I* have spoken" (ἂν ταῦτ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πορίσητε, τὰ χρήματα πρῶτον ἃ λέγω) (33), clearly undermines the idea that a clerk read Demosthenes' schemes. Given that Demosthenes speaks of his schemes as γνῶμαι suggests strongly that they were written on a separate piece of papyrus; for, if the assembly had passed his motions, how else would a scribe have transcribed them (whether on white tablets or stone) unless there was a separate copy from which to work? Thus, Trevett's third option and Jaeger's interpretation are compatible. I suspect that the *First Philippic* is

Returning to the *Poroi*, the preceding discussion brings into clear focus the essential nature of Xenophon's literary enterprise. As already argued, the *Poroi* is not only *protreptic* but *apodeictic* as well, for Xenophon aims to convince his audience with clear demonstrations that his financial plans will be beneficial to the city. Xenophon quite literally "demonstrates" new sources of revenue and indicates how those revenues should be managed. In many respects, the *Poroi* functions generically as an "exposition of ways and means" (πόρου ἀπόδειξις). This financial document, as it seems, has its origins in the procedure whereby *poristai* and/or statesmen came together to "investigate" (σκοπεῖν) possible sources of funding for a given enterprise. At the beginning of the *Poroi*, Xenophon too says he has been "investigating" the financial situation of Athens (σκοποῦντι δή μοι ἃ ἐπενόησα τοῦτο μὲν εὐθὺς ἀνεφαίνετο, ὅτι ἡ χώρα πέφυκεν οἵα πλείστας προσόδους παρέχεσθαι) (1.2), which leads him to the conclusion that Athens can supply itself with an income large enough to maintain its population. Remarkably, Xenophon encourages his readers to "investigate" (σκοπεῖν) the details of his plans and even to "run the numbers" (λογίζεσθαι) in order to corroborate their viability (e.g., 4.18, 34; 5.11, 12). Here Xenophon is looking to his audience as colleagues in the deliberative process, which is precisely the dynamic we find between *poristai*/statesmen and the council. Moreover, Xenophon's understanding of his plans as *probouleumata* (6.2) evidences the last stage of the legislative process whereby proposals on ways and means were framed specifically as motions (γνῶμαι) to be

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probably a composite of three separate speeches, and therefore the exclusion of Demosthenes' financial schemes was the result of an editor, who, in fact, may have been Demosthenes himself.

introduced to the assembly, such as we find in the *First Philippic* under the title πόρου ἀπόδειξις. However, whereas Demosthenes' proposals are already *gnomai*, Xenophon's are inchoate, that is, they are in the process of becoming *gnomai*.[150] Perhaps, then, the identification of the *Poroi* with πόρου ἀπόδειξις is not entirely apropos.

Demosthenes' remarks with which he introduces his *gnomai*, however, should be recalled at this point. The orator says that he will "relate" (λέξω) to his audience the sources of revenue, which is not synonymous with ἀναγνώσομαι, "I will read." In Demosthenes ἀναγνώσκειν means to read verbatim from a document, whereas λέγειν, which can also mean "to read," especially as an imperative, more commonly signifies to read with explanatory remarks.[151] Consequently, λέξω indicates that Demosthenes himself read the exposition of ways and means so that he could explain the finer points of his proposals and clarify any difficulties. There is no doubt that these "explanatory remarks" would have been similar to the ones he used in the council as he was persuading the *bouleutai* of the efficacy and solvency of his proposals. The discursive properties of πόρου ἀπόδειξις, therefore, are not fixed to one performative context only, as a "demonstration" would have been required in both the council-chamber and assembly. Thus, we may speak of πόρου ἀπόδειξις, on the one hand, specifically as the title of an official Athenian financial document and, on the other, more generally as a kind of

150 For instance, Xenophon advocates implementing his proposals piecemeal, which would require an iterative legislative process (4.35-8).

speech genre within deliberative oratory.[152] Accordingly, I submit that the *Poroi* is the literary representation of these two modes of discourse, in that it includes both a formal exposition of ways and means *and* "explanatory remarks," or what Aristotle calls "artful persuaders" (ἔντεχνοι πίστεις), arguments and proofs that the author "invents" himself for a given occasion. Xenophon's literary genius lies in the fact that he gives literary form and expression to what most Athenians would have considered a sub-literary financial document.

I now return to the question of audience. The preceding observations would seem to indicate that Xenophon is specifically addressing the council, as the inchoate nature of his proposals evinces the preliminary stage of the legislative process. A number of textual features strongly support this interpretation. First, Xenophon's exhortation to his audience to "examine" (σκοπεῖν) the details of his plans is appropriate in the context of *probouleusis*, "prior consideration." In fact, Xenophon's expression σκοπῶν ὁ βουλόμενος κρινέτω (4.18) invokes the official language of *probouleusis*, when the council grants "to whomever wishes" (τῷ βουλομένῳ) the right "to examine"

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151 E. Müller in Sandys 1924: 101 citing Demosthenes 21.130, where the two verbs are explicitly contrasted.

152 The idea of speech (oral and written utterances) being governed by recognizable codes or conventions, which depend on specific social, political, and cultural situations, occasions, or contexts, is that of Bakhtin. See, for example, his essay, "The Problem of Speech Genres" in Bakhtin 1986: 60-102, esp. 78-80. Perhaps the reason why there are no surviving examples of public, assembly deliberative speeches on ways and means is because all such speeches would have been delivered initially in the council-chamber. If my argument is correct, when it came time to introduce proposals to the assembly, they were in the form of motions, which in some cases needed to be read aloud with explanatory remarks. These remarks apparently do not make it into published versions of speeches, as in the *First Philippic*.

(σκοπεῖν) proposals before they are sent to the assembly and, in some cases, to "draft" (γράφειν) additional proposals of their own.[153]

Moreover, Xenophon's invitation to "run the numbers" (λογίζεσθαι) strongly suggests an audience experienced in financial matters. Interestingly, Xenophon does not calculate the total amount of startup capital needed but assigns this task to his audience (4.34). In order to compute this number, a person would have had to consider many factors, such as the market price of slaves, depreciation costs, money needed for maintenance of the slaves, etc. Perhaps calculation was a function of special advisors, but generally the council dealt with the nitty-gritty details of finance.[154] Indeed, Xenophon's use of *hypophora* is illuminating in this respect, given that seven out of the ten examples of this figure of thought are found in the sections on the mines, which are the most technical, quantitatively oriented, and controversial of the work.[155] As answers to "imagined" objections, *hypophorae* intimate the type of audience best able to raise objections in the first place. For example, Xenophon's objection at 4.28 "imagines" a person familiar with the mining industry: "Then why, someone may say, are there not as many new cuttings now as there were in the past" (τί δῆτα, φαίη ἄν τις, οὐ καὶ νῦν, ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν, πολλοὶ καινοτομοῦσιν;)? There are only two ways someone

153 Gauthier 1976: 145 rightly notes the connection. The relevant texts are *IG* I^3 64, 6; 133, 11; Andocides, *On The Mysteries* 83-4; Demosthenes 24.18, 23; Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 29.2 with Rhodes 1981: 374. The phrase τῷ βουλομένῳ also occurs in publication clauses in Athenian decrees (e.g., *IG* I^3 84, 26).

154 In general, see Rhodes 1972: 88-113, esp. 105: "Only the boule had access to the information which would show whether extra taxation was needed, or whether the city could afford some new charge in its resources, and this must be the reason for the boule's financial predominance."

could have gained the kind of knowledge required to raise this question: to be experienced with the mining industry through either direct participation or political oversight, involving the examination of the leasing records. Incidentally, it was the council's responsibility to publish the mining leases, including the "new cuttings" (καινοτομίαι) Xenophon mentions here.[156] That Xenophon is in dialogue with these specialists and policy makers is evidenced by the verb ξύμφημι, "I agree," at 4.51: "If my proposals are put into practice, I agree that the city will not only be more financially solvent but will become more obedient, disciplined, and capable in war as well" (πραχθέντων γε μὴν ὧν εἴρηκα ξύμφημὶ ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον ἂν χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ εὐπολεμωτέραν γενέσθαι).[157] The *Poroi* therefore is dialogical, encouraging responses from the audience, while, on occasion, even giving voice to anterior discourse between Xenophon and other statesmen and financial specialists.[158]

In the final analysis, Xenophon could never have composed the *Poroi* as an assembly speech because its primary audience is a smaller group of Athenian citizens

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155 *Poroi* 4.10, 19, 22, 28, 34, 46, 48; 5.5, 11, 13. It is also telling that the other three usages come from the sections where Xenophon advocates a universal peace policy, which, to say the least, was a divisive issue.

156 Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 47.2-3. I discuss the mining industry in Chapter 5, Section 5D.

157 Richards 1907: 102 suggests that the text should read φημί because "the proposal and the anticipation are put forward as entirely the writer's own." Despite the awkwardness produced by retaining ξύμφημι, there are no good paleographical reasons to explain the presence of the prefix ξυν. At any rate, Marchant 1925: 223, n.1: "If the text is right, one naturally asks "With whom?" Thiel 1922: xxv, n. 1 suggests Eubulus but the connection between the two men is rightfully questioned (Gauthier 1976: 223-31, 260ff).

158 For the term "dialogical," as opposed to "monological," see Bakhtin's essay "Discourse in the Novel" in Bakhtin 1981: 257-422, esp. 275-331 and "The Problem of the Text" in Bakhtin 1981: 103-131. While Bakhtin's ideas are largely applied to fictional discourse, he was also interested in the dialogic aspects of

responsible for policy formation. In other words, Xenophon does not aim to persuade the entire Athenian citizenry straightaway with his exposition but rather those who would introduce his proposals to the assembly as specific motions.[159] The *Poroi*, therefore, is best categorized as a deliberative discourse (συμβουλευτικός λόγος) of the private or *bouleutic* variety. In fact, if my interpretation is correct, the *Poroi* is the only surviving example of such a discourse from Athens of the Classical period.[160] However, it is important to note that I do not say "speech." Although no deliberative speeches addressed to the council are extant, there are a few examples concerning non-deliberative matters, such as the crowning and scrutiny of public officials.[161] All these speeches begin with the introductory formulas ὦ βουλή or ὦ ἄνδρες βουλευταί, forms of address that would have been mandatory given the audience's stature. The fact that Xenophon does not employ these suggests that the *Poroi*, in its present form, is not a

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prose writing and rhetoric in general. In the next section, I will further elaborate the anterior discourse that informs the composition of the *Poroi* by examining the dramatic context.

159 That is not to say Xenophon is disinterested in convincing a wider civic audience. In order for his schemes ultimately to succeed, the arguments Xenophon uses to persuade his fellow financial specialists and politicos had to register in the assembly as well. The fact that Aristotle and Anaximenes distinguish between private and public deliberation and yet do not differentiate the discursive properties appropriate to each would seem to indicate the fluidity of deliberative rhetoric. A complete study on the rhetoric of private deliberation, especially as directed to councils and other smaller deliberative bodies, remains to be written; in general, see Stevens 1933. It is most unfortunate that Aristotle's Περὶ συμβουλίας, "On Counsel," Aristippus' Πρὸς τὸν συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειροῦντα, "To the one who tried to be a counselor," and Simon's Περὶ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, "On Deliberation" (Diogenes Laertius 5.24; 2.84, 123) are no longer extant, as they would no doubt provide many answers to the issues raised here.

160 I say "Athenian" because there are examples of this kind of speech delivered by non-Athenians; see, for example, the speeches of Archidamus and the Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas in Thucydides 1.79-86 (we can be sure this is a private deliberation because Thucydides notes, on the one hand, that the Spartans "deliberated by themselves" apart from the Lacedaemonian League and, on the other, that when war was decided, Sthenelaidas then put the question to the "Spartan assembly" (1.87). The only examples from Athens that approximates private deliberative speeches are those of the Sausage-Seller and Cleon narrated in indirect discourse in Aristophanes' *Knights* 624-82.

161 See, for example, the speeches of Critias and Theramenes in *Hellenica* 2.3.24-51; Lysias 16, 25, 31; Demosthenes, *On the Trierarchic Crown*.

council speech.[162] It could be argued that Xenophon initially read the text in the council and revised it for a reading audience, but such an interpretation would completely miss the point of Xenophon's project. Deliberative speeches address particular issues on specific occasions. An orator does not speak generally about war and peace but about specific proposals for war and peace at a precise moment in time.[163] The *Poroi*, by contrast, is general in its orientation, and therefore does not lend itself well to delivery on any one occasion. Xenophon is interested in curing Athens of the disease of empire and transforming the city into an instrument of peace.[164] In order to achieve these aims, sufficient revenue is needed, which itself is attainable only through the gradual implementation of numerous proposals on ways and means. Therefore, the *Poroi* requires multiple occasions of delivery to realize its ultimate aims. In political terms, Xenophon needed to convince not just one *prytany* of councilors but practically a whole "generation" of councilors, both those of the current *bouleutic* year and those in the several years to come.[165]

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[162] Though it is interesting to note the striking similarity between the proem of Critias' *bouleutic* speech at *Hellenica* 2.3.51: Ἐγώ, ὦ βουλή, νομίζω προστάτου ἔργον εἶναι οἵου δεῖ, ὃς ἂν ὁρῶν τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατωμένους μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ with that of the *Poroi*: Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεί ποτε νομίζω, ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι.

[163] Even in *On the Peace*, which is intended for a reading audience, Isocrates keeps up the pretences of an actual assembly speech by situating his address in the context of the specific occasion when the *prytanies* brought forward proposals making peace with the Chians, Rhodians, Byzantines, and Coans (15-16).

[164] At 3.9 Xenophon explicitly says that when poleis are at war they are "sick" (νοσήσωσι).

[165] In the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon suggests to the *hipparch* that he have "suitable representatives" (ῥήτορας ἐπιτηδείους) in the council to speak on his behalf (1.8) (for such advocates, see Perlman 1963: 344-6). Perhaps among Xenophon's *philoi* (see Section 2E) numbered such *rhetores*, upon whom he relied to introduce his proposals to the council.

It necessarily follows from this conclusion that Xenophon circulated the *Poroi* among political circles as a pamphlet.[166] The term may not be entirely appropriate to an ancient context, especially since pamphlets and pamphleteering emerged in the early modern period as a result of a complex historical process involving, among other things, increased literacy, the emergence of a reading culture, and the advent of cheap printed materials that could be circulated widely.[167] Naturally, without the printing press, texts in Athens were disseminated on a relatively small scale, and, though the extent of literacy is still a contested issue, even by early modern standards few Athenians in the fourth century could read or read well enough to make sense of texts like the *Poroi*.[168] Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that texts were circulated for political or partisan purposes among a reading public, however small, as early as the end of the fifth century.[169] As in the early modern period, pamphlets assumed many literary forms including forensic and deliberative orations, such as Isocrates' *Areopagiticus*, which, of course, was the literary inspiration for Milton's imaginary parliamentary address of the

166 So e.g., Müller 1971: 198-9, Jaeger 1938: 73, Sealey 1955: 7, Giglioni 1970: xii, Anderson 1974: 193, and Finley 1999: 163.

167 So Raymond 2003, whose study of the genre focuses on its origins in Britain during the 16th and 17th centuries. On political pamphlets in the classical age, see Schoell 1890, Wilamowitz 1893, I, 169-85, II, 13ff., Adams 1912, Jaeger 1940: 440-50, Jacoby 1949: 71-99, 129-31, 210-15, and Rhodes 1981: 22-24.

168 In general, see Havelock 1982, Knox 1985, Harris 1989, and Thomas 1989 and 1992.

169 The main examples that are usually cited as pamphlets are: Stesimbrotus of Thasos' *On Themistocles, Thucydides, and Pericles* (*FGrH* 107 F 10a), which may be an early example of political biography (see Rhodes 1981: 22); the defense speech of Theramenes in the Heidelberg papyri collection (Rhodes 1981: 22), though recent discoveries of fragments would suggest it belongs to a narrative history (Loftus 2000); the *Athenaion Politeia* of Ps.-Xenophon; Antiphon's defense speech, *On Revolution* (Thucydides 8.68.2; with Rhodes 1982: 22 and Gagarin 1997: 248); Thrasymachus of Chalcedon's *Peri Politeias* and *On Behalf of the Larissans* and *On Constitution* (*DK* 88, B 1-2); the *Peri Politeias* ascribed to Herodes Atticus but most the work of a fifth century oligarch, quite possibly Critias (Wade-Gery 1945); Andocides, *Against Alcibiades* (Raubitschek 1948).

same name.[170] What is unclear is the precise role the pamphlet played in the context of Athenian political culture, which offered many avenues to citizens and non-citizens alike for expressing political views (e.g., assembly, council, law courts, and dramatic festivals).[171] Though more work needs to be done, Adams' analysis is a good point of departure. He proposes four types of individual for whom the pamphlet was useful: 1) the man who sought to propagate political doctrines and political movements that could not be discussed openly; 2) the man who for any reason had no access to the bema and wished to influence public opinion; 3) the man who wished to reach a small reading class about ideas that demanded more deliberate thought than could be expressed in the assembly; and 4) the man who wished to influence public opinion in other states.[172] Of these four categories, it is the third that fits extremely well with Xenophon's objectives in

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[170] The key question that has not been satisfactorily answered is whether these deliberative orations were first composed as speeches for oral delivery and then circulated (cf. Lysias' speech in Plato, *Phaedrus* 227a-234c) or originally written specifically for a reading audience. By the middle of the fourth century, there is little doubt that Isocrates composed his "speeches" in the latter manner, but it is debated whether orators like Demosthenes ever circulated their deliberative speeches at all (see Adams 1912 and Trevett 1996).

[171] All Athenian citizens had the privilege of *isegoria*, the equal right to address the assembly. At the beginning of each meeting, as a part of normal procedure, the herald made the general proclamation: "Who wishes to speak?" (τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται) (Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 45, *Thesmophoriazusae* 379, *Ecclesiazusae* 130; Aeschines, *Against Timarchus* 1.23, *Against Ctesiphon* 3.4; Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 18.170; Plutarch, *Moralia* 784 c-d). Even though the council by and large set the agenda for the assembly, proposing specific recommendations to be voted on (*probouleuma*), in many cases the council issued an open *probouleuma* to the assembly at which any one could bring recommendations forward (Rhodes 1997: 12-13). Even if the recommendation of the council was not open, citizens still had the right to propose amendments or alternative motions (see, for example, Xenophon's narrative (*Hellenica* 1.7.1-35) of the debate over the fate of the six Athenian generals after Arginusae in 406). In fact, on one day a month disenfranchised citizens and even foreigners could address the assembly on any matter public or private (Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 43.6 with Rhodes 1982: 527-8; cf. Demosthenes 9.3). Naturally, the right to speak in the law courts was somewhat circumscribed, especially in private cases where only the injured party could initiate proceedings (*dikai*), but in matters of public concern any Athenian (ὁ βουλόμενος) had the right to prosecute another (*graphe*).

[172] Adams 1912: 8-9; cf. Kennedy 1963: 204 who suggests that the publication of political speeches may have originated among aliens who "were desirous of influencing Athenian political opinions, but who were barred from speaking in the assembly." This view cannot be maintained in light of Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 43.6 (see previous note).

the *Poroi*. The multiplicity of schemes, the technical subject matter, and the need for quantitative analysis and computation would have required multiple readings and readers. Unlike some of the pamphlets from the end of the fifth century that take the form of public speeches, which were in all likelihood read aloud, little in the *Poroi*, both in respect to form and content, lends itself to the idea that it was "performed" at small political gatherings, although the idea should not be ruled out completely.

The *Poroi*, therefore, may rightly be considered a "reading text." With reading texts oral presentation is not needed or even preferred, as Cole explains: "What delivery…is to an entire oral performance and its success with an audience, such is style to a piece whose presentation the factor of delivery does not enter. The performer delivers the whole text of his role to the audience; and, in corresponding fashion, style "delivers" the contents of the role into a written text. It is, to use the expression of a modern critic, a kind of 'writing out loud'...the written word's effort to do the work of the spoken word."[173] Interestingly, Cole argues that reading texts developed during the fourth century as a consequence of professional speech writers composing speeches for their clients of limited speaking abilities that "might suggest the real person, real moral commitment (*prohairesis*), and real character (*ethos*) behind the words it contained. In this way they were contributing to the development of a medium so successful for projecting another person before an audience that orators [and Plato and Isocrates as he goes on to argue] eventually decided to use it for self-projection as well."[174] The idea of

[173] Cole 1991: 122; the "modern critic" Cole speaks of is Roland Barthes.
[174] Cole 1991: 123.

"self-projection" in reading texts is instructive for our analysis of the *Poroi* because it helps to explain two stylistic and linguistic oddities.

First, Xenophon is fond of making strong first person assertions by frequently employing the pronoun ἐγώ and the intensive ἔγωγε—a tendency unparalleled in his other works.[175] Second, the diction of the *Poroi* is so characteristic of Xenophon that it confounded L. Gauthier's attempts to categorize Xenophon's works according to dialectical variation. For instance, the diction of the *Memorabilia* and *Hellenica* approximates the pure Attic dialect more so than any of Xenophon's other works, and thus Gauthier naturally assumed that Xenophon composed these texts for an Athenian audience. However, if true, why does the *Poroi*, which Xenophon undoubtedly wrote for Athenian consumption, display so many un-Attic usages?[176] The inclusion of these two features may have been unconscious on Xenophon's part, but considering the nature of his literary enterprise, another interpretation recommends itself. By writing a discourse on a topic that traditionally belonged to deliberative oratory and yet, in his case, was not suitable for oral delivery, it was necessary, rhetorically speaking, for Xenophon to project himself before his reading audience. For modern readers of Xenophon, and *a fortiori* for

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[175] In fact, Xenophon employs ἐγώ or the emphatic ἔγωγε eleven times in the *Poroi*, a number that is matched only by *Hipparchicus*, a work which, keep in mind, is significantly longer than the *Poroi*; cf. *On Horsemanship* = 2; *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* = 5; *Agesilaus* = 6; *Apology* = 2. Pearson 1976: 114 argues similarly that Demosthenes' extensive use of ἐγώ in *On Symmories* is a way for the relatively "unknown speaker" to distinguish himself from his contemporaries who are more familiar to the Athenian public.

[176] L. Gauthier 1911: 135: "The true language of Xenophon is that of the *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia*. It is in these works that the particularities of Xenophon are the most apparent, especially in respect to the lexicological order. When looking at it from the point of view of the *Memorabilia*, we see that the *Hellenica* was composed for the Athenian public; the aim of the work it to persuade Athens to reconcile herself with Sparta in order to confront a common enemy: Thebes. In these circumstances it is not improbable that the author made an effort to conform more strictly to Attic usage." "We have to admit that *Revenues* does not offer any support to my hypothesis. Its language is that of the Cyropaedia, etc." (135, n.

an Athenian readership, Xenophon's style and diction are immediately recognizable. Similarities in respect to diction and style between Xenophon's own speeches in the *Anabasis* and the *Poroi* bear this statement out. However, when Xenophon composes speeches for others, he tries to project the speaker's ethos, not his own.[177] Thus, Xenophon's self-projection in the *Poroi* demonstrates his desire to distinguish himself and his ideas from those of his Athenian contemporaries.

By way of concluding this section on the genre and audience of the *Poroi*, it behooves us to consider briefly the political orientation of Xenophon's rhetoric. In her book-length study of Andocides' deliberative speech, *On the Peace*, Missiou argues persuasively that the orator's rhetoric is decidedly "subversive," because he refuses "to conform to the democratic code of rhetorical behavior."[178] According to Missiou, an orator who employs this democratic code composes his speech in such a way that it explains "*what* is to be done and *why* and *how* it should be done" so that "it enables the many to participate in the process of weighing up a situation and reaching a decision in favor of their interest in terms of gain and loss." For Missiou, Demosthenes' *On the Symmories* (the occasion of which was a meeting of the assembly that was to decide whether the Athenians should go to war with the Persians) exemplifies this democratic code because he tells the Athenians "*what has been done wrong* and *why* it is wrong and

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2). For examples of Xenophon's use of Doric, Ionic, Hellenistic, and rare poetic forms, see L. Gauthier 1911 passim and Thiel 1922: xxi-xxiii.

177 So Gray 1989 in respect to the *Hellenica*. It should be noted that she also speaks of Xenophon obeying the "rule of propriety" (τὸ πρέπον), which posits that the style of writing match or be appropriate to the subject matter (183).

178 Missiou 1992: 176. Harris 2000 has rightly questioned the authenticity of this speech, but for my purposes here its genuineness is irrelevant.

what ought to be done and *why* and *how* it can be done."[179] By contrast, Andocides "preached peace but did not demonstrate its usefulness to his audience" nor show how peace could be maintained given the current political circumstances.[180] Missiou's notion of a democratic code operating within Athenian deliberative rhetoric is helpful for understanding the ideological orientation of the *Poroi*. Throughout the work, Xenophon explains thoroughly to his readers *what* is to be done with Athenian finances and *why* (see next section) and *how* his financial proposals should be carried out. No other work of deliberative oratory exhibits the *Poroi's* level of detail in the elaboration and demonstration of how a plan should be executed. For example, in *On the Peace* Isocrates is certainly meticulous in describing *what* the Athenians have done wrong to the Greeks and *why* (8.18-131), but when it comes to offering specific ways on *how* they can change course and act justly (132), Isocrates comes up short, giving three very general and generic recommendations that seem more of an afterthought than serious proposals for reform (133-5). In fact, only one of Isocrates' suggestions—electing the kind of men to run the state who administer their private affairs well (133)—involves the democratic process, that is, voting. Xenophon, as argued above, views his proposals specifically as *probouleumata*, encouraging his readers to calculate their value in the hopes that they both consider them beneficial for the polis and introduce them into the assembly. In short, because the *Poroi* is dialogical, welcoming active participation in the deliberative process, it is a splendid piece of democratic rhetoric.

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[179] Missiou 1992: 152-3, quoting Pearson 1976: 29. Cf. Demosthenes 3.10: "Perhaps someone would say that we all know that it is necessary to send help, and we will send help, but tell us *how*."
[180] Missiou 1992: 142.

2E. Xenophon's Civic Pedagogy

In this last section, I would like to consider one last aspect of Xenophon's rhetoric, namely his framing of the work in terms of a civic pedagogy. Xenophon aims not simply to persuade his audience of the expediency of his plans but also to educate them about their merits for making a citizenry virtuous. This should not come too much as a surprise, because the *rhetor* who possessed specialized financial knowledge functioned much like a teacher within the Athenian democracy.[181] The Athenian demos by and large was ignorant of finance and hence needed the *rhetor* to teach them not only the intricacies of money matters but also how they related to the functioning of the democracy and the perpetuation of democratic values. According to Kallet-Marx, what connections the *rhetor* above all tried to insinuate were those between money, power, and empire; money was necessary for power and power for empire, and empire itself was fundamental to the functioning of the democracy, because imperial revenues subsidized payments for political participation.[182]

Xenophon, however, departs from his contemporary *rhetores* in that he challenges these identifications, drawing attention to the negative repercussions of Athenian imperial finance. Because he addresses a limited audience of the Athenian demos, he is able to speak more frankly and, indeed, more philosophically. The long, complex opening sentence of the *Poroi* evidences well Xenophon's civic pedagogy, which establishes a distinctive pedagogical relationship with his audience:

> Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεί ποτε νομίζω, ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθήνησι

181 Kallet-Marx 1994.
182 Kallet-Marx 1994: 239-48.

προεστηκότων ἔλεγόν τινες ὡς γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἔφασαν ἀδικώτεροι εἶναι περὶ τὰς πόλεις, ἐκ τούτου ἐπεχείρησα σκοπεῖν εἴ πῃ δύναιντ' ἂν οἱ πολῖται διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν, ὅθενπερ καὶ δικαιότατον, νομίζων, εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἅμα τῇ τε πενίᾳ αὐτῶν ἐπικεκουρῆσθαι ἂν καὶ τῷ ὑπόπτους τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι.

I have always held the opinion that states' constitutions[183] are determined by the character of its leading politicians. However, when some of the leading politicians at Athens kept saying that they understood justice no less than other men, but on account of the poverty of the multitude they felt compelled to be rather unjust in their treatment of the allied cities,[184] I accordingly tried to examine whether the citizens could be maintained in some way from their own territory, which indeed would be the most just solution, because I thought that if this were so, they would be relived not only of their poverty but the suspicion that exists among the Greeks as well (1.1).

Unlike Xenophon's other works, only the *Poroi* begins notably with a gnome. On the syntactic level, the μέν…δέ construction directs the reader to take this gnomic statement with the following sentiments of the *prostatai*. Nevertheless, as a direct response to the gnome their remarks seemingly make little sense. Xenophon only asserts that he has "always held the opinion that states' constitutions are determined by the character of its leading politicians," and in reply to this generalization, the *prostatai* defend themselves

183 Though I have translated τὰς πολιτείας as "constitutions," the parallel passage in the *Cyropaedia* makes it all but certain that Xenophon is using *politeia* in the more general sense of the "political community," that is, the citizens of the state (so Gauthier 1976: 35); cf. Cicero, *Epistles to His Intimates* 1.9.12: *quales in republica principes essent, tales reliquos solere esse cives*.

184 Commentators have interpreted τὰς πόλεις as "allies," but it must be stressed that this designation includes all poleis allied with or subject to Athens, not just those states that are members of the Second Athenian Sea League. Xenophon refers to the League members specifically as the "islanders" (5.6). Moreover, elsewhere in the *Poroi* (2.1, 3.11, 4.8, 4.9, 5.2, 5.8), αἱ πόλεις means Greek cities more generally.

specifically against the charge of being "unjust" toward the allied states.[185] Their apologia would be non-sequitur unless, that is, Xenophon had been expressing his disapproval with them for some time. In other words, the gnome contains latent criticism of the *prostatai* and their policies toward Athens' allies. Properly speaking, then, the passage is analeptic, because it recalls anterior discourse between Xenophon and the *prostatai* about the injustice of empire. As argued above (Section 2B), the deictic adverb ἐπεί brings us to the *origo* or context of their remarks. This discursive context seems to have been dialogic in nature, involving numerous exchanges between Xenophon and the *prostatai*, as indicated by the imperfect tense of ἔλεγον. While a number of interpretations may commend themselves, there are good reasons for believing that these exchanges were personal and didactic in nature.

First, the introductory gnome is identical to the one Xenophon expresses in the *Cyropaedia* (8.8.5), which explains why he says, "I have *always* held the opinion." However, as the commentators correctly point out, the notion of citizens exhibiting the same character as their leaders is not unique to Xenophon, because the idea was a *topos* at the time.[186] It is found primarily in *protreptic* discourses, of which Isocrates' *To*

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[185] As there is no stated subject governing the verb εἶναι in the indirect statement introduced by ἔφασαν, the subject refers back to the *prostatai*: it is they who are specifically actingly "rather unjust." Xenophon is being coy. It was commonplace for the demos to deflect criticism aimed at their policies by blaming the leadership, whose names were prominanetly inscribed on all laws and decrees (see Thucydides 8.46.6).

[186] Thiel 1922: 3 and Gauthier 1976: 36; cf. Rosenbloom 2004: 92, who refers to the idea as a "trope." Demosthenes' citation of the idea implies that it was a commonplace: "Though you probably know it, I will nonetheless tell you: whatever sort of men you appear to court and preserve, these are the men you will seem to be like" (ὡς ἐκεῖν′ εἰδόσιν μὲν ἴσως, ὅμως δ′ ἐρῶ· ὁποίους τινὰς ἂν φαίνησθ′ ἀγαπῶντες καὶ σῴζοντες, τούτοις ὅμοιοι δόξετ′ εἶναι) (22.64). The same sentiment is found also in *Memorabilia* 3.5.14; Isocrates 2.31; 3.37; 7.22; 8.53; Demosthenes 20.13; Polybius 9.23.6-8; 11.29.11.

Nicocles and *Nicocles* are the two earliest examples.[187] Scholars refer to these texts and others of their ilk with various designations, such as "wisdom literature," "instructional literature," or "instruction of princes."[188] In this genre, a speaker adopts the persona of a pious wise man who encourages his readers/listeners to turn away from vice (*protreptic*) by giving positive counsel on how to live a virtuous life (*parainesis*). The advice tends to be traditional, gnomic, and practical and is usually addressed to the speaker's *philoi*, among whom numbered princes, kings, and even tyrants.

The reason the idea of the ruled mirroring the character of the rulers finds expression in such *protreptic* contexts is because the successful moral conversion of the one necessarily leads to the conversion of the many. "But if a man should turn to virtue those who control the people," Isocrates reasons, "he would assist both of them at once, both those that hold sovereignty and those who are subject to them" (εἰ δέ τις τοὺς κρατοῦντας τοῦ πλήθους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν προτρέψειεν, ἀμφοτέρους ἂν ὀνήσειεν, καὶ τοὺς τὰς δυναστείας ἔχοντας καὶ τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῖς ὄντας) (2.8). According to this pedagogy, the leader serves as an ethical model (παράδειγμα) to the multitude (τὸ πλῆθος); as long as he is "above suspicion of immoral conduct" (ῥᾳστώτατος...τῶν

[187] In *To Demonicus*, Isocrates speaks of those who "compose hortatory essays to their friends" (τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φίλους τοὺς προτρεπτικοὺς λόγους συγγράφουσι) (3). For Isocrates, λόγος προτρεπτικός is a particular kind of work in which a sophist exhorts young readers to become competent orators. Isocrates therefore eschews this title for his hortative works, preferring to call them "moral instructions" (παραινέσεις) because of the heavy emphasis on gnomic instruction. Perhaps for this reason, the philosophers of the fourth century entitled their hortative works Προτρεπτικός in order to distinguish their advice from the traditional, gnomic counsels of Isocrates (Diogenes Laertius 2.85; 5.22; 6.2, 16). Despite Isocrates' preference for the term *parainesis*, modern scholars prefer the designation "*protreptic*" (e.g., Jebb 1876: 81-4, following the Renaissance scholar Jerome Wolf (1570) or "*logos symbouleutikos*" (Jaeger 1934: 55; cf. Jaeger 1944: 308, n.3).

τοιοῦτων ὑποψιῶν), the multitude are "wont" (φιλεῖ) to take him as a pattern for their own conduct (3.37; 2.31). The benefits of this relationship are reciprocal: the leader gains security (ἀσφάλεια) in his position of power (1.43; 2.8, 36; 3.54, 56) and the state as a whole becomes prosperous (εὐδαίμων) (2.39; 3.10, 32, 63).[189] Even though the gnome in question probably has its origins in the instruction of princes genre, it found traction in the rulers and ruled dynamic of the Athenian democracy because the *prostates* embodied and performed the communal identity in a manner analogous to kings.[190] Thus, the deployment of this gnome so prominently at the beginning of the *Poroi* recommends the view that the exchanges between Xenophon and the *prostatai* originated in a discursive context similar to the one in which Isocrates frames his *protreptic* discourses.

Furthermore, the expression γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων has a Socratic ring and is reminiscent of certain conversations from Books III-IV of the *Memorabilia* between Socrates and other Athenian *prostatai*

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188 See, for example, Jaeger 1934: 54-60 and 1944: 84-105, West 1978: 3-30, Martin 1984, and Gray 1999: 159-77.

189 It is interesting to note that in the *Cyropaedia* Xenophon sets up a similar dynamic with Cyrus as the model (παράδειγμα) of conduct for his people (7.5.85; 8.1.39). When Cyrus was alive, the empire was virtuous and prosperous; but as soon as he died and his sons took over, they failed to heed their father's deathbed advice, and so the empire turned to wickedness and wrongdoing (8.8.5). In a sense, by interjecting the gnomic idea of citizens embodying the moral character of its leaders, Xenophon provides an etiology not only for the moral decline of the empire but its initial success and prosperity under the leadership of Cyrus.

190 Rosenbloom 2004: 92 and Connor 1992: 115. The quintessential passage evidencing the connection between the *prostates* of the demos and monarchy is Herodotus 3.82.4: "whoever is leader of the demos…appears to be a monarch" (ἂν προστάς τις τοῦ δημοῦ...ἐφάνη μούναρχος ἐών) (cf. Thucydides 2.65.9). Accordingly, to Rosenbloom, it was an "ideological imperative" for those hostile to democratic leadership to oversimplify the relationship between leaders and followers by ignoring the fact that at any given time there were several *prostatai* of the people (92). Of course this cut both ways, as the

about justice.[191] Although the setting and characters in these passages belong to the fifth century, the ideas and sentiments the characters express are representative of the political milieu of late 360s and 350s. Xenophon therefore portrays not accurate historical conversations between Socrates and his *philoi* but largely fictive dialogues between a Socratic figure and largely generic characters about problems and concerns particular to the middle part of the fourth century. While one cannot know the extent to which Xenophon's portrayal of Socrates is historically accurate, it is difficult to deny that his representation of the philosopher was, in part, a literary invention. Recently V. Gray has argued persuasively that Xenophon specifically "frames" the *Memorabilia* in the tradition of instructional wisdom literature in order to produce a coherent image of Socrates that rejoins the capital charges the Athenians brought against him.[192] By depicting Socrates as a traditional wise man who both honors the gods and benefits his friends and city by dispensing practical advice, Xenophon ably vindicates him of the charges of impiety and corrupting the young. Gray's observations are instructive because they reveal that Xenophon was not only thoroughly familiar with the genre of instructional literature but also interested in modernizing and even "Socratising" instructional literary traditions.[193]

Moreover, it is also apparent from his instructional works that Xenophon is keen on "Socratising" his relationships with his own *philoi*.[194] In *On Horsemanship*,

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demos was suspicious of oligarchic leaders turning themselves into tyrants as well (e.g., Alcibiades). These dynamics played out in a similar fashion in the fourth century (see Ober 1989: 318-24).

[191] Gauthier 1976: 37-8, citing *Memorabilia* 4.2.20; cf. 4.4.1-25 and Luccioni 1953: 163.

[192] Gray 1998: 159-192.

[193] Gray 1998: 194-5 suggests interpreting the *Hiero*, *Cyropaedia*, *Symposium*, and *Oeconomicus* in this manner.

[194] I am thinking primarily of *Hipparchicus*, *On Horsemanship*, and *Cynegeticus*. I follow Richards 1907: 111-127 and Gray 1985, who argue that the *Cynegeticus* is an authentic work of Xenophon.

Xenophon says that he wants to demonstrate to "his younger friends" (τοῖς νεωτέροις τῶν φίλων) what he considers to be the "most correct way to deal with horses" (1.1). Presumably, his younger friends knew only the "wrong" way, and Xenophon proceeds to give practical advice on horsemanship. Some of this advice is traditional because he includes recommendations from the fifth-century equitation writer Simon. The inclusion of Simon's opinions squares with Socrates' attitude toward traditional advice in the *Memorabilia*: "And the treasures that the wise men of old have left behind in their books I open up and go through with my friends, and if we see anything good, we consider it; and we count it a great profit if we become useful to one another" (1.6.14). In the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon concerns himself with the formation of Athens' political leaders in particular by advising the would-be *hipparch* on how best to carry out his duties for "himself, his friends, and polis" (σαυτῷ δὲ καὶ φίλοις καὶ τῇ πόλει) (1.1). Socrates, we are told, consorts with his friends so that "they are able to do their duty to their household, family, relatives, friends, polis, and fellow citizens" (καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆσθαι) (*Memorabilia* 1.2.48; cf. 4.5.10).

Judging from these passages, it appears that Xenophon not only had a personal interest in his *philoi's* education but that he framed his relationships with his *philoi* Socratically by assuming the part of the wise, practical advisor.[195] Such is his role

[195] Cf. Luccioni 1953: 163, who speaks of Xenophon placing "his projects of reform [sc. in the *Poroi*] under the patronage of Socrates;" his notes on this page draw further parallels between Socrates' recommendations in the *Memorabilia* and Xenophon's own in the "technical treatises." However, perhaps it is a mistake to distinguish so sharply between Xenophon and Socrates. After all, Socrates did not leave any writings behind, and therefore it is just as likely a proposition that the similarities between the

implicit at the beginning of the *Poroi*, I submit. For Gauthier the *prostatai*'s claim of understanding τὸ δίκαιον is clear proof they had a "Socratic education."[196] Although the idea of a formal Socratic education may be somewhat of a reach, we should not discount the notion that the *prostatai* acquired their knowledge of Socrates and his philosophy not only from reading works like the *Memorabilia* but also directly from Xenophon himself (e.g., in private conversation, at symposia, in letters, etc.). It would seem, then, that Xenophon actively sought out political leaders in order to teach them how to improve the polis by first improving themselves. Socrates' conversation with Pericles the Younger in the *Memorabilia* illustrates well how seriously Xenophon took this pedagogical mission. "What can the Athenians do," asks Pericles, "to recover their former excellence?" (νῦν οὖν, ἔφη, τί ἂν ποιοῦντες ἀναλάβοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἀρετήν;). "By imitating those who are currently of the first rank and practicing their habits," responds Socrates (τούς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας μιμούμενοι καὶ τούτοις τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντες) (3.5.14). But Pericles is dubious because, as a general, he knows how incredibly insubordinate (ἀπειθεστάτοι) and undisciplined (ἄτακτοι) the Athenians are in war. Nevertheless, as long as a few examples of good conduct continue to exist, Socrates urges Pericles not to "think the wickedness of Athenians so utterly past remedy" (οὕτως ἡγοῦ ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους) (18).

Nonetheless, the *prostatai's* defense against the charge of being unjust toward the allies reveals a serious breakdown in Xenophon's civic pedagogy. The poverty of the

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Memorabilia and *On Horsemanship* et al. result not from Xenophon "Socratising" these works but from Xenophon "Xenophonizing" Socrates.

masses, they claim, necessitates their unjust behavior. In this regard, they are echoing a common Athenian conception about poverty, namely, that poor people are more likely to commit crimes in the hope of escaping destitution.[197] By this admission, they turn Xenophon's entire educational paradigm on its head: the leaders reflect the character of the ruled, not the other way around. Yet, by proposing measures that seek to improve the material condition of the Athenian masses in the "most just" (δικαιότατον) manner, Xenophon attempts to neutralize this defense and make the *prostatai* accountable for their behavior. Xenophon promises that "if the plans which I have proposed are carried out, I say that not only will the polis be better off in respect to its revenues but also more obedient, disciplined, and successful in war" (πραχθέντων γε μὴν ὧν εἴρηκα [ξύμ]φημὶ ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον ἂν χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ εὐπολεμωτέραν γενέσθαι) (4.51). There are three notable aspects of Xenophon's contention.

First, by making the polis χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν, Xenophon ensures that justice will once again return to the state because the *prostatai* will no longer feel compelled to relieve the poverty of the masses through the unjust treatment of the allies. Accordingly, instead of being a "cause of suspicion" the Athenians will become "more agreeable to the Greeks…and more glorious" (προσφιλέστεροι μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησι…εὐκλεέστεροι) (6.1). Recall that, according to Isocrates, the leader-exemplar must be "above suspicion of immoral conduct" for the multitude to take him as a pattern

196 Gauthier 1976: 37, 43.

for their own conduct. Secondly, and more importantly, the implementation of Xenophon's plans will ultimately help realize the goals of his civic pedagogy, for the polis will recover its "former excellence" by becoming "more obedient, disciplined, and successful in war." Lastly, Xenophon boasts that by making the polis χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν he will render it "secure in its prosperity" (μετ' ἀσφαλείας εὐδαιμονοῦσαν) (6.1). As demonstrated above, Isocrates too offers his advisees the hope of security (ἀσφάλεια) and prosperity (εὐδαιμονία) as rewards for following his instructions. For Xenophon, then, the defense of the *prostatai* does not lead him to abandon his civic pedagogy but to transform it by acknowledging that the material condition of humans and their societies can be both a hindrance and a *means* for achieving *arête*. In the final analysis, the *Poroi* is not only a collection of ways and means for improving the material prosperity of Athens but a *poros* for its citizens to live the good life.

Conclusion

As I argued in Section 2B, the philological, historical, and circumstantial evidence strongly suggest that Xenophon returned to Athens after his exile had been lifted shortly before the battle of Mantinea, and thus that Xenophon composed the *Poroi* while living in Athens. The genre analysis given in the previous section strengthens significantly this interpretation. Introducing proposals of ways and means was the province not only of financial experts like the *poristai* but by the middle of the fourth century it was becoming one of the most important functions of an Athenian statesmen. The level of engagement

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[197] Dover 1974: 109-12 and Rosivach 1991.

in the political and economic affairs of the city that the *Poroi* presupposes casts serious doubt on the idea that Xenophon was only a casual visitor to the city. He returned not only as a citizen but also as an actively engaged citizen. As Anaximenes asserts: "A good citizen…is one who procures for the state abundant revenues" (πολίτης δὲ ἀγαθός ἐστιν…ὅστις πλείστας προσόδους παρασκευάζει) (1446b33). Moreover, considering that Xenophon crafted the *Poroi* specifically as a deliberative discourse of the private or *bouleutic* variety, we must take seriously the practicality of Xenophon's proposals, which he treats as inchoate *probouleumata,* which will eventually be introduced into the assembly. This last stage in the legislative process was, of course, contingent upon the number of policy makers that Xenophon could convince of the expediency of his schemes. The dramatic context of the *Poroi's* prologue reveals that Xenophon possessed a network of political *philoi,* whom he had been instructing and encouraging to behave in a just manner toward Athens' allies. These were the individuals on whom Xenophon especially counted to implement his financial proposals.

Chapter 3: Poverty, *Trophe* and Athens' Imperial Economy

Whoever lives in poverty lives not as he wishes,
because want is ready to cause him to do bad things.[1]

Introduction

At the end of the previous chapter, I examined the prologue of the *Poroi*, in which Xenophon articulates the purpose of the work: to relieve the poverty of the Athenian citizens by maintaining them from their own domestic resources. Xenophon deems this plan the "most just solution," because, as some Athenian political leaders alleged, "the poverty of the masses compelled them to act rather unjustly toward their allies." According to Xenophon, curing the Athenians of their poverty will ameliorate Athens' standing among the Greeks, who were suspicious of the Athenians because of their abuse of the allies. By framing the prologue in such a manner, Xenophon impugns not only the unjust behavior of certain Athenian politicians but also the entire imperial economy on which the Athenians depended for their sustenance. From the very beginning of the work, therefore, Xenophon aims to set his financial and economic proposals apart from imperial modes of acquisition, creating anticipation in the reader that his program will be new, innovative, and, indeed, an alternative to empire. For the *Poroi's* originality, Polanyi contends, "lies in the thought that wealth, power, and security can be the product of peace rather than war."[2] It is with good reason, then, that Higgins considers Xenophon's economics "essentially anti-imperialist."[3]

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[1] Philemon Fg. 157 (Edmonds); cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 498-9.
[2] Polanyi 1977: 196.
[3] Higgins 1977: 140.

A number of scholarly controversies and misconceptions about the *Poroi*, however, complicate the foregoing interpretation. First, some historians who approach the fourth century from the perspective of class interpret Xenophon's recommendations in the *Poroi* as a case study in the Athenian elite's efforts to mitigate social and political tensions created by an increasing gap between rich and poor, especially because of the effects of the Social War.[4] The evidence for class conflict in fourth century Greece is well attested, but in Athens open class antagonism and widespread class-consciousness were virtually non-existent.[5] That is not to say that tensions between rich and poor did not exist, but it seems that the Athenian democracy itself, its institutions, laws, and public fora, played a significant role in reducing class conflict.[6] Some Athenians did advocate materialistic solutions to ameliorate class tensions though. For instance, to avoid socio-economic *stasis* in Greek poleis Isocrates proposed resettling the indigent and other undesirables, who advocated the cancellation of debts and/or the redistribution of property, in conquered territories outside the Greek world.[7] The problem is that in the *Poroi* there is not even a hint of such social instability. As argued in Section 2B, Xenophon most likely composed the *Poroi* over many years, beginning before the outbreak of hostilities, and thus it is problematic to assume the work responds exclusively to the adverse economic conditions caused by the Social War. To my mind, Xenophon is

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4 E.g., Pöhlmannn 1984: 240-51, Payrau 1971: 50-8, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 348-9, Schütrumpf 1982: 32 and 1995: 298, and Azoulay 2004: 221-30.

5 Dover 1972: 37-41, Pecirka 1976: 17-18, Ste. Croix 1981: 284, and Ober 1989: 198. For discussions and analyses of class and class conflict, see Pöhlmannn 1984: 251-65, Mossé 1962: 137-55, 407-9 and 1973: 16-17, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 20-5, Wood and Wood 1978: 41-64, Ste. Croix 1981-278-300, Finley 1983: 1-23, 97-121, Strauss 1986: 55-9, and Ober 1989: Chapter 5 and 1991. Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 338-51 have collected the most relevant fourth century sources.

6 This is the thesis of Ober 1989, which was first proposed by Ste Croix 1981: 284.

quite clear and direct on the issue: the poverty of the Athenians has led to unjust actions not at home but *abroad*; accordingly, a reduction in poverty, brought about through increases in domestic resources, will relieve the Athenians of the suspicion running rampant in the greater *Greek* world.[8] The main conflict here is between ruler and subject, not rich and poor. I do not mean to suggest that an analysis of class has no place in the *Poroi*, but rather that it contributes little to our understanding of Xenophon's primary aim in composing the *Poroi*.[9]

A second obstacle to understanding Xenophon's anti-imperialistic economics is the interpretation of the term τροφή. In the prologue, Xenophon contemplates whether "the Athenian citizens can be maintained (διατρέφεσθαι) from their own domestic resources," a question he answers later in the work when he declares that "sufficient maintenance for all Athenians" (ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις τροφὴν) is possible if the city adopts his proposals (4.33; cf. 4.13, 52). Some historians take *trophe* to mean quite literally "food" or "payment for food," while others, claiming that *trophe* is a veritable synonym of *misthos*, argue that it refers to a payment or wage in exchange for

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[7] See, above all, Baynes 1955: 144-67 and Fuks 1972; cf. Green 1996: 21: "What Isocrates really wants, in short, is protection for *property owners*…" Cf. Aeneas Tacticus, *Siegecraft* 14.

[8] Similarly at 5.1-4, where Xenophon speaks of peace, he concentrates almost exclusively on how the greater Greek world benefits, and at 6.1 he begins his enumeration of the benefits of his program not with Athens but the Greeks. Indeed, he does say in this same passage that his program will have the benefit of "releasing the rich from the expenses of war." Yet, this admission does not necessarily mean that the rich had been the primary financiers of Athens' welfare system. One of the main objectives of this chapter is to demonstrate that the vast majority of funds to subsidize *trophe* for the demos came from the Athenian empire.

[9] It is noteworthy that the term πλῆθος, "multitude," which elites seem to have used to connote the poor "commons" (e.g., *Ath. Pol*. 2.1 with Rhodes 1981: 88-9), is what Xenophon puts into the mouths of the *prostatai*, whereas he himself employs the class-neutral word πολῖται, "citizens." In other words, some *prostatai* wished to turn the injustice of Athenian imperialism into a class issue, but Xenophon refused to

services rendered to the state. The difference of meaning gives rise to two radically different interpretations of the *Poroi*. If *trophe* indicates "food" or one of its concomitant translations, such as "nourishment," "livelihood," or "sustenance," then Xenophon's perspective is largely economic, that is, in its strictest sense of satisfying material needs and wants.[10] If *trophe*, on the other hand, is synonymous with *misthos*, signifying pay for services rendered to the state, then Xenophon's ultimate purpose in composing the *Poroi* is political, because he aims to free the Athenians from the toil of work so that they might engage in politics full time.[11] Given the stakes of this debate, I devote Section 3A to the analysis of *trophe* in the *Poroi*. I firmly support the view that *trophe* refers strictly to food and/or money for food and thereby endorse the economic orientation of the work. In Section 3B, I investigate the related issue of poverty in fourth century Athens, examining in particular what Xenophon means by the "poverty of the *plethos*."

Lastly, many historians in the last thirty years have questioned seriously the idea that Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century was imperialistic. This school of thought contends that Athens learned from the mistakes of the past and did not actively pursue a policy to reconstitute its fifth-century empire. Athens' objectives overseas were largely defensive, and whenever they did intervene in allied states, the Athenians respected their freedom and autonomy. Because this interpretation flies in the face of Xenophon's depiction of Athens as a parasitic state, I devote a significant portion of this chapter to examining Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century. I maintain that

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countenance such an explanation and placed the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of all Athenians (cf. 4.33: πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις).

[10] Thiel 1922: 55, Cawkwell 1963: 63, note 92, Schütrumpf 1982: 15-38, 65-72, and Doty 2003: 5-9.

[11] Herzog 1914: 473-4, Wilhelm 1932: 43-4, Gauthier 1976: 20-32, 241-53 and 1984.

Athens did aim to recover its fifth-century empire and pursued imperialistic policies throughout the century, which fomented resentment and, ultimately, revolt among the allies (Section 3C). In Section 3D, I explore the causes of this renewed imperialism. I argue that securing *trophe* for the demos significantly influenced Athenian foreign policy, thus supporting Xenophon's framing of the *Poroi* in terms of "empire for food."

3A. *Trophe* and *Misthos*

The historians who have studied the classical attestations of *trophe* and *misthos* generally maintain that the Greeks used these terms interchangeably down until the advent of large mercenary armies in the middle of the fourth century.[12] For Pritchett, who deals primarily with the evidence from Thucydides concerning the remuneration of soldiers, *trophe/misthos* referred strictly to money for rations: "Just as dikastic pay was for maintenance, so the stratiotic pay made to citizens in the fifth century was for purchase of rations."[13] Greeks in the fourth century commonly deemed these ration-payments with such terms as εἰς σῖτος, σιτηρέσιον, or simply σῖτος. Loomis has challenged this interpretation, contending that *trophe/misthos* means gross pay, that is, pay plus ration-money.[14] He rests his argument on two claims: 1) Thucydides' use of *misthos* for mercenary pay suggests more than ration-money, because "[m]ercenaries are unlikely to fight for someone else…unless they expect to 'net' some money over and above whatever they have to pay for food;" and 2) rations could have been purchased for 2 to 3 obols per day, which is about half the average sum attested for pay before ca. 412;

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12 Pritchett 1971: 3-28, Will 1975, Gauthier 1976: 20-32 and 1984: 192, Gabrielsen 1981: 67-81, and Loomis 1998: 32-61.

13 Pritchett 1971: 6.

consequently, *misthos* must mean something more than ration-pay.[15] Recently, Kallet has cast serious doubts on both interpretations with her studious examination of Thucydides' financial terminology.[16] The historian's usage of *trophe* at 1.11.2, which undoubtedly refers to rations, cautions against taking *trophe* and *misthos* as synonyms. Moreover, in Book 8 Thucydides employs the term *trophe* predominantly in reference to Spartan expectations of receiving subsistence payments only, not full pay.[17] Kallet therefore proposes that "Thucydides uses *trophe* as a kind of subcategory of *misthos*, to connote mere subsistence..."[18] Apparently, at the end of the fifth century the Greeks were beginning to distinguish between wages for services and money for rations.[19]

This view of *trophe* and *misthos* accords well with Gabrielsen's analysis of these terms in fourth-century authors. Though he ultimately concludes that the two words were synonyms, Gabrielsen nevertheless asserts that *misthos* "conveys no particular meaning other than the general one for payment or wages," whereas *trophe* "bears an additional implication as to the usage of a given payment, i.e. to cover one's food expenses."[20]

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[14] Loomis 1998: Chapter 2.

[15] Loomis 1998: 35.

[16] Kallet 2001: 295-308.

[17] Kallet 2001: 297-99.

[18] Kallet 2001: 299.

[19] Schütrumpf 1982: 69-70 makes a similar point, citing Ps.-Xenophon, *Athenaion Politeia* 1.3, 16; Lysias 27.1; and Plato, *Gorgias* 515e6.

[20] Gabrielsen 1981: 70; cf. Schütrumpf 1982: 68-9 and Gauthier 1984: 192 n.15. On pages 72-3 Gabrielsen backs away from drawing this distinction, because, as he claims, four passages (Demosthenes 4.28-9; 18.260; Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 42.3, 62.2) call into question that fourth-century authors distinguished the terms consistently. Such a view is a mistake in my opinion, as Gabrielson's interpretations of these passages are unsound. His reading of Demosthenes 4.28-9 is so mistaken that it is sufficient to cite the analysis of Loomis 1988: 52-3. Demosthenes 18.260, which refers to Aeschines' receiving a *misthos* of "tipsy cakes, cracknels and currant buns," has nothing to do with the system of state pay and therefore should not be used as an example of how *misthos* could denote "payments in kind." Furthermore, the passages in the *Athenaion Politeia* indicate, according to Gabrielsen, that the sums for *trophe/sitos* payments were sometimes higher than *misthos* payments. At 62.2 Ps.-Aristotle says that the

Surprisingly, Gabrielsen ignores the evidence from Xenophon, who makes this same distinction consistently in his works. In the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon says that Cyrus "provided *misthos* and *trophe* for many" (8.5.23), which speaks strongly against the synonymy of the two words. Throughout the work, Xenophon, in a sense, glosses *trophe* for us by frequently mentioning τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, "the necessaries of life," in conjunction with *trophe*, which suggests that Xenophon is referring primarily to food, though τὰ ἐπιτήδεια may also mean the necessities of clothes and shoes (e.g., Plato, *Republic* 369d).[21] Interestingly, in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon links *trophe* specifically with food and *misthos* with clothes and shoes:

> Οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Χίῳ μετὰ τοῦ Ἐτεονίκου στρατιῶται ὄντες, ἕως μὲν θέρος ἦν, ἀπό τε τῆς ὥρας ἐτρέφοντο καὶ ἐργαζόμενοι μισθοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν· ἐπεὶ δὲ χειμὼν ἐγένετο καὶ τροφὴν οὐκ εἶχον γυμνοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι, συνίσταντο ἀλλήλοις καὶ συνετίθεντο ὡς τῇ Χίῳ ἐπιθησόμενοι.
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> The troops that were in Chios with Etonicus, *subsisted* from the produce of summer until harvest time and worked for a *wage* up and down the land; but when winter came, they did not have *food* and were naked and without shoes, so they came together and agreed to make an attack on Chios (2.1.1)

Etonicus' troops became naked and shoeless not because they were deprived of their *trophe* but because they could no longer work for *misthos*. This passage allows us to

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archons received four obols for εἰς σίτησιν, whereas dicasts got a comparable three obols *misthos*. "[B]y comparing the three obols *misthos* of the dicasts," he argues, "and the one drachma *eis sitesin* given to the archon for Salamis, or the one drachma *eis trofen* received by the sophronist (*Ath. Pol*. 42, 3) we can see that the two latter terms refer to sums that are relatively greater than *misthos*." This argument is cogent but, by no means, necessary. The discrepancy in payments is better explained by the fact that archons and other magistrates had to maintain dependents and/or slaves. For example, the nine archons had to support a herald and piper out of their funds (Loomis 1998: 26).

draw the conclusion that *trophe*, which here denotes rations, but elsewhere in Xenophon may also mean "ration-payment," refers strictly to food. *Misthos*, on the other hand, was a wage that, in theory, provided enough money to buy other necessities, such as shoes and clothing.[22] In the *Anabasis*, soldiers expected their *misthos* to be large enough not only to cover the necessities for themselves but also to yield some savings to help their families back home (5.6.19-29). For Xenophon then, *trophe* means both food and ration-payment, whereas *misthos* indicates gross pay; *misthos* may implicitly refer to *trophe*, but *trophe* never signifies *misthos* per se. The inclusion of *trophe* within the category of *misthos* does not indicate an equivalence of the two terms.[23]

The real issue, in my opinion, is whether *trophe* must always denote either payment in kind or ration-payment as *compensation* for services rendered, a conclusion Gabrielsen seems to reach.[24] Given that the remuneration of state-officials is his primary concern, it is understandable that Gabrielsen advocates this interpretation. Yet, Xenophon uses *trophe* countless times in non-payment situations.[25] For instance, the immediate context of Xenophon's remarks in the prologue about "maintaining" (διατρέφεσθαι) the Athenians has nothing to do with remuneration. In fact, in Chapter 1 Xenophon concerns himself exclusively with persuading his readers that Attica and its resources can "feed" (τρέφει) countless people (1.5). Hence, one cannot assume that

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21 *Cyropaedia* 1.6.15; 2.3.8; 4.5.17; 5.4.28; cf. *Anabasis* 5.6.32; 7.3.8; *Memorabilia* 2.8.2; and *Oeconomicus* 4.5-6, where Socrates proves that the Persian king is a diligent farmer because he supplies his army with *trophe.*

22 In fact, Xenophon, *Anabasis* 6.2.4 is the earliest attestation of the word σιτηρέσιον with the meaning ration-payment.

23 Cf. *Hellenica* 5.1.17.

24 Gabrielsen 1981: 74.

trophe implies payment for services rendered without examining the immediate context in which the word is deployed.[26] Let us now turn to the two most contested passages (2.1 and 6.1) and investigate how scholars have interpreted them.

In a short section on metics, Xenophon declares: "For the revenue from the metics seems to me to be one of the best, because they do not receive state-pay for the many benefits they render to cities all the while supporting themselves and paying the special metic tax" (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ πρόσοδος τῶν καλλίστων ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἐπείπερ <αὐτοὶ> αὑτοὺς τρέφοντες καὶ πολλὰ ὠφελοῦντες τὰς πόλεις οὐ λαμβάνουσι μισθόν, ἀλλὰ μετοίκιον προσφέρουσιν) (2.1). Gabrielsen claims this passage proves that Xenophon treats *misthos* and *trophe* synonymously:

> The inference to be made on analyzing the relevant sentences is that τοὺς αὐτοὺς [sic] means that the Athenian metics earned their living by means of private enterprise, therefore in no way burdening the state; moreover, that their actual earnings from these activities are, in view of the verbal form τρέφοντες, to be identified with the substantive *trofé*. These logically implied trofé payments earned by the metics are actually seen to be used by Xenophon interchangeably with the *misthós* payments, which proves their synonymity.[27]

Gabrielsen reasons soundly but his conclusion is by no means compulsory. As argued above, *misthos* may implicitly refer to *trophe* but cannot be used interchangeably with *trophe*, because *misthos* means gross pay, whereas *trophe* means either ration or ration-payment. All Xenophon says is that metics have enough money to feed themselves despite receiving no political *misthos*. In the *Hellenica*, for example, Xenophon employs

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[25] For non-payment uses of *trophe* in Xenophon, see, for example, *Hellenica* 6.3.6; Memorabilia 4.3.5; 4.3.10; *Oeconomicus* 5.5; 15; 17.14; *Symposium* 4.41; *De republica Lacedaemoniorum* 2.5.7.

[26] In addition to the prologue, Xenophon mentions *trophe* and its verbal derivatives seven other times in the *Poroi* (2.1; 4.13, 33, 49, 52 (2); 6.1), while *misthos* occurs only once (2.1).

the verbal forms of *trophe* to denote the maintenance of troops and sailors with *misthos* (5.1.24; 7.4.33), but he also uses these forms to signify their support with rations (e.g., 6.1.11; 6.2.37). The point of the former is that *misthos* allowed for the purchase of rations, and thus it is accurate to say that *misthos* "maintained" (τρέφειν) a fleet or army. What Xenophon does not say is that rations or ration-payments are equivalent to *misthos*.

Moreover, Gauthier argues that Xenophon's reference to metics receiving no *misthos* contains an implicit contrast with the practice of compensating citizens with *misthos* for political service, the implication being for Gauthier that Xenophon in the *Poroi* must be thinking primarily about Athenian civic *misthoi*, regardless of the term he employs.[28] For the moment, I am willing to overlook that Xenophon is generalizing in this passage, referring to Greek poleis more broadly, and accept that he is implicitly contrasting the non-payment of metics in the Greek world with civic *misthoi* at Athens. Nevertheless, it is specious to make such a contrast the heuristic basis for analyzing all of Xenophon's proposals vis-à-vis *trophe*, especially his initiative of supplying all Athenians with a daily allowance of three obols.[29] As I examine more fully in Chapter 5, Section 5C, Xenophon intends to fund this program by citizen and foreign participation in capital funds, of which the public purchase of slaves in the mining industry is the most notable example. The proceeds from these funds bear no similarity to the dynamic of *misthos*, in that the participants render no service or labor beyond fronting the startup

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[27] Gabrielsen 1981: 70; cf. Gauthier 1976: 32-3 who offers a similar interpretation of this passage.

[28] Gauthier 1976: 27; cf. Gabrielsen 1981: 70.

[29] The calculations that Xenophon gives at 3.9-10 prove that he intends to provide *every* Athenian with a daily *triobolon* (cf. 4.33) (see Marchant 1925: 203, n. 1 and Gauthier 1976: 93-4). This rate is also confirmed by Xenophon's remarks at 4.17, where he proposes increasing the number of slaves until there

capital. The initial outlay of the citizens may best be understood as a kind of *epidosis*, "gift," to the state, but one that yields monetary returns for the individual as well as revenues for the state. The participants are not "wage earners" (μισθωτοί), as Gauthier would have it, but "investors." One of the main problems with Gauthier's interpretation of this passage, which also holds true for much of his analysis of the *Poroi*, is that he denies Xenophon's creativity, because, as he sees it, Xenophon did "not pass for having had intelligence or an exceptional imagination."[30] The originality of Xenophon's financial scheme, which requires citizens to act as "economic animals," speaks strongly against Gauthier's interpretation.

In the second passage in question, Xenophon summarizes the benefits he thinks his financial schemes will generate for the city:

> Ἀλλ' εἴ γε μὴν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀδύνατον μὲν μηδέν ἐστι μηδὲ χαλεπόν, πραττομένων δὲ αὐτῶν προσφιλέστεροι μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησι γενησόμεθα, ἀσφαλέστερον δὲ οἰκήσομεν, εὐκλεέστεροι δὲ ἐσόμεθα, καὶ ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι τῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον δαπάνης ἀπαλλαγήσονται, περιουσίας δὲ πολλῆς γενομένης μεγαλοπρεπέστερον μὲν ἔτι ἢ νῦν ἑορτὰς ἄξομεν, ἱερὰ δ' ἐπισκευάσομεν, τείχη δὲ καὶ νεώρια ἀνορθώσομεν, ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν…
>
> Now indeed, if none of my proposals is difficult nor impossible, and if they are implemented, then we shall become more favored by the Greeks; we will live in greater security; we will be more esteemed; the Athenian people will have an abundance of *trophe*; and the rich will be released from the burdens of funding our wars. Moreover, with a large surplus [of revenue], we will conduct our festivals more magnificently than we do now; we will restore our temples and repair the walls and naval yards; and

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are three for every citizen; because he expects each slave to bring in an obol a day net (4.14, 23), this yields three obols a day per citizen (see Doty 2004: 6).

30 Gauthier 1976: 22.

> to the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry we will restore their ancient privileges (6.1).

Traditionally, the debate over this passage has focused on 1) whether the phrase ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει refers to political payments and, if so, which ones; and 2) whether the phrase ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν alludes to the remuneration of priests, the council, magistrates, and cavalry. Expanding upon Wilamowitz's interpretation of "*trophe* for the demos" as kind of "state-pension," Herzog contends that in 6.1 Xenophon is thinking primarily about *misthos* for civic functions.[31] He buttresses his claim by citing 4.52, where Xenophon remarks that Athenians, serving in a variety of defense duties, will carry out their duties better, "if *trophe* is given for each of these tasks (ἐφ' ἑκάστοις τῶν ἔργων τῆς τροφῆς ἀποδιδομένης). Thiel, however, vigorously resisted the identification of ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει with civic *misthos*, because, as he correctly points out, Xenophon intends all citizens, both rich and poor, to receive the same three obol rate.[32] This uniformity does not suggest payments for civic services and offices, since the rates of pay for these varied significantly. Thiel nonetheless follows Herzog's lead in reading ἱερεῦσι…τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν as Xenophon's political manifesto to remunerate

31 Herzog 1914: 473-4; cf. Wilamowitz 1893: I, 212 and Wilhelm 1932: 38-40.
32 Thiel 1922: 55; cf. Andreades 1933: 389, n.7 and Cawkwell 1963: 63, n.92.

priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry by reinstating their former rates of pay, which had been reduced or abolished by the time Xenophon was composing the *Poroi*.[33]

Capitalizing upon this reading of τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν, Gauthier attempts to revive Herzog's political interpretation of the phrase ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει. He contends that the word "demos" denotes the people not as an economic or social entity but as a political body.[34] Since τὰ πάτρια represents a return to the traditional *misthoi* paid to the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry, the "*trophe* of the demos," argues Gauthier, must represent the *misthoi* paid to the rest of the citizens who likewise served in some political capacity, namely, in the assembly and courts. Moreover, Gauthier asserts that Xenophon intends to fund these political payments in two different ways. The *immediate* increase in revenue, especially the monies derived from the capital fund (3.9), will result in the creation of a *euporia* of *trophe* for the demos; the *eventual* increase in revenues accrued from the leasing of mining slaves, a plan Xenophon says requires gradual implementation (4.35-40), will one day provide the rest of the citizenry (priests, council, etc.) with the *misthoi* they once received in the past.[35] Xenophon's promise to guarantee "a sufficient *trophe* for all Athenians" (ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις τροφὴν) (4.33) points, then, to the future when all Athenians will collect a daily three-obol payment in compensation for their political activity. Accordingly, one

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33 Thiel does not say when these rates were reduced or explain why; Herzog 1914: 474 speculates that pay rates fell during the Social War. Cf. Schütrumpf 1982: 26-8 and 1995: 298 and Azoulay 2004: 225-6 who likewise interpret τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν as referring to political *misthos*.

34 Gauthier 1976: 24 and 1984: 190-1.

35 Gauthier 1976: 27-30, 242-45.

must distinguish between Xenophon's short-term goals and his long-term ideals.[36] But this leads to an inevitable "contradiction" in ideals, Gauthier insists, because the creation of a permanent leisure class of citizens, who devote themselves entirely to the political life, undermines Xenophon's program for economic recovery, which is predicated upon the entrepreneurial activities of these very citizens.[37] In short, Gauthier concludes that modern commentators and even Xenophon himself have failed to recognize this fundamental opposition between the ideals of *homo politicus* and those of *homo economicus*.

Though Gauthier presents the most compelling case for the political significance of *trophe*, it suffers from a number of fatal flaws. As Hansen argues persuasively, the word "demos" never refers to the *dikasterion* but only to the *ekklesia*, and thus the opposition in 6.1 between the "demos" and "the wealthy" (ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι) strongly enjoins the interpretation that "the meaning of *demos* in this passage is 'the common people', 'the poor' and not the people acting as a body of government (= the *ekklesia*)."[38] In other words, the phrase ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει fulfills Xenophon's promise in the prologue to relieve the "poverty of the masses" (τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν). As Thiel argued rightly long ago, "*trophe* for the demos" has nothing to do with political *misthos*. In fact, the very phrase cited by Gauthier, "a sufficient *trophe* for all Athenians" (ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις

36 Gauthier 1976: 22 and 1984: 187.
37 Gauthier 1976: 238-53.
38 Hansen 1978 and 1979: 20-1, n.23.

τροφὴν), calls his entire interpretation into question, because all the fourth-century examples of the locution ἱκανός + *trophe* refer explicitly to food.[39]

Furthermore, the explanation of τὰ πάτρια in terms of political pay runs into similar interpretive problems. The phrase ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν is "an embarrassingly vague statement."[40] But supposing that it does signify political *misthos*, then only two interpretations are admissible, as Hansen demonstrates: 1) *misthos* for the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry had been abolished some time before Xenophon composed the *Poroi*; or 2) *misthos* for the priests et al. had been reduced in comparison with an earlier period.[41] There is no evidence, however, to suggest that any these political payments had been abolished between the end of the fifth century and ca. 355.[42] A year later Demosthenes actually mentions that the priests, council, and cavalry were remunerated.[43] Nor is there

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39 E.g., Isocrates, *Busiris* 13, 15; Plato, *Protagoras* 322b and *Critias* 110d; Demosthenes, *Exordium* 3; Aristotle, *Politics* 1256b11 and *Oeconomica* 1344b3. Interestingly, the construction ἱκανός + *misthos* is not attested until late antiquity.

40 Hansen 1979: 15.

41 Hansen 1979: 15; cf. Gabrielsen 1981: 103-5.

42 Gauthier 1976: 29, n. 13 cites Demosthenes 39.16-17 and 45.3-4, which mention the inability of the state to pay *misthos* for the *dikasterion* in times of war. Given that the remuneration of the courts is not the issue but that of the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry, I do not see the relevance. Besides, Demosthenes does not say that *misthos* ceased for all those serving in the courts but that *dike*-suits were suspended; *graphe* cases continued to be introduced and tried. Hansen 1979 argues cogently that *misthoi* for magistrates were suspended after 403/2, although he stakes much on an argument from silence. He also does not examine all the evidence, and it is certainly possible that these payments were passed over in silence in the sources because they were "negligible" (Gauthier 1976: 28). At any rate, if magistrates did in fact stop receiving *misthos* in the fourth century, my argument still holds, as it is certain that the council, priests, and cavalry were paid throughout the century (see Loomis 1998: Chapters 1 and 2 with Appendix 1: 261-70).

43 Demosthenes 24.96-101 with Gabrielsen 1981: 104: "Did Athens succeeded [sic] in accumulating in less than a year the large surplus dreamt of by Xenophon? Our sources referring to the financial history of Athens do not contain the slightest indication as to the occurrence of such a miracle, and hence it is improbable that the payments mentioned by Demosthenes had just been reintroduced." Moreover,

any indication that the rates for political *misthos* decreased during this time.[44] The period from 403 to 330 in general saw a steady rise in wages.[45] It also should not be inferred that the effects the Social War led to a temporary reduction in political *misthos*, because during the Corinthian War, when Athenian revenues were abysmally low, the Athenians increased assembly pay from one to two obols and then to three by 393, a level that was maintained down to the King's Peace of 387/6.[46] Of the four civic/military functions Xenophon mentions, only pay for the cavalry was reduced in the fourth century, dropping from one drachma to four obols.[47] This payment, however, was most likely ration-money for both rider and horse and continued down until the time Xenophon was composing the *Hipparchicus* (ca. 357) (1.19).[48] If Xenophon had wished to increase *misthos* for the cavalry, it is surprising that we hear nothing of it in the *Hipparchicus*. On the contrary, Xenophon thinks the existing payments to be sufficient not only to motivate the cavalry to practice their horsemanship but to train efficiently for war. Such is

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Gabrielsen's interpretation of Isocrates, *Areopagiticus* 24-5 (89-93), which Jaeger 1940 dates to the early 350s, corroborates Demosthenes' testimony.

44 Gabrielsen 1981: 104-5, citing no evidence, cautiously admits the possibility.

45 See Loomis 1998: 241-2. Though the evidence is not particularly rich, it appears that the wage for serving in the council (at least for the prytaneis) in the fourth century increased by a 100% in comparison to the fifth, and payments made to priests and priestesses stayed roughly the same and, in some cases, increased slightly.

46 Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 41.3; Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae* 183-8, 300-10 and *Wealth* 329-30. For the economy in postwar Athens, see Strauss 1986: 42-69.

47 The decrease came in 403/2 at the suggestion of Theozotides (see Lysias, *Against Theozotides*, Fg. 10C with Todd 2000: 382-4 and n.10), whose motives are unclear: he may have wished to punish the cavalry for their support of the Thirty or been compelled by fiscal necessity. These two interpretations of Theozotides' motives hinge on the restoration of lines 77-8: "whereas the *hippotoxotai* should receive eight obols instead of two [obols/drachmas?]…" If "drachmas" is the correct reading (Loomis 1995), then it seems certain that Theozotides' measure was fiscally motivated; alternatively, if "obols" is to be preferred, Theozotides seems to have had political objectives.

48 For the 4 obol *sitos*-payment, see Kroll 1977: 97-8, n. 36. In 351 Demosthenes proposes to pay the cavalry 30 dr./month (1dr/day) to campaign against Philip (4.28), which suggests that rates may have occasionally increased for certain operations. I am inclined, therefore, to interpret Theozotides proposal as a fiscal measure intended to bring war rates of payment back to peacetime levels.

Xenophon's point in the *Poroi* when he avows that the Athenians will carry out their military duties better if the state provides *trophe* (4.52). It is undeniable that Xenophon saw a reciprocal relationship between rewards and performance, but nothing compels us to assume that remuneration had to take the form of *misthos*. For Xenophon, *trophe* was a necessary but sufficient incentive.

How then should ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν be interpreted? Demosthenes' speech *Against Timocrates*, which was delivered a year after Xenophon composed the *Poroi*, is instructive. Demosthenes declares that, when revenues are lacking, the business of the state suffers for "the people (assembly), the cavalry, the council, the sacred sphere (i.e. the priests), and the civil authority (i.e. the magistrates)" (δῆμον, ἱππέας, βουλήν, ἱερά, ὅσια) (24.101). The overlap of civic offices and posts with those in the *Poroi* is significant. I think it imperative, therefore, to take ἱερεῦσι…τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν together with Xenophon's comments that immediately precede it about how a revenue surplus will allow the Athenians to celebrate festivals more magnificently, to restore temples, and to repair walls and docks—three salient examples of state business neglected in times of fiscal insolvency. The word τὰ πάτρια, according to this reading, would refer to these very prerogatives the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry once possessed when financing was abundant, perhaps during the fifth century before the Peloponnesian War. Consequently, increases in revenues would have helped the magistrates execute their

duties, for which they received glory and praise from the Athenians for jobs well done.[49] For example, in the fourth century ten elected magistrates received 30 minai a year (= ½ talent) to repair the temples, whereas in the fifth century, the state had allocated ten talents a year to temple restoration.[50] The council too had numerous financial responsibilities and duties, such as the inspection of the walls and naval yards and the right to allocate money for their repair.[51]

Increases in revenues would have also benefited the priestly class, because the financing of sacrifices and festivals in the 350s seems to have been precarious.[52] Demosthenes quotes a decree moved by Epicrates calling for a meeting of the *nomothetai* "in order that the sacrifices may be offered, that the financing be sufficient, and that any lack of funds for the celebration of the Panathenaic Festival be made up…(ὅπως ἂν τὰ ἱερὰ θύηται καὶ ἡ διοίκησις ἱκανὴ γένηται καὶ εἴ τινος ἐνδεῖ πρὸς τὰ Παναθήναια διοικηθῇ) (24.27). Demosthenes charges that Epicrates drafted this decree "under the pretext of finance and the urgency of the festival" to help steamroll Timocrates' legislation about state-debtors introduced on the following day and thus intimates that no shortfall in funds existed (28). Yet, even if we countenance Demosthenes' accusation in this particular

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49 In the fourth century, Athenian magistrates were given an annual allowance to finance their activities (Rhodes 1972: 103). Cf. the epitaph of Lycurgus: "This man lived his life in moderation, who, when appointed as administrator of finances, discovered new sources of revenue, built the theater, Odeum, docks, and triremes, and constructed harbors as well" (οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως· ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὗρε πόρους, ᾠκοδόμησε τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ᾠδεῖον, νεώρια, τριήρεις, ἐποιήσατο λιμένας) (Hyperides Fg.118). On the financial duties and responsibilities of magistrates, see Chapter 2, Section 2D and Chapter 3, Section 3A.

50 Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 50.1; *IG* I^3, 52 B, 5-12 = *ML* 58 with Rhodes 1981: 573.

51 Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 47.1; Aeschines 1.80. The council was also responsible for providing prizes for the games (49.3; 60.1), and thus would have been the body responsible for the bestowal of rewards under Xenophon's plan to honor magistrates who adjudicate commercial cases justly and expediently (3.3).

52 See Rhodes 1972: 100-1.

instance, it is difficult to accept that such a pretext could have ever held water with the Athenians, unless the adequate funding of festivals at this time was problematic. In 354/3 Epicrates introduced another law, resolved by the *nomothetai*, dealing with festival finance.[53] The law is lacunose, but enough of the prescript survives to establish that the sacrifices to Hephaestus and Athena Hephaestia, presumably at the Hephaesteia festival, lacked funds, which were to be obtained henceforth from the mining and coinage industry. On both occasions, then, Epicrates appears to have been motivated by the same civic spirit operating in the *Poroi*, which was to make festivals as "beautiful as possible" (ὡς κάλλιστα) (24.28; cf. *Poroi* 6.1: μεγαλοπρεπέστερον). Even the cavalry had important roles at such events, for Xenophon recommends making the cavalry processions "displays as beautiful as possible" (ὅπως ἥ δυνατὸν κάλλιστα ἐπιδείξει) (*Hipparchicus* 3.1). The magistrates, priests, cavalry, and council did not need a wage to perform their civic duties but sufficient financing.

In sum, very little commends itself to the political interpretation of *trophe* in the *Poroi*.[54] Gauthier's conclusion that there is a fundamental contradiction between Xenophon's short-term goals and his long-term ideals falls flat. While I am sensitive to the temporalities of Xenophon's economic program, Gauthier arbitrarily connects Xenophon's proposals with his analysis of 6.1.[55] He is surely mistaken to think two separate plans exist for creating the *triobolon*, of which one (3.9) will go to pay

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53 *Agora* I, 7495. Although the law has yet to be published, M.B. Richardson presented a preliminary text at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Philological Association in Chicago.

54 There is no denying that Xenophon foresees real political benefits resulting from the implementation of his program to supply the Athenians with sufficient *trophe*, but it is a mistake to disavow, as Gauthier 1976: 39 does, the fundamental economic orientation of the *Poroi*.

55 See the excellent comments of Schütrumpf 1982: 70-1.

immediately for assembly and jury pay, while the other (4.17) will fund the remaining civic *misthoi* in the future.[56] As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, Sections 5C-D, Xenophon only sketches the basic workings of the capital fund at 3.9, which he then fleshes out in his discussion of the mines. He may have intended the Athenians to expand the capital fund to include other investments (e.g., the public leasing of ships at 3.14), but he does not spell this out for his readers. We must read 3.9 and 4.17 in conjunction with each other, which leads inevitably to the conclusion that Xenophon aims to provide *trophe* for the demos by leasing public slaves in the mining industry. Moreover, as my reading of 6.1 strongly suggests, the *Poroi* is largely but not exclusively about *trophe*, as Xenophon also endeavors to augment revenues so that the polis can meet all of its expenses and effectively deliver public services.

3B. The Poverty of the Demos

It now behooves us to consider exactly what Xenophon means by "the poverty of the multitude" (τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν). The nouns πενία and πένης, which traslate roughly as "poverty" and "poor person" respectively, do not carry the connotation of desitution they do in English.[57] The term destitution more aplty applies to πτωχεία, "beggary," and πτωχός, "beggar," that is, one who does not have the necessities of life. Aristophanes famously observes the distinction between πένης and πτωχός: "The life of the destitute, which is what you're taking about, is to live having nothing. The life of a poor man is to live frugally, keeping at one's work, to have no surplus but not to have a

56 Gauthier 1976: 28, n.11, 242-4.

shortfall either" (πτωχοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίος, ὃν σὺ λέγεις, ζῆν ἐστιν μηδὲν ἔχοντα· τοῦ δὲ πένητος ζῆν φειδόμενον καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχοντα, περιγίγνεσθαι δ' αὐτῷ μηδέν, μὴ μέντοι μηδ' ἐπιλείπειν) (*Wealth* 553-4). Indeed, πενία and πένης derive from the verb πένομαι (cf. πόνος), which means to "work" or "toil." Lacking leisure the *penetes* labored in a variety of trades, but farming seems to have been the most representative field of activity.[58]

However, it must be acknowledged that the *penetes* did not form a homogenous class with equal resources, as the term seems to cover a wide spectrum of the population, including members of the hoplite census as well as poor *thetes*. Around 358/7 the Athenians passed the law of Periander, which stipulated that the richest 1,200 citizens be divided into twenty *symmories* for the trierarchy. Previously, and after 340 when Demosthenes reformed the system, only the 300 richest citizens were subject to this military liturgy.[59] According to Demosthenes, during this interim period, "the liturgies were now falling upon the *penetes*."[60] Apparently, around 900 *penetes* became subject to the trierarchy, which cost a talent per year, though the members of a *symmory* shared this financial burden. Given that the *Poroi* post-dates Periander's law, the reference to "the rich" (οἱ πλούσιοι) being released from the burdens of funding wars (6.1) probably includes these 900 or so *penetes*. On the other end of the spectrum, some *penetes* were

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[57] Hemelrijk 1925: 28-54, Hands 1968: 62-66, Dover 1974: 109-11, Gauthier 1976: 38-9, Davies 1981: 10-12, Markle 1985: 267-71, Rosivach 1991, and Sealey 1993: 22-4.

[58] Jones 1957: 13-4, 79-80, Ste. Crox 1981: 286, Davies 1981: 52-4, and Rosivach 1991: 192-3.

[59] See Davies 1981: 13-28, who refutes the position first advanced by Jones 1957: 85-88 that 1,200 represents the "normal" number for the trierarchic register; see, however, the reservations of Rhodes 1985: 4-5. On the law of Periander with references to earlier scholarship, see Rhodes 1982, Cawkwell 1984: 342-3, and MacDowell 1986.

ἄποροι, "without resources," that is, dangerously close to becoming πτωχοί.[61] If one had to refer to these extremely poor *penetes* and *ptochoi* collectively, some evidence suggests that the Athenians characterized them generally also as *penetes*.[62]

Demographically speaking, the rich made up only 4% of the 30,000 of the adult male population during the fourth century, which means that 96% of Athenians were, technically speaking, *penetes*.[63] Of these, about 9,000 were relatively well off, owning property worth more than 2000 drachma—the cutoff for serving as a hoplite.[64] The average hoplite plot was probably in the range of 4 to 6 hectares, which was not large enough to yield a significant surplus but sufficient for meeting the needs of the *oikos*.[65] Greek terminology notwithstanding, these *penetes* were not the poor Xenophon is talking about in the *Poroi*, because they lived above the subsistence level. The remaining 20,000 of the Athenian adult population, then, comprised the moderately-to-extremely poor, among whom numbered *ptochoi*. Taken together these two sub-hoplite groups correspond to the Solonian thetic class. According to Dionysius Halicarnassus, the Athenians in 403 proposed a law that only those owning land should be citizens, which

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60 Demosthenes 20.18; cf. 18.104, 108 with Davies 1981: 13.

61 Markle 1985: 268-9.

62 Rosivach 1991: 189-90 citing Plato, *Symposium* 203b-c.

63 Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae* 1132-3 put the Athenian male population in 391 at more than 30,000. Granted this number is "conventional" (Herodotus 5.97.2 and Menander, *Epitrpontes* 1088-9 with Sommerstein 1998: 235), but so too is the 20,000 figure in *Wasps* 708 and *Athenaion Politeia* 24.3. Hansen 1985 presents the most convincing case that the adult male population at the end of the fourth century was around 30,000, which contrasts with the 21,000 figure of Ruschenbusch 1984 (see Section 3C below).

64 Jones 1957: 28-29, 81-7.

65 For the 4 to 6 hectare plot size, see Cooper 1978: 170, Jameson 1977-8: 125, n.13, and Garnsey 1988: 92. As I argue below (Section 3D), a hectare produced on average 471.8kg (= 15 medimnoi) of wheat or 635kg (= 24 medimnoi) of barley per year. An "average" Greek needed to consume 77 kg/day (281kg/year) of wheat or 1.12 kg/day (410kg/year) of barley. Thus, a four-hectare plot could produced

would have resulted in the disenfranchisement of 5,000 people.[66] Thus, of these 20,000 poor about 15,000 were small property owners, that is, those holding less than four hectares but probably averaging around 20 plethera (= 1.8 ha).[67] This figure is significant because it indicates that half of Athenian citizens were at or below the subsistence level. In the fourth century, crop failures were frequent for wheat and leguminous crops, though less so for barley, leading to numerous "food crises" or to what some call "subsistence crises."[68] "Each food crisis," Garnsey explains, "occupies a place on a continuum leading from mild shortage to disastrous famine."[69] Subsistence farmers attempt to minimize the deleterious effects of such crises, but in traditional societies like Athens, many peasants look to their communities for alimentary support and to the state to have the prescience and power to avoid crises in the first place by managing the food supply.[70]

The remaining 5,000 landless poor, it is reasonable to assume, were comprised mainly of the indigent and urban proletariats (μισθωτοί), although some of them may have worked as seasonal labors in the fields.[71] Those workers who were skilled (e.g.,

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2540kg of barley or 1887kg, which would have comfortably feed a family of six, which is the size of Foxhall and Forbes 1982 "hypothetical" Greek family (1 adult male, 2 adult females, and three children).

66 Dionysius Halicarnassus, *Argumentum ad Lysiam* 34. The historicity of this claim has not been seriously challenged; see Jones 1957: 79-80 and Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 79.

67 Jones 1957: 81 (5 acres = 2 ha = 22 pl) and Cooper 1978: 170. My demographic figures differ from these authors, who start from a total adult population of 21,000 and 25,000 respectively.

68 E.g., Scott 1976: 13-34, Garnsey 1988: 6-16, and Gallant 1991: 5-7.

69 Garnsey 1988: 6.

70 In general, see Polanyi 1957: 50-5 and 1968: 9-19, 25, 148-57, 207-37, Scott 1976: 27-8, Finley 1983: 40. Garnsey 1988: 137-49; cf. 69-86 enumerates the four main strategies the Athenians employed in the fourth century to avoid food crises and to lessen their effects: diplomacy, incentive, regulation, and, most importantly for the present discussion, imperialism (see Section 3D).

71 In theory it would have been possible for the poor to lease public lands for farming, but the evidence suggests that it would have been very difficult because of the long lease period (usually a minimum of 10 years) and the high rents that are attested (see Walbank 1991; cf. Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 188-90). On

bricklayers and stonemasons), receiving 2 to 2 ½ dr. per day, probably made just enough to support their families, but the total number of skilled workers compared to that of unskilled workers, who made around 1 ½ dr. per day, was relatively small, and thus a vast majority of these 5,000 lived below the subsistence level.[72] Thus, when Xenophon identifies "the poverty of multitude" as a cause of Athenian imperialism, I submit that he is really talking about these two groups of Athenians, peasants and urban proletariats, who were just at or below the subsistence level. Their total number was most likely just

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the supposed town/country rift in post-War Athens (e.g., Mossé 1976: 12, 30), see Strauss 1986: 59-63, who systematically dismisses the notion. The cornerstone of this thesis is a passage from Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae* 197-8: "We need to launch a fleet: the poor man say yes, but the rich and farmers say no" (ναῦς δεῖ καθέλκειν· τῷ πένητι μὲν δοκεῖ, τοῖς πλουσίοις δὲ καὶ γεωργοῖς οὐ δοκεῖ). But as Strauss argues well, the phrase τοῖς πλουσίοις δὲ καὶ γεωργοῖς expresses not two categories but one (note the absence of the definite article for γεωργοῖς). The construction is therefore an example of hendiadys, and thus we must read the phrase as "the rich farmers" (Strauss 1986: 62-3; cf. Missiou 1992: 165 and Sommerstein 1998: 155). Thucydides' comments about the majority of Athenians living in the countryside at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War are instructive and probably hold true for the first half of the fourth century: "But they found it difficult to move, as most of them had always been used to living in the country" (2:14; cf. 2.16). Rhodes 1981: 297, no doubt, is correct in reading Ps.-Aristotle's claim (*Athenaion Politeia* 24) about Aristides persuading the Athenian country folk to move to the city as an unhistorical piece of "later theorising."

[72] For rates of pay for Athenian μισθωτοί, see Loomis 1998: Chapter 7. Unlike the peasant, who in theory grew or raised most of what the *oikos* needed, the proletariat had to purchase most household necessities (e.g., wine, meat, cheese, olives, oil, honey, figs, clothing, fuel, etc.) in the market and even had to pay rent as well if he did not own his own house (*IG* II^2 1590a gives an indication of the annual rent-levels for an *oikia*, with prices ranging between 126 to 175 drachmas; Finley 1952: 255, n. 73 suggests that these rents were high; rents for *synoikia* or apartments were probably lower). Because of the large number of festival days and other holidays, it has been reasonably estimated that workers labored on no more than 260 days a year (see Sinclair 1988: 225-7; cf. Markle 1985: 296-7). For unskilled workers, this would have netted them just under 400 dr. per year. Add to this number, 45 dr. for attending the assembly (presuming these meetings did not overlap with working days) and the *theorikon* (Jones 1957: 81), and we get a maximum of just under 450 dr. per year. Would this have been sufficient to support a family of four? Because it is impossible to calculate even roughly the daily costs of living (for one such attempt, see Markle 1985 279-81, 293-97), no satisfactory answer can be given to this question. However, if we take a three obol maximum daily allowance (daily ration (*trophe*) of public slave in 329; *IG* II^2, 1627, 4-5, 42-3, 117-8, 141-2) and a two obol minimum (daily ration for disabled person with property less than three mnai; Ps.-Aristotle, *Ath. Pol*. 49.4) for each adult person, we get 183 dr. and 122 dr. per year respectively. For children, one obol seems to have been standard (*SEG* 28, 46.9-10), which yields 61 dr. per year. In total, a family of four (two adults and two children) at the maximum level needed 488 dr. per year or 366 dr. at the minimum level; a family of six (three adults and three children), 732 dr. and 549 dr. respectively. Thus, a wage of 450 dr. per year probably was sufficient to feed a family of four, but add in the cost of fuel, clothing, which was very expensive (see Pritchett 1956: 203-10), and other household necessities (furniture, utensils, etc.), there was probably nothing left over at the end of the year.

under 20,000 strong. It necessarily follows from this conclusion that Xenophon is not addressing some contemporary food crisis precipitated, for example, by the Social War or the drought of the late 360s; rather, he is responding directly to the long-standing impoverished condition of the Athenian masses.[73]

What would have been the economic impact on those citizens receiving three obols a day under Xenophon's plan? In theory, the recipients of the triobolon could have used it to buy any foodstuff, but most of this amount would have been spent on grain, because around 75% of an Athenian peasant's diet probably consisted of grain, as Foxhall and Forbes have ably demonstrated.[74] How much grain did three obols buy in Athens? In Section 3D, I argue that a "typical" Athenian needed to consume around 1.12 kg or 2.03 *choinikes* of barley per day or .77 kg or 1.2 *choinikes* of wheat. Assuming that the average price for a medimnos of barley was around three drachmas or .375 obol for a choenix, a family of four needed 3.05 obols a day to buy grain; with a six drachma average price for a medimnos of wheat (.75 obol/ choenix), a family of four required 3.6 obols.[75] Naturally, for families with more than four individuals three obols would have been insufficient to cover grain purchases, whereas for those smaller than four this amount would have been enough to buy grain and additional foodstuffs like wine and cheese. But on average, three obols would have contributed significantly to alleviating

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[73] The Social War interpretation is that of Schütrumpf 1982: 32 and is rightly citicized by Gauthier 1984: 191-2.

[74] Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 71-73, 86-7 and Section 3D below.

[75] Given that this number corresponds exactly to Xenophon's rate of return from the capital fund, we have further proof that he conceives of *trophe* strictly as money to purchase food. Note that this figure is significantly higher than Markle 1985: 277-81, who follows Foxhall and Forbes' outdated figures for the weight of barley, arguing that 1.65 obols would have provided "a family of four with the most essential part of their diet." For the price of grain in classical Athens, see Pritchett 1956: 186, 196-8, Markle 1985: 279-

the poverty of the Athenian poor. In good years, however, the triobolon could have contributed to the creation of a surplus, which so many *penetes* lacked. As I argue in Chapter 5 (Section 5D), a surplus would have theoretically freed many better-off *penetes* from the constraints of the "safety first" oriented peasant economy, emboldening them to participate in riskier economic ventures, such as mining, upon which Xenophon's plan for financial recovery is largely based.

3C. Athenian Imperialism in the Fourth Century

In the following section, I take it for granted that imperialism existed in the ancient world, even though the Greeks or the Romans had no word for it.[76] I use the term loosely and in a non-theoretical way to describe "the interventionist and expansionist foreign policy pursued by the Athenians in connection with their empire,"

80, 293-4, and Stroud 1998: 74. I follow Markle and Stroud, who use the three-drachma figure in their calculations.

76 The term was invented in 19th century first to describe the regime of Louis Napleon and then the foreign policy of the British Empire under Gladstone (Koebner and Schmidt 1965: xiii-xxv). As Cartledge argues, though the "Greeks may not have had a word for imperialism…*philotimia* (ambition, competitive love of honor), *polypragmosunê* (activism, meddlesomeness) and *pleonexia* (greed for material aggrandizement) between them come close to covering the semantic range of 'imperialism', at least in its psychological aspect; and it is possible to find a broad, objective definition of the term that will subsume all particular instances, ancient as well as modern" (Cartledge 1987: 86-7; cf. Griffith 1978: 143-4 and Balot 2001: 99-135 and 2006: 138-42). Any definition of imperialism is to a certain extent arbitrary, satisfying some but not all readers. Yet formulating an ideal type of imperialism, as Cartledge suggests, has the distinct advantage of being able "to include historical examples which encompass a variety of eras and states under a variety of political, social, and economic organizations" (Zevin 1972: 321; cf. Finley 1978: 1-2). Such a definition would approximate what "the man in the street" thinks, who knows imperialism when he see it (Finley 1978: 1). One definition that comes close to achieving this goal is the principle or policy of a people to exert power and influence (politically, militarily, economically, and/or culturally) over other peoples and territories that infringes upon or negates their autonomy, however defined (see Hammond 1948: 105-6). Notice that this definition presumes nothing about causes, purposes, motives, and methods of imperialism—topics that have no place in a definition of imperialism but are nonetheless indispensable to any analysis of it (Zevin 1972: 319). Contrary to some scholars' definitions (e.g., Balot 2006: 141-2), I do not think the "consent," or the lack thereof, of the subject is "*the* crucial indicator of imperialism." In my opinion, the existence of willing/unwilling subjects indicates not the presence/absence of imperialism, but rather the type of imperialism. In the Greek conception, rule over willing subjects is monarchic in nature, whereas rule over unwilling subjects is tyrannical. In the *Cyropaedia*, for example, Xenophon emphasizes that Cyrus ruled over many peoples who freely accepted their fate, but he never for a moment considers that this rule is anything but an empire (Nadon 2001: Chapters 4 and 5).

that is, their "rule" (ἀρχή) over others.[77] Writing about the oligarchic revolution of 411, Thucydides asserts that the conspirators found it difficult to deprive the demos of its freedom, because "it was not only free during that whole period [sc. from the end of the Peisistratid tyranny], but for well over half of that time it was *accustomed* to rule over others" (καὶ οὐ μόνον μὴ ὑπήκοον ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἥμισου τοῦ χρόνον τούτου αὐτὸν ἄλλων ἄρχειν εἰωθότα) (8.68.4; cf. *Hellenica* 2.3.24). This "habit" of empire was an integral part of the Athenian national ethos.[78] When young men entered into military service and swore the ephebic oath, they avowed to "defend things sacred and profane and not hand over (to their descendents) the fatherland smaller, but larger and better" (ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσιῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάττω παραδώσω τὴν πατρίδα, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω).[79] Although the oath does not qualify "larger," indicating whether it means augmenting the state through internal and/or external growth, the politicians of the fifth century brilliantly exploited this ambiguity to further their own imperialistic and expansionist designs. Pericles, for instance, invokes this line to

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[77] Raaflaub 1994: 104, n.2; cf. W.V. Harris 1979: 1, 4. The intersection between imperialism and expansionism in the fifth and fourth centuries is evidenced particularly well by the institution of cleruchies. The settlement of Lesbos in 427 after the Mytilenian revolt is instructive (Thucydides 3.50.2). The Athenians divided the whole island, except for the territory of Methymna, into three thousand allotments, which were then parceled out to Athenian citizens chosen by lot. However, the Athenians did not work on the plots themselves, but leased them out to the Lesbians, who paid them an annual rent of two minai for each allotment. Since this amount corresponds to that of hoplite pay, it has been argued that these cleruchs were of hoplite status serving as a resident garrison (see the references in Hornblower 1991: 440). Thus, the cleruchy at Lesbos demonstrates the Athenian imperialist impulse both to expand its territory and to rule over others. See Walbank 1991: 154, *Agora* XIX, L2, and Aelian 6.1 for evidence of other cleruchies arranged in a similar manner.

[78] Cf. 1.70. For a good account of Thucydides' view of imperialism as part and parcel of the Athenian "national character," see Forde 1989: 17-56 and Balot 2006: 170-1; cf. Ehrenberg 1947: 47. Balot 2006: 146-7 credits Herodotus (8.7) with the discovery of situating the roots of imperialism in culture; cf. Evans 1991: 23-8. On imperialism as a phenomenon of cultures in general, see Said 1993: 3-14.

encourage the Athenians to defend not only the fatherland but the empire as well: "And we must not fall behind them [sc. our ancestors], but must defend ourselves in every way against our enemies and try to hand down to our descendants these things undiminished" (ὧν οὐ χρὴ λείπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούς τε ἐχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις πειρᾶσθαι αὐτὰ μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδοῦναι).[80] The last phrase, "these things (viz. an empire) undiminished," accords well with Pericles' strategy "to not add to the empire" during the war (Thucydides 1.144.1), but it was only a matter of time until more ambitious politicians advocated handing down the empire "larger and better" as a matter of principle.

According to Plutarch, Alcibiades "often put the ephebes in mind of the oath which they had made at Aglauros, to the effect that they would account wheat and barley, and vines and olive, to be the limits of Attica; by which they were taught to claim a title

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79 *GHI*[2] 88, 9-10; cf. Lycurgus, *Leocrates* 77, Pollux 7.105, and Stobaeus 4.1.8. On the oath in general, see the excellent analysis of Siewert 1977.

80 Thucydides 1.144.4. See Siewart 1977: 104, who rightly takes αὐτά, translated here as "empire," back to the clause in the previous sentence: those things which "our fathers…advanced…to the present state." It is also interesting to point out that Pericles substitutes the middle form ἀμύνεσθαι for the active ἀμύνειν. In Greek ethical thought, it was justifiable to defend oneself by "striking back" against an assailant. According to Hesiod, this translated into the right to requite not quid pro quo, but two times what one had suffered: "if he wrongs you first, offending in either word or deed, remember to repay him double" (*Works and Days* 710-11; cf. Antiphon 4.2.2-3; 4.4.7; Demosthenes 23.50; *Laws* 880a; *Republic* 464e). Interestingly, in Sophocles' *Trachiniai* Zeus punished Heracles for killing Iphitus, not so much because he committed murder, but because he killed by treachery and not by "openly fighting back" (ἐμφανῶς ἠμύνατο) (278). Thus, Pericles' use of the middle in the context of international relations strongly suggests that he and his fellow Athenians considered it justifiable to go on the offensive when another state attacked the empire and/or Athenian imperial interests (cf. Thucydides 2.42.4). While Alcibiades also acknowledges this principle, he takes the bold step in asserting that it is justified to fight back by "anticipating the attacks of those coming against you" (6.18.2). This nascent conception of preemptive war is unparalleled in Greek ethical thought.

to all land that was cultivated and productive."[81] The speech Thucydides puts into the mouth of Alcibiades on the eve of the Sicilian expedition fleshes out nicely this imperialistic ideology:

> καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷδε καθέσταμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχθῆναι ἂν ὑφ' ἑτέρων αὐτοῖς κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοιμεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε.
>
> It is impossible for us to control the limits to which we wish to extend our empire but a necessity to conspire against some and not relax our hold on others, since we have put ourselves into this position (i.e. of ruling over others), for if we do not rule over others, we run the risk of being ruled ourselves. You cannot regard inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you change your habits so as to resemble theirs.[82]

Indeed, the "habit" of empire was hard for the Athenians to break. Change was possible, Alcibiades intimates, but "the safest course for humans," he argues, "is to govern themselves by their current habits and customs without changing them a bit, even if it be for the worse" (6.18.7). The worse came in 404 when the Athenians lost the Peloponnesian War and barely escaped utter annihilation. The fundamental question to answer then is whether the Athenians' defeat in the Peloponnesian War did anything to change their habit of ruling over others.

The conventional interpretation of Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century supports firmly the idea that the Athenians never abandoned their hopes of regaining their

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[81] Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 15.7. The clause in the oath reads: "Witness are the gods Aglauros, Hestia, Enyo, Enyalios, Ares and Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone, Heracles, and the boundaries of the fatherland, wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, fig-trees" (*GHI*^{2} 88, 16-20).

[82] Thucydides 6.18.3. I have relied heavily on the notes of Marchant 1914: 155 in my translation of this passage.

empire.[83] Ambitions to return to an aggressive foreign policy came as early as 395, when the Athenians, motivated not simply by a desire to thwart Spartan designs on central Greece, started to reassert themselves belligerently in areas they had dominated and controlled during the fifth century. Through the efforts of Conon and Thrasybulus, the Athenians rebuilt their walls and fleet, regained naval supremacy over the Spartans, and began to challenge Persian spheres of influence in Asia Minor.[84] The expedition of Thrasybulus in 391 resulted in numerous alliances with poleis in the northern Aegean, the Hellespont, and Anatolia, which became subject to Athenian taxes and other forms of imperial control.[85] As Seager summarizes:

> Thus it appears that the constant determining factor of Athenian policy between the restoration of the democracy and the peace of Antalcidas is the refusal of the mass of Athenians to accept the fact that the empire had been lost and their desire to attempt to recreate it in fact soon as or even before the time was ripe…It was this longing for empire which determined the actions of the Athenians throughout the period…[86]

Though the Peace of Antalcidas temporarily put an end to Athenian aspirations of reconstituting their fifth century empire wholesale, the Persian king and the signatories of the Peace formally recognized Athens' claim to the islands of Lemnos, Scyros, and

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[83] The list of scholars subscribing to this interpretation is too long to produce here; see, above all, Marshall 1905, Cawkwell 1963, 1976, and 1981, Seager 1967, Perlman 1968, Mossé 1973: Chapter 2, Hamilton 1980, Hornblower 1982a: 183-218 and 1982b, Badian 1995, and Ruzicka 1998. For helpful surveys of Athenian policy from the Peloponnesian War to the mid fourth century, see Cloché 1934, Accame 1941, Mossé 1973, and Sealey 1993.

[84] Perlman 1967: 366 and Badian 1995: 85. Cawkwell 1976: 276 argues that the main bone of contention between Conon and Thrasybulus was Persia, but Strauss 1984: 46-7 expresses doubt.

[85] Seager 1967: 110-1, Perlman 1968: 264-5, Cawkwell 1976: 270-1, Badian 1995: 82-86; cf. Strauss 1986: 150-7.

[86] Seager 1967: 115; cf. Seager 1968: 267 and Cawkwell 1976: 270

Imbros.[87] There the Athenians once again set up cleruchies, a dreaded word among subjects but the crowning prize of Athenian imperialists.

From 387/6 to 378/7, the Athenians abided by the terms of the King's Peace, concluding only defensive alliances with former allies, such as Chios, Byzantium, and Methymna.[88] These alliances provided the framework for the creation of the Second Athenian Sea League in 377, nominally a defensive alliance of approximately 60 to 75 poleis to ensure that the Spartans leave the Greeks free and autonomous, living in peace, and in the secure possession of their own territory.[89] As leaders of the alliance, the Athenians gave many assurances to their allies: freedom and autonomy; the right of self-

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87 I find it troubling that scholars have not called into question Athens' right to possess Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros. Historians generally agree that the Greeks universally recognized these islands as Athenian territory (see, for example, Brunt 1966: 80, Jones 1957: 171, Meiggs 1972: 424, and Stroud 1998: 31 and n. 57; in general, see Figueira 1991: 253-6). But this universal recognition did not exist until the King's Peace of 387/6. The Persian king's granting of the islands to the Athenians on grounds that they were "ancestral" is tantamount to the Munich agreement of 1938, which transferred the Sudetenland to Hitler, who had long maintained that that region of Czechoslovakia traditionally belonged to Germany. The Athenians alone claimed that these islands were their ancestral possessions, and so the Peace confirmed and, to a certain extent, condoned the original expulsion of the non-Greek Pelasgians and Dolopians in the early fifth century (Hammond 1986: 193, commenting on the Athenian cleruchies and colonies of the late 6th century in Lemnos and the Chersonese, rightly notes that: "The reduction of neighbors to dependent status and the imposition of cleruchies were the first signs of imperialism in Athens). In the case of Lemnos, some Greeks did consider the eviction to be unjust, most notably the historian Hecataeus. The Athenians defended their actions through the invention and propagation of myths that both justified Athenian racial superiority over the Pelasgians and rationalized their expulsion from the island by Miltiades sometime after 500 (Herodotus 6.137-40 with How and Wells: 1912: 122-24). For instance, accordingly to one version of the myth, in recompense for the Lemnian abduction of the Athenian women at the festival of Artemis at Brauron, the Lemnians promised the Athenians that they could possess the island when a ship was able to sail in the very same day from Athens to Lemnos (6.139.4). Miltiades, who had just captured Elaeus in the Chersonese, sailed to Lemnos in one day, and then reminded the Lemnians of their promise, arguing that Elaeus was now a part of Attica. The people of Hephaestia agreed to relocate, but the people of Myrina refused, challenging the sophistic identification of Elaeus with Attica. But the Athenians were able to overcome them (6.1401-2). Whether the Athenians expelled all the Pelasgians at this time is unclear, but it is noteworthy that when Athens lost its right to Lemnos and the other islands in 404, the city of Myrina became independent (Cargill 1995: 12-12 citing *IG* xii (8) 2, a proxeny decree passed ca. 400 by the *boule* and demos of "the Myrinaeans," which differs from the prescript formula "the Athenians in Myrina" during times of Athenian control (cf. Rhodes 1997: 253-4).

88 For the foundation of the Second Athenian League, see Cawkwell 1973, Hamilton 1980, Cargill 1982: 51-82, and Morstein-Marx 1985.

determination; and immunity from garrisons, governors, and tribute. They even promised to give up their land-holdings and real estate in allied territory. Just as the *raison d'être* of the Delian League had been to combat Persian aggression against the Greeks, the Second Athenian Sea League similarly came into being to resist the tyranny of the Spartans, and so the question eventually arose, as it had after the Peace of Callias in the fifth century, about the relevance and purpose of the League once Sparta became allies with Athens after 370/69.[90]

A violent precedent, however, was set three years earlier (373/2) when Paros revolted. The Athenians and the other allies forcefully brought the Parians back into the League, who were required to bring an ox and panoply to the Panathenaic festival and an ox and phallos to the Dionysia—obligations the Athenians demanded of all members of their empire in the fifth century.[91] Other revolts followed in the 360s, the most notable being that of Ceos in 362. After retaking the island, the Athenians (and not the allies) ordered the Ceans to pay arrears in *syntaxeis* and demanded that legal suits against Athenians be settled in Athens, which was a violation of the Ceans' autonomy.[92] Athens also began to forcefully levy *syntaxeis* (a euphemism for *phoros*[93]) from their allies and to send out cleruchies, governors, and garrisons—the very heavy-handed policies that the

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89 *IG* II^2 43, 9-11 = *GHI*^{2} 22. Cargill 1981: 45-7 estimates that the total number of names inscribed on the Decree of Aristoteles was around 60, whereas Aeschines gives 75 (2.70) and Diodorus 70 (15.30.2) for the total number of allied members.

90 Rightly noted by Tod 1948: 69; cf. Mossé 1962: 415, Hamilton 1980: 100-5, and Sealey 1993: 71-2.

91 *GHI*^{2} 29; cf. Cargill 1981: 163-4 and Sealey 1993: 63-4.

92 *GHI*^{2} 39, 9-17, 45-50, 73-75 with Marshall 1905: 46 and Accame 1941: 184; cf. *GHI*^{2}40, 20ff. and *IG* xii (5) 528, 538 with Hornblower 1982b: 237. For other examples of Athenian judicial interference, see *IG* II^2 179, 9, 12, 14 (Naxos); *Hesperia* 26 (1957): 231-3 (Siphnos); *GHI*^{2} 28, 73 (Delos).

93 For the forceful exactions of *syntaxeis*, see below. The identification between *syntaxis* and *phoros* is made by Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 98; Isocrates 12.116; Plutarch, *Solon* 15.2; *OGIS* 1, 11-15.

Athenians explicitly disavowed in 377.[94] These demonstrations of power were so effective that in 369 the Greeks and Persian king formally recognized the Athenian claim to the long-sought-after prizes of Amphipolis and the Chersonesus.[95] Athenian abuses escalated in the 360s, causing deep resentment among the allies.[96] First, in 365 the Athenians sent a cleruchy to Samos, which occasioned some debate in the Athenian assembly, and then in 361/0, contrary to a long-standing Athenian policy of supporting democracies, Chares stirred up civil war on Corcyra by backing the oligarchic faction.[97] Writing in 355 Isocrates attests to a general state of disgust with Athens in which the Greeks were denouncing the Athenians for "harassing them and extorting money."[98] For many scholars, these heavy-handed, imperial actions precipitated the revolt of the allies

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94 Cleruchies: Unknown 370/69 (*IG* II^2 1609, 88-111 with Sealey 1957: 99-100); Samos 365/4 (Diodorus 18.18.9) and 352/1 (Philochorus 328 F 154); Potideia 361 (*GHI* 146); Chersonese 353/2 (16.34.4; *IG* II^2 1613, 297-8) and not later than 343/2 (Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 158). Garrisons: generally: Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.4.1: in 371 the Athenians "withdrew their garrisons from the cities" (τὰς τε φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἀπῆγον)—implying they had been there at least since the peace of 375; Demosthenes 13.6; Cephallenia (*IG* II^2 44, 17); Abdera (Diodorus 15.36.4; Aeneas Tacticus 15.8); Amorgos (*GHI*^{2} 51, 9): Andros (*GHI*^{2} 52; Aeschines 1.107); Mytilene (*Hesperia* 9 (1940): 318); Euboea (Diodorus 15.30.5); Corinth (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.4.4-7); Corcyra (Aeneas Tacticus 11.13-15). Governors: Hellespont *IG* II^2 133, 23-25; Amorgos (*GHI*^{2} 51, 4-5); Chersonesus (Demosthenes 23.159); Crithote (Demosthenes 23.161); Ios (*IG* xii (5), 1000 with Accame 1941: 185). In general, see Marshall 1905: 42, 61, 111, Accame 1941: 184ff, Cawkwell 1981: 51-2, and Cargill 1981: 146-160, and 1995, and Figueira 1991: 241-9

95 Demosthenes 7.29; 9.16; 19.137, 253 and Aeschines 2.32 with Sealey 1993: 74-77; cf. Cawkwell 1963: 51-2 and 1981: 52-3.

96 There are some indications about the ill treatment of locals by Athenian governors and magistrates: Timarchus on Andros (Aeschines 1.107-8) and Aristophon on Ceos (scholium to Aeschines 1.64).

97 For Samos, see Diodorus 18.18.9 and Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1384b32-5, who mentions how one Cydias "harangued the people about the cleruchies at Samos; for he demanded the Athenians imagine themselves with the rest of the Greeks standing around them who would not only hear but also see what they were about to decree." It is unknown whether Cydias was the only dissenter. For Corcyra, Diodorus 15.95.3 and Aeneas Tacticus 11.13; cf. Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 99-100 with Cawkwell 1981: 51, 54-5.

98 *On the Peace* 8.125, 142. Anti-Athenian feelings are attested even earlier than this. There were anti-Athenian riots on Delos in 376/5 (*GHI*^{2} 28, 134-40; cf. Hornblower 1982a: 190-1 with n. 60) and an Athenian proxenos on Ceos was murdered by an oligarchic faction shortly before 362 (*GHI*^{2} 39, 27ff. with Meiggs 1972: 218).

in 357.[99] In short, the ultimate cause of the Social War was Athens' successive attempts to reconstitute its fifth-century empire. The Second Athenian Sea League, therefore, as the Delian League had before it, degenerated into an empire. As one historian maintains, the Athenians in the fourth century were possessed by the "ghost" of Pericles' empire, which they, even in periods of defeat, were never fully able to exorcise from their national ethos.[100]

During the past twenty-five years, scholars have begun to challenge the foregoing interpretation, conceding that the Athenians did aim to restore their empire between 395 and 387 but disputing vehemently the notion that the Second Athenian Sea League degenerated from a defensive alliance into a full-blown empire between 374 and 357.[101] Rather, the Athenians learned from their past mistakes and, for the most part, pursued a defensive foreign policy. Scholars in this camp focus almost exclusively on Athens' treatment of its allies in the League. The most notable are Philip Harding and Jack Cargill. Cargill points out that no evidence attests to cleruchies on allied territory, as Samos, Potideia, and the Chersonesus were not League members; the cleruchies on Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros were universally recognized as Athenian possessions and produced no resentment among the Greeks.[102] In respect to garrisons and governors, he concedes their existence in allied territory but insists that as long as host poleis invited

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[99] E.g., Marshall 1905: 103-7, Ryder 1965: 89, Cawkwell 1981: 52-4, Hornblower 1982a: 206-8, Davidson 1990, and Badian 1995: 94-9.

[100] Badian 1995: 81.

[101] The most conspicuous of this group of scholars are Griffith 1978, Cargill 1981, 1982, and 1983, Ostwald 1982: 48-9, Mitchell 1984, Sealey 1993: 50-108, and Harding 1995; cf. Ste. Croix 1972: 45-9 and 1981: 292-3 and Meiggs 1972: 401-3, who are reticent to problematize Athenian imperialism.

[102] Cargill 1981: 148-50 and 1982: 99; cf. Sealey 1957: 108, Griffith 1978: 138, and Harding 1995: 115.

them with the approval of the allied *synedrion* there was no breach of autonomy.[103] Moreover, notwithstanding Theopompus' cynical identification of *syntaxis* with *phoros*, which Cargill dismisses on grounds that the historian was generally hostile to Athens, *syntaxis* was just "a new name for a new type of assessment, collected and disbursed in co-operation with the allied council (*synedrion*), and not known ever to have been used for any purpose which was not designed to benefit the League members as well as the Athenians."[104]

In regard to Athenian abuses, Cargill and Harding contend that the apparent resentment resulting from Chares' actions on Corcyra in 361 is questionable, because Diodorus, the disseminator of the tradition, was following Ephorus, a student of Isocrates who had it out for Chares. Aeneas Tacticus' account, on the contrary, is preferable because he states only that Chares was present with a garrison.[105] Besides, Corcyra was not a League member as once thought, though they were allied with Athens.[106] Samos likewise was never in the League nor allied with Athens. Cargill argues further that, whereas the resettlement of the island in 352/1 was comprised solely of Athenians, mostly Samian democrats in exile since the Peloponnesian War made up the cleruchy in 365/4.[107] Their restoration to the island should be understood in the context of Timotheus' defensive policy to challenge Persian encroachments into the Greek islands. Sometime before the seizure of Samos, the Persian satrap Tigranes had sent a certain

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[103] Cargill 1981: 151-60 and 1982: 99; cf. Griffith 1978: 132, Sealey 1993: 106-7, and Harding 1995: 115.
[104] Cargill 1982: 98; cf. Griffith 1978: 135, Mitchell 1984, Harding 1995: 110-11, and Sealey 1993: 64-5.
[105] Cargill 1982: 100 and Harding 1995: 119.
[106] Cargill 1981: 40-41, following Bradeen and Coleman's findings that [Κερκυ]ραίων on line 97 of the Decree of Aristoteles cannot possibly fit the line, and Cargill 1982: 100.
[107] Cargill 1983 and 1995: 17-19; cf. Sealey 1993: 106.

Cyprothemis to garrison the island with support of the local oligarchs, which they argue was a contravention of the King's Peace; thus its capture and settlement was entirely justifiable.[108] Beyond Corcyra and Samos, other Athenian abuses were limited to the period of the Social War and perpetrated primarily by the hawkish Chares.[109] Lastly, Cargill and Harding reject Isocrates' *On the Peace* as an accurate source of Athenian transgressions, because his citations of specific Athenian abuses derive not from the fourth but the fifth century.[110] Accordingly, they doubt seriously that Athenian aggression and imperialism caused the Social War. Instead, they favor other interpretations for the outbreak of the war, such as Theban and/or Persian encroachments against Athens' allies and Athenian/allied interests.[111] This benign characterization of Athenian foreign policy culminates in Harding's analysis, which likens it to the American policy of containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. While they may have made some mistakes, "the Athenians gave more than they took."[112]

While this reinterpretation occasionally sets straight Athens' record with its League allies, it suffers from a number of problems in analysis and an overall,

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[108] Cargill 1983: 328-31 and 1995: 19; cf. Griffith 1978: 139, Sealey 1993: 88, and Harding 1995: 118.

[109] Cargill 1982: 100, Griffith 1978: 135, Sealey 1957: 108 and 1993: 106-7.

[110] Cargill 1982: 100 and Harding 1995: 114-5; cf. Sealey 1993: 107-8, 114-16. Note that Davidson 1990: 21-4, 30 argues persuasively that Isocrates does not periodize the history of the Athenian empire (as Xenophon does, for example, in the *Poroi* 5.5-8) but treats the entire period from 478 to 355 as a thematic whole.

[111] Cargill 1981: 161-88, Sealey 1995: 78-93, and Harding 1995: 117.

[112] Harding 1995: 119; cf. Cargill 1982: 102: "Whether mainly from weakness, or perhaps also from having learned a bitter and painful lesson, fourth-century Athenian policies were essentially defensive rather than imperialistic. It is reasonable to suggest that the Second Athenian League represented a development in Athenian foreign policy that was more realistic and more enlightened than the imperialism of Pericles) or its abortive reinstitution, prior to the establishment of the King's Peace, by Thrasyboulos."

unmistakable penchant for apology.[113] That fourth-century Athenian foreign policy should be judged solely by Athens' relationships to its League allies is a red herring. An unbiased account of Athenian foreign policy must take into account Athens' conduct toward *all* peoples and poleis, both Greek and non-Greek. This interpretive prejudice of Athenian foreign policy, in truth, has its antecedents among the apologists of Athenian aggression in the fourth century. Isocrates, for instance, defends Athens' enslavement of Melos and the destruction of Scione precisely because they were not allies, offending Athens with their independence (*Panegyricus* 100-102). "A much clearer proof that we administered the affairs of our allies benevolently," Isocrates boasts, "is seen in the fact that among the states that remained our loyal subjects not one experienced these disasters." In the *Panathenaicus*, Isocrates' casuistry is even more outrageous, absolving Athenians' behavior because they injured only "islets so small and insignificant that many of the Hellenes do not even know their existence" (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ συνέπεσε περὶ νησύδρια τοιαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα τὸ μέγεθος ἐξαμαρτεῖν, ἃ πολλοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδ' ἴσασιν) (70; cf. 89). To put it into modern terms, Isocrates excuses Athenian aggression because it was directed at the Greek "Third World."[114] But the argument is specious, because the evidence suggests the complete opposite, that the affairs of small poleis greatly concerned both Greeks and non-Greeks. The terms in the Peace of Antalcidas, which stipulate that "with the exception of Clazomenae and Cyrpus,

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[113] Hornblower 1982b: 237 calls Cargill an "apologist" of Athens; Badian 1995: 91, n. 36 deems Cargill's interpretation of the Samian cleruchy as "a *tour de force of apologia*; cf. Sherwin-White 1982: 271 who calls Cargill's approach "Athenocentric."

[114] For the idea of the Greek Third World, see Gehrke 1986. I use the term more strictly than Gehrke, in that I tend to limit its application to small to medium states that were generally poor and lacking in native resources—essentially Gehrke's fourth and fifth "types."

the rest of the Hellenic cities, those both small and large (τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας) shall be free and autonomous," evidences well that even "islets small and insignificant" were in the purview of powerful states.[115] The abuse of small states is precisely what the Athenians regretted after their defeat in 404. According to Xenophon, "they were thinking how they had no way out except to suffer the very things which they made others suffer, people of *small states* (μικροπολίτας) whom they wronged not out of any revenge for crimes committed but because of hubris, and for no other reason than that they had allied themselves with the Spartans" (*Hellenica* 2.2.10; cf. 2.2.3).

Blowback for Melos and Scione did not come to pass in 404, but the fact that Greeks were still recalling these two incidents in the middle of the fourth century suggests strongly that some still feared that Athens could perpetrate such crimes again. These fears were well founded. In 353/2 Chares captured Sestos, slew the adult inhabitants, and enslaved the rest—an incident difficult to defend considering it was not wartime, though some scholars have tried to exonerate the Athenians.[116] Perhaps Diodorus, the commemorator of this event, should not be trusted, because he may have

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115 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.1.31. The πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας clause is of fifth century origin (Thucydides 5.77.5; Ps.-Xenophon, *Athenaion Politeia* 2.3; Plutarch, *Pericles* 17). Aeschines 2.120 reports that Clearchus of Chalcis states as a general principle that "small states…feared the secret diplomancy of greater states" (τοὺς γὰρ μικροπολίτας...φοβεῖν τὰ τῶν μειζόνων ἀπόρρητα).

116 Diodorus 16.34.3. Sealey 1993: 118-9 implies that Sestos' strategic position made it a necessary and legitimate target. Cargill 1995: 26-7, on the other hand, argues that Sestos was pro-Persian (though there is no evidence for this assumption) and thus "Chares' attack on Sestos may reasonably be seen as another chapter in the Athenians' struggle with the Persians…His bloody treatment of the captured city's population might reflect exasperation with Sestos' history of switching sides depending on whose forces were most powerful in the region at the time: he finally 'disposed' of them, and replaced them with Athenian settlers whose loyalty could be trusted. Cruel, but intelligible, and analogous to certain atrocities of the Peloponnesian War period." Many atrocities in the West, I may add, have been dismissed, at one time or another, by the casuistry of historians.

been following Ephorus, who had it out for Chares much like his teacher Isocrates. Alternatively, maybe the right interpretation should be one from silence, that since we hear no condemnation of what transpired at Sestos nobody cared or worried about it, even though Greeks did care about Melos, Scione, and Alexander's destruction of Thebes in 335.[117] In the *Panegyricus*, written around 380, Isocrates attempts to refute those who reproach the Athenians for their cleruchies, claiming that the Athenians sent them "into depopulated poleis for the protection of their territories and not for material aggrandizement" (ἃς ἡμεῖς εἰς τὰς ἐρημουμένας τῶν πόλεων φυλακῆς ἕνεκα τῶν χωρίων, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ πλεονεξίαν ἐξεπέμπομεν) (107). Twenty-five years later Isocrates' tune on the subject of cleruchies has changed: "it is possible for us to cut off a piece of Thrace large enough so that not only will we have abundance but also be able to furnish a sufficient livelihood for those of the Greeks who are in need and wander around because of their poverty" (8.24). Yet, the Athenians never invited other Greeks to settle in the Chersonese and Sestos per Isocrates' suggestion and they certainly did not send these cleruchies into depopulated areas.[118] Apparently, by 353/2 *pleonexia* did motivate the Athenians to settle abroad. Where did the resentment over these cleruchies go? At least in the case of Samos, honorary inscriptions of the city from the early Hellenistic period attest to a large number of poleis that aided and housed Samian

[117] So Griffith 1978: 143: "This single sentence represents the sum of our knowledge about Sestos at this time. What can the Athenians have thought they were doing? What can the world have thought of it?...But more surprisingly (and more depressingly) it did not stop other Greeks from associating just as freely with Athens as though it never happened…In spite of Sestos, and Samos, the Greeks were not all of a tremble now about what Athens would do to them next (and *rightly* not)" (emphasis mine).

[118] The Athenian names mentioned in the sources are mostly those of magistrates sent to the Chersonese. Cargill 1995: 90-2 mentions the possibility of a few individuals of Sestian origin but argues that they were pro-Athenian, and thus allowed to remain in their native polis.

refugees of the post-365 diaspora.[119] Greek sympathy with the Samians' plight ran high, and I suspect that Athenian massacre and enslavement of the citizens of Sestos troubled many Greeks as well.

On the question of garrisons and governors, the argument resting on "invitation" is suspect. Invitation proves nothing except that there were some people in a given polis who stood to gain by collaborating with the Athenians, whereas for others Athenian intervention and occupation were anathema. Examples abound throughout history of such invitations by "puppet" regimes or sympathizers of imperial rule.[120] Interesting for consideration in this respect is the so-called "safe" clause in Athenian documents concerning the dispatch of governors and garrisons.[121] In an honorary decree for one Apollonophanes of Colophon (ca.427/6), the Athenians command "that he guard the territory of Dios Hieron (Dioseritai) in order that it be *safe* for the Athenians" (τ[ο δὲ χορ]ίο Διὸς hι[ε]ρο ἐπιμέλεσθαι αὐ[τὸν τε]ς φυλακες hόπος ἂν σοον εἶ Ἀθεν[αίουσ]ι).[122] We learn from Thucydides that the Athenians at this time had intervened at Notium, the port of Colophon, on behalf of an anti-Persian party that was in exile, which had previously collaborated with the Persians in their first attempt to take the city during civil strife (3.34). After the Athenian general Paches restored these exiles, the Athenians sent out colonists and set up Apollonophanes as their proxy in the area. Thus,

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119 See Hornblower 1982b: 238 and Sherwin-White 1982: 271 for the references.

120 For example, in 1979 the Karmal government technically invited the USSR to intervene in Afghanistan, who cited their 1978 bilateral "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness" with Afghanistan, though the US considered it an "invasion" and in contravention of international law.

121 *IG* I^3, 65, lines 11-14; *GHI*^{2} 52, 7-8; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.4.4; *IG* II^2 404, 6; *IG* II^2 44, 22-23. Cargill 1982: 156-7 argues against the idea that this clause has anything to do with the installation of a garrison, but he fails to take *IG* I^3, 65 into consideration, which explicitly refers to ἡ φυλακή.

when we read that the Athenians ordered a general to be sent to Andros in 365 "so that [it] might be safe for the people of Athens and the people of Andros" (ὅπως [ἂ]ν Ἀνδ[ρος] ε[ἶ] σ[ᾶ] τῶι δ[ή]μωι τῶι Ἀθη[να]ίων [καὶ] τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀνδρίων), the historian should be circumspect of the Athenians' motives.[123] The word "safe" was ambiguous enough to cause suspicion among certain groups within allied cities. The Corinthians in 366/5 ordered the Athenians to remove their garrisons from the city when they caught wind that Athens had just passed a decree ordering their generals "to see to it that Corinth be *safe* for the Athenian demos" (ὅπως καὶ Κόρινθος σῴα ᾖ τῷ δήμῳ Ἀθηναίων) (*Hellenica* 7.4.4). The Corinthians' fears were well founded, because Chares soon arrived with a fleet of warships, which resulted in an open break between the two cities (7.4.5).

Concerning the causes of the Social War, the poor state of the primary sources will never yield an interpretation satisfactory to most historians, and so it is best not to put too much stock in any one explanation. But the shortcomings of the apologists' interpretation must be pointed out, who seek to minimize Athens' part in the revolt by pinning the blame instead on the Persians and/or the Thebans. A major obstacle to this interpretation is Cos, which was one of the four main defectors singled out by Diodorus (16.7.3). Because it was not a League member (though the apologists assume wrongly that it was), Cos' participation in the revolt can be explained as resulting neither from Theban pressure (Diodorus 15.79.1 says that Epaminondas tried to persuade Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium alone to help Thebes achieve naval supremacy in 364/3) nor from

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[122] *IG* I^3, 65, 11-14; cf. Gomme 1956: 296 and Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 124.

Persian/Carian encroachment (Cos was a democracy and, in theory, would have turned to Athens for assistance against the aggression of the oligarchic-backing Persians and Carians).[124] But Cos did ally itself with Mausolus, and thus another interpretation must be sought. The situation at Rhodes affords the best parallel, which was also democratic at the time of the revolt. As Hornblower reasons: "it was the Rhodian *democrats* who turned to Mausolus and broke away from Athens, thereby slitting their throats politically…Athens must have given such democrats reason to prefer even a satrap to Athens, and it is the historian's job to ask why."[125] To draw one reasonable conclusion, Mausolus and Persia's role was only a "precipitating," not an "underlying" cause of the Social War.[126] Any explanation that seeks to assign blame should include an examination of the part played by Athens.

Nonetheless, Ruzicka has recently reexamined Thebes' connection to the revolt. Epaminondas' diplomatic mission to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium in 364/3, according to Diodorus, intended to wrest these cities from Athens by inviting them to participate in the creation of a Theban naval hegemony. Already at this time, Thebes' fleet was so formidable that they drove away the Athenian general Laches, who had been sent to intercept Epaminondas, resulting in these "cities becoming Thebes' own" (ἰδίας τὰς

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123 *GHI*^{2} 52, 7-8; cf. Cargill 1982: 155-7.

124 Sherwin-White 1978: 42 argues convincingly that Cos was not a member of the League; cf. Sherwin-White 1982: 271 and Hornblower 1982b: 237 and 1982: 209.

125 Hornblower 1982b: 238; cf. Hornblower 1982a: 209-12, Sherwin-White 1982: 271, and Badian 1995: 98. According to Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 62) Byzantium was also a democracy, and as there is no evidence to the contrary, Chios was probably democratic at this time also (see Appendix 1, n. 34 and Ruzicka 1998: 66).

126 Hornblower 1982a: 208.

πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίους) (Diodorus 15.79.1).[127] The reason that Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium entertained Epaminondas' offer, Ruzicka argues, is that they feared Athens' renewed presence in the eastern Aegean "would lead to hostilities between Athens and Persia and that continued alliance would put them at great risk in the event of an Athenian-Persian war."[128] In other words, because Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium were democracies, the real fear was that if Athens lost in its bid against Persia, they would be replaced with oligarchies. Furthermore, war would raise "the specter of economic disaster," as these cities were important commercial states along the busy trade routes paralleling the western Anatolia coastline.[129] Ruzicka speculates that the three poleis actually defected from the League as early as 364/3. But by 358/7 the situation had changed dramatically: Epaminondas was dead, as was the Theban attempt at naval supremacy (Plutarch, *Philopoemen* 14.1-2). Citing Isocrates 8.36 Ruzicka claims that Athens began to deliver ultimata to these defectors to return to the League or face the threat of attack. What kept Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium from yielding to Athens was evidently an invitation from Mausolus to join a new alliance (Demosthenes 15.3)—a charge implying that without Mausolus there would have been no alliance and no Social War.[130] This is a fresh and interesting argument that takes a number of steps in the right direction. Nevertheless, I would like to clarify a few points.

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[127] Ruzicka 1998: 60 citing Hornblower 1982a: 200, n.137, who argues that ἰδίας, translated as "friendly" (Cawkwell 1972: 270) "is too weak." I agree, but does this phrase mean that "Epaminondas established formal alliances between Thebes and Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium," as Ruzicka argues? This seems unlikely, because such a significant breach of the Second Athenian Sea League would have resulted in a concerted Athenian effort to win them back.

[128] Ruzicka 1998: 65.

[129] Ruzicka 1998: 66.

[130] Ruzicka 1998: 68.

First, the evidence seems to indicate that only Byzantium defected in the late 360s.[131] This makes sense given Isocrates' remarks about the Thebans sending triremes to Byzantium alone at this time (*Philip* 53). Diodorus does not say where the sea-battle took place that resulted in the defeat of the Athenian fleet under Laches, but it is reasonable to infer that they fought somewhere in the Hellespont—an event that would have certainly breathed confidence in the Byzantines to revolt from Athens. The Byzantines immediately began to seize Athenian grain fleets and confiscate their cargoes (Demosthenes 50 dates these events to 362 and 361). The Athenian response was to dispatch a fleet under the command of a general to the Hellespont every autumn to guard the grain-transports. However, most of these generals between 363 and 359 failed in their missions and were subsequently prosecuted for dereliction of duty.[132] The fact that Chabrias was sent out in 358 with only one ship proves that the situation had improved dramatically by this year. Timotheus' capture of Byzantium, then, must be placed sometime between 361-59. Regrettably, we know nothing more of this episode, but it is reasonable to assume given Nepos' language (*Byzantios bello subegit*) that the recapture of Byzantium was a bloody affair, which must have aroused fear in the other disaffected allies that they would be next.[133] The events in Byzantium from ca. 364 to 357

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131 Revolt is reasonably inferred from the belligerent actions of the Byzantines against the Athenian grain-fleet (Demosthenes 5.25; 45.64; 50.6, 17; Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1346c29-39l and 1347b24-5; cf. Cassius Dio 75.12); see Marshall 1905: 97, Accame 1941: 179, n. 3; Ryder 1965: 84, Hornblower 1982a: 203 and 1982b: 237, Cargill 1982: 169, and Sealey 1993: 91. The only other revolt attested for this time period is that of Ceos (*GHI* 141 and 142).

132 For the evidence, see Marshall 1905: 99 and Sealey 1993: 90-1, 253-5; cf. Rosivach 1993.

133 Nepos, *Timotheus* 1.2. The historicity of Nepos is questioned by Cargill 1982: 169, n.13 and Ruzicka 1998: 67, n.27 but confirmed by Hornblower 1982b. 237. Ruzicka argues that had Timotheus taken Byzantium "Isocrates surely would have mentioned it in the *Antidosis*." Yet Isocrates' panegyrical digression is not an accurate historical recounting of Timotheus' exploits and omits many other achievements of the general. Besides, it was not in Isocrates' interests to promote the idea that Timotheus conquered a democratic ally, even though it was recalcitrant.

strengthen the interpretation that the Social War was more "a process than an event," which was brought on by years of Athenian aggression.[134]

Secondly, by privileging Diodorus' account Ruzicka silently dismisses Demosthenes' explanation of the war as resulting from 1) Athenian plotting against Chios, Byzantium, and Rhodes (ἠτιάσαντο μὲν γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι) (15.3); and 2) the Athenian recovery of what was its own (τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὰ ὑμέτερα ὑμῖν φθονήσαντες) (15.15). Though Demosthenes' testimony presents some interpretive problems, I do not think this evidence can be ignored. Cawkwell provides two possible interpretations of the ambiguous phrase τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὰ ὑμέτερα ὑμῖν φθονήσαντες.[135] First, Demosthenes uses κομίσασθαι τὰ ὑμέτερα elsewhere in reference to the recovery of both Amphipolis and the Chersonese. But the phrase may also refer to the recovery of what Isocrates describes as "the possessions in the cities" (τὰς κτήσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι) (8.6) or what Andocides deems "the colonies, estates, and loans" (τὰς ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα) (3.15). Cawkwell endorses the first reading, reasoning that φθονήσαντες "would be an odd choice of word if what Demosthenes meant by 'what belongs to you' was what he well knew the members of the confederacy thought belonged to themselves." But as Badian correctly points out, the aorist tense of κομίσασθαι "shows that the Athenians *have* in fact already *received* what

134 Hornblower 1982b: 237.
135 Cawkwell 1981: 52-3; cf. Hornblower 1982a: 208.

belonged to them (or was due) to them."[136] Cawkwell's first option, the recovery of Amphipolis and Chersonese, is unconvincing, since the Athenians never recovered Amphipolis and the Chersonese was not regained until 353/2. The allies therefore appear to have resented the Athenians for having already recovered their property that was obtained in the fifth century and maybe even during the short-lived empire under Thrasybulus and Conon. The "plotting" that Demosthenes speaks of is an additional charge but one not necessary unrelated to the recovery of property. I do not wish to speculate on what these machinations could have been, but Badian's remarks are probably not too far from the truth: "Demosthenes' words about conspiring against the allies are best taken as referring to a far from unjustified suspicion that Athens was preparing to tear up the compact of the League that she had initiated and return to unlimited imperialism."[137] In sum, these alternative explanations for the origins of the Social War sufficiently put the onus back on those who maintain that Athenian imperialism in the 360s was an insignificant factor in instigating the conflict.

Lastly, the apologist interpretation of Athenian foreign policy tends to limit the discussion to political and militaristic forms of control and dominance, largely ignoring the economic aspects of Athenian imperialism.[138] This is an inexcusable lacuna. I am not talking about the economic incentive of imperialism and expansionism—a theme

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[136] Badian 1995: 98, n.54. Badian's correction effectively negates the counter-argument of Harding 1995: 117, who criticizes Cawkwell's claim that the recovery of Amphipolis led to the outbreak of the Social War on grounds that "the Athenians wasted little time, money, or manpower in the quest to regain it."

[137] Badian 1995: 99; cf. Figueira 1991: 245-6 on the role of Athens' aspirations to recover fifth-century colonies in fomenting allied disaffection.

[138] Harding 1995: 113 actually countenances the existence of economic forms of control but restricts his analysis entirely to the political and military realms, because these, he claims, are "customary" areas of concern in discussions about Athenian imperialism.

which I address below (Section 3D)—but forms of imperial control and dominance that are economic in nature.

As the great historian of imperialism, John Hobson, remarks: "The clearest significance of imperialist finance…appears on the side…of taxation."[139] According to Hobson, democracies have a difficult time supporting imperialism by direct taxation of incomes or property and resort to other methods of raising revenue, such as indirect taxation and foreign investment.[140] So it was with the Athenians, who viewed all forms of direct taxation as marks of tyranny.[141] To be sure, in times of fiscal emergency, the Athenians levied *eisphorai*, direct taxes on citizens, but such levies were unpopular, especially among the wealthy who contributed the greatest share of money but received little recognition for their sacrifices.[142] For the most part, the Athenians seem to have held two related views about imperial finance: 1) that empire should pay for itself; and 2) that non-Athenians and allies should pay as many of the imperial expenses as possible. The fifth century sources commonly refer to Athens' allies as ὑποτελεῖς, which literally

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139 Hobson 1938: 97.

140 Hobson 1938: 98.

141 Andreades 1933: 126-30 and Finley 1985: 95 and 230, n.1, who both cite Tertullian, *Apologeticum* 13.6: direct taxes are "marks of bondage" (*notae captivitatis*). Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 135-6 contest this conception, noting the ubiquity of tithes or ten-percent taxes on land in the Greek world. However that may be, the existence of a ten-percent at Athens (Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 155, no. 58a, l.7), which may not even be a land tax, says nothing about the attitude Athenians had to direct taxation in the first place. Not even Plato (*Laws* 955d ff), whom they cite as a counter-example to taxation being a "sign of tyranny" (137), was clear on the issue: in the *Republic* (567a ff) Plato links tyrants' war mongering with their policy to tax the people. Also overlooked in this regard is Aristotle's analysis of tyranny in the *Politics* (1313b26), who claims that tyrants directly tax their citizens in an effort to make them so poor that they cannot plot against them (cf. 1314b15). In fact, tyrants are so associated with the imposition of taxes that their reduction or abolition are signs of their mildness (e.g., Aristotle Fg. 611.20 (Rose), Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 16.6-7, and Thucydides 7.54.5).

142 The general loathing Athenians felt toward *eisphorai* can be inferred from the fact that it was illegal to even propose a property tax unless a decree of immunity (*adeia*) was passed first (*IG* I^3 52b, 15-19 = *ML* 58). See also Boeckh 1976: 18, Andreades 1933: 342-4, Thomsen 1964: 1 and 1977: 137, and Pritchett 1991: 481.

means, "subject to taxes."[143] Of the six hundred talents Thucydides says the Athenians received annually in income from their allies on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, "tribute comprised the greater part" (2.13.3). Since this number does not correspond to the existing figures in the tribute lists, which average less than four hundred talents per annum, the most reasonable assumption is that the remaining two hundred talents were derived from other imperial revenues, such as rents from sacred lands overseas, cleruchies, mines, and other taxes.[144]

During the Peloponnesian War and especially after 415, the Athenians began to privilege taxation as a source of income when tribute payments from the allies began to wane.[145] In 413 the Athenians abolished the collection of tribute altogether, levying in its stead a five percent tax (εἰκοστή) on all sea-borne commerce, and in 411 they imposed a ten percent (δεκατή) transit tax on goods traveling in and out of the Black

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[143] Thucydides 1.56.2, 66.1; 2.9.4; 5.111.4; 7.57.4

[144] So Kallet-Marx 1993: 99-101; cf. Figueira 1991: 186-90. The controversy surrounding the interpretation of the phrase ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου (translated above as, "tribute comprised the greater part") in 2.13.3 is unfortunate. Gomme 1956: 17 suggests translating the phrase as "generally," "by and large," or "as a rule." While these translations suit ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, the dependent genitive φόρου suggests another alternative (as Kallet-Marx 1993: 100, n.72 correctly notes, Gomme's own parallels lack a dependent genitive and therefore are not apropos). *LSJ s.v.* πολύς IV.4c cite this passage and Plato, *Politicus* 294e for ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ meaning "for the most part." To these citations, I would also add Aeschylus Fg. 424c (Mette): ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ γραῶν τὸ φόρημα ἦν. Therefore, the idea that φόρου is a gloss is not convincing, as *ATL* 3:132 and Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 88 suggest.

[145] Kallet-Marx 1993: 144-8 locates this change during the settlement of Mytilene in 427, when the Athenians chose not to impose tribute on the island but rather to divide the island up into three thousand allotments and collect rent from the Lesbians who cultivated the land (Thucydides 3.50). That Athens was having difficulty collecting its tribute is evidenced by a series of decrees in the early 420s: the Cleonymus decree on collecting tribute in 426 (*IG* I^3 68 = *ML* 68); the reassessment of tribute in 425/4 (*IG* I^3 71 = *ML* 69); and quite possibly (see Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 121 and Mattingly 1996: 316-18) the Cleinias decree in the 420s (*IG* I^3 34 = *ML* 47).

Sea.[146] The Athenians reintroduced both these taxes ca. 391, but historians have assumed, erroneously in my view, that the terms of the King's Peace prohibited the Athenians from collecting them after 387/6. In Appendix 2, I examine the evidence and conclude that the Athenians did impose both the *eikoste* and *dekate* periodically from ca. 370 to at least 357. I also address the reception of both these taxes in the Athenian empire, contending that the Greeks considered them, especially the *dekate*, extortionate and piratical. Hence, the continued existence of these taxes in the fourth century speaks strongly in favor of the idea of continuity between fifth- and fourth-century imperial practices.

During the period of the Second Athenian Sea League, the Athenians also received "contributions" (συντάξεις) from their allies.[147] The nature of these contributions is controversial because the evidence for them obtains from a later period of the League's history. First, the sources tend to make *syntaxis* synonymous with *phoros*. According to Harpocration, "At the suggestion of Callistratus, they [sc. the Athenians] used to call also tribute 'contributions', as Theopompus says in Book 10 of the Philippica" (ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ τοὺς φόρους συντάξεις, ἐπειδὴ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον οἱ Ἕλληνες τὸ τῶν φόρων ὄνομα, Καλλιστράτου οὕτω καλέσαντος, ὥς φησι Θεόπομπος ἐν ι Φιλιππικῶν).[148] Scholars who argue that the Second Athenian Sea

146 Thucydides 7.28.4; Aristophanes, *Frogs* 363; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.1.22; Diodorus 13.64.2; Polybius 4.44.4. In general, see Boeckh 1976: 325, 401, Beloch 1884: 44, Romstedt 1914: 36-46, Andrews and Dover 1970: 408-9, Meiggs 1972: 349, Kallet 2001: 136-40, 195-226, and Appendix 2,

147 Marshall 1905: 38-42, Accame 1941: 131-4, Wilson 1970, Cargill 1981: 124-8 and 1982: 97-8, Mitchell 1994, Brun 1983: 74-142, Pritchett 1991: 462, and Sealey 1993: 64-5.

148 Harpocration *s.v.* συντάξις = Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 98; cf. Isocrates 12.116; Plutarch, *Solon* 15.2; *OGIS* 1, 11-15.

League was just an instantiation of the fifth-century empire have made much of Theopompus' interpretation, but it must be recognized that there were some significant differences.[149] First, Athens did not unilaterally impose *syntaxeis* on the allies, but rather the allied *synedrion* worked in close conjunction with the Athenian council in the assessment process.[150] Secondly, the contributions went straight to fund the allied war effort, especially the federal fleet, and not to subsidize Athenian-building programs, as tribute had in the fifth century.[151] The true litmus test for assessing the relationship between *phoros* and *syntaxis*, however, is whether these payments were voluntary or not. Hansen states the problem well: "Members of a *symmachia* might have to pay tribute, in the Delian League called *phoros*, in the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy called *syntaxis*. If the tribute was enforced by a hegemonic city, it was an infringement of the *autonomia* of the member states; if the members of their own free will had agreed to paying it, there was no violation of the *autonomia* of the members."[152] It is prima facie likely that, at least in the beginning, the allies did pay their *syntaxeis* voluntarily. By the late 370s and 360s, however, when allies became disgruntled and started to defect from the League and stopped paying their contributions, Athens seems to have forcefully exacted *syntaxeis*.[153]

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149 E.g., Tod 1948: 69 and Marshall 1905: 37, 130.

150 Marshall 1905: 37, Andreades 1933: 313, Accame 1941: 132, Cargill 1981: 124-28 and 1982: 98, Brun 1983: 115, Harding 1995: 110, and Badian 1995: 91-2.

151 For *snytaxeis* for the fleet, see Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.2.1 with Underhill 1900: 225 and Isocrates 7.2; *IG* II^2 123, 9-21 = *GHI*^{2} 52 mentions how *syntaxeis* fund the garrison on Andros in 356. Cf. Cargill 1982: 98, Brun 1983: 99, 115, and Harding 1995: 110.

152 Hansen 1995: 29 and cf. 31-2 and Ryder 1965: 21-2.

153 With powerful cities like Thebes, who had stopped paying by 374 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.2.1), the Athenians did not force the issue, but with smaller states Athens could afford to be heavy handed.

In 372 Xenophon reports that Iphicrates "first sailed to Cephallenia to exact money; some contributions were voluntary, others forced" (πρῶτον μὲν εἰς Κεφαλληνίαν πλεύσας χρήματα ἐπράξατο, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἑκόντων, τὰ δὲ παρ' ἀκόντων) (*Hellenica* 6.2.38). Previously, Timotheus had won over the cities of Cephallenia in 375 (Diodorus 15.36.5) and two inscriptions of the same year attest that they had concluded an alliance with Athens (*IG* II^2 98), having sent ambassadors to Athens formally requesting entrance into the League (*IG* II^2 96 = *GHI*^{2} 24). However, of the four cities on the island (Pronnoi, Same, Kranaioi, and Pale), only Pronnoi's name is inscribed on the stele of Aristoteles (l.108). In the succinct analysis of Cawkwell, "[s]omething had gone wrong."[154] For whatever reason Same, Kranaioi, and Pale did not ultimately wish to join the League, but they were nonetheless bound to the stipulations of the alliance, which as Cargill argues, was not a bilateral treaty but an alliance with Athens *and* the League analogous to the one concluded with Corcyra (*IG* II^2 97 = *GHI* 127).[155] According to this kind of alliance, the Cephallenians were to act "in accordance with the resolutions of the Athenians and the allies" (κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἀθηναιων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων) (l. 15, 34). Apparently, by 372 these cities were not in compliance, and Iphicrates subjected them to the will of Athens and the League (*Hellenica* 6.2.33; cf. 6.2.13-4).[156] Isocrates attests to these extortionate practices, when

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154 Cawkwell 1981: 46. Cf. Cargill 1981: 74-5.

155 Cargill 1981: 75.

156 The way I read *Hellenica* 6.2.38, "[Iphicrates] first sailed to Cephallenia to exact money; some contributions were voluntary, others forced," is as follows: the people of Pronnoi paid voluntarily; those of Same, Kranaioi, and Pale did not pay willingly. Though Xenophon uses the generic term χρήματα ἐπράξατο, "he exacted money," he must be referring to *syntaxeis*, which the Athenians and allies voted to

he says, "we sail the sea in many triremes and force the allied cities to pay their contributions" (ἢν τὴν θάλατταν πλέωμεν πολλαῖς τριήρεσι καὶ βιαζώμεθα τὰς πόλεις συντάξεις διδόναι) (8.29). Other methods included threats of banning "those who were unwilling to pay their contributions from sailing the sea" (μηδὲ τὴν θάλατταν πλέοντας τοὺς μὴ τὰς συντάξεις ἐθέλοντας ἡμῖν ὑποτελεῖν)—an obvious return to the heavy-handed practices of the fifth century (8.36).[157] Such a threat would have been effective against restive allies, who, though unwilling to defect from the League, were on the losing end of the vote when the allied *synedrion* assessed *syntaxeis*. The resolutions of the League were passed by a simple majority, and as Brun points out, those in the minority were, in a sense, "compelled" against their will to pay their *syntaxeis*.[158] As hegemon, Athens' enforcement of the collection of *syntaxeis* was a clear infringement on the *autonomia* of the member states. Perhaps it was for this reason that Theopompus considered *syntaxeis* to be another form of tribute.

It is debated whether the Athenians levied *syntaxeis* regularly or only sporadically as the need arose. According to Aeschines, the Athenians (ca. 346) "exacted sixty talents in contributions a year from the miserable islanders" (τοὺς μὲν ταλαιπώρους νησιώτας καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα εἰσέπραττον σύνταξιν)

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collect in accordance with the stipulations of alliance (κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἀθηναιων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων).

157 For Athenian control of the sea, see, for example, Old Oligarch, *Athenaion Politeia* 2.2-3 + 2.11-12; Methone Decree, *IG* I^3 61, 32-41; and Thucydides 1.120.2; 3.86.3-4, 6.90.2. The threat to ban allies from sailing the sea was especially pertinent after Leuctra in 371 when the Spartans and Athenians were allies. According to Cawkwell 1981: 48, the only explanation the Athenians could have given to their allies for the continuance of the League after 370/9 was to pay for "policing of the Aegean," which was infested with pirates and privateering in the 360s (see De Souza 1999: 33-6).

(2.71). It is not entirely clear if this statement refers strictly to the period in question or to the entire history of the League. For Brun, who sees a watershed in Athens' relations with its allies after the Social War, Aeschines must be talking about the procedure of the 340s, because such "automatic" payments from the start would have rendered the *synedrion's* part in assessing the allies irrelevant.[159] However, Aeschines' κα*θ*′ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν need not imply that these payments were automatic, but simply that the *synedrion* voted for them every year.[160] One may object that, given the problems Athens had with its allies in the 360s and 350s, the League would never have voted for *syntaxeis* every year. Yet, as disgruntled League members stopped sending their representatives to Athens and began to defect, the remaining loyal allies would have continued to bring resolutions touching *syntaxeis* to the vote. A simple majority would have been easy to achieve in this political climate. Backed with support from the League, the Athenians would have had the authority to forcefully exact payments from whomever they thought they could. As the treaty between Athens and Ceos of 362 demonstrates

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158 Brun 1983: 99.

159 Brun 1983: 99

160 Brun 1983: 97-99 argues wrongly, in my view, that after the Social War the Athenians assessed the allies directly without the consultation of the *synedrion*. His argument rests on a statement of Demosthenes (ca.341), who says that Charinus brought a *graphe paranomon* against a decree on the *syntaxis* of Aenos, which "Thucydides introduced" (ὅ Θουκυδίδης εἶπε) (58.37-8). According to the assessment procedures he himself outlines (reconstructed reasonably on the basis of *IG* II^2 112, 12-17 = *GHI*^{2} 41), the allies would have brought their *dogma* concerning the assessment of an ally directly to the Athenian council, which then deliberated about it (94-5). Naturally, the *probouleuma* that came out of this body would carry the name of the Athenian who proposed and introduced it to the assembly for a vote. Thucydides' name, therefore, is not proof that the Athenians assessed without the approval of the allies. Furthermore, the decree concerning Tenedos of 340/9 (*IG* II^2 233, 27-8 = *GHI*^{2} 72), indicates clearly that the *synedrion* still had the prerogative of assessing *syntaxeis.*

well, the Athenians even saw to the collection of arrears in contributions that had accrued during the years an allied city was in revolt.[161]

Furthermore, Aeschines' testimony implies that the Athenians introduced *syntaxeis* at the inception of the League, though the stele of Aristoteles makes no mention of the League's finances, except for the provision prohibiting the Athenians collecting tribute from the allies (*IG* II^2 43, 23 = *GHI*^{2} 22). Plutarch's reference to Chabrias' dispatching of Phocion to "collect the contributions from the islands" (ἐπὶ τὰς νησιωτικὰς συντάξεις) after the battle of Naxos, which took place on 16 Boedromion 376, suggests that *syntaxeis* were collected from the start (*Phocion* 7.1; cf. Polyaenus 3.11.2).[162] Some historians, however, have expressed doubt about the accuracy of Plutarch's source and opt for a 373 date, privileging the testimony of Demosthenes, who mentions Timotheus' payment to his crews "from the common contributions" (ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν συντάξων) in 373 (49.49).[163] While 373 cannot be ruled out, a date coterminous with the beginning of the League is more likely. First, Mitchell rightly insists that the provision in the decree of Aristoteles about the confiscation of goods becoming the "common property of the allies" (κοινὸν ἔστω τῶν συμμάχων) (l.46) requires the existence of an allied treasury.[164] The Athenians and their allies, he argues, would never have created a treasury for such an irregular source of income as that

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[161] *IG* II^2 111, 6-17 = *GHI*^{2} 39 with Brun 1983: 122.

[162] Marshall 1905: 38, Cloché 1934: 62-3, Accame 1941: 132, Wilson 1970: 322-35, Mitchell 1984, and Badian 1995: 91-2, n. 37.S

[163] Cawkwell 1963: 91-3 and 198: 48, n. 31, Brun 1983: 95-8, and Sealey 1993: 65

accruing from confiscated goods. It is thus reasonable to infer that a regular source of income, namely *syntaxeis*, necessitated the creation of this treasury. Secondly, because the large maritime states, such as Chios, Mytilene, Rhodes, and Byzantium, most likely contributed to the League in the form of ships and crews, smaller cities that could not make such commitments, must have contributed financially for the maintenance of the federal fleet instead.[165] Finally, Xenophon mentions that by 374 the Athenians were ready to make peace, because, in part, the Thebans "were not contributing money for the maintenance of the fleet" (χρήματά τε οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικόν) (*Hellenica* 6.2.1). Would Xenophon have provided this detail if *syntaxeis* had been a recent invention? Nay, the tenor of the passage suggests that Thebes had not been paying for some time.[166]

Lastly, the amounts of the *syntaxeis* themselves are uncertain. According to Aeschines, the contributions totaled about 60 talents a year. This contradicts Demosthenes' figure of 45 talents (18.234). The discrepancy is troubling since Demosthenes and Aeschines were talking about the same period: ca. 346.[167] However, Demosthenes stood to gain by making the number appear as small as possible so that the total gained under his leadership would seem all the more impressive.[168] Brun is undoubtedly correct to argue that Demosthenes' number represents what was actually

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164 Mitchell 1984: 25-7. Brun 1983: 109-111 tentatively asserts that the League did not have a common treasury. However, he does not consider *IG* II^2 125, 16, which attests to its existence ca. 357/6. The line has been restored, but the reconstruction is sound and has not been seriously challenged.

165 Badian 1995: 91; cf. Sealey 1993: 65. For military service and ship contributions, see Brun 1983: 111-14.

166 Badian 1995 92, n.37.

167 Brun 1983: 117.

168 Brun 1983: 117.

received, whereas Aeschines' corresponds to the theoretical number of what should have been received.[169] Most scholars take sixty talents as a minimum and reasonably assume a higher total for the period before the Social War. Using tribute payments from the fifth century as a basis of comparison, Brun provides some convincing estimates.[170] Of the 62 cities inscribed on the stele of Aristoteles only about 33 remained by ca. 346. Taking averages of tribute payments from 454/3 through 426/5 for these cities, that is, before the Athenians increased tribute assessments, Brun calculates approximately 67 talents.[171] This number is too close to Aeschines' 60 talents to be a coincidence, and therefore using the same procedure for the 370s he estimates that the Athenians received around 195 talents in *syntaxeis*. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the Athenians based the allied *syntaxeis* on the traditional tribute rates of Aristides.[172] While this number represents probably only half of what Athens received in tribute at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, it was still a significant sum, not "chickenfeed," as Griffith rashly deemed it.[173]

In conclusion, very little commends itself to the view that Athens in the fourth century did not desire to reconstitute and, for the most part, succeed in reconstituting its fifth-century empire. Erstwhile imperial institutions and means of control such as

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169 Brun 1983: 118.

170 In this respect, Brun is following the lead of Beloch 1967: 166-8, Accame 1941: 135-6, Wilson 1970: 322-4, and Griffith 1978: 135.

171 Brun 1983: 127-35.

172 Though perhaps only a piece of Athenian imperial ideology, the allies considered the assessment of Aristides to be just (Plutarch, *Aristides* 24). In 421 we learn of six Chalcidic poleis who agreed to pay the tribute of Aristides according to the terms of the Peace of Nicias (Thucydides 5.18.5). Hansen 1995: 31-2 argues persuasively that the payment of tribute was not considered a breach of these cities' autonomy. Thus, one cannot assume that the allies of the Second Athenian Sea League were not autonomous just because they were paying traditional tribute rates.

173 Griffith 1978: 135.

cleruchies, garrisons, governors, taxation, and tribute remained firmly in place in the fourth century. Terrible atrocities committed against other Greeks continued, though they did not achieve the same kind of notoriety as those perpetrated during the Peloponnesian War. This Athenian empire *redivivus* was undoubtedly smaller in scale than its predecessor, and while the development of Athenian imperialism in the fourth century did not follow a seemingly logical and consistent trajectory as it did in the fifth century (or so Thucydides leads us to believe about the growth of Athenian power in 1.23.6), resulting in the Peloponnesian War, the failure of the Athenians to eradicate their lust for empire from their foreign policy fueled discontent and anger among the allies, which in turn contributed significantly to the outbreak of the Social War.

It is unfortunate that historians have largely ignored Xenophon's insights in the *Poroi* about Athenian imperialism in the fourth century. For he claims that the Athenians not only treated the allies "unjustly" but also lost the hegemony over the Greeks precisely because of their brutality toward the allies:

> τὴν δὲ ἡγεμονίαν βουλόμενοί τινες ἀναλαβεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ταύτην διὰ πολέμου μᾶλλον ἢ δι' εἰρήνης ἡγοῦνται ἂν καταπραχθῆναι, ἐννοησάτωσαν πρῶτον μὲν τὰ Μηδικά, πότερον βιαζόμενοι ἢ εὐεργετοῦντες τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἡγεμονίας τε τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ ἑλληνοταμιείας ἐτύχομεν. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ ὡμῶς ἄγαν δόξασα προστατεύειν ἡ πόλις ἐστερήθη τῆς ἀρχῆς, οὐ καὶ τότε, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα; οὔκουν καὶ Θηβαῖοι εὐεργετούμενοι ἡγεμονεύειν αὑτῶν ἔδωκαν Ἀθηναίοις; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ βιασθέντες ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀλλ' εὖ πάσχοντες ἐπέτρεψαν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας θέσθαι ὅπως βούλοιντο. νῦν δέ γε διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχὴν παραπεπτωκέναι μοι δοκεῖ τῇ πόλει ὥστε καὶ ἄνευ πόνων καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ ἄνευ δαπάνης ἀνακτᾶσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

> Some who wish to recover the hegemony for the city think it can be achieved more easily by war than peace. Let them first recall the Persian Wars. Did we gain the leadership of the fleet and the stewardship of the League funds by benefiting the Greeks or compelling them? Furthermore, after the city with its reputation for excessive savagery was stripped of its empire, did not the islanders willingly bestow the leadership of the fleet at that very point when we abstained from committing injustice? Did not even the Thebans because of our benevolences give the hegemony to the Athenians? And again the Lacedaemonians entrusted themselves to the Athenians in regard to the hegemony to arrange it as they saw fit not because they were forced but because they were treated well by us. Now because of the disorder in Greece I think it has befallen the city to win back the Greeks without toil, danger, and expense (5.5-8).

As Xenophon is uninterested in scolding the Athenians for their wrongdoings but rather intent on demonstrating how they can recover a leadership role among the Greeks, he glosses over the details of the years intervening between the conclusion of the alliance with the Spartans in 370/69—to which Xenophon alludes here—and the end of the Social War. But something went terribly wrong during this period, as evidenced by the word ἀνακτᾶσθαι, "to win back": the Athenians had once again lost the hegemony. Though Xenophon does not discuss the specific incidents that occasioned this event, he does identify the general causes: historical penchants for war, violence, and injustice. Xenophon is confident though that the Athenians can regain the hegemony but only by turning from their imperialistic ways and embracing peace and justice. Xenophon claims the Athenians can do this "without toil, danger, and expense." With this tricolon, Xenophon directly challenges Athenian imperial ideology, which vigorously promoted the ideas that the Athenians submitted themselves freely to every danger, toiled constantly for the empire, and had a unique imperial economy that enabled them to

outspend their enemies in war.[174] The rhetoric in this passage, no doubt, has "imperialist overtones," as Cartledge observes, but Xenophon invokes the language of empire only to call it into question.[175] As I argue in Chapter 4, Section 4D, Xenophon's hegemony of peace is anti-imperialistic to the core.

3D. The Causes of Athenian Imperialism

When Xenophon reports that the poverty (i.e. the lack of sufficient *trophe*) of the demos necessitated the unjust treatment of the allies, the historian should take seriously his claim that economics played a decisive role in Athenian imperialism. Two notable early theorists of European imperialism, Hobson and Lenin, maintained that economic incentives drive all forms of imperialism and expansionism, and a generation of classicists and ancient historians writing under their influence explained Athenian imperialism largely in terms of economic motives.[176] Cornford's thesis on the origins of the Peloponnesian War is the most notorious in this respect. Rejecting outright Thucydides' explanation of the cause of the war (i.e. the growth of Athenian power), Cornford argues that in the decades leading up to the war, commercial, industrial, and nautical interests in the city began to rival the traditional, agricultural based economy, coalescing into a political force known as the "Piraeus party." It was this party that forced Pericles to enact the protectionist Megarian decrees in the hopes of financially

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[174] Pericles' speeches in Thucydides best articulate this ideology; see 1.141.5-142.1; 2.39.1-4; 2.62.1-5; cf. 1.70.8; 1.83.2; Lysias, *Funeral Oration* 55; Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 83; Xenophon, *Agesilaus* 7.1. For discussions about the restlessness of the Athenians, see Loraux 1986: 152-4 and Forde 1989: 17-40; for Periclean conceptions of Athenian imperial finance, see Kallet-Marx 1993.

[175] Cartledge 1997: 228. On Xenophon's manipulation of imperial rhetoric, see Dillery 1993 and Chapter 4, Sections 4A and 4C.

devastating Megara, who rivaled Athens in the east/west trafficking of merchandise.[177] Cornford's modernist thesis, with its predilection for assimilating the Athenians to turn-of-the-20th century British imperialists, was an easy target for criticism.

Hasebroek was the first to contest such economic interpretations of Athenian imperialism, contending that "the aims of ancient imperialism were never economic in the sense of seeking advantage for citizen merchants or producers; and they were never…national. They were exclusively political."[178] Hasebroek formulated this thesis by examining two areas where modern and ancient Athenian imperialism intersected: colonization and taxation. Unlike states in the age of mercantilism, the Athenians never imposed protective tariffs, but rather duties on exports and imports "for revenue purposes only."[179] Similarly, the Athenians colonized "not to secure markets for domestic export and cheap raw materials," as the British would go on to do in the 18th century, but to dominate militarily and maintain a ready source of consumable supplies.[180] Hasebroek's political interpretation of Athenian imperialism has informed numerous studies of Athenian foreign policy in the fifth and fourth centuries,[181] and now it is taken for

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176 Hobson 1902 and Lenin 1939. See for example, Cornford 1907: 15-51, Gernet 1909: 282-3, Weber 1978: 913-21, Bonner 1923, and Grundy 1948: I. 186-190. On economic imperialism in general, see the quintessential readings in Boulding and Mukerjee 1972.

177 Cornford 1907: 15-51.

178 Hasebroek 1965: 135; cf. 100-1.

179 Hasebroek 1965: 100-1.

180 Hasebroek 1965: 135; cf. 100-1.

181 See, for example, de Romilly 1963, Meiggs 1972, Finley 1982, and Schmitz 1988. Perhaps de Romilly's interpretation has gone the farthest in divorcing economic considerations from the Athenian imperialism. For de Romilly, financial profit "inspired only a secondary and intermittent course of action. Many people adopted an imperialistic attitude without ever considering the financial aspect, and those who did think of filling the treasury intended merely to use the money for further conquests: wealth led to power, not power to wealth" (77). Indeed, Thucydides speaks of the Athenians' greed, but "this desire is rooted in psychological forces which remained independent of the straightforward idea of material gain" (77). Greed, argues de Romilly, "depends upon two basic emotions, the love of action and the need for

granted that, at least in the way Hasebroek framed the debate, *Machtpolitik* (power politics) and not *Handelspolitik* (commercial politics) prompted the overseas actions of the Athenians.[182]

It is important to stress, however, that Hasebroek did countenance the role of the food supply (*trophe*) in Athenian imperialism. In his estimation, "[t]he life and independence of the State was…conditioned by its food supply and the provision of other necessaries."[183] For those states that were not economically self-sufficient, conquest and expansion were natural solutions to ensuring a ready food supply.[184] Athens was particularly well suited to this enterprise because of its navy, which exercised complete control of the seas and concomitantly the flow of foodstuffs. In short, the "Athenian thalassocracy was the handmaid of supplies."[185] The prologue of the *Poroi* factors significantly into Hasebroek's analysis, because it epitomizes this imperialistic dynamic: "The writer assumes in his readers the unquestioning belief that the well-being of the city is normally conditioned by the measure of its exercise of power over its subjects, and depends not upon the development of its own economic resources by native labour and industry and trade, but upon the contributions to its maintenance which its subjects supply."[186] Hasebroek then not only underscores the part the food supply played in motivating Athenian imperialism but also identifies it as the primary cause.

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power" (77). "What in fact inspires the Athenians is the desire which they have for fame, renown, and honors. In its highest form, their ambition aims at glory, in its lowest at the use of power" (79).

182 Hasebroek 1965: 103-4; cf. Finley 1982: 54, 56-7, Ste. Croix 1972: 214-20, and Schmitz 1988.

183 Hasebroek 1965: 139.

184 Hasebroek 1965: 140. See Raaflaub 2004: 192-3, who questions this general notion that "an 'imperialist impulse' was firmly embedded in the Greek idea of freedom."

185 Hasebroek 1965: 145, 136.

186 Hasebroek 1965: 137.

While some may consider Hasebroek's mono-causal explanation of Athenian imperialism to be reductionist or even facile, a significant number of historians have followed suit, countenancing the role of *trophe* in shaping Athenian foreign policy.[187] The evidence in support of this thesis is overwhelming. In every prytany, the Athenians held a sovereign meeting of the assembly to discuss the grain supply, and as noted last chapter, both Xenophon and Aristotle include grain/*trophe* as one of the most important concerns of the politician.[188] Xenophon calls this an "immense task" (παμμέγεθες πρᾶγμα), because one must calculate "how long domestic sources of grain will maintain the city and how much is needed annually" to make up inevitable shortfalls. For

187 Gernet 1909: 382-3 (cf. 357), Glotz 1926: 293, Treves 1937: 131-4 (distinguishes the *trophe* imperialism of Thrasybulus with the Panhellenic imperialism of Pericles and Conon), Grundy 1948: I, 186-90, Momigliano 1944: 7, Will 1972: 204-210, Ste. Croix 1972: 46-9 and 1981: 292-3, Pecirka 1982, and Sealey 1993: 24-6; cf. Missiou 1992: 76-8. Even Finley 1978: 11 and 1982: 55-8 and Harding 1995: 119 aver in this direction. Some historians have questioned the role of the food supply motivating Athenian imperialism, but their attempts are futile (e.g., Nesselhauf 1933: 63, Mossé 1962: 404, de Romilly 1963: 71-4, Meiggs 1972: 272, Bloedow 1982, and Garnsey 1988: 117-33). Bloedow, who offers the most spirited critique, argues that Corinth, which had only a slightly smaller population density than Athens (114 inhabitants per sq. km. to Athens' 127) and relied just as heavily on imported grain in the fifth century as Athens but did not turn to imperialism to procure its grain (24-25), proves that the need for grain was *not* the cause of Athenian imperialism (29). The major problem with this interpretation is that it takes for granted that Corinth's territory had the same proportion of cultivable land as Athens and that both territories were equally fertile. Until these two assumptions can be substantiated with evidence, we cannot take seriously Bloedow's argument from analogy. Garnsey 1988: 117-44, producing a new set of demographic and grain-import figures, argues more generally that Athens' reliance on imported grain has long been overstated, and that imperialism is only one response among many to which the Athenians turned to solve food supply problems (e.g., diplomacy, trade, incentive, and regulation). I deal more fully with Garnsey's argument below.

188 Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 43.4. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.6.13; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1359b21-3: "imports and exports" but at 1360a12 discussed under the heading "*trophe*." The statesman must also see to it that "that grain shipments be conveyed to the Piraeus along friendly coasts" (Demosthenes 18.301). At Athens there were also special magistrates called "guardians of grain" (*sitophylakes*), who administered the selling and weighing of gain (Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 51.3 with Rhodes 1981: 577-9 and Stroud 1974: 80). For Athenian laws pertaining to the buying/selling and exporting/importing of grain, see Plutarch, *Solon* 24; Lysias 22.6; Demosthenes 34.37; 35.50, 51; 56.6, 11; Lycurgus 1.27; Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 51.4 with Isager and Hansen 1975: 28-9 and Rosivach 2000: 44-57).

Xenophon, the question is not "if" but "when" domestic grain supplies run out.[189] In the debate over the Sicilian expedition, Nicias reminds his audience that Sicily has the distinct advantage over the Athenians because "they grow their grain at home instead of importing it" (6.20.4). Demosthenes, writing in 355/4, asserts that "[the Athenians] relied on imported grain more than all the rest of mankind; and the grain imported from the Pontus is equal to all the grain that comes to Athens from other places of export" (ὅτι πλείστῳ τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡμεῖς ἐπεισάκτῳ σίτῳ χρώμεθα. πρὸς τοίνυν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπορίων ἀφικνούμενον ὁ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου σῖτος εἰσπλέων ἐστίν) (20.31; cf. 18.87). He then provides the figure of 400,000 medimnoi imported from the kingdom of *Bosporus* (ἐκ τοῦ Βοσπόρου) annually—a number he says the *sitophylakes* can corroborate (20.31-2). If we take Demosthenes at his word and conflate grain from the Black Sea and the Bosporus, it would appear that the Athenians imported some 400,000 medimnoi of grain per year from this region, which produces an absolute minimum of 800,000 medimnoi of total grain imports. Yet, we learn in *Against Lacritus* that "Pontus" is not a "stylistic variant" for "Bosporus," which calls Demosthenes' reasoning into question.[190] How much grain, then, did the Athenians import from the Pontus as a *whole*? It is likely that the amount imported from

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189 In a speech of Procles of Phleius at Athens in 369 (*Hellenica* 7.1.4, 7), Xenophon says that "the livelihood for most of you comes from the sea" and that "your entire safety depends on the sea," which Cartledge 1987: 274 interprets thus: "Prokles did not mean that most Athenian citizens attending the Assembly were professional soldiers, traders or fisherman, but rather that the mass of poor Athenians were more or less dependent for their very survival on the regular annual importation of wheat from the northern shores of the Black Sea." Cf. Pritchett 1991: 468.

190 Contra Rosivach 2000: 40, n. 27. In the speech, Demosthenes says that Androcles loaned money to the brother of Lacritus for a double-voyage to the *Pontus* (35.3, 7). At 10-11 he reproduces the contract, which

outside of the Bosporus did not exceed 400,000 medimnoi or else Demosthenes would have left himself open to easy repudiation, as these two figures would come to 800,000 medimnoi.[191] Thus, 800,000 medimnoi should represent an absolute maximum of imported grain from the Pontus, which amounts to 1,600,000 medimnoi of total grain imports.[192] Recently, Whitby, adducing reliable fourth-century evidence concerning Philip's seizure of the Athenian grain-fleet at Hieron in 340, estimates that the total number of medimnoi from the Pontus as a whole was ca. 600,000.[193] 1,200,000 medimnoi, then, is a reasonable *media res* between the absolute maximum and minimum for total grain imports.[194]

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offers the trader the choice of either sailing directly to the *Bosporus* or voyaging to the "left" as far as the river *Borysthenes* (τῆς ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ μέχρι Βορυσθένους) (e.g., Olbia).

191 E.g., Jones 1957: 77-8, Isager and Hansen 1975: 18-19, and Gallo 1984. Garnsey 1988: 97 is overly skeptical about Demosthenes' presentation and rejects the figure of 800,000, arguing that this passage only supports "the limited point that Athens might have had to import in any particular year as much as 400,000 medimnoi from one source." However, as Whitby 1998: 123 notes: "Demosthenes presents Leucon of Bosporus as a perpetual benefactor of Athens, and strongly implies that the level of exports was a regular one that would be maintained in the future [cf. Rosivach 2000: 41-3]…I share the suspicion that Demosthenes was overemphasising the importance of Leucon, but would note that the one possible deception in his argument is the suggestion that exports from the Bosporus kingdom are synonymous with exports from the Black Sea…it is possible that imported grain from the Pontus did roughly match that from other sources, and that substantially more than Leucon's annual export, whether 400,000 medimnoi or not, came from the Pontus as a whole" (123-4).

192 Isager and Hansen 1975: 19 give the equation: 2 X (400,000 + x) = total grain imports ("x" representing imports from "the other city states along the Black Sea coast").

193 Whitby 1998: 124-5. According to Didymus, who cites both Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 162) and Theopompus (*FHG* 115 F 292), Philip seized either 230 or 180 grain-ships respectively (Didymus 10.34-11.5). One reason that has been put forward for the discrepancy between the two historians is that 180 represents the total number of enemy ships that Philip confiscated and sold off as booty, from which Theopompus says Philip received 700 talents (Bresson cited in Whitby 1998: 124, n. 39 and Sealey 1993: 188). The only problem with this interpretation is that Didymus emphasizes that Philip's seizure of the fleet was designed to deprive the *Athenians* of their grain. Hieron was the site where the Athenians met every autumn to convey their Pontic grain to Athens. There is no evidence to support the idea that grain-ships bound for other cities converged there as well. Whitby thus takes 200 as a rough average and multiplies this by 3,000 medimnoi (the carrying capacity of the most common 120 ton ship: Casson 1971: 183-4; cf. Stroud 1998: 65, who speculates that the 3,000 medimnoi "shares" articulated in Athenian Grain-tax law of 374/3 reflects a common carrying capacity of a normal grain ship), which yields 600,000 medimnoi.

194 These 1,200,000 medimnoi also include grain from the cleruchies (see below). This figure, in fact, is the estimate of Gomme 1933: 32-3. Cf. the exceptionally high figure of 2 to 2 ¾ million medimnoi of

How much grain did the Athenians derive from domestic sources? The first-fruits inventory at Eleusis for the year 329/8, the only inscription of its kind, supplies the historian with some figures for the domestic production of grain.[195] The total production for Attica amounted to a marginal 339,925 medimnoi of barley and 27,062.5 medimnoi of wheat.[196] The consensus today is that this year's harvest was abnormally small, though no direct ancient evidence exists to support this conclusion.[197] Comparative data from the modern period provide some insights, though these can serve only as approximations, and any conclusions drawn from them must be cautious.[198]

The area of Attica in the fourth century seems to have been around 240,000 hectares, of which various figures have been proposed for the percentage of cultivable land.[199] Estimates range between 20% and 40%, but these numbers ultimately depend on whether the Athenians universally followed a biennial fallow regime and used all their

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Isager and Hansen 1975: 19 (cf. Gernet 1909: 273-93) and the more reasonable 1.5 million of Ste. Croix 1972: 46-7.

195 *IG* II^2 1672, 263ff. For interpretation, see Jardé 1925: 36-60, Garnsey 1988: 98-105, Gallant 1991: 177-8, and Sallares 1991: 79-80, 392-4. A good summary of the methodological problems encountered in these works can be found in Stroud 1998: 33-7. It must be kept in mind that "[a] continuous run of data for twenty or thirty years would be needed to obtain statistically significant results for total production" (36). Cf. Cargill 1995: 197-8, who is much too skeptical about the use of this inscription.

196 I have not included the meager grain output from the disputed territories of Oropos and Drymus, which produced 12,000 medimnoi of barley and 6,900 medimnoi of wheat and 625 medimnoi of barley and 2,925 medimnoi of wheat respectively (*IG* II^2 1672, 271-3). Besides, Oropos was lost to the Boeotians in 366 (see Sealey 1993: 86-7). Salamis, which produced a respectable 24,525 medimnoi of barley (line 274), was technically speaking a cleruchy and not a part of Attica.

197 Garnsey 1988: 99-101, Sallares 1991: 392-3, and Gallant 1991: 77; cf. Stroud 1998: 35-6, who exposes the weaknesses of the ancient evidence used to support this claim.

198 Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 113 note well: "we are dealing with calculations that cannot be substantiated in the ancient sources. Not knowing the cultivated area and unable to verify the existence of one and only one system of cultivation, and furthermore not knowing the yield nor the amount of sowing per area-unit, we must conclude that such calculations should be relegated to scholar's desks as some kind of mental exercise." Given new evidence about the weight of ancient wheat and barley (see below), I am less sanguine than Isager and Skydsgaard on the ability to approximate ancient grain yields.

199 Whitby 1998: 104.

arable land for grain production.[200] As I am interested in reaching a maximum figure of grain output, I adopt 40% as a point of departure for my calculations. Sallares, Gallant, and Whitby all stress the importance of intercropping in ancient Greek agriculture, and thus a number less than 40% seems certain.[201] In Attica the lack of rainfall made it unsuitable for growing leguminous crops but perfect for olive cultivation. Accordingly, Sallares proposes that around 30% of Attica was available for grain, while the remaining 10% was devoted to olive production.[202] The question of biennial fallow cannot be addressed fully here, but even those scholars who argue that intensive, mix farming was the norm in Attica acknowledge the importance of fallow and advocate a three-year cropping cycle where two-thirds of the arable land each year was devoted to grain production.[203] We therefore may assume that in any given year no more than 20% of Attica (48,000 ha) was available for growing grain. This number has the advantage of being a *media res* between the 10% "low" estimate of Jardé and Whitby and Garnsey's "maximum" of 30%.[204]

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200 Jardé 1925: 52-3 (20%); Garnsey 1988: 91-3 and Whitby 1998: 104 (35-40%); Sallares 1991: 310 (40%). These higher figures represent the estimates based on data from the 1961 Athenian census.

201 Sallares 1991: 303-9, Gallant 1991: 38-41, and Whitby 1998: 104.

202 Sallares 1991: 303, 309; cf. Whitby 1998: 104.

203 For arguments and evidence in favor of biennial fallow, see Jardé 1925: 81ff., Sallares 1991: 381-6, and Whitby 1998: 104-5; the most vocal critics of this school are Garnsey 1988: 93-4 and Gallant 1991: 56, but see Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 108-14 who express caution about Garnsey's alternative model.

204 Jardé 1925: 52-3 and Whitby 1998: 106; Garnsey 1998: 102. Although Garnsey in his table on p. 102 claims 17.5% to be the "likely" number of cultivable land, on p. 92 he argues that 20% is too low because that would make an Athenian hoplite (9,000 low in 322; 25,000 high in 431) have "at his disposal an average of at best 5.3 hectares, at worst 1.9. We are asked to believe that the average hoplite (or knight) was operating below the subsistence level (in 431BC) or near subsistence level (in 322 BC), in terms of *home-based* arable land" (italics mine). The fact that Garnsey acknowledges that many of these hoplites would have had estates abroad makes it difficult to put too much stock in his calculations. Besides, as argued in Section 3A, most men of hoplite status were technically "poor" (*penetes*), that is, living near the subsistence level.

Jardé estimates that the productivity levels of Greece as a whole were 8-12 hl/ha (600-900 kg/ha) for wheat and 16-20 hl/ha (1,020-1,270 kg/ha) for barley—figures that more or less correspond to the averages for crop yields during a forty-year period in Greece from 1911 to 1950.[205] Athens during this time averaged 629.1 kg of wheat and 793.7 kg of barley per hectare. However, to utilize this modern data responsibly, we have to take into account the fact that the weight of ancient of grain was lighter than modern varieties by about 20% for barley and 25% for wheat.[206] Accounting for this discrepancy, the modern data suggest that ancient yields for Attica were around 471.8kg (= 15 medimnoi) of wheat and 635kg (= 24 medimnoi) of barley per hectare. Total yields then for 20% cultivable area amount to 720,000 medimnoi of wheat or 1,152,000 medimnoi of barley. Unfortunately, there is no way of determining the exact ratio of wheat to barley grown in Attica. In general, Athenian farmers grew much more barley than wheat, because Attica was well suited for growing this grain (Theophrastus, *History of Plants* 8.8.2). Scholars once thought the Athenians ate only wheat and gave the barley to their livestock, but recently historians have rightly dismissed this assumption because

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205 Jardé 1925: 53; cf. Gallant 1991: 77-8.

206 Garnsey 1985: 72 estimates average modern weights at 42.73 kg/medimnoi for wheat and 33.75 kg for barley (cf. Jardé's 41.95kg/34.07kg and Foxhall and Forbes' 40.27 kg. for wheat). We know these numbers are off because the Grain-tax Law of 374/3 (*Hesperia* Suppl. 28 = *GHI*^{2} 26) gives the equivalence of 5/6 medimnos of wheat per talent and 1 medimnos of barley equaling a talent (ll. 21-5). Taking Lang's (*Agora* X) figure of 26.46-27.72 kg/talent (cf. the 25.86kg/tal in *OCD*^{3} *s.v.* "Weights"), the approximate weight of barley was 26.46-27.72 kg and 30.86-32.34 kg for wheat (Stroud 1998: 55). In the following calculations, I adopt the lower figure of 26.46 to bring it into line with the traditional 26 kg figure. It is interesting to point out that during the course of the twentieth century the mean weight of barley increased fifteen percent (Sallares 1991: 486, n. 148).

the evidence seems conclusive that barley was a staple of the Athenian diet.[207] A 6:1 ratio of barley to wheat is a sensible estimate.[208]

To see whether these domestic yields and the amount of imported grain given by Demosthenes provided for Athens' requirements, we need to consider both the consumption levels of the Athenians and the size of the resident Attic population in the fourth century. Concerning the former, Garnsey gives a minimum of 150 kg, a likely of 175 kg, and a maximum of 230 kg of barley per year, but Whitby demonstrates conclusively that these numbers are too low, since Garnsey fails to distinguish between unprocessed and processed barley, which looses about 30 percent of its weight after milling.[209] According to the ancient evidence, *distribution* rates were much higher, one choenix per day of wheat or two choenikes per day of barley meal were considered standard rations.[210] Foxhall and Forbes, whose study is the most comprehensive and scientific, argue that these figures are excessively high. Employing the standards from the FAO for the caloric needs of those living in modern Third World countries, they

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207 Jardé 1925: 123-7 and Jones 1957: 77. For the importance of barley, see Sallares 1991: 314-16, 366-68 and the authors cited by Stroud 1998: 36.

208 Jardé 1925: 36. Garnsey 1988: 102-4 argues that the ratio of 10:1 barley to wheat calculated on the basis of the Eleusis inscription is too high, because 329/8 was a bad year and barley would have "done better than wheat, which needs more rain in the growing season." The 4:1 barley to wheat ratio mentioned in the Grain-tax law of 374/3 (*GHI*^{2} 26, 8-10), which concerns Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, can be taken as a lower limit, because Lemnos and Imbros were better suited to the production of wheat than Attica. I would add that the high crop failure rate for wheat in Attica (Garnsey 1988: 10-11) makes it certain that most Athenian peasants, who probably made up half of the Athenian population (see Section 3B above), planted barley predominantly, which failed roughly once in every twenty years. According to Scott 1976: 13-29, the economic calculus of peasants is based almost entirely on the "safety first principle: "In the choice of seeds and techniques of calculation, it means that the cultivator prefers to minimize the probability of having a disaster rather than maximizing his average return" (18). 10:1 seems closer to the truth than 4:1 (cf. Rosivach 2000: 58).

209 Garnsey 1988: 102; Whitby 1998: 114-5. Whitby does not consider wheat, but Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 76 show about a 5% decrease after milling. Given such a small difference, I have not factored this into my calculations.

210 Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 51-62 with Table 3.

estimate that a daily requirement for a "typical" Greek whose protein requirement was satisfied mostly by grain (75%) was .58 kg of wheat (212 kg/year) or .90 kg of whole, hulled barley (328kg/year).[211] Again, ancient weights of barley and wheat were 20% to 25% lighter than modern varieties, and thus Foxhall and Forbes' calculations need to be adjusted to .77 kg/day (281kg/year) for wheat and 1.12 kg/day (410kg/year) for barley.[212]

As for the population of Attica during the first half of the fourth century, it is best to assume an uncontroversial figure, say 200,000, which is a compromise between low (100,000) and high estimates (250,000 to ca. 325,000).[213] An Attic population subsisting

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[211] Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 71-73, 86-7 with Whitby 1998: 115-17. They arrive at this number by taking the average daily caloric needs of an "active," hypothetical family of six (1 adult made, 2 adult females, and three children) (15,495 ÷ 6 = 2,583 x .75 = 1937) and dividing it by the total calories of 1 kg of wheat (3340), which yields .58 kg/day or 212 kg/year; 1 kg of whole, hulled barley has 2158 calories (46), which yields (1937 ÷ 2158) .90 kg/day or 328 kg/year.

[212] Wheat: 3340 x .25 = 2505; 1937 ÷ 2505 = .77; Barley: 2158 x .20 = 1726; 1937 ÷ 1726 = 1.12. These figures have the distinct advantage of differing far less from the attested ancient distribution rates than earlier modern estimates (1 choenix of wheat = .64 kg; 2 choenikes of whole barley = 1.1 kg = 1.4 choenikes of barley meal = .77 kg).

[213] The high/low estimates depend on the size of the Athenian male citizen population attested at the end of the fourth century. Demetrius of Phaleron (317-307) conducted a census of the population, which Ctesicles says accounted for 21,000 adult male citizens (*FGrH* 245 F1). For the year 322/1 Plutarch (*Phocion* 28.7) also puts the population at 21,000, but Diodorus (18.18.5) records 31,000. Both attest to 9,000 citizens with full rights but differ in respect to the amount disenfranchised because of the Lamian War: 12,000 and 22,000 respectively. Hansen 1985 and Whitby 1998: 109-14 have put forth the strongest cases for 31,000, whereas Ruschenbusch 1984 and Sealey 1993: 19-22 have argued spiritedly for 21,000. For metics, Demetrius' survey yielded 10,000. Ctesicles refers to his census as an ἐξεταμός (military review), and thus Hansen 1985: 31-6 argues well that the 10,000 are only adult males capable of military service (cf. Sealey 1993: 21-2 and Whitby 1998: 111-2). To determine the number of metic and citizen children and women, a multiplier of 3.5 to 4.5 is standard with 4 being the most common (Isager and Hansen 1975: 14 and Whitby 1998: 111). In respect to slaves, Demetrius' census puts their number at an untenable 400,000. All but Marxist historians have rejected this number (Isager and Hansen 1975: 15), and arrive at a number of arbitrary figures ranging from as few as 15,000 to 30,000 (Garnsey 1988: 90 and Sallares 1991: 60; cf. Sealey 1993: 22) to as many as 150,000 to 200,000 (Isager and Hansen 1975: 17); cf. Whitby 1998: 114 who estimates 100,000. Strauss 1986: 81 puts the male citizen population after the Peloponnesian War at 14,000-16,250, which implies a total citizen population (multiplier of four) of 56,000 to 65,000 (by the middle of the century, these numbers certainly increased as they had, for example, shortly after the Archidamean war; see Thucydides 6.12.1); Sealey 1993: 22 concludes that the resident population was more than 100,000 but less than 200,000; Garnsey 1988: 90 = 120,000 to 150,000; Sallares 1991: 60 = 150,000 average; Whitby 1998: 114 = 250,000 to 300,000; Isager and Hansen 1975: 14-17 = 248,000 to

on a diet consisting solely of barley, then, would require a staggering 3,099,017 medimnoi per year, whereas one of wheat 1,821,128 medimnoi! Clearly, the truth is probably somewhere between these two figures, because Athenians consumed both types of grain.[214] As calculated above, Attica on average could produce 1,152,000 medimnoi of barley or 720,000 of wheat. Taking a 6:1 ratio of barley to wheat *exempli gratia*, Attica in any given year grew 102,855 medimnoi of wheat and 987,432 of barley, which could feed 75,022 people. Even allowing for an extremely large margin of error in these calculations, there is no escaping the conclusion that the Athenians did not produce enough grain for their own needs.[215] If we return to the 1,200,000-medimnoi figure estimated above for imported grain, which probably consisted mostly of wheat, an additional 131,787 people could be fed.[216] It would seem, then, that imported grain just made up the difference for the domestic shortfall. [217]

327,000; cf. Jones 1957: 78-79 = 144,000 and Ste.Croix 1972: 46, n. 88 = ca. 250,000 (both do not proceed from the ancient figures given above).

[214] Another incalculable, but one that needs to be taken into consideration, is grain for livestock such as oxen (Jardé 1925: 125-8, Isager and Hansen 1975: 17, and Whitby 1998: 106), though Sallares 1991: 312 downplays their role in farming; he bases his argument, in part, upon the idea that farmers of small plots cultivated their land with a hoe and not with a plough (but the evidence for this practice obtains mainly from New Comedy); cf. Plato, *Laws* 848c who discusses *trophe* for livestock. The amount of gain needed for the maintenance of horses for the cavalry is another factor, but one that can be crudely calculated using Xenophon's testimony (*Hipparchicus* 1.19) that the state paid forty talents a year for *sitos* payments to the cavalry (see Chapter 1, note 40). The price of barley is attested at a low of two dr. to a high of 6 dr. per medimnoi (see Stroud 1998: 74). Cavalry riders using this money to buy grain from the market or to subsidize their own losses (more likely) could amount to nearly a 100,000 medimnoi a year.

[215] This conclusion is not far off from Garnsey 1988: 105, whose population numbers are significantly lower than mine: "my calculations suggest that Athens never in a normal year had to find grain from outside Attica, narrowly defined, for more than one-half its resident population" (cf. Rosivach 2000: 38).

[216] The grain imported from the Bosporus was almost certainly all wheat (Sallares 1991: 331-2 and Rosivach 2000: 40, 59). Rosivach 2000: 58 notes that because barley has a larger volume compared to wheat for the same nutritional value, it was therefore more expensive to transport, making it less likely to be imported than wheat (cf. Jasny 1944: 15).

[217] Sealey 1993: 25 and Whitby 1998: 119 stress the important role that "impressions" played in the Athenian grain-supply. For Sealey, the key question is not, "How far did the Athenians depend on imported grain?", but "How far did the Athenians think that they depended on imported grain? Policy is determined not by the economy, but by what people believe about their economy." While this conclusion

The key question is how the Athenians paid for this substantial import bill. Translated into monetary terms they needed some 1,200 talents to purchase grain from abroad.[218] I say the "Athenians" and not the state, because the polis rarely, if ever, intervened in the grain trade by securing shipments from abroad and distributing it to the citizens, as was done, for example, in Hellenistic Samos and in Rome.[219] In fact, governmental intervention in the foreign grain trade, at least up until the time Xenophon was composing the *Poroi*, was rather limited.[220] It was not until the grain reached the wholesale and especially the retail market that the state supervised and controlled the

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may be a bit too generalizing, it has some merit for the grain-trade, because, as Hansen 1986: 13 argues well, the Athenians probably did not have accurate figures for the resident population—a number that would have been indispensable for anyone to determine Athens' requirements (Xenophon's remarks in the *Memorabilia* (3.6.13), however, take it for granted that the statesman had some means to calculate Athenian needs). It also must be remembered that barley has a greater laxative effect than wheat, which reduces its nutritional effect (Peterson cited in Whitby 1998: 115, n. 21). Furthermore, barley meal has a high glycemic index rating (measures how fast 50 grams of carbohydrate raises blood glucose levels); wheat is slightly lower than barley on the index but still considered high. Thus, those Athenians for whom grain fulfilled a bulk of their protein requirement (i.e. the poor), feelings of hunger would have resulted quickly after meals—sensations commonly attested in the comedies of Aristophanes (e.g., *Knights* 777-8). We must imagine then one of the ten sovereign meetings of the assembly at which the grain-supply was discussed, consisting of many of these "hungry" Athenians, who came partly for their meal ticket, partly to ensure that their fellow citizens voted correctly to maintain sufficient or more than sufficient levels of grain and in whatever way necessary.

[218] On the basis of an average 6dr. per medimnos price for wheat (Pritchett 1956: 196-8 and Stroud 1998: 76; cf. Markle 1985: 294). The price of wheat in Athens was generally twice that of barley.

[219] Garnsey 1988: 79-86, 125. In 445/4 Psammetichus gave 30,000 (Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 90) or 40,000 (Plutarch, *Pericles* 37) medimnoi of wheat to the Athenians, which was distributed in 5 medimnoi shares to some 14,240 citizens (cf. scholium Aristophanes, *Wasps* 718). The evidence for wartime distributions is limited and obscure; see *IG* II^2 1686B with Rhodes 1981: 355 and Aristophanes, *Wasps* 715-21 (discussed below). In general, the Athenians distributed money for the purchase of grain rather than grain itself (e.g., the *diobelia* (*Athenaion Politeia* 28.3 with Rhodes 1981: 356)

[220] The two most important roles the Athenian state played in the grain trade was guarding the grain convoy every autumn (*Athenaion Politeia* 43.4; Demosthenes 18.301-2; cf. Sealey 1993: 26, 91) and forging ties of friendship with grain-producing regions and states, such as with the Spartocids in the Bosporus (e.g., Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1360a 12-18; cf. Rosivach 2000: 39-43, though he tends to underestimate the role the "market" played in this relationship). The laws prohibiting any Athenian or metic living in Athens from exporting grain to any port but the Piraeus or contracting a loan to any destination but Athens (Demosthenes 35.50-51; 34.37; Lycurgus 1.32) most likely belong to the 340s (see below).

buying and selling of grain.[221] By and large, the Athenians received their grain through private enterprise and initiative.[222] Athenian and non-Athenian entrepreneurs loaned much of the money to merchants (comprising foreigners, metics, and Athenians) who purchased the grain abroad and conveyed it to Athens. What the state *did* do for its citizens, especially the poor, was supply them with money in the form of wages to help them buy grain and bread in the retail market.[223] Whence did most of this money come? In a word, from the *empire*.[224]

That imperialism was the major solution to the problem of the food supply is manifest from a number of classical sources.[225] Let us distinguish between three general methods of imperial acquisition, from which the Athenians derived their income to pay

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221 See, above all, Rosivach 2000: 44-52.

222 There is no better indication of this than the procedures outlined in the Grain-tax Law of 374/3 (discussed below). The grain taxed in kind from the cleruchies of Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros is to be conveyed to the Piraeus and transported to the city at the expense and risk of the private merchant (10-15; the "buyer" of the tax is equated with the emporos at line 26) (see Stroud 1998: 26).

223 Polanyi 1977: 163-7, Markle 1985, and Garnsey 1988: 131. As argued above, (Section 3B), with an average price for a medimnos of barley around three drachmas or .375 obol for a choenix, a family of four needed 3.05 obols a day (186dr./year) to buy grain; with a six drachma average price for a medimnos wheat (.75 obol/ choenix), a family of four required 3.6 obols (219dr./year). If we take the 1,200 talents (cost of grain imports) and divide it by 20,000 (approximate number of poor people living just at or below the subsistence level), the individual Athenian's share of the import bill amounted to 360 dr. per annum. Furthermore, an unskilled laborer working 260 days a year at 1.5 dr./day had an income of 390 dr. My "high" estimate for the cost of living of a family of four was 488 dr./year, whereas my "low" estimate was 366dr./year (see note 73 above). Thus, we can see that without assistance from the state, many "poor" families could not make ends meet.

224 Xenophon, *Anabasis* 7.1.27 says the yearly revenue (from both indigenous and foreign sources) of the Athenians on the eve of the Peloponnesian War was no less than 1,000 talents. Thucydides 2.13.3 attests to the figure of 600 talents from imperial revenues. Thus, imperial revenues outpaced domestic revenues by 3 to 2. But it is likely that Thucydides does not include revenues obtained as a result of the empire but collected domestically (e.g., court deposits, poll taxes, etc.; cf. Old Oligarch, *Athenaion Politeia* 1.16-8 and below) in his calculations. Imperial revenues were probably much higher than 600 talents.

225 Though Garnsey 1988 minimizes the extent to which Athens was dependent upon foreign corn, he does countenance the importance of imperialism as a general response to food crises (69-70) and notes its use among the Athenians in the fourth century (142-4) (cf. Finley 1999: 131-2). Another method not discussed here is that of gifts of grain. While such grants could be significant (Cyrene gifted Athens 100,000 medimnoi between 330-6; *GHI*^{2} 96, 5), they nonetheless were sporadic and thus could not be counted upon as a regular source of grain. Besides, gifts were by and large given to states who were suffering from shortages and famine.

for grain imports: 1) the regular financial exploitation of subjects and weaker states (viz. tribute and taxes); 2) depredation and extortion on the high seas; and 3) the establishment of cleruchies and colonies. First, according to Ps.-Aristotle, the Athenians under Aristides' influence "established an abundance of *trophe* for many citizens," "for the combined proceeds from the tributes and the taxes and the allies served to feed more than twenty thousand men" (συνέβαινεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φόρων καὶ τῶν τελῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πλείους ἢ δισμυρίους ἄνδρας τρέφεσθαι) (*Athenaion Politeia* 24.3).[226] The historical merits of this passage notwithstanding, it nonetheless demonstrates nicely the fourth-century philosophical attitude to the Athenian empire, which underscores the intimate connection between imperialism and feeding the demos.[227] First, Ps.-Aristotle mentions the importance of tribute, which during the fifth century was a massive source of state income. As argued above, tribute payments in the fourth century (viz. *syntaxeis*) yielded about half of the income they had in the fifth (ca.195 talents), but they were not insignificant amounts of money. These monies went directly to fund League operations, paying for soldiers in garrisons, officials abroad, and

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[226] Schütrumpf 1982: 68 (contra Gauthier 1976: 25-6) rightly notes that the emphasis of *Athenaion Politeia* 24 is not on political pay but on *trophe* in the sense of ration-payment. It must be stressed that Aristides convinces the demos "to leave their *farms*," where they had previously secured their *trophe*, and to move to the city to live off the proceeds of empire. Athens in the fourth century never became the *emmisthos polis* it was during the fifth (Plutarch, *Pericles*; cf. Demosthenes 23.209). Hopes for perpetual pay from empire died with the disaster in Sicily. Thucydides claims that a vast majority of Athenians "fell in love" with the campaign because they thought "they would get money for the moment and attain a power base whence they would secure endless pay" (ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν) (6.24.3). However, when the expedition ran into fiscal trouble, the request of the generals for *misthos* resulted in the Athenians voting to send *trophe* instead (6.93.4; see Kallet 2001: 299). That most Athenian citizens in the fourth century were content to serve with the only form of remuneration being *trophe* seems certain, because *trophe* was all the state could afford (see, for example, Demosthenes 4.23-25, 28-29, 7.26, 47; 23.209; 49.11, 15; cf. Pritchett 1991: 458-9).

[227] For the historical accuracy of this passage, see Rhodes 1981: 297.

most importantly, rowers.[228] Next, Ps.-Aristotle notes the role of taxes in feeding the Athenian demos. In addition to the *dekate* and *eikoste*, which were levied periodically during the first half of the fourth century (see Appendix 2), the Athenians benefited from other taxes of imperial origin. For example, the Grain-tax Law of 374/3 attests that the 8 1/3% and 2% taxes collected in Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros had previously been paid into the treasury for the financial administration (*dioikesis*) of the city.[229] In other words, revenues derived from these cleruchies prior to 374/3 financed the running of the state, of which funding political pay was a significant part (more below).

The last source of alimentary support of which Ps.-Aristotle speaks is "the allies." The inclusion of this generic category in his list of imperial revenues has long puzzled scholars, largely because tribute, which Ps.-Aristotle lists first, was imposed primarily on the allies.[230] The confusion over "the allies" is removed, however, if we bring in the analysis of the Old Oligarch, who discusses at length the profits the Athenians acquired from the *symmachoi* by forcing them to come to Athens for *dikai* (1.16-17), a procedure still in practice during the fourth century.[231] He claims that from the deposits at law the

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[228] See, for example, *GHI*^{2} 52, where the Athenians decree that the garrison on Andros "shall have its *misthos* out of the *syntaxeis*" (10-11), and that "Archedemus shall exact the money from the islands which is due for the soldiers in Andros, and hand it over to the governor in Andros so that the soldiers can have their pay" (16-21). Cf. *GHI*^{2} 51, 8-15, *IG* II^2 207, 12-15, Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 116, and Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 17.3 (mercenaries of which some were citizens; see Pritchett 1991: 397-8, n.566). In general, see Brun 1983: 89-91. On the controversial question of whether tribute/*syntaxeis* was a source of dicastic pay, see A scholium to *Wasps* 684 with Kallet-Marx 1994: 246-7.

[229] *Hesperia Supp.* 29, ll. 55-9 = *GHI*^{2} 26. For more on this law, see below.

[230] Kaibel and Wilamowitz thought it so odd they deleted καὶ τῶν συμμάχων altogether. Others have attempted a variety of emendations. The most convincing of which is proposed by Rhodes, who, following the sense of Hude's emendation, wants to read: τῶν τελῶν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμάχων (see Rhodes 1981: 301).

[231] As Rhodes 1981: 301 admits, the entire twenty-fourth chapter of the *Athenaion Politeia* is based on "genuine fifth-century evidence," some of which was colored by pamphleteers like the Old Oligarch. For judicial cases of allies in Athens, see *GHI*^{2} 39, 45-50, 73-75; *IG* II^2 179, 9, 12, 14; *Hesperia* 26 1957: 231-3 with Cargill 1981: 136ff.

people received their dicastic *misthos* for the whole year, which is certainly an exaggeration, but one that does not belie the fact that the allies contributed in this way to the maintenance of the Athenian demos.[232] Moreover, the Old Oligarch declares that the city profits in other ways from the allies: there are increases in revenue from the one percent tax in the Piraeus; the innkeepers rent out more rooms; the owners of transportation hire out more animals; and the heralds of the assembly "do better when the allies are in town." Ps.-Aristotle concludes this chapter as he began it, by noting that the Athenians will receive their *trophe* from all these imperial revenues: "for all these citizens had their maintenance from public funds" (ἅπασι γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις ἦν).[233]

The second method of securing *trophe* was derived from Athens' naval supremacy that she exercised throughout most of the fourth century. Isocrates, for instance, laments how Athenian sea power accustoms those "who have lost their own possessions" "to secure their livelihood from the possessions of others" (ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων πορίζεσθαι τὸν βίον).[234] The Athenians seem to have followed three related practices. First, when funds were low or non-existent to pay troops in the field, Athenian generals forcefully exacted money from both League and non-League members.[235] In the former case, these monies were in addition to their normal *syntaxeis*

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232 For the Old Oligarch's hyperbole in this passage, see Frisch 1942: 226. Cf. Thucydides 6.91.7, who also talks about revenue derived from the lawcourts (contra Gomme et al. 1970: 365-6, who do not dicuss the Old Oligarch).

233 See Rhodes 1981: 309 on διοίκησις, "administration of state" = "maintenance."

234 *Panathenaicus* 116 with Momigliano 1944: 4; cf. Thucydides 1.81.4 and *Hipparchicus* 8.8.

235 For example, Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.8.30; 6.2.38; Lysias 28.5; Isocrates, *Antidosis* 111; Demosthenes 4.29; Diodorus 15.47.7; 16.21.2; Polyaenus 3.10.9.

payments.[236] Secondly, they often turned to piracy both to relieve food shortages at home and to feed rowers, soldiers, and mercenaries abroad. Sometimes they seized grain, but more often than not, they confiscated goods, which were then sold for money to buy victuals.[237] The last practice was contingent upon the threat of such depredations, whereby Athenian generals extorted money from traders to allow them to sail the seas unmolested. The case of Diopithes is notorious:

> πάντες ὅσοι πώποτ᾽ ἐκπεπλεύκασι παρ᾽ ὑμῶν στρατηγοί (ἢ ᾽γὼ πάσχειν ὁτιοῦν τιμῶμαι) καὶ παρὰ Χίων καὶ παρ᾽ Ἐρυθραίων καὶ παρ᾽ ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι δύνωνται, τούτων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκούντων λέγω, χρήματα λαμβάνουσιν. λαμβάνουσι δ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἔχοντες μίαν ἢ δύο ναῦς ἐλάττονα, οἱ δὲ μείζω δύναμιν πλείονα. καὶ διδόασιν οἱ διδόντες οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ οὔτε τὰ πολλὰ ἀντ᾽ οὐδενός (οὐ γὰρ οὕτω μαίνονται), ἀλλ᾽ ὠνούμενοι μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι τοὺς παρ᾽ αὑτῶν ἐκπλέοντας ἐμπόρους, μὴ συλᾶσθαι, παραπέμπεσθαι τὰ πλοῖα τὰ αὑτῶν, τὰ τοιαῦτα· φασὶ δ᾽ εὐνοίας διδόναι, καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομ᾽ ἔχει τὰ λήμματα ταῦτα. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τῷ Διοπείθει στράτευμ᾽ ἔχοντι σαφῶς ἐστι τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι δώσουσι χρήματα πάντες οὗτοι· πόθεν γὰρ οἴεσθ᾽ ἄλλοθεν τὸν μήτε λαβόντα παρ᾽ ὑμῶν μηδὲν μήτ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔχονθ᾽ ὁπόθεν μισθοδοτήσει, στρατιώτας τρέφειν;
>
> All the generals that have ever set sail from your land—if I am wrong, I submit myself to any penalty—raise money from the Chians, from the Erythraeans, from whatever people they can, I mean of the Greeks of Asia Minor. Generals with only one or two ships raise less; those with a larger

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[236] However, one should not distinguish too sharply between ἀργυρολογεῖν, "to collect money" and χρήματα [εἰσ]πράττειν, "to exact money." While the former is often used for officially sanctioned collections of tribute and taxes and the latter for ad hoc collections of money from states who contributed willingly or not (e.g., Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.3.8; Thucydides 8.3.1, 107.1, 108.2; Aristides, *Encomium of Rome* 45; Meiggs 1972: 254 calls these "emergency levies"), the distinction is not always followed (see Kallet-Marx 1993: 136-7, 160-4, 202). In the fourth century, the *syntaxeis* payments were also collected by the generals (Plutarch, *Phocion* 7.1; Isocrates 4.113; 8.29, 15.123; *GHI* 168; *IG* II^2 207, 15-17; cf. Marshall 1905: 39-40 and Cawkwell 1981: 51. Brun 1983: 100, who argues that the regular, non-wartime procedure was probably to bring the contributions directly to Athens; however, his view is supported by an idiosyncratic reading of Plutarch, *Phocion* 7.1, which I do not endorse.

[237] Isocrates 18.61; Lysias 19.50; Demosthenes 2.28; 8.9; 13.6; 20.77; 24.11; Aeschines 2.71; Diodorus 16.57.2; for additional references, see Pritchett 1991: 378-82, 391-98, 485-99.

> fleet raise more. Also those who pay do not pay the sum, be it large or small, for nothing; they are not such madmen. No, they purchase for the merchants sailing from their own harbors immunity from injury or robbery, or a safe conduct for their own ships, or something of that sort. They say that they are granting "benevolences." That is the name for these exactions. And so too in this case, while Diopithes has a force with him, it is perfectly plain that all these people will pay up. For where else do you suppose that he looks for the maintenance of his troops, if he gets nothing from you and has no private fortune to furnish their pay? (Demosthenes 8.24-6; trans. Vince).

There are two notable aspects of this passage. First, the specter of injury (ἀδικεῖσθαι) or depredation (συλᾶσθαι) from the Athenians on the high seas was very real. Those who did not pay the Athenians suffered seizure and the confiscation of their goods and money (cf. 8.9). Second, Diopithes and the generals before him exacted these "benevolences" not only from allies like Chios but also from non-allies who lived in Asia, that is, from those who were technically subject to the Persian *arche*. In other words, the Athenian thalassocracy allowed the Athenians to extend their power and influence over peoples outside the League. What is so remarkable about Demosthenes' *On the Chersonese*, the speech from which this passage is drawn, is that one gets the impression that the Athenians tacitly approved these extortionate methods not so much because the state could not fund its campaigns (Demosthenes, in fact, implies that it could at 21-3), but because such means of securing *trophe* was readily available and easy to perform (requiring only one or two ships).[238] The sums from some of these exactions

[238] That Athenian finances in the fourth century were dismal is a commonplace in the scholarship (e.g., Griffith 1978: 135 and Ste. Croix 1981: 292, 607, n. 37). This position, however, has been grossly overstated. It is Demosthenes' belief that if the Athenians only paid their war taxes or served in person, kept their hands off public funds, and paid out the *syntaxeis* to Dipithes which the League had authorized, such extortionate practices could be avoided. In *On the Symmories*, Demosthenes boasts that "there is wealth in the city that is equal to that of all the other Greek cities put together" (14.25). Even allowing for hyperbole, this is an amazing statement, coming as it does only one year after the Social War. Demosthenes' point is that this wealth is either undeclared or hidden from the *eisphora* assessments (26; cf.

were enormous. According to Lysias, the Athenian general Diotimus, who had been operating in the Hellespont ca. 388 (*Hellenica* 5.1.25), collected at least "40 talents from the *naukleroi* and the *emporoi*" (19.50)![239]

The last means by which the Athenians acquired their *trophe* was the establishment of cleruchies and colonies, though the former seems to have been the more common form of settlement in the fourth century.[240] First, many Athenians who were sent to settle conquered areas were from the two lowest social classes, the *thetes* and *zeugitai*, whose new possession of land in some instances helped advance them to hoplite status and thus right out of poverty or maintained them comfortably at hoplite rank.[241] It is impossible to estimate the total number of settlers in the fourth century, but Hansen conjectures around 5,000 for the cleruchies in Samos and the Chersonese between 365-53.[242] Whether these settlers worked the land themselves or, as in the case of Mytilene in 427, collected rent from locals who farmed the plots, sufficient *trophe* was guaranteed

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30). A few years later (349/8), for example, we learn from a decree that the Athenians were able to fund adequately a large overseas expedition with *trophe* under the leadership of Chares and Charidemus (*IG* II^2 207, fg. a-b with Pritchett 1991: 497).

239 It is important to note that all these monies which belonged to the state could either be spent abroad to fund a campaign or brought home to the Athenian state treasury. In both instances, accounts had to be kept and an audit was performed. Each general and trierarch had a treasurer who kept account of monies received and paid out for *misthos* (Harpocration *s.v.* ταμίαι; Lysias 19.50-51; 29.3; Demosthenes 49.5-10; 50.10; see also Pritchett 1991: 394, 489, n. 743).

240 For cleruchies and overseas settlements in the fifth and fourth centuries, see Jones 1957: 167-77, Brunt 1966, Meiggs 1972: 121-3, 260-2, Gauthier 1973, Hansen 1985: 70-2, Garnsey 1988: 128-31, Figueira 1991, and Cargill 1995. Whatever distinction there was between cleruchies and colonies (*apoikiai*) in the fifth century, disappeared in the fourth (Cargill 1995: xxi-xxiii; cf. Figueira 1991: 61).

241 E.g., the colony at Brea (*IG* I^3 46, 36-46); cf. Plutarch, *Pericles* 11.6 with Jones 1957: 168-9 and Meiggs 1972: 260-1. I do not mean to suggest, however, that cleruchies and colonies were restricted to the lower classes, as most were open to all ranks (Cargill 1995: 196; cf. Figueira 1991: 57-62, who argues that colonies were open to all classes, whereas cleruchies were limited to *thetes* and *zeugites*). That cleruchs retained their Athenian citizenship is generally agreed (Graham 1983: 167, Hansen 1985: 71, Figueira 1991: 72, and Cargill 1995: xxi-xxiii).

to them and their families.[243] Did the Athenians profit in other ways from the cleruchies, and, in particular, did any grain produced in the cleruchies find its way to Athens? According to Thucydides, the fall of Amphipolis in 424/3 brought great fear upon the Athenians, "especially because the city was profitable to them both through its conveyance of wood for shipbuilding and its financial revenue (χρημάτων προσόδῳ)" (4.108.1). This passage is proof positive that resources and income regularly flowed from overseas settlements to Athens.[244] Unfortunately, the evidence for such incomes is scant and obscure. Figueira speculates that "[t]hese revenues would probably be derived from indirect taxes, and possibly from income on resources, the exploitation of which was retained by the Athenian government rather than attributed to colonists."[245] These indirect taxes were likely harbors dues and, in places like Amphipolis, levies on mines.[246] More certain is income (viz. rents) derived from sacred properties, as ten percent of a given cleruchy was dedicated to the gods.[247]

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[242] Hansen 1985: 71; cf. Jones 1957: 173-4 4,000-figure for the fifth century. Hansen does not consider the cleruchies on Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros. For these, Moreno 2003: 102 estimates around 540, because the holdings on these islands probably belonged to those of the *pentakosiomedimnoi*.

[243] For the settlement of Mytilene, see Thucydides 3.50.2 with Gomme 1956: 326-8 and Hornblower 1991: 440-1. Gomme estimates that the landholdings on Lesbos were 45 hectares, which is impossibly large. The annual rent of two minai (200 dr.) corresponds to that of a hoplite, whose property was valued at a minimum of 2000 dr. (Jones 1957: 31 and Gauthier 1966: 64). The average rent on land in Athens seems to have been on average 8% per annum, which would indicate a land value of 2500 dr. (Jones 1957: 30, Cooper 1978: 169, n.38, and Millet 1991: 232-5). If we then take the 50 dr. per plethora land value estimate of Andreyev 1974: 15ff., the lot holding on Lesbos were exactly 50 pl. or 4.5 hectares. As argued above (note 65), four hectare plot could, theoretically speaking, easily satisfy the alimentary needs of a family of six.

[244] See Figueira 1991: 186-93 and Kallet-Marx 1993: 99-101, 175-6.

[245] Figueira 1991: 191.

[246] Figueira 1991: 74-81, 91 citing *IG* I^3 47 (cf. *GHI*^{2} 26, 8 with Stroud 1998: 38-9); for mines, see Kallet-Marx 1993: 175-6.

[247] Thucydides 3.50.2; *IG* I^3 376; Aelian, *Varia Historia* 6.1; Walbank 1991: 154 and Kallet-Marx 1993: 101.

Moreover, new evidence proves that cleruchs and colonists, in addition to paying *eisphora*, were subject to direct taxes on their land, a burden Athenians living in Attica did not share.[248] In the recently published Grain-tax law of 374/3, we read that the statesman Agyrrhius proposed the law to ensure that "there [might] be grain for the demos in the public domain" (ὅπως ἂν τῶι δήμωι σῖ[το]ς ᾖι ἐν τῶι κοινῶι) by selling the 8 1/3% tax (*dodekate*) and the 2% tax originating in Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros "in terms of grain" (σίτο) (5-8), whereas previously these taxes had been paid in cash.[249] Stroud is probably correct in interpreting the 2% as a levy on grain cargoes exported from the islands.[250] The identification of the 8 1/3% is puzzling though, as this tax rate is seemingly unattested at Athens.[251] The high level led Harris to conjecture that the *dodekate* was a "transit tax," but this interpretation is problematic.[252] Moreno has

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[248] For *eisphora*, see *IG* I^3 41, 38-9 with Figueira 1991: 69-70, 191-3 and Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1347a18-24. Cf. *IG* I^3 237, which Walbank 1991: 155 speculates may be decree dealing with taxes on leases of land, houses, and other real estate in land abroad. Cleruchic land, technically speaking, was private property (Figueira 1991: 185 and Walbank 1991: 150-1) and not "public," as argues Gauthier 1973: 70. But the fact that this land was directly taxed by the state demonstrates that it was in a special category of private property, perhaps because the state retained the "title" to the land Walbank 1991: 151).

[249] *Hesperia* Supplement 29 (1998): ll. 4-5 = *GHI*^{2} 26 with Stroud 1998: 80, 109, Harris 1999: 269, and Moreno 2003: 97. The law prohibiting any Athenian or metic living in Athens from exporting grain to any port but the Piraeus (Demosthenes 35.50-51; 34.37; Lycurgus 1.32; cf. Demosthenes 56.10) may provide prima facie evidence that most of the grain exported from the three islands went to Athens, but the law does not cover Athenians living abroad. Cleruchs could have shipped their surplus grain anywhere they wished. Besides, the law probably belongs to the early to mid 340s. The earliest reference to it is Demosthenes 35, which dates to 340-38 (Gernet 1954: 179-80 and Isager and Hansen 1975: 169-70). The law stipulates that "if any man lends out money contrary to the requirements of the law, a denouncement (*phasis*) and an account of the money shall be laid before the *epimeletai* [of the *emporion*] in the same manner as is provided in regard to the ship and the grain" (Dem. 35.51). In Section 5B, I argue that the decree of Moerocles (Demosthenes 57.10-3, 53-6), which protects traders from false denunciations, must date between 346 and 344. This decree was probably enacted shortly after the law in question was in effect to ameliorate the legal situation of falsely accused traders.

[250] Stroud 1998: 38; cf. Moreno 2003: 98 and Harris 1999: 271, who identifies the 2% with the *pentekoste* of grain mentioned in Demosthenes 59.27.

[251] Stroud 1998: 27.

[252] See Engles 2000: 114, Rosivach 2000: 39, n.24, Moreno 2003: 97-8, n.9, and Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 123-4.

offered the most compelling explanation, which links the 8 1/3% with the tax of the same rate deduced by Boeckh of the Solonian *pentakosiomedimnoi* class.[253] Since the law stipulates that the tax is to be collected in "shares" (μερίδες), each consisting of 500 medimnoi, 100 of wheat and 400 of barley (8-10), the law was essentially a tax on the cleruch holdings of the *pentakosiomedimnoi* class.[254] Using similar calculations to those given above for Attica, Moreno estimates 540 cleruchs for the three islands, whose tax burden would have amounted to 270,000 medimnoi of grain a year.[255] Judging from the production totals of the Eleusis accounts for 329/8, this number was clearly a significant portion of yearly production.[256] If Moreno's interpretation is sound, it would appear that the Athenians profited handsomely from these cleruchies. Before 374/3, when the tax was collected in kind, the Athenians probably generated in the neighborhood of 50 talents a year, which was earmarked for the administration of the city (59); after this date, the Athenians not only ensured that they would receive a regular supply of 270,000 medimnoi of grain but also that they would potentially triple their profit, since the grain

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253 Moreno 2003: 98-99 and Boeckh 1976: 503-4. Solon had estimated the value of a medimnus at a drachma (Plutarch, *Solon* 23). Thus, 500 medimnoi of grain is 8 1/3% of one talent, which Boeckh argues was the total taxable capital of the *pentakosiomedimnoi* class.

254 As Moreno 2003: 99 notes well, the complete word πεντακοσιομέδιμνοι appears in a decree concerning Lemnos of 387/6 (*Agora* XIX L3, 12), which concerns land regulations.

255 Moreno argues that there was a total of 600 *kleroi*, each equaling 1000 plethora and producing 650 kg/ha per annum with biennial fallow. This yields a total yearly production of 540,000 medimnoi. Moreover, he suggests that ten percent of the *kleroi* would have been reserved for the gods, following the example of Lesbos in 427 (Thucydides 3.50). With 540 total *kleroi* paying 500 medimnoi in tax, we get 270,000 for the total amount of grain that the Athenians could have purchased. This number is significantly higher than Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 127, who argue that the tax would have amounted to around 30,000 medimnoi a year.

256 *IG* II^2 1672, 275-9, 288-97 reports that Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros produced 303,325 medimnoi of barley and 110,550 of wheat, totaling 413,875 medimnoi of grain, which is 46,887 more than the total production of Attica for this year. Again, it is unknown whether these totals represent a good, average, or bad year, but the scholarly consensus is that, unlike Attica, it was an average to good year for these islands (Garnsey 1988: 100 and Stroud 1998: 35-6; cf. Moreno's calculations above; if correct, this year was probably well below average).

was sold to the public (40-44).[257] It is completely understandable, then, why the Athenians made such a fuss about the retention of the three islands in the lead up to the King's Peace: they were sources of large revenues and veritable "breadbaskets."[258] The metaphor is apt, for this is what Pitholaus, one of the murderers of Alexander of Pherae, called Sestos: "the bread-basket of the Piraeus" (Σηστὸν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ Πειραιέως).[259] Indeed, all cleruchies were probably to a certain degree breadbaskets for the Athenians.[260]

What is unknown is whether land in the cleruchies before 374/3 was normally taxed in cash or in kind. The case of Euboea in the fifth century potentially calls into question the novelty of Agyrrhius' law. The Athenians had established a cleruchy on

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[257] Moreno's analysis is insightful: "The law was a democratic masterstroke not only because it provided a public supply of grain for the Athenian demos, but also because it turned a tax on the wealthy cleruchs of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros from a δωδεκάτη in cash (a relatively painless yearly payment of 500 drachmas [= 45 talents total (500 dr. x 540 cleruchs)]) into a much more onerous δωδεκάτη in grain, *equaling a yearly payment of five hundred medimnoi from each cleruch*" (Moreno 2003: 100, citing Rhodes 1981: 142-5 that by the early 5th c. the Solonian requirements had changed to being assessed in drachmas instead of medimnoi, on a 1:1 basis). Depending on the price of grain set by the assembly, this could have amounted to a cash equivalent of 1800 dr. per cleruch or 162 talents total (assuming an average 4 dr. price for barley and 6 dr. for wheat). These monies were then assigned to the military fund (*stratiotika*) (ll.53-4), which financed further expansionist and imperialistic projects, for which many Athenians received their *misthos* and *trophe*. Thus, it was a win-win for the demos.

[258] See the provocative title of Moreno 2003; cf. Whitby 1998: 108. Given the productivity of these islands, one wonders what Xenophon thought about them. Did the fact that they "belonged" to Athens since 387/6 make him overlook that they were attained through war and imperialism? Or rather, did he see them as illegitimate possessions? There is no way of knowing for sure, but it is important to note that in the first chapter of the *Poroi* Xenophon defines Attica strictly in terms of its contiguous territory. This land is παμφορωτάτη, "all-productive," not πολύφορος, "highly-productive" (1.3; for the difference, see Plato, *Laws* 705b). If Xenophon did believe these fertile islands to be Athenian, here would have been the perfect place for their inclusion in the work.

[259] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1411a13. *LSJ* s.v. glosses τηλία as a "*board or table with a raised edge*, to prevent meal and pastry placed on it from falling off, *corn seller's* or *baker's board*."

[260] The scholium to Aristophanes' *Knights* 259-65 says the "The Thracian Chersonese is a place and polis subject to the Athenians and favorable for the growing of wheat; it is from this place that the Athenians transport their grain" (Χερρόνησος τῆς Θράκης χωρίον καὶ πόλις, ὑποτελὴς τῶν Ἀθηναίων,

Carystus in 453/2 or 452/1, and after the Euboean revolt in 446/5 they settled much of the island.[261] Thucydides maintains that Euboea was more valuable to the Athenians than Attica.[262] The lists of confiscated properties on the "Attic Stelai" indicate that many wealthy Athenians owned large estates there.[263] In Aristophanes' *Wasps*, Bdelycleon addresses Euboea's specific role of providing the Athenians with grain. He first attacks greedy politicians for holding back the proceeds of empire, which in his estimation is capable of providing a livelihood (βίος) for the entire demos (698ff.). With some comic exaggeration, he claims there are a thousand tributary states that could feed (βόσκειν) luxuriously twenty-thousand Athenians (707-9).

> ἀλλ' ὁπόταν μὲν δείσωσ' αὐτοί, τὴν Εὔβοιαν διδόασιν
> ὑμῖν, καὶ σῖτον ὑφίστανται κατὰ πεντήκοντα μεδίμνους
> ποριεῖν. ἔδοσαν δ' οὐπώποτέ σοι· πλὴν πρώην πέντε μεδίμνους,
> καὶ ταῦτα μόλις ξενίας φεύγων, ἔλαβες κατὰ χοίνικα κριθῶν.
> ὧν εἵνεκ' ἐγώ σ' ἀπέκλειον ἀεὶ
> βόσκειν ἐθέλων καὶ μὴ τούτους
> ἐγχάσκειν σοι στομφάζοντας.
>
> But whenever they're scared themselves, they promise you Euboea and get set to supply you with fifty-bushel rations of grain. But they never give it to you, not counting yesterday when you got five bushels, but only after narrowly escaping a challenge to your citizenship, and then it was barley in one quart installments. Which is why I kept you locked up: I wanted to feed you and I didn't want these blowhards to make a chump of you (715-21; trans. Henderson).

εὔφορος εἰς πυροῦ γεωργίαν. ὅθεν καὶ ἐσιταγώγουν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι). Lysias 32.15 mentions how "grain comes in every year from the Chersonese" for the family of Diodotus, who had an estate there.

261 Pausanias 1.27.5 and Diodorus 11.88 with Moreno 2003: 104, n.37.

262 Thucydides 8.96.2 and 7.28; cf. Andocides 3.9; Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 108.

263 See Pritchett, *Hesperia* 22 (1953): 225-99, 25 (1956): 178-328, 30 (1961): 23-29; Euboean estates can be found, for example, on Stele II, Col. III, l.178, 312 and Stele VI, frag. n. l.151.

This passage evidences the same phenomenon between Athenian political leaders and the demos attested at the beginning of the *Poroi*. Leaders fearful of the demos felt compelled to fleece the cleruchies in order to provide it with *trophe*. They did not follow through with their promises in the case of Euboea, however, and reduced distribution levels by 90%. As five medimnoi is ten percent of fifty, and fifty ten percent of five hundred, Moreno may be correct in interpreting the passage as a joke exposing the fraud of the politicians, who initially promised the demos a 8 1/3% tax on Euboean grain from the *pentakosiomedimnoi*.[264] At whatever rate these distributions imply, it seems certain that this particular tax was collected in kind. However, the main difference between Agyrrhius' law and the proposal here is that the latter is envisioned as a dole and thus suggests a temporary measure designed to relieve shortages brought on by the war.[265] Without additional evidence to elucidate the workings of taxation in the cleruchies, we may assume that the normal procedure was to collect the taxes in cash.

The loss of cleruchies like Euboea after the Peloponnesian War was particularly grievous to the Athenians, and in the late 390s there is a strong desire to win them

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264 Garnsey 1988: 125 dates this episode to 424/3. Moreno 2003: 104: "If Aristophanes is seeking in this passage to portray the demagogues as tight-fisted, the reader is inevitably confused to find a grain distribution κατὰ πέντε μεδίμνους being criticized, since this amount is more than enough to feed six adult males for a year." Here Moreno is terribly mistaken as five medimnoi a year would not have fulfilled the requirement for one adult male. Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 72 estimate that a family of six (comprising an adult man and wife, an elderly woman, and three children—one male and two female) needed a maximum of about 1419 kg of wheat per year. Again this figure is too low because of the difference in weight between ancient and modern cultivars of wheat. Taking the 281 kg/year figure (see above) and multiplying it by 6 yields 1685 kg/year; a number which divided by 30.86 kg (weight of 1 medimnos of wheat) amounts to just under 55 medimnoi a year. Given that the original distribution of fifty medimnoi was to be in wheat, which is reasonably assumed from Bdelycleon expressing his frustration with distributions κατὰ χοίνικα κριθῶν, it seems extremely likely that 50 medimnoi represents a reasonable estimate to allot to each individual citizen for himself and his family for a year.

265 It is also entirely possible that the grain distributed was grown on public land in Euboea; see Walbank 1991: 154.

back.[266] The recuperation of property abroad meant real financial gains for wealthy Athenians in the form of rents and loans. But for many others, the cleruchies were a significant source of *trophe*. Andocides complains about these people, whom he sees as an obstacle to peace: "Thus even now some say that they don't understand what sort of reconciliation it is if the city only gets walls and ships; they are not recovering their private property from abroad, and they cannot get their *sustenance* from walls" (ὅπου καὶ νῦν ἤδη τινὲς λέγουσιν οὐ γιγνώσκειν τὰς διαλλαγὰς αἵτινές εἰσι, τείχη καὶ νῆες εἰ γενήσονται τῇ πόλει· τὰ γὰρ ἴδια τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς ὑπερορίας οὐκ ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τειχῶν οὐκ εἶναι σφίσι τροφήν) (3.36). Indeed, the recovery of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros in 387/6 and the cleruchies in Samos, Potideia, and the Chersonese later in the century afforded the Athenians significant and reliable sources of *trophe*. With the build-up of their naval forces throughout the first half of the fourth century, the Athenians were able to secure those grain-producing areas and protect the grain-convoys that set out each fall from them to Athens; it was not until 340 when Philip captured the grain convoy did any one seriously oppose the Athenian thalassocracy.[267]

Plato too weighed in on the debate about *trophe* in Book 2 of the *Republic*, where he implicitly criticizes the Athenians for succumbing to imperialistic modes of acquiring their *trophe*. To facilitate their discussion of justice, Socrates suggests that he and his

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[266] *Hellenica* 4.8.15; Andocides, *On the Peace* 15. Harris 2000 has rightly questioned the authenticity of this speech, but the sentiment to recover the cleruchies is probably an accurate representation because the Hellenistic fabricator composed this speech by following authentic historical material from the period (500).

[267] See Garnsey 1988: 142-3, Sealey 1993: 91, 107-8, 188, and Whitby 1988: 123.

interlocutors examine a hypothetical city coming into being, where, he hopes, they may detect more easily the origins of justice and injustice. Socrates asserts the principle that no person is self-sufficient; he requires "associates" and "helpers" to procure what he needs. "Need" (χρεία), he explains, is the immediate cause of the polis' existence (369b-c). The first and greatest of needs is the procurement of food (ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευή), followed by the need for housing and clothing (369d). Accordingly, the city of "utmost necessity" would consist of four or five men: a farmer, builder, weaver, and cobbler (369d-e). Socrates then elaborates upon the idea of the specialization of labor, which in his mind necessarily occasions further specializations according to the principle of "the multiplication of effects": the farmer, for example, will not make his own plow or hoe, and consequently smiths and other craftsmen will be needed in the city, traders to procure materials for the creation of those goods, more farmers to grow crops for the increased population, and so on (370c-371e).[268]

"So where does justice and injustice reside in this city," asks Adeimantus, "unless it is somewhere in one of these needs themselves (372a)? Socrates responds by describing for his friends what Glaucon famously refers to as "the city of pigs"—an idyllic city that succumbs only to satisfying its "necessary desires." For Socrates, people who reside in this city live in peace and have health (372d); in a word, it is a "healthy" (ὑγιής) city (372e). But what Glaucon finds so offensive about this city is that it has no "luxuries," that is, "to recline on couches…to dine from tables, and have relishes and sweetmeats such as are now in use" (ἅπερ νομίζεται· ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι

[268] Shorey 1930: xiv.

οἶμαι τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν, καὶ ὄψα ἅπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα). The phrases ἅπερ νομίζεται and οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι reorient the discussion from the hypothetical city in speech to a luxurious city that has a real city as its model: Athens. This city is the counterpoint to the healthy one because it is "feverish" (φλεγμαίνουσας), according to Socrates. The image is gripping because the luxurious city, no longer confining itself to necessities, requires an endless supply of refinements and concomitantly an exponential number of artisans, manufacturers, and artists who can produce them (373a-d). The outcome of this process is that the population of the city will grow beyond what the territory can produce to feed it, and war becomes inevitable: "Then we shall have to cut out a cantle of our neighbor's land if we are to have enough for pasture and plowing, and they in turn of ours if they abandon themselves to the unlimited acquisition of wealth, disregarding the limit set by our necessary wants" (οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἱκανὴν ἕξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅρον) (373d; trans. Shorey). The necessity of war leads to the creation of a large class of professional warriors who devote themselves to the protection of the city's property and luxuries (374a). The polis at this point devotes itself to an unjust militarism whose only salvation, according to Socrates, lies in a class of enlightened guardians who can educate the citizenry to, among other things, reject their unnecessary desires—the very cause of war and the polis' injustice.

The therapeutic program Socrates sketches in the remainder of the *Republic* need not concern us here. Of greater interest is Plato's focus on *trophe* in determining where justice and injustice originate in the city. Socrates concedes Adeimantus' suggestion that justice and injustice reside in one of the three needs: *trophe*, housing, and clothing. In their respective discussions of the city of pigs and the luxurious city, Socrates and Glaucon speak predominantly about food. The apparent lack of "relish" in Socrates' prescriptions elicits a quick response from Glaucon. Socrates admits that he left out such savories as salt, olives, cheese, onions, etc., but these do not satisfy Glaucon, who demands more dainties. He fixates on the luxurious world of the symposium; relishes and sweetmeats give way to myrrh, incense, prostitutes, and varieties of cakes (373a). For Socrates then *trophe* easily degenerates into *truphe*, "luxury," and it is *truphe* that precipitates an unsustainable population increase. At this point, Socrates insists, the choice for the city is either poverty or war, and the luxurious city naturally chooses war as the means of securing its needs, both necessary and unnecessary.[269] Though Plato's analysis is more complex than Xenophon's in the *Poroi*, both authors ultimately agree that "feeding" the mega, luxurious polis necessarily involves war, expansionism, and consequently the unjust treatment of one's neighbors.[270]

In the final analysis, the abundant historical evidence and the testimonies of Plato and Xenophon illuminate clearly the motives of Athenian imperialism, compelling the

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[269] Cf. *Phaedo* 66c. For the connection between luxury and imperialism, see Herodotus 1.125-6; 5.49.4; 9.82 and Thucydides 6.12.2 with Davidson 1990: 27 and Balot 2006: 158-9.

[270] The key difference is that Plato locates the underlying cause of imperialism in the desire for unnecessary luxuries, because satisfying these wants leads to an unsustainable increase in population. *Trophe* in Plato's estimation is only the precipitating cause of imperialism. Xenophon seems less concerned with luxury than we might expect (see, for example, *Hellenica* 6.2.6; *Memorabilia* 1.6.10;

interpretation that securing *trophe* for the demos was a significant factor in motivating Athenian aggression and expansionism in the fourth century. This explanation of Athenian imperialism privileges the role of satisfying basic physiological needs over gratifying psychological desires like fame and honor, which scholars have long assumed to be the underlying cause of Athenian imperialism. It is helpful to recall Alcibiades' manipulation of the ephebic oath, in which he asked the ephebes "to account wheat and barley, and vines and olive to be the limits of Attica." Alcibiades inspires his recruits with neither ideas nor abstractions and makes no appeal to their courage, honor, and fame. Rather, he entices them with the promise of concrete material benefits gained from conquest. For Alcibiades and a majority of Athenians, then, *trophe* and empire were inextricably connected. That is not to say other economic and political factors did not contribute to Athenian expansionism and imperialism. The economic benefits of empire went well beyond alimentary considerations, as Finley ably demonstrates.[271] Moreover, as other commentators have emphasized, the poor were not the only ones who benefited from the empire. The Athenians could never have maintained their empire in the fifth century nor regained it in the fourth without the consensus of a majority of Athenians.[272]

Cyropaedia 8.3.40). In fact, his plans for economic recovery depend on people having the ability to buy luxuries with Athenian silver (*Poroi* 4.7-9).

[271] Finley 1982: 57-60; cf. Rhodes 1981: 300-2 and Galpin 1984: 107. Jones 1957: 5-7 (cf. Moore 1986: 248-9 and Kallet-Marx 1994: 247-8) contests the idea that "democracy was parasitic on empire," because political pay continued in the fourth century despite the loss of the empire, and "the Second Athenian League…was never a paying proposition, the contributions of the allies by no means covering the cost of military and naval operations." My discussion above about the reconstitution of empire in the fourth century speaks strongly against this argument; the Athenians received income from sources other than *syntaxeis*.

[272] This is essentially the argument of Raaflaub 1994 and 2004: 166-81; cf. Kallet-Marx 1994 and Balot 2006: 163, 170-1. On how the wealthy profited from empire, see Andrewes 1978: 4-5, Davies 1981: 90, Ste. Croix 1981: 290, 604-5, Galpin 1984: 100, Carter 1986: 34-7, Strauss 1987: 51-3, Starr 1988: 123, Schmitz 1988: 79-115, and Badian 1995: 81; cf. Davidson 1990: 28-9. As demonstrated above, the wealthy owned substantial chunks of land in Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. It must be stressed, however,

However, historians of Athenian imperialism cannot lose sight of the fact that Xenophon proceeds from the premise that *trophe* was an important if not *the* most important cause of Athenian imperialism, because he is resolute in his belief that providing the Athenians with sufficient *trophe* will eliminate in one fell swoop their need for empire. This understanding of Athenian imperialism may not satisfy some modern readers, but Xenophon certainly takes it for granted that his contemporaries saw the link between *trophe* and empire. In the end, this is all that really matters.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined some of the major obstacles to my thesis that Xenophon composed the *Poroi* to wean the Athenians off empire by ameliorating the long-standing poverty of the Athenian demos. For many scholars, Xenophon's intention to provide "sufficient *trophe* to all Athenians" is not a straightforward economic proposition but rather a political manifesto concerning the remuneration of citizens for political activity. I demonstrated that such a reading of the *Poroi*, which rests on the erroneous view that Xenophon used *trophe* and *misthos* interchangeably, is untenable. By the time he composed the *Poroi*, I estimated that the number of Athenian poor at or below the subsistence level was around 20,000, a full two thirds of the adult male population. Many of these would have experienced frequent subsistence or food crises. To compound the problems of the poor, the yearly grain output of Attica was insufficient

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that much of the grain produced in these islands was earmarked "for the demos" after 374/3, and that the tax in kind was much more burdensome that it had been in the past. According to Hobson, it is a truism that those who benefit the most from imperialism always pay the least when it comes to the financing of imperialistic policies (Hobson 1938: 94-109). It must be remembered that *strategoi* and *hipparchs* did not get paid for their services, and that the wealthy, not the state, paid for most of the expenses in maintaining the fleet of triremes. And as far as booty is concerned, this technically was the possession of the state (see Pritchett 1991: 378-90)

to feed the total Athenian population. Imports probably made up the deficit, but the funds to pay for these were not readily available from private and public domestic sources. Feeling this demographic and economic pressure, the Athenians turned to imperialism to make up the shortfall in funds and with the monies derived from empire subsidized *trophe*-payments for the poverty-stricken demos.

Nevertheless, I did not take it for granted, as does Xenophon, that securing *trophe* for the Athenian poor necessitated empire, because the apologist interpretation of Athenian foreign policy has contested the very existence of an imperial Athens in the fourth century, which calls seriously into question Xenophon's veracity as historian and political commentator. I therefore devoted a significant portion of this chapter to substantiating the idea that Athens was a parasitic state in the fourth century. If my own reading of Athenian foreign policy has a ring of apologia, it stems not from a desire to impugn the Athenians but from an aspiration to understand better this little, but significant text. I now turn to an examination of Xenophon's anti-imperialist economics.

Chapter 4: Xenophon's Anti-imperialistic Economics

> [W]e are not concerned here with what belongs to the practical issues of political and economic policy. It is the economic theory for which we claim acceptance—a theory which…dispels the delusion that…empire is a necessity of national life.[1]

Introduction

In the concluding pages of his brilliant chapter, "The Economic Taproot of Imperialism," John Hobson asserts that every country whose land cannot maintain its population faces the same "choice of life," in which it must decide between imperialism and territorial acquisition or the perspicacious improvement of "the political and economic management of their own land."[2] For Hobson, the latter specifically entails the "scientific" intensification of agriculture and industry, which "support[s] in progressive comfort and character a considerable population upon a strictly limited area."[3] This choice of life finds expression, albeit in a rudimentary way, in the ending of Herodotus' *History*. The historian recounts how after the Persian defeat of the Medes, one Artembares counseled the victors to remove themselves from their "little rugged land" to the "better" Median territory. When they presented this plan to Cyrus, the king said that if they so desired, "be prepared to become subjects and no longer rulers; for soft lands are wont to produce soft men; wondrous fruits and good warriors do not spring from the same land." When the Persians heard his reply, "they chose to be rulers living in a poor land rather than be slaves dwelling in a fertile plain tilling the soil for others." The passage is laden with irony because by the end of the work, the reader already knows that

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[1] Hobson 1938: 91.
[2] Hobson 1938: 92.
[3] Hobson 1938: 92-3.

Cyrus and his successors ultimately rejected this advice. The Persians *did* seek to acquire better lands. For example, Herodotus claims that Xerxes initially had no desire to march against Greece (7.5.1), but Mardonius spurred him on by pointing out that "Europe is an exceedingly beautiful land that abounds in cultivated trees of every kind, is very fertile, and is worthy to belong to the king alone of all mortals" (7.5.3). This information intrigues Xerxes: "I anticipate that we will gain glory and a land that is not lesser nor worse, but more fertile, than the land we now possess" (7.8a2).[4] Of course, Xerxes failed in achieving these objectives. The ending of the *History*, then, functioned as a moral for the Athenians who had prevailed over the Persians: be content with the land you have; do not expand your territory at the expense of the defeated.[5]

What Herodotus' account lacks, however, is any positive counsel about what the Greeks or any people, for that matter, should do in the event they choose not to pursue imperialism and territorial expansion. The choice is difficult, because, as we learn from Solon's encounter with Croesus at the beginning of the *History*, self-sufficiency is unattainable for both individuals *and* countries: "it is impossible for a man to get at one time all good things together, just as no land is sufficient to produce all things for itself, but what one land has it lacks in another; and the land that has most things is the best. Indeed, not even a single human being is self-sufficient; for one thing it has it lacks in another" (1.32.7-9). If no country is self-sufficient, and imperialism and expansionism

[4] Admittedly, I have simplified Herodotus' narrative, concentrating more on the economic motives than the other ones the historian ascribes to Mardonius and Xerxes, namely, "revenge" (cf. 7.6.1) But Evans 1991: 17 argues persuasively that in Herodotus such "[a]lleged causes might serve very well as justifications, but they were not necessarily real causes." In his narrative, Herodotus challenges the pretext for taking revenge against the Athenians because he notes how Xerxes intends to subdue not just Athens, but all of Greece (7.138.1, 157.2).

are morally opprobrious and fraught with danger, it invites the question: what should a country do to provide for its citizens?

As far as we can tell, no Greek attempted to solve this problem until Xenophon. In the *Oeconomicus* we see the first glimpse of a rejoinder to Herodotus. Here the Persian king actually serves as the paradigm for the household manager of the dialogue, Ischomachus.[6] The king provides *trophe* for his empire (4.6, 11) through extensive and intensive farming (4.8-11). Through a system of rewards and punishments, he ensures that his satraps keep the lands and fields under cultivation and full of trees and crops so that they can feed a large population (4.8). To those that cultivate the land well he gives additional territory to farm. Similarly, Ischomachus learns from his father both methods of farming: "For he never allowed me to buy a well-cultivated plot of land, but encouraged me to buy any that was uncultivated and unproductive because of the lack of diligence or the inability of its owners" (20.22).

> **Socrates**: Ischomachus, did your father keep all the plots of land he cultivated, or did he sell them if he could get a good price?
> **Ischomachus**: He would sell them, by Zeus, and he would buy another uncultivated plot immediately to replace it, because he loved working.
> **Socrates**: You are telling me, Ischomachus, that your father naturally loved farming as much as merchants love grain. For because of their great love of grain, merchants sail wherever they hear there is an abundance of it, so as to get it, across the Aegean, the Euxine, and the Sicilian Sea…(20.26-7).

Ostensibly, Ischomachus' father is like a grain-trader because he loves profit. But Socrates' comparison also serves to accentuate the *extent* to which Ischomachus' father will go to add land to his holdings. The philosopher jokes with Ischomachus because he

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5 See How and Wells 1928: 337 and Fornara 1971.

6 Pomeroy 1994: 240.

has a problem not with intensive, but with extensive cultivation, which may lead the entrepreneur to obtain holdings abroad. Ischomachus' reply (20.29) implies that such is not his intention, but because the *chora* of Attica has natural limits, his prescriptions are untenable without eventual territorial expansion. Xenophon then seems to intimate what Hobson takes as a given centuries later: "a full simultaneous application of intensive and extensive cultivation is impossible."[7]

In this chapter, I argue that the *Poroi* responds directly and proactively to the challenges of this ethico-political dilemma by advancing a viable alternative to the economics of imperialism and expansionism. Remarkably, Xenophon does not begin where he leaves off in the *Oeconomicus*, exploring the potential of increasing food production through the intensification of agriculture. Rather, he develops a scheme to expand and promote domestic industry and commerce through which significant amounts of revenue are to be created for the purchase of imported grain. This plan to pay for imports with the annual proceeds generated, not from empire, but from Attica itself, marks a great transformation in Athens' orientation away from a consumer-based to a producer-based economy. In this chapter I do not examine the specific details of his proposals, a task I reserve for Chapter 5. Rather, I investigate the ideological import of his views on war and peace and explain how his anti-imperialistic arguments further his economic and fiscal agenda. Here I also aim to situate Xenophon's ideas in the context of Athenian political and intellectual culture of the fifth and fourth centuries.

In Section 4A, I demonstrate that Xenophon's worldview flies in the face not only of Athenian imperialists but also of conservatives like Plato and Aristotle. I frame my

[7] Hobson 1938: 92.

discussion around the issue of self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*). In that Xenophon promotes a policy of free and reciprocal commercial exchange as a means of acquiring *trophe*, the *Poroi,* I submit, occupies a conceptual and ideological space between two competing views of *autarkeia*: the imperial (as practiced by the Athenians) and the Spartan (as idealized and promoted by fourth-century reformists, such as Plato and Aristotle). Here I also explore in particular Xenophon's encomiastic, "idyllic picture" of Attica, which exhibits many *topoi* of epideictic rhetoric, especially those used to characterize imperial Athens. As we shall see, however, Xenophon invokes the encomiastic rhetoric of empire only to call it into question, that is, he applies these *topoi* to his peaceful, commercial alternative to imperial Athens "to demonstrate that the city does not need an empire to survive."[8]

In Section 4B, I argue that Xenophon's plan to encourage manufacture and silver mining is designed to turn Athens into a "producer city." My interpretation thus calls into question Finley's wholesale application of Weber's "consumer city" model to the ancient world, as Xenophon aims to pay for the city's substantial import bill not with revenues derived from the empire but with monies and goods produced domestically. In the next section (4C), I digress to examine yet another example of Xenophon's manipulation of imperial ideology: his providential argument to justify his new peaceful world order. According to Xenophon, during the creation of the universe the gods purposefully allotted to the Athenians both native goods particular to Attica and a

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[8] Dillery 1993: 2. Dillery's study of Xenophon's manipulation of Athenian imperial ideology is indispensable to my analysis in this chapter. However, at various points, my interpretation differs significantly from his, and I have examined other examples of Xenophon's employment of the rhetoric of empire, which Dillery does not address.

geographic position suitable for exchanging these goods for needed imports. In my judgment, he advances this argument to counter providential notions of Athenian imperialism, which ascribe Athens' hegemonic position to divine will. For Xenophon, the ordering of the universe recommends that the Athenians should trade with the world and not wage war upon it. Lastly, in Section 4D, I build a case that, unlike his Athenian intellectual contemporaries (especially Plato and Isocrates), Xenophon is a true-blooded anti-imperialist: in addition to opposing the imperial practices of his day, he objected to the very *idea* of empire.

4A. Beyond *Autarkeia*

The opening chapter of the *Poroi* is the linchpin of the work, because if Xenophon fails to convince his readers that the domestic resources of Attica can provide the Athenians with sufficient *trophe*, his entire anti-imperial agenda falls flat and along with it the possibility of a establishing a new world order based on the principles of peace and justice.[9] Here also, perhaps more than anywhere else in his oeuvre, Xenophon offers his readers a unique glimpse of his *Weltanschauung*. The main sections of this chapter (1.2-8), therefore, are worth quoting in full:

> (2) σκοποῦντι δή μοι ἃ ἐπενόησα τοῦτο μὲν εὐθὺς ἀνεφαίνετο, ὅτι ἡ χώρα πέφυκεν οἵα πλείστας προσόδους παρέχεσθαι. ὅπως δὲ γνωσθῇ ὅτι ἀληθὲς τοῦτο λέγω, πρῶτον διηγήσομαι τὴν φύσιν τῆς Ἀττικῆς. (3) οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τὰς ὥρας ἐνθάδε πρᾳοτάτας εἶναι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα μαρτυρεῖ· ἃ γοῦν πολλαχοῦ οὐδὲ βλαστάνειν δύναιτ' ἂν ἐνθάδε καρποφορεῖ. ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ γῆ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ περὶ τὴν χώραν θάλαττα

[9] Cartledge 1997: 227 aptly uses the phrase "a new world order" to describe Xenophon's peace politics (see below, Section 4D).

παμφορωτάτη ἐστίν. καὶ μὴν ὅσαπερ οἱ θεοὶ ἐν ταῖς ὥραις ἀγαθὰ παρέχουσι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἐνταῦθα πρῳαίτατα μὲν ἄρχεται, ὀψιαίτατα δὲ λήγει. (4) οὐ μόνον δὲ κρατεῖ τοῖς ἐπ' ἐνιαυτὸν θάλλουσί τε καὶ γηράσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀίδια ἀγαθὰ ἔχει ἡ χώρα. πέφυκε μὲν γὰρ λίθος ἐν αὐτῇ ἄφθονος, ἐξ οὗ κάλλιστοι μὲν ναοί, κάλλιστοι δὲ βωμοὶ γίγνονται, εὐπρεπέστατα δὲ θεοῖς ἀγάλματα· πολλοὶ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι προσδέονται. (5) ἔστι δὲ καὶ γῆ ἡ σπειρομένη μὲν οὐ φέρει καρπόν, ὀρυττομένη δὲ πολλαπλασίους τρέφει ἢ εἰ σῖτον ἔφερε. καὶ μὴν ὑπάργυρός ἐστι σαφῶς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ· πολλῶν γοῦν πόλεων παροικουσῶν καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν εἰς οὐδεμίαν τούτων οὐδὲ μικρὰ φλὲψ ἀργυρίτιδος διήκει. (6) οὐκ ἂν ἀλόγως δέ τις οἰηθείη τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ πάσης δὲ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀμφὶ τὰ μέσα οἰκεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἄν τινες πλέον ἀπέχωσιν αὐτῆς, τοσούτῳ χαλεπωτέροις ἢ ψύχεσιν ἢ θάλπεσιν ἐντυγχάνουσιν· ὁπόσοι τ' ἂν αὖ βουληθῶσιν ἀπ' ἐσχάτων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπ' ἔσχατα ἀφικέσθαι, πάντες οὗτοι ὥσπερ κύκλου τόρνον τὰς Ἀθήνας ἢ παραπλέουσιν ἢ παρέρχονται. (7) καὶ μὴν οὐ περίρρυτός γε οὖσα ὅμως ὥσπερ νῆσος πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεταί τε ὧν δεῖται καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἃ βούλεται· ἀμφιθάλαττος γάρ ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπορίᾳ· ἤπειρος γάρ ἐστιν. (8) ἔτι δὲ ταῖς μὲν πλείσταις πόλεσι βάρβαροι προσοικοῦντες πράγματα παρέχουσιν· Ἀθήναις δὲ γειτονεύουσιν αἳ καὶ αὐταὶ πλεῖστον ἀπέχουσι τῶν βαρβάρων.

As I was looking into the details of what I had proposed, I was immediately struck by the realization that the land is by nature well suited to provide a great amount of revenue. In order that you may come to know the truth of what I am saying, I will first describe the nature of Attica. First, the produce itself proves that the seasons here are the mildest; that is to say, the plants that cannot even sprout in other parts of the world bring forth their fruit in Attica. The sea that surrounds Attica is just as exceedingly productive as the land. Indeed, the very goods of the earth that the gods provide in their season, all of these begin here at the earliest possible moment and end at the latest. Not only does the land excel in those things that bloom and decay on a yearly basis but it also possesses imperishable goods. For nature has implanted in the earth an abundant supply of stone [i.e. marble], with which people build the most

> beautiful temples and altars and the most magnificent images of the gods; and both Greeks and non-Greeks are in need of it. Furthermore, it is possible for our land not to bring forth its bounty when sowed, but when mined it feeds many times more people than if the same land produced grain. Thus, it is plain to see that Attica is veined with silver because of divine ordering; for not even the smallest vein of silver ore extends to any of the states that border on Attica on both land and sea. It would be completely reasonable, then, for someone to think that Athens occupies a position at the center of Greece or rather the entire inhabitable world, because the further away people live from it, the more they encounter rather severe weather conditions of cold and heat; and as many of those who wish to travel from one end of Greece to the other, all of them either sail or go past Athens as if it were a compass point of a circle. Furthermore, although Attica is not surrounded by the sea, it nonetheless is like an island in that the winds bring the goods that it needs and sends out the goods that it wants to export; for it has the sea on both sides. And it receives many goods over land as well by commerce; for it is also part of the mainland. Moreover, in most states non-Greeks live nearby and cause them problems; but those states neighboring Athens are themselves far away from non-Greek populations.

What is so remarkable about this passage is that Xenophon believes the solution to the problem of feeding the Athenians lies squarely in the realm of finance, because "the land is by nature well suited to provide a great amount of revenue."[10] To prove this contention, he describes a tripartite *physis* of Attica, which corresponds to three revenue-producing sectors of the Athenian economy: agriculture and fishing (1.3); quarrying and mining (1.4-5); and commerce (1.6-8). Because he begins his discussion with agriculture, it is easy to overlook the largely fiscal orientation of the chapter. Xenophon has no intention of recommending the expansion or intensification Attic agriculture to

[10] Sections 1 and 2 of the chapter follow a logical sequence; the phrase σκοποῦντι δή μοι…ἀνεφαίνετο hearkens back to Xenophon's aspiration in the prologue σκοπεῖν εἴ πη δύναιντ' ἂν οἱ πολῖται διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν. To translate loosely: *I have tried to consider whether the Athenian citizens could be maintained from their own domestic resources…and as I was considering this problem, the answer kept jumping out at me at once.*

remedy the poverty of the Athenians, as one scholar suggests.[11] Rather, he discusses agriculture since it is just one sector of the Athenian economy with revenue-generating potential.[12] Von der Lieck rightly calls attention to the *Oeconomica* of Pseudo-Aristotle: "the most important revenue of a polis comes from the special products of the land, then revenue from markets and transit dues, and finally revenue from every-day transactions."[13] Interestingly, Xenophon treats each of these three sources of revenue in the *Poroi* (cf. 3.5; 4.40). In particular, he privileges Athenian silver as a "special product of the land" because silver from the earth can "feed many times more people than if the same land produced grain" (ὀρυττομένη δὲ πολλαπλασίους τρέφει ἢ εἰ σῖτον ἔφερε) (1.5). Taken together, these three sectors of the Athenian economy have the potential of producing πλείστας προσόδους, if only the Athenians devote their energies to exploiting them effectively. But what appears "straightaway" (εὐθύς) obvious to Xenophon is lost on the Athenians.

The reason for this disconnect it that Xenophon's program is radically out of step with the views of his contemporaries on the question of how Athens should maintain

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11 Gernet 1909: 298.

12 Because there was no direct tax on produce in Athens, Gauthier 1976: 54 contends that agriculture was a poor source of revenue, which explains why Xenophon does not discuss it at length in the *Poroi* (cf. Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 137-43 who question the assumption that the Athenians never levied direct taxes on agricultural produce). But in *Hiero* 9.7-8, Xenophon explicitly states that increasing competition among farmers "would augment revenues" (αἱ πρόσοδοι αὔξοιντ' ἄν). In *Cyropaedia* 3.2.17-23 he notes how a state of peace occasions the expansion of agriculture, which, in turn, leads "to a greater increase in revenue" (πολὺ γὰρ ἂν αὐξάνεσθαι τὴν πρόσοδον)—a point Xenophon echoes in the *Poroi* about all kinds of revenues: "it seems clear that if the state is to receive *all* of its revenues (πᾶσαι αἱ πρόσοδοι), peace is necessary" (5.1). Cf. *Oeconomicus* 20.22-6 with 11.9. In my opinion, since Xenophon in these aforementioned passages is speaking prescriptively, not descriptively, Gauthier's explanation is moot.

itself. On the one hand, Xenophon's unwillingness even to entertain the expansion and/or intensification of agriculture in the *Poroi* must have shocked some of his readers, for whom agrarianism was the only kind of life worth living.[14] Xenophon's own keen interest in farming as evidenced in the *Oeconomicus* certainly would have added to their bewilderment. Indeed, this lacuna has so puzzled scholars that some have made it the basis of their denial of Xenophon's authorship.[15] On the other hand, while Xenophon's plan to feed the Athenians from their own public revenues would have made sense to many of his urban readers, nevertheless his claim that domestic revenues alone could sustain a population the size of Athens would have also dumbfounded them because in the popular imagination only imperial revenues subsidized the civic *misthoi* through which the demos received its *trophe*.[16] Xenophon therefore occupies a conceptual and ideological space between two competing views of *autarkeia* (self-sufficiency): the imperial (as practiced by the Athenians according to Pericles) and the Spartan (as idealized by fourth-century reformists, such as Plato and Aristotle).

It is commonplace among classicists and ancient historians to maintain that *autarkeia* was the goal of every Greek polis, because self-sufficiency promoted freedom

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13 1346a 6-8: ταύτης δὲ κρατίστη μὲν πρόσοδος ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γινομένη. εἶτα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων καὶ διαγωγῶν. εἶτα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων. Von der Lieck 1933: 26; cf. Gauthier 1976: 53.

14 For example, those from rural Attica whom Thucydides mentions had a "hard time" moving into the city during the Peloponnesian invasion (2.14-16.2). On the agrarian ethic in ancient Greece, see Hanson 1995.

15 Jaeger 1938: 219, n. 14, Rostovtzeff 1941: 74, and Hopper 1961: 139 and 1979; cf. Giglioni 1970: l and Gauthier 1976: 1-2, 52. Perhaps one could argue that Xenophon neglects agriculture because he wants his readers to consult works like the *Oeconomicus* for a fuller treatment on the topic. Yet, if this were true, we should expect to find some kind of cue in the text itself, such as the one Xenophon offers his readers in *On Horsemanship* about the *Hipparchicus* (12.14).

16 E.g., Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 24.3; Aristophanes, *Wasps* 698-721 with A scholium to line 684 and Kallet-Marx 1994: 246-7.

and independence.[17] Much of the evidence backing this claim, however, comes from the works of Plato and Aristotle. To be sure, individual or *oikos* self-sufficiency was an ideal and a very old one at that, dating at least to the time of Homer and Hesiod, but no evidence exists to support the notion that the Greeks universally promoted *autarkeia* as a political principle.[18] In fact, the historical sources allow us to draw the opposite conclusion, namely, that most Greeks thought that *autarkeia* was an impossible ideal.[19] The two notable exceptions to this rule were Sparta and imperial Athens. In order to understand the ideological import of Xenophon's economic and fiscal program, let us examine in turn each type of *autarkeia*.

Philolaconian thinkers during the fourth century promulgated the idea that the legislation of Lycurgus, especially his laws concerning the equal division of property, the common mess, and iron currency, made the Spartans "self-sufficient" (αὔταρκες) in both their private and public lives, by which they garnered "a lasting heritage of freedom" (πολυχρόνιον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν).[20] Among these intellectuals are Plato and

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[17] The idea is at least as old as Marx, *Capital* I.14.5 = Marx 1977: 487, n. 56); see also, for example, Rostovtzeff 1941: 249, 707, Will 1954: 19, Kitto 1951: 30, Ehrenberg 1960: 95-6, Adkins 1972: 144-6, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 131-2, Polanyi 1977: 200, Loraux 1986: 87, 380, n. 46, Gauthier 1987-89: 192-5, Runciman 1991: 352, Veyne 1990: 40-2; Rosivach 2000: 61, Scheidel and von Reden 2002: 3, and Raaflaub 2004: 184-7.

[18] Raaflaub 2004: 186. For *oikos* self-sufficiency, see Hesiod, *Works and Days* 363-65, 394-400, 405-9, 475-78, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 15-17, 41-3, 46, Tandy 1997: 216, 226-7, and Finley 1999: 34, 36, 50, 109-10.

[19] See for example, Herodotus 1.32.7-9; Thucydides 1.120.2; Euripides, *Suppliants* 208-11; Old Oligarch 2.3; Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 42; Aratus, *Phaenomena* 111-12; Agatharchides, *On The Red Sea* 49; Cicero, *De Officiis* 2.13; Manilius 1.87-8. For scholars who question the ideal of self-sufficiency, see Andreades 1933: 140, Wheeler 1955: 419, Burke 1992: 204, Hansen 2000: 18, Cohen 2000: 11-17, and Harris 2002: 71.

[20] Polybius 6.48.3-7; Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 8.2, 31.1. According to Walbank 1957: 734, Polybius draws from Ephorus for his praise of Spartan institutions in this chapter of his *Histories*, whereas his condemnation of Spartan foreign policy is likely to be his own. Thus, the idea of Spartan *autarkeia* goes back at least to the fourth century.

Aristotle, who adumbrate a form of Spartan *autarkeia* in their prescriptions for the ideal state, as evidenced in their endorsement of such institutions as the equal division of property, common meals, and the limited use of money in order to achieve this goal.[21] Because Plato and Aristotle were some of the most notorious purveyors of the so-called Spartan "mirage," it is difficult to determine the historical reality of Sparta's *autarkeia*.[22] Regardless, the Spartan ideal of self-sufficiency became a useful piece of propaganda in the therapeutic political programs of Plato and Aristotle.

They both argue that no individual or household is self-sufficient, but by coming together to form partnerships (*koinoniai*) people exchange or barter the goods they need with those immediately around them.[23] The polis is essentially a collection of such partnerships whose ultimate aim (*telos*) is to achieve *autarkeia*.[24] The key question for Plato and Aristotle is what constitute the "needs" of the *oikos*. Both fundamentally agree that "necessaries" (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα), such as food and clothes, should be the only licit objects for acquisition and exchange.[25] These goods, the philosophers contend, should

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[21] Wheeler 1955: 419-20, Popper 1962: 182, Morpeth 1982, Morrow 1993: 533-4, and Mayhew 1995. For the equal partition of land, see *Laws* 737e; *Politics* 1329b36-30a25; common meals, *Laws* 842b; cf. *Republic* 416e, 458c; and *Politics* 1330a2-25; for coinage, see the references in note 29 below. For Plato and Aristotle's views on Sparta, see Morrow 1993: 40-63 and passim, Cartledge 1987: 402ff., Powell 1994, and Schütrumpf 1994.

[22] The term "Spartan mirage" is that of Ollier 1933; see also the articles collected in Powell and Hodkinson ed. 1994. For the questionable historicity of equal land-holdings in Sparta, see Hodkinson 1983: 378-86. See Holladay 1977: 116 and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 90 for Sparta's abundance of necessities; Herodotus 7.147.2 and Thucydides 3.86.4 (cf. 6.90.3); 4.53.3 mention grain imports to the Peloponnesus but not specifically to Laconia. The reason Sparta did not need to import grain is because they controlled two-fifths of the Peloponnesus, the so-called Lakonike land, which included the fertile Eurotas valley (Thucydides 1.10.2 with Hornblower 1991: 34; cf. Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 179); much of this land, however, was gained through conquest. For an excellent reassessment of Sparta's apparent non-usage of gold and silver, see Hodkinson 2000: Chapter 5.

[23] *Republic* 369b-c; *Politics* 1253a26-27 and 1257a1-31.

[24] *Republic* 369d and 373b; *Politics* 1253a1-2, 1280b35, and 1281a2.

[25] *Republic* 373b-d; *Laws* 704c; *Politics* 1256a20-56b40; 1257b12-15.

be obtained strictly from the territory (*chora*) of the polis itself, and consequently agriculture (both farming and animal husbandry) factors decisively in their ideal states.[26] The nature of the *chora*, Aristotle writes, should be "the most self-sufficing…such is that which necessarily is all-productive, for self-sufficiency means having at hand all things and lacking nothing" (αὐταρκεστάτην…τοιαύτην δ′ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παντοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενὸς αὔταρκες) (*Politics* 1326b28-30).[27] A principal factor motivating Plato and Aristotle's promotion of self-sufficiency is that deficiencies and surpluses necessitate trade—both long-distance (*emporia*) and retail (*kapelike*)—which in turn requires the existence of money to facilitate exchange.[28] However, because money has a propensity to become an end in itself—and an end without a natural limit, they argue—they restrict its use in their ideal states and eschew the professions that employ it.[29] In fact, both philosophers advocate a

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26 *Laws* 704d, 842c, and 847e; *Politics* 1258a40, 1328b6, 20; cf. 1318b7ff. (the best democracy consists of farmers).

27 Mayhew 1995 argues that Aristotle's view of self-sufficiency has more in common with Pericles' imperialistic notion of *autarkeia*, because it includes "the ability to acquire goods from the outside." However, this interpretation is entirely contingent upon *Politics* 1327a25-8, the only passage where Aristotle speaks of securing necessities from outside the polis. The only way to resolve the contradiction between this passage and all the other ones quoted above is to distinguish between two kinds of self-sufficiency: one in regard to *living* and the other in regard to *living well* (490-1; cf. *Politics* 1328b17; 1326b8-9). In fact, Aristotle criticizes Plato for not making this kind of distinction in *Republic* 369b-371e, where he describes "the city of utmost necessity." In Mayhew's view, then, Aristotle deems a city that requires imports from abroad but promotes the "good life" self-sufficient, whereas the one that produces all of its necessities domestically but does not promote the good life (e.g., because it does not offer enough leisure time for its citizens to participate in politics) not self-sufficient; indeed, for Aristotle, such a city would not even constitute a polis (502). I am inclined to accept this interpretation, but I would add that the overall impression one gets from reading these passages on self-sufficiency is that Aristotle is preferential toward the polis that does not require any imports from abroad.

28 *Republic* 371c-d; *Laws* 679a-c, 704c-705b, 831e, and 919b; *Politics* 1257a30-1258a15. See Knorringa 1926: 102-39 and Morrow 1993: 138-48 for a fuller account of Plato and Aristotle's attitude toward trade and traders.

29 *Laws* 743c-e, 831c-e, 919d-20c; *Republic* 371c; *Politic*s 1257a1-1258a18, 1328b6-23 (traders not mentioned in his list of six necessary occupations for a city).

"closed society" as a political ideal, for an excessively large population would necessitate imports from abroad.[30] Thus, they propose a variety of measures to restrict population growth.[31]

While the Laconism of Aristotle and Plato was largely academic, there is some indication that their views found traction in conservative political circles.[32] Fisher's recent review of the evidence concerning the Athenian attitude to Sparta between Leuctra and the Lamian War (371-322) shows an increasing receptivity to the Spartan mirage of *homonoia* and *eunomia*.[33] Invoking Spartan laws and institutions, especially those purported to be of Lycurgan invention, became a *topos* for conservative, reformist politicians who wished to "build a more disciplined, cohesive and even 'moral' Athens."[34] If Ephorus is the ultimate source behind the Polybius passage quoted above, where the historian praises Lycurgus for making the Spartans self-sufficient in both their

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30 Popper 1962: 86-201. While I do not endorse Popper's interpretation of Plato as a theorist of totalitarianism, he is certainly correct to see him as an enemy of the "open society," hostile as he was to individuality, negative liberty, pluralism, and commerce (see Balot 2006: 203).

31 See, for example, *Republic* 423a-b; *Laws* 740d-741a, 838e; *Politics* 1273a23. The presence of an excessively large population (of both citizens and foreigners) was viewed as a particular characteristic of democracy (*Politics* 1320a17, 1321a1). In general, see Popper 1962: 182, 295, n.7.

32 It should be noted that most philosophical schools in the Socratic tradition, especially the Cynics, promoted the ideal of individual *autarkeia* for the philosopher. For Socrates' *autarkeia*, see Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.14 and Diogenes Laertius 2.24-28; cf. Plato, *Philebus* 60b. The Cynic doctrine of *autarkeia* may have originated with Socrates (see Sellars 2003), but Antisthenes (Lovejoy and Boas 1935: 119) and Diogenes (Finley 1969: 89-101) are often credited with its discovery (see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius 6.78). Many of the Cynic passages on self-sufficiency are conveniently collected in Lovejoy and Boas 1935: 117-52. While most Cynics seem to have promoted *autarkeia* as a goal for the philosopher, some Cynics like Crates (Diogenes Laertius 6.85) seem to have followed Plato and Aristotle's lead in making it the ideal for the polis as well. For earlier, Presocratic treatments of *autarkeia*, see Democritus *DK* B 209, 246 and Hippias *DK* A 12.

33 Fisher 1994. Cf. Demosthenes 20.105-8 where the proponents of Leptines' law banning exemption for liturgies and taxes invoke Sparta as an example of a well governed state that gets along nicely without such exemptions.

34 Fisher 1994: 382.

private and public lives, then it seems certain that the ideal of self-sufficiency circulated well beyond the philosophical schools during the middle part of the fourth century.[35]

It is remarkable how much Xenophon's program for reform contrasts with these Laconizing prescriptions of the day, especially given his reputation for being a Laconophile. Recently, scholars have thoroughly refuted this cliché, but that is not to say he does not admire certain aspects of Spartan society and esteem individual Spartans like Agesilaus.[36] The *Lacadaemonion Politeia* abounds with examples of Spartan laws and institutions of which Xenophon openly approves. Like Plato and Aristotle, he seems to commend the common use of private property, the *syssitia*, and restrictions on the use of money (5.1-4; 6.3-5; 7.1-5). Yet, when it comes to recommending reforms at Athens, Xenophon belies his supposed appreciation for the Spartan political-social system. The conversation between Socrates and Pericles the Younger in the *Memorabilia* evidences well Xenophon's reticence to adopt Spartan institutions at Athens. "What can the Athenians do," asks Pericles, "to recover their former *arete*?" Socrates suggests first to follow the practices of their Athenian ancestors and then, failing that, to imitate "those who are currently of the first rank" (τούς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας μιμούμενοι) (i.e., the Spartans) and to practice their customs (3.5.14). Pericles responds approvingly by citing a litany of Spartan customs, but he is incredulous as to whether the Athenians will be able to adopt them successfully (3.5.15-17). Socrates' reply is telling because he does not indulge Pericles' Laconizing interpretation of his wisdom. For Socrates, Athens itself

[35] Cf. Ephorus *apud* Diodorus 7.12, where he ascribes Sparta's loss of the hegemony to the abolishment of the Lycurgan laws, especially those concerning the use of money and private collection of wealth (see also, Xenophon, *Lacadaemonion Politeia* 14).

still affords a sufficient number of examples of virtuous conduct for imitation—examples not unique to the past but ones that are *au courant* (3.5.18-20). The dramatic date for this passage, set sometime during the last years of the Peloponnesian War, explains why Pericles equates "those who are currently of the first rank" with the Spartans. But the historical context of the dialogue is post-Mantinea, when the Spartans were anything but a people in the first rank. Thus, the exchange is replete with Socratic irony, which Xenophon doses out masterfully to undermine the backward-looking, Laconizing agenda of Plato and his ilk.

Though Xenophon in the *Poroi* does not offer his recommendations in the same spirit as Plato and Aristotle (viz. to offer a blueprint for an ideal society), he nonetheless shares the same philosophical interest in making Athens "better." As discussed in Section 2E, he is confident that the implementation of his financial schemes will restore not only justice to international relations but also *arete* to the Athenians: "Indeed, if the plans which I have proposed are carried out, I say that the polis will not only be better off in respect to its revenues but also more obedient, disciplined, and successful in war" (πραχθέντων γε μὴν ὧν εἴρηκα [ξύμ]φημὶ ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον ἂν χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ εὐπολεμωτέραν γενέσθαι) (4.51). However, to occasion this revival, Xenophon does not advocate the ideal of self-sufficiency but rather economic interdependence. Through a vibrant industrialism and commercialism, Athens under his plan is to generate large

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36 See, e.g., Lipka 2002: 14; cf. Higgins 1977: 65-75, Tuplin 1993: 13, 31, 163 and 1994, Humble 1997, and Badian 2004.

amount of revenues to solve its social and political problems. The phrase χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν responds directly to the claim in Chapter 1 that Attica is naturally suited to provide πλείστας προσόδους. For Xenophon, *trophe* comes not directly from the land itself but from purchases from foreign producers paid for with increases in domestic income. This arrangement flies squarely in the face of the philosophical/Spartan ideal of *autarkeia*.[37]

Let us flesh out Xenophon's views on economic interdependence a bit further. At 1.7 he states explicitly that Athens has need for imports (πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεταί τε ὧν δεῖται), which are to be paid for with Athenian goods and currency:

> ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις ἐν μὲν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἀντιφορτίζεσθαί τι ἀνάγκη· νομίσμασι γὰρ οὐ χρησίμοις ἔξω χρῶνται· ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πλεῖστα μὲν ἔστιν ἀντεξάγειν ὧν ἂν δέωνται ἄνθρωποι, ἢν δὲ μὴ βούλωνται ἀντιφορτίζεσθαι, καὶ [οἱ] ἀργύριον ἐξάγοντες καλὴν ἐμπορίαν ἐξάγουσιν. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν πωλῶσιν αὐτό, πανταχοῦ πλέον τοῦ ἀρχαίου λαμβάνουσιν.
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> Moreover, merchants in most other cities feel compelled to ship a return cargo because the local currency has no value in other states. At Athens, on the other hand, it is possible to export many goods that humans need, but if the merchants do not want to ship a return cargo, by exporting silver they practice good business sense; for whenever they sell it, they are bound to make more money on their investment anywhere else in the world (3.2).

The many indigenous goods other people need are, presumably, those Xenophon mentions in 1.3-5: natural products of the land and sea, marble, and silver. Xenophon privileges Athenian silver in particular as a medium of exchange, because he believes that

[37] Thiel 1922: 4, von der Lieck 1933: 26, and Gauthier 1976: 53 argue rightly (contra Herzog 1914: 477

silver from the earth can "feed many times more people than if the same land produced grain" (1.5).

Furthermore, because Xenophon thinks that this abundant silver supply is unique to Attica (cf. "for not even the smallest vein of silver ore extends to any of the states that border on Attica on both land and sea") and can be manufactured in great quantities (4.1), he is the first thinker to adumbrate the economic principle of "comparative advantage," the notion that a nation, state, or region has a distinct advantage over others in the production of a particular good.[38] In order to ensure that the state gets the most from their comparative advantage, he proposes to the Athenians that they not only reorganize and expand the mining industry but the commercial sector of the economy as well. For Xenophon, mining and commerce go hand and hand. A vigorous mining industry will produce a huge supply of money, guarantying every Athenian a daily *triobolon*, which in turn will attract money-hungry grain-traders to Athens. The whole system is built upon the principle of supply and demand: Athens has a surplus of silver but a deficiency of grain; the rest of the world has a surplus of grain but a deficiency of silver (1.5; 4.8-9). And as long as Athens is tranquil, "what class of men will not need it? Will not traders and ship-owners head the list" (5.3)? In addition to the growth of imports and exports, Xenophon also envisions rises in sales, rents, and taxes (3.5; cf. 3.13). The net effect of all this is that state revenues will be "augmented" (αὔξεσθαι) (2.7; 3.6; 4.40, 49; 5.12).

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and Giglioni 1970: xlviii) that Xenophon does not endorse the ideal of *autarkeia.*

[38] The theory of comparative advantage was pioneered by Robert Torrens in his 1815 essay "On the External Corn Trade." He argued that it was to the advantage of England to trade sundry goods with Poland in return for grain, even though it might be theoretically possible to produce that grain more cheaply in England than in Poland.

It therefore appears that just as the function of *oikonomia* is "to increase the household by making a surplus" (περιουσίαν ποιῶν ἄυξειν τὸν οἶκον) (*Oeconomicus* 1.4), so the function of Xenophon's political *oikonomia* is to increase the polis by making a surplus of revenue (5.2, 6.1). Aristotle decries this very notion of *oikonomia* because he feels that the householder lives continuously "to increase his property with money to an unlimited amount" (αὔξειν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἄπειρον).[39] In fact, on the question of polis finance, Aristotle asserts that "those who throw their market open to the world do so for the sake of revenue" (οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσόδου χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν)—a kind of financial policy that he thinks evinces "greed" (πλεονεξία).[40] Such criticism demonstrates clearly how fundamentally different Xenophon's Athens is from the ideal autarkic poleis of Plato and Aristotle. Giglioni is certainly correct to point out that Xenophon's "open" Athens contrasts markedly with Plato and Aristotle's closed societies.[41] Whereas the two philosophers desire to limit population growth, Xenophon openly embraces it, for a large population contributes to Athens' economic greatness (more below).[42]

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39 *Politics* 1257b38-41. For Aristotle, increase becomes an end in itself and thus an obstacle to living the good life.

40 *Politics* 1327a29-31. Plato is also prejudiced to making money from custom dues (see *Laws* 847b and 949e).

41 Giglioni 1970: lv-lvi. Gauthier 1976: 52 objects to this comparison because Plato is concerned with *nomoi*, Xenophon with *poroi*. Needless to say, Xenophon is also concerned with *nomoi*, because he states explicitly that his plans will be implemented by legislation (3.6).

42 Interestingly, in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon represents *polyanthropia* as an obstacle to oligarchy (2.3.24). Here again, the old cliché that Xenophon was an oligarchic sympathizer is patently false.

Turning to the imperial notion of *autarkeia*, we find the earliest and clearest expression of it in the Funeral Oration of Pericles, who boasts that Athens is "the most self-sufficient" (αὐταρκεστάτη) polis (Thucydides 2.36.3). Because Athens relied heavily on imported grain, Pericles' use of the term *autarkeia* seems at variance with truth. Yet, if we consider his remark in the context of aristocratic *oikos* ideology, as some scholars have suggested, the espousal of imperial Athens as the most self-sufficient city is not necessarily a contradiction in terms.[43] The idea deserves scrutiny, especially when considered in light of the aristocratic Homeric *oikos*. Indeed, the ideal of the Homeric *oikos* was self-sufficiency. In practice, however, it was difficult to achieve, because most chieftains (*basileis*) needed precious metals and slaves, which were not readily available in all parts of the Greek world.[44] Only two modes of acquisition were acceptable in the Homeric value-system: war/raiding and gift-exchange.[45] The former was the means by which the *oikos* largely satisfied its material needs, whereas the latter was the primary mode of acquiring luxury goods, which served as "symbolic capital" for the household. Such capital contributed to the power of the chieftain, who redistributed

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[43] Loraux 1986: 87 and Kallet-Marx 1993: 19 speculate that Pericles is extending the ideal of the self-sufficiency of the *oikos* to the polis but do not develop the idea; cf. Lowry 1987: 24 and Raaflaub 1994: 110, who characterizes Athens as a "hero-city."

[44] Finley 1978: 63-4 and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 40-4, 203-4.

[45] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 42-3 and Seaford 1995: 19. There were a variety of reasons why Homeric chieftains distained trade as a way to obtain these items, but procuring goods for the *oikos* through commercial transactions made the chieftain dependent on others, which therefore limited his personal freedom and compromised the autonomy of his household. By contrast, obtaining goods through raiding and war did not diminish the freedom and autonomy of the chieftain because success in these enterprises depended largely on his *arete* as a warrior.

these goods to attract warriors from outside his kingdom who offered their service and loyalty to the king in exchange.[46]

Yet what is integral to both forms of acquisition is the impulse of the chieftain, as head of the *oikos*, to appropriate goods and relationships external to the household and to integrate them into the *oikos*.[47] In this respect, the Homeric economy (*oikonomia*) was essentially "anthropocentric" because it predicates man at the center of an administrative universe, not just any man, however, but the functionally excellent man who improves the material condition of his *oikos* by means of his *arete*.[48] And this form of "*arete*," Adkins explains, "requires that one shall be willing to take risks to secure and increase the prosperity of the group to which one belongs."[49] Conceptually speaking, then, the *oikos* of the chieftain extended as far as his *arete* permitted. For example, after Odysseus returns to Ithaca and kills the suitors, his first order of business, he announces to his wife, is to restore the economic integrity of the *oikos*: "look after the goods that I have left in my halls; as for the flocks which the insolent suitors have squandered, I myself will recoup many of these by making raids, the rest the Achaeans will give, until they have filled all of my folds."[50] Odysseus' *arete* as a warrior enables him to plunder successfully the surrounding lands; his *arete* as a king guarantees that his subjects "honor him like a god with gifts" (*Iliad* 9.155, 297). A later theorist calls this form of *oikonomia*

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[46] For the term "symbolic capital," see Bourdieu 1977: 183-97 and Kurke 1991: 36-8, 57-61 for its application in the aristocratic value system of archaic Greece. Cf. Seaford 1994: 21 citing *Iliad* 9.462-95.

[47] Finley 1978: 62, Seaford 1994: 21, and Tandy 1997: 101-6.

[48] Lowry 1987: 51ff, 268, n.14; cf. Sombart 1915: 172 who describes early "capitalists" in these very terms.

[49] Adkins 1972: 134.

[50] *Odyssey* 23.355-8. Cf. 13.10-15 where Alcinous says that the Phaeacians will recoup the gifts they have given to Odysseus "by collecting them from the people."

"kingly" (βασιλική) precisely because its "power extends over everything" (αὕτη δυναμένη μὲν τὸ καθόλου) (Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1345b20). Viewed in this light, then, the Homeric *oikos* was self-sufficient as long as the *arete* of the chieftain remained functionally intact to appropriate the goods the household needed for both consumption and redistribution.[51]

The Athenian empire was in some important respects analogous to the Homeric *oikos*. Indeed, the city too was at the center of an administrative universe and appropriated the goods of the world to satisfy its material and political needs. Through the *arete* of their ancestors, argues Pericles, the Athenians received an empire, which the present generation has increased through toil. Because of this empire, he adds, "we have provided the city with every resource so that it is the *most self-sufficient* in both peace and war" (καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην) (2.36.1-3; cf. 2.41.1). The Athenians acquired many of their possessions in war (2.36.4), but others "automatically" came to them as a result of their imperial power: "Because of our city's greatness (τὸ μέγεθος) all the products of the world come to us, and we enjoy goods from abroad as though they were our own as much as our home products."[52] Athens' "greatness" connotes euphemistically Athens' imperial *dynamis*, which ensured that all the goods of the world flowed in one direction

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[51] Conversely, notes Adkins 1972: 146, any curtailment of one's self-sufficiency or freedom through a reduction in his property necessarily "reduced or abolished one's *arete*." Self-sufficiency and *arete*, therefore, were inexorably linked.

[52] 2.38.2: ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρᾳ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. For the translation of this passage, see Gomme 1956: 117.

only: to Athens.[53] The Old Oligarch elaborates: "Whatever the delicacy in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the Peloponnesus, or anywhere else, all of these things have been gathered together in one place on account of the Athenians' rule of the sea (διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης).[54]

Moreover, imperial Athens parallels the Homeric *oikos* in that goods from abroad were destined not only for consumption but also for redistribution. In the same spirit as Pericles, who praises the "openness" of Athens (2.39.1), Isocrates extols the city for benefiting the world by establishing the Piraeus as an *entrepôt*:

> ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν οὐκ αὐτάρκη κεκτημένων ἑκάστων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐλλείπουσαν, τὰ δὲ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν φέρουσαν, καὶ πολλῆς ἀπορίας οὔσης τὰ μὲν ὅποι χρὴ διαθέσθαι, τὰ δ' ὁπόθεν εἰσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ ταύταις ταῖς συμφοραῖς ἐπήμυνεν· ἐμπόριον γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατεσκευάσατο, τοσαύτην ἔχονθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὥσθ' ἃ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν παρ' ἑκάστων χαλεπόν ἐστιν λαβεῖν, ταῦθ' ἅπαντα παρ' αὑτῆς ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πορίσασθαι.
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> Furthermore, because each of these states possesses land that is not self-sufficient—one land producing a deficiency of goods, another bringing forth more than is needed—and because there was much confusion among those in these states about where they should dispose of their surplus and

[53] Loraux 1986: 86-7 argues that Pericles intentionally employs the vague term τὸ μέγεθος to disguise the fact that it was Athenian imperialism and not subsistence agriculture that was responsible for Athens' *autarkeia*.

[54] Old Oligarch 2.7 (cf. 2.11-12). See also Aristophanes, *Wasps* 520; Hermippus Fg. 63 (Edmonds): "O tell ye me know, ye Muses that dwell in Olympus exalted, what Dionysus hath shipped us from the day that he took to the sea; silphium and hides from Cyrene, from the Hellespont everything salted, from Thessaly sides of good beef and wheatmeal as fine as can be. And this from the land of Sitacles—a pox for the Spartan foe; and these from Perdiccas' country—lies by the shipload or so. From Syracuse swine and fine cheese—and Corcyra her navy abroad, because she won't make up her mind, I consign to Thy mercies, O Lord! So far so good; next, Egypt, now, sends paper and sailcloth; Crete best cypress-wood for the shrines of the Gods; Syria incense sweet; Libya ivory sells us; Euboea choice apples and pears; dried fruits that flavor our dreams—these are the Rhodian wares; Phrygia sends us servants; Arcadia fighters for pay—Pagasae, bondsmen branded to keep them from running away. Paphlagonians succulent almonds send and chestnuts, to crown our feast, Phoenicians gay cushions and rugs from the West, and dates and fine flour from the East."

> from where they should import, our city came to the aid in these unfortunate circumstances; for she established the Piraeus as an emporium in the middle of Greece, which has such an abundance that the goods which are difficult to get, one here, one there, from the rest of the world, all of these things are easy to procure at the Piraeus (*Panegyricus* 42).

One tenet of Athenian imperial ideology was that Athens acquired its "friends not by receiving benefits, but by conferring them" (οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὖ, ἀλλὰ δρῶντες κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους) (Thucydides 2.40.4). Isocrates deploys this *topos*, arguing that the Athenians established the Piraeus not to remedy their own shortfalls but those of their friends. Hence, according to Isocrates, it was not Athens but the rest of the world that had trouble achieving self-sufficiency. The picture of imperial Athens is that of the Homeric *oikos* writ large: "final products, ready for consumption, were gathered and stored centrally, and from the center they were redistributed."[55] Interestingly, Finley calls the Homeric *oikos* "authoritarian," because the chieftain was solely responsible for acquiring and distributing goods. Indeed, by Pericles' own admission, Athens' rule was "like a tyranny" (2.63.2).

Returning to the *Poroi*, Xenophon contests this entire imperial notion of *autarkeia*, which entailed both the vigorous and even violent appropriation of resources from the periphery of the empire and their eventual redistribution to the margins of the world. However, in "suggesting to his fellow-citizens that they should divert toward 'economic' activities the spirit of enterprise and audacity which had characterized their political adventures," Xenophon paints a picture of Athens that is astonishingly akin to that of the imperial city in the propagandistic representations of admirers like Thucydides

[55] Finley 1978: 62; cf. Polanyi 1977: 40-2, 170.

and Isocrates.[56] Thus, we may wonder if he is ideologically closer to the world of the Athenian empire than he is to the ideal self-sufficient states of the philosophers. Yet, if we recall Dillery's thesis that Xenophon invokes the rhetoric of Athenian imperialism only to modify it and thus to call it into question, any confusion about Xenophon's objectives should disappear.[57] I wish to explore three prominent examples of this strategy.

First, Xenophon advocates a policy of the "open" city, which makes its market and town available to the world. Athens will be thronged not only with traders and shipowners but also with investors, artisans, sophists, philosophers, poets, and spectators (5.3-4).[58] Xenophon's remarks call to mind Pericles' encomium of Athens in the Funeral Oration.[59] There he describes Athens famously as the "School of Hellas" to connote its greatness as an artistic and cultural center (2.41.1). But as Dillery rightly notes, "the difference between Pericles' vision of Athens and Xenophon's is that for the former the city's claim to be the education of Greece is based on her military power (δύναμις II 41.2) whereas for the latter it is an Athens at peace which will attract the world's philosophers and educators."[60] Moreover, both Pericles and Xenophon "throw open the city to the world," welcoming a large foreign population. However, for Pericles, the imperial city serves as a "spectacle," where subjects come to bask in the glory of the

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56 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 316.

57 Dillery 1993: 2. See, for example, Delebecque 1957: 475 and Cartledge 1997: 228 who mistake Xenophon's rhetoric for an endorsement of imperialism.

58 Cf. 3.11 and 4.12 on the participation of foreigners in the capital funds.

59 Thucydides 2.38-39.1; cf. Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 40-50 and *On the Peace* 145; Plato, *Protagoras* 337d. Cognasso in Dillery 1993: 5, n.22 was the first to make this connection.

60 Dillery 1993: 5.

imperial *dynamis* (2.39.1; cf. Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 41, 44-6); for Xenophon, foreigners come to Athens to work and make a profit (2.6; 3.2; 4.49-50). Athens' *polyanthropia* has taken a remarkable modern turn in this thought, as Moyle appreciated well: "That admirable Maxim *That the true Wealth and Greatness of a Nation, consists in Numbers of People*, well emply'd, is every where inculcated throughout the whole Course of the Treatise."[61] While some imperialists like Diodotus certainly recognized the value of the allies' labor (Thucydides 3.46.3-4), such sentiments were overshadowed by the Athenians' ability and willingness to liquidate whole populations of workers from time to time (e.g., Scione, Melos, Sestos).[62]

Secondly, Xenophon's characterization of Athens "as an island" (ὥσπερ νῆσος) is a *topos* of Athenian imperial ideology, expressed famously by the Old Oligarch and Pericles.[63] But again, to quote Dillery, "Xenophon's use of the image is subtly different; while Pericles and the 'Old Oligarch' deploy the *topos* in reference to Athens' might at sea (N.B. Thucydides I 143.5 θαλάσσης κράτος, 'Old Oligarch' II 14

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61 Moyle 1697: 8-9. The idea that wealth and population growth were interconnected underlies many assumptions of classical economics (e.g., labor theory of value); see above all Hume's essay *On the Populousness of Ancient Nations* in Haakonssen ed. 1994.

62 Although I am not entirely convinced of the applicability of the psychoanalytic approach to ancient history, Sagan's observations about genocide (viz. *andrapodismos*) in Greece are compelling (1991: 235-9). He perceptively notes that when the Greeks and especially the Athenians liquidated the adult male population, they forfeited serious monetary profits. Destroying their "own property in a genocidal rage" constitutes a form of "moral psychosis," the origins of which must be sought in the human psyche (239). Could the Athenians' constant state of war with the world (Isocrates 8.42 and Finley 1987: 67) have contributed to the retardation of their economy?

63 Thucydides 1.143.5: "The rule of the sea is a great matter. Consider this for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders. Who could occupy a more impregnable position? Now you must strive as closely as you can to this conception…" (μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε δέ· εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν; καὶ νῦν χρὴ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου); Old Oligarch 2.14-16 with Gomme 1959: 461 and Dillery 1993: 4. Cf. Hartog 1988: 202ff. who suggests that Herodotus' description of Scythian nomadism evokes Pericles' strategy to turn Athens into an island.

θαλασσοκράτορες), Xenophon describes Athens as an island in the context of merchant-trading."[64] To accentuate the difference, Xenophon says Athens' "might" (κρατεῖ) (1.4) lies in its possession of indigenous goods, especially marble and silver, which, as we have seen, serve as mediums of exchange. For Xenophon, then, power accrues to Athens from its robust commercialism not from its military might. Furthermore, the sea facilitates not only the spread of Athenian wares and silver but ultimately the aims of peace as well. Just as Xenophon envisions a "universal peace" resulting from the implementation of his policies, so too he imagines a state of economic prosperity where *all* the peoples of the world desire Athenian goods.[65] Peace and commerce go hand in hand in Xenophon's thinking. I will return to this point below.

Lastly, Xenophon's representation of Athens at the center of the world (τὰ μέσα, 1.6)—"like a point of a circle" (ὥσπερ κύκλου τόρνον)—is yet another example of a *topos* borrowed from the world of the Athenian empire. More so than any other image of the city, Xenophon's understanding of Athens' centrality poses the most direct challenge to Athenian imperial ideology, and therefore I would like to explore it in some detail. In the passage from the *Panegyricus* quoted above, the orator asserts the geographic centrality (ἐν μέσῳ) of Athens and the commercial advantages that accrue from this position (42). There Isocrates emphasizes the beneficiary role Athens plays by establishing the Piraeus as an *entrepôt* for the nations of the earth. This seems to be a slight modification of the *topos* itself, which emphasizes how the imperial power ensures

64 Dillery 1993: 4.

that the goods of the earth flow from the periphery to the center of the empire for consumption. Such is the view of Pericles in the Funeral Oration and the Old Oligarch, but the idea seems to be older, as Herodotus was the first to deploy it to characterize the Persian Empire. The historian singles out Darius specifically for siphoning off from the periphery the resources of the world (3.90-98). In these sections, Herodotus describes the centripetal nature of his rule, calculating all the riches and luxuries Darius receives from his tributaries. Elsewhere, he mentions how one of these tributaries, Babylon, supplies food for the empire: "All the land ruled by the great king is divided up for the provisioning (ἐς τροφὴν) of himself and his army, besides the tribute they owe; now the territory of Babylon feeds (τρέφε) him for four months of the year, while the whole rest of Asia for the other eight" (1.192.1). Herodotus sardonically notes that Assyria, the richest grain-producing area of the world (1.193.2), does not feed the Persian people as a whole, but rather the king *himself*. This remark serves to highlight the consumptive character of Darius and his empire.[66]

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[65] See, for example, 1.4, 3.2, and 4.8 (quoted and discussed below). Xenophon's universalism is again expressed in the idea that Athens is not just at the center of Hellas, but of "the entire world."

[66] Herodotus' characterization of the Persian Empire is taken over by Plato in *Critias* 113bff. and Aristophanes in *Birds*, who both seem to be implicitly critiquing the Athenian empire. In Plato, for example, the island of Atlantis is conceived of as a circle with the main island occupying the center. Here is the seat of the kingdom, from which the royal family control the outlining islands. "For because of their empire," explains Plato, "many goods come to them from abroad" (114e). In the *Birds*, Cloudcuckooland occupies the middle space between heaven and earth (187, 550-2; cf. 1004), where Euelpides and Peisthetairos set up their empire (508) to prevent the flow of goods (i.e. sacrifices) to the gods unless they pay them tribute (186-93) (see Konstan 1997 who reads the play as a commentary on Athens' "will to power"). For imperial ideologues like Pericles, such parasitic practices are not contemptible, as Herodotus intimates, but sources of pride. Aelius Aristides, in his *Roman Oration*, took the *topos* to a new level when he praises Rome as the "common market of the world." "Cargoes from India and, if you will, even from Arabia the Blest," he boasts, "one can see in such numbers as to surmise that in those lands the trees will have been stripped bare and the inhabitants of those lands, if they need anything, must come here and beg (μεταιτήσοντας) for a share of their own" (7, 12). In other words, the people on the periphery of the Roman Empire are compelled to come to Rome to plead for a share of the very goods which the Romans

That Xenophon conceives of empire in these very terms is evidenced in his treatment of the Persian Empire in the *Cyropaedia*. Xenophon emphasizes how Cyrus the Elder occupies a position "in the center" (ἐν μέσῳ) of his empire and receives from the cities of the periphery "whatever fine thing they have in their land, whether it is grown, raised, or manufactured" (ὅ τι καλὸν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἢ φύοιτο ἢ τρέφοιτο ἢ τεχνῷτο) (*Cyropaedia* 8.6.22-3).[67] However, unlike the Darius in Herodotus' portrayal, Cyrus does not just consume the goods from the periphery (e.g., 8.2.4-5), but he also redistributes them to those in need: "every private individual thought he would become rich if he would do something to please Cyrus; for Cyrus took from each those goods of which the givers had an abundance and gave in return goods that he perceived they lacked" (8.6.23). Xenophon's portrait of Cyrus' empire as a locus of consumption *and* redistribution, then, corresponds to the idealized picture of the Athenian empire in the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates.

Xenophon's employment of the *topos* of Athens' centrality, therefore, demonstrates his readiness not only to appropriate the language of Athenian imperial ideology, but also to subvert it in an effort to persuade his audience that empire is not necessary for their survival. Rather than indulge the Athenians and foster the notion of Athens as a center of imperial consumption and decadence, Xenophon aims to turn the

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despoil from their lands. This same dynamic was also operating in Athens during the fifth century, as evidenced by the Second Methone Decree (426), which records how subject states were required to come to Athens to request the right to import grain from Byzantium, which was under Athenian control and management (*IG* I^3 61, 34-31 = *ML* 65; cf. *IG* I^3 62 and 63; cf. Old Oligarch, *Athenaion Politeia* 2.11-13 and Isocrates 8.36).[66] The Athenians published the decree on an ornate stele, which depicts a seated Athena in a gesture of *dexiosis* with Artemis (the patron goddess of Methone), which speaks to the level of conceit they took in having subservient allies. I intend to treat this theme in a future work.

city into a commercial and productive hub, which sends out merchandise and goods from the center of the world to the periphery. Xenophon's Athens is the antithesis of empire because it gives something back to the world, not goods that originate in the periphery, and which are then redistributed from the center, but goods that are produced at the center and fulfill the needs of all peoples: both "Greeks and barbarians *need*" (προσδέονται) Athens' "imperishable stone" (1.4); "people" (ἄνθρωποι) generally "have *need*" (δέωνται) of Athenian goods (3.2); and "whenever states are doing well, people have a strong *need* for silver" (ὅταν γε εὖ πράττωσιν αἱ πόλεις, ἰσχυρῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀργυρίου δέονται) (4.8). To gratify the people of the periphery even further, Xenophon guarantees the traders who exchange their goods for Athenian silver a substantial profit from their transactions (3.2) and opens the mining industry to foreign investment (3.11) and exploitation (4.12). For Xenophon, commerce is not zero-sum—a view often held in Greece—but rather an opportunity for strengthening the bonds of friendship between states.[68] In fact, under his plan for the exploitation of the mines, the periphery, not the center, will become the locus of luxurious consumption, because "men [sc. of other poleis] want to spend [Athenian] money on fine arms, good horses, and magnificent houses and buildings, whereas women desire expensive clothes and gold jewelry" (4.8). One of Xenophon's greatest innovations, then, rests in his belief that "the

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[67] Cf. *Agesilaus* 8.6-9.5 where Xenophon describes the unnamed Persian king in similar terms and contrasts him with the behavior of Agesilaus.

[68] Runciman 1990: 351. The idea that commercial exchange was zero-sum for the Greeks is evidenced from the age of Homer (Tandy 1997: 137) down to Aristotle (Schofield 2000: 337) (cf. Weber 1927: 356). For Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* IV.3.c9 (= Smith 1981: 493), commerce creates a "bond of union and friendship" among individuals and nations.

way to prosperity lay in interdependence and in the expansion, not the contraction, of trade and technology."[69]

4B. The Rise of the Producer City

It is important to stress how radical Xenophon's vision of a productive Athens was at the time and, indeed, in antiquity. As a basis of comparison, Dio Chrysostom's discourse *On Wealth* is instructive. Like Xenophon, Dio is vexed by the parasitic nature of empire. But unlike the empires of past that plundered the periphery to obtain commodities, Dio laments that the Romans buy their luxuries from the ends of the world with Roman silver and gold, which precipitates an exodus of currency from Rome to the periphery of the empire (79.5-6). Dio likens this movement of specie away from Rome as a form of "tribute" the Romans are compelled to pay because of their slavish devotion to foreign luxuries.[70] Nevertheless, as Finley correctly points out, "[n]o economic analysis or economic program followed [sc. from this critique], either in the moralist writings or in practice, private or in public."[71] The kind of "economic" analysis of which Finley is thinking is the one that the English historian Winwood Reade provided in 1871:

> As London is the market of England, to which the best of all things find their way, so Rome was the market of the Mediterranean world; but there was this difference between the two, that in Rome the articles were not paid for. Money, indeed, might be given, but it was money which had not been earned, and which therefore would come to its end at last.
> Rome lived upon its principal till ruin stared it in the face. Industry is the only true source of wealth, and there was no industry in Rome. By day the

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69 Wheeler 1955: 419 ascribes this sentiment to an anti-aristocratic, pro-commercial ideology that developed in the Archaic age. This may be true, but Xenophon is the first author who actually articulates it.

70 Cf. Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 12.84 who claims that the luxuries from India, China, and Arabia alone cost the Romans 100 million sesterces a year, and Strabo 2.5.12.

71 Finley 1999: 132.

> Ostia road was crowded with carts and muleteers, carrying to the great city the silks and spices of the East, the marble of Asia Minor, the timber of the Atlas, the grain of Africa and Egypt; and the carts brought nothing out but loads of dung. That was their return cargo. London turns dirt into gold. Rome turned gold into dirt.[72]

The image, perhaps, is a bit hyperbolic, but Reade's analysis contributes to our understanding of the *Poroi* because it underscores nicely the fundamental difference between a parasitic, consumer-based economy and one based on production. According to Reade, money has to be "earned," which means it must be first invested in productive, economic enterprises like industry, which in turn creates the necessary capital to pay for imports. Even if huge amounts of money leave a country, the "real" wealth of the nation remains in the form of "fixed" capital (buildings, roads, machinery, etc.). Writing a generation later, Weber and Sombart defined manufacturing centers, such as London, "producer" cities, because they paid for necessities with income derived from industry and commerce. The ancient city, they argue, was largely a "consumer" city, because it paid for necessities not with money derived from urban production but with money derived from rents and taxes on those who worked in the hinterland, which the city dominated politically. Sombart explains: "By a consumption city I mean one which pays for its maintenance…not with its own products, because it does not need to. It derives its maintenance rather on the basis of a legal claim such as taxes or rents, without having to

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[72] Winwood Reade, *The Martyrdom of Man*: Chapter 4 (Web Text). I cannot help but think of how Reade's image of gold coming into the city and dung leaving is evocative of the mass exodus of trash on floating barges from New York city. Also, the literal export of trash from the U.S., especially in the form of hazardous electronic wastes to China, Pakistan and India, demonstrates well the lapse in the productive output of the U.S. economy.

deliver return values."[73] These exchanges of goods and services were non-reciprocal, whereas those between a producer city and the hinterland were reciprocal in that both parties profited from the relationship.[74] According to one scholar, "the reciprocity or non-reciprocity of economic relationships…is at the heart of the debate concerning the consumer vs. producer city."[75]

The notion of a "consumer" city has found favor in many scholarly treatments of the ancient economy, especially those of Finley and his followers.[76] Consequently, the idea has drawn a considerable amount of controversy among modernists and formalist historians.[77] This is not the place to address all the complexities of the debate, but one major shortcoming of the model is that it concentrates exclusively on the economic relationship between town and country and therefore fails to explain adequately economies like that of Athens, which obtained most of its necessities not from its hinterland but from imports abroad. Recently, Erdkamp argues persuasively that the model of the consumer city is viable as long as it is expanded to include external economic relationships between cities.[78] In particular, he suggests that it must accommodate the imperial city whose political hinterland extends beyond its territory. But what remains essential to the model, in any case, is the notion that the consumer city

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[73] Sombart, *Modern Capitalism* quoted in Finley 1999: 192. For Weber's discussion of consumer and producer cities, see *Economy and Society*, Chapter 16.2 (= Weber 1978: 1215-7); for Sombart and Weber's contribution to the study of the ancient economy, see Vidal-Naquet and Austin 1977: 5-7; Finley 1982: 11-18 and 1985: 88-103.

[74] The reciprocity involved in these exchanges was first noted by Adam Smith, in *The Wealth of Nations* 3.1.1 (= Smith 1981: 376).

[75] Erdkamp 2001: 343.

[76] Finley 1999: 123-49, 191-6, Hopkins 1978: 72-7, Garnsey and Saller 1987: 48-9, 55-8, 97-100, Veyne 1990: 38-40, Hansen 2000: 156-61, Erdkamp 2001, and the citations in Andreau 2002: 42.

[77] See the works cited in Erdkamp 2001: 336, n. 8 and Morely 1996; cf. Shipton 2000: 2-5.

feeds itself on the basis of non-reciprocal relationships with agricultural producers.[79] In other words, an imperial city exemplifies the consumer model if it draws resources from producing parts of the empire by way of taxes, levies, rents, and tribute. Defined in these terms, it is indisputable that imperial Athens was a consumer city. As discussed in the last chapter (Section 3D), a wide variety of sources attest to the fact that Athens paid for most of its grain imports with revenue derived from empire. No clearer example of this phenomenon can be offered than Ps.-Aristotle's comment that "the combined proceeds from the tributes and the taxes and the allies served to feed more than twenty thousand men" (*Athenaion Politeia* 24.3).

The key question, then, for our discussion is to which of these two competing models of the city does Xenophon's Athens correspond. Although the city of the *Poroi* is decidedly the antipode of the parasitic imperial city, it nonetheless would be a mistake to conclude that it must therefore conform to the producer city type without first establishing the precise nature of the exchanges Xenophon envisions between the city and agricultural producers. In other words, does Xenophon predicate his economics upon an understanding of reciprocity that profits both parties in an exchange? If one relied on the insights of the *Poroi's* commentators, it would seem that the city's economy is not based on reciprocity because it is fiscally oriented.[80] For example, Schütrumpf asserts: "Xenophon is not concerned with the establishment of productive industry so that the maintenance of the population is guaranteed with necessary goods or so that Athens has

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78 Erdkamp 2001: 342.

79 Erdkamp 2001: 346.

80 Von der Lieck 1933: 26, 37, Gauthier 1976: 19, 54, 238-41, and Schütrumpf 1982: 3-8.

something to give in exchange for its imported wares, but rather it is a question of revenues. His interest is in political finance, not political economy, in finance, not economics."[81] To be sure, Xenophon aims to feed the Athenians with revenues derived from the metics, trade, and the mines, a plan that has led some historians to deem his city a "*rentier*" state.[82] Yet, to equate this type of alimentary policy with the model of the consumer city is an example of missing the forest through the trees.

As pointed out above, Xenophon guarantees that Athens will give something back to those living on the periphery for the grain she imports. Some traders will choose to purchase Athenian wares and goods but many will depart Athens with a return cargo consisting only of Athenian money, because "whenever and wherever they sell it, they will make a profit on their investment" (3.2). Xenophon clearly envisions that these exchanges will be reciprocal. Furthermore, the money used to pay for these imports is not only a manufactured good but also commodity itself (cf. καὶ [οἱ] ἀργύριον ἐξάγοντες καλὴν ἐμπορίαν ἐξάγουσιν), no different from the other indigenous products suitable for export (1.3-4). Considering the attention Xenophon devotes to the mining industry, one cannot but think that without the intensification and expansion of production his entire plan for supplying the Athenians with *trophe* would have been untenable. Athens' export economy under Xenophon's plan, then, is just as important

81 Schütrumpf 1982: 4-5; cf. Giglioni 1970: lxix.

82 Schwahn 1931: 253, von der Lieck 1933: 13-8, 24, Bolkestein 1958: 146, and Doty 2003: 8; cf. Gauthier 1976: 248-51 who rejects the notion of the *rentier*-state only in so far as it is predicated upon an economic reading of the *Poroi*, to which, as we have seen (Chapter 3, Section 3A), he objects.

fiscally as its import economy, which presupposes that the city has raw goods and manufactured wares to send abroad (1.7; 3.5).[83]

Nevertheless, Finley staunchly asserts that Xenophon is thinking of "manufacture *only* for the local market."[84] This interpretation, however, contradicts his reading of 3.2, which he cites to demonstrate that Athens paid for its "impressive" import bill with the silver from Laurion.[85] To deny or diminish the crucial role the mining industry plays in the *Poroi* as a productive manufacture is to make a major interpretive and methodological misstep. Finley's analysis typifies the scholarship on the *Poroi*, which for too long has interpreted the work simply as a mirror of Athenian economic values and practices. Yet, by all accounts, the mines during the first half of the fourth century were operating far below their potential, and thus domestic silver production did not in any significant way cover the large import bill when Xenophon was composing the *Poroi*.[86] There are many reasons for this, but the one that has the most explanatory power is the parasitic character of the Athenian imperial economy. As long as the empire was a paying proposition, the Athenians did not need to exploit the mines intensively or extensively. On the one hand, then, the *Poroi* validates the model of consumer city, but only in so far as it applies to imperial Athens, which is the target of Xenophon's criticism. On the other hand, the text seriously calls into question the blanket application of the consumer city model to all cities of the ancient world, real or imagined.

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[83] In the next chapter (Section 5A), I explore further this sector of the Athenian economy in my examination of the metics.

[84] Finley 1999: 135 (emphasis mine).

[85] Finley 1999: 134.

[86] See Chapter 5, Section 5D.

No better proof can be offered in support of this claim than Xenophon's discussion of the expansion of the mining district itself, which seriously challenges David Hume's notorious dismissal of ancient manufacture: "I do not remember a passage in any ancient author where the growth of a city is ascribed to the establishment of a manufacture."[87] To the contrary, the exploitation of the mines under Xenophon's program will occasion the birth of a new polis itself:

> Οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων ἀποφορὰ τὴν διατροφὴν τῇ πόλει αὔξοι ἄν, ἀλλὰ πολυανθρωπίας περὶ τὰ μέταλλα ἀθροιζομένης καὶ ἀπ' ἀγορᾶς τῆς ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀπ' οἰκιῶν περὶ τἀργύρεια δημοσίων καὶ ἀπὸ καμίνων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων πρόσοδοι ἂν πολλαὶ γίγνοιντο. ἰσχυρῶς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ πολυάνθρωπος ἂν γένοιτο πόλις, εἰ οὕτως κατασκευασθείη· καὶ οἵ γε χῶροι οὐδὲν ἂν εἶεν μείονος ἄξιοι τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἐνταῦθα ἢ τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἄστυ.
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> The rent derived from the slaves would not only increase the alimentary support for the city, but if a large amount of people were concentrated in the mining district, many revenues would also accrue from the marketplace there, from the public housing near the mines, from the furnaces, and from all other sources like these. For an exceedingly populous city would come into being there, if it were managed in this way; and the estates there would become no less valuable to their owners there than those estates in the suburbs of Athens (4.49-50).

Although some scholars may not classify this settlement as a polis, because it does not meet certain modern definitional requirements, it nonetheless *does* constitute a polis from Xenophon's perspective;[88] for this populous city has a fortified urban center (cf. 4.43-4)

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87 Finley quotes this passage approvingly twice in *The Ancient Economy* (1999: 22, 137; cf. Cartledge 2002b: 26).

88 Thiel 1922: 32, Lauffer 1955-6: 19, n.1, Gauthier 1976: 188-9, and Schütrumpf 1982: 171 consider this polis not a city-state but a town. According to Hansen 2000: 158, "in Archaic and Classical sources the term *polis* used in the sense of town to denote a named urban center is not applied to just any urban center, but only to a town which was also the political centre of a *polis* [viz. a state]." The standard "minimalist"

with an agora and a kind of hinterland comprised of landed estates, some of which may have produced wine and grain for the town itself.[89] In any case, without the intensification and expansion of the mining industry, Xenophon intimates that not only would this virtual polis not grow into a bustling and populous city but that it would not even come into being in the first place. This is proof positive that at least one ancient author ascribed the growth and development of a city to the establishment of a manufacture.

Xenophon's suggestion to invest significantly in the mining industry not only represents a radical shift away from a consumer-based to a producer-based economy, but it also marks a fundamental change in the Greek attitude to money. For Xenophon, Athens' prosperity lies not within its stores of surplus monies, though this is important (6.1), but in its ability to pay for what she needs with the annual produce of the country, which represents the true wealth of the state. This notion, of course, is one of the central tenets of classical economics. To quote Adam Smith, who famously distinguishes money from wealth: "It would be too ridiculous to go about to prove, that wealth does not consist in money, or in gold and silver; but in what money purchases, and is valuable only for purchasing. Money, no doubt, makes always a part of the national capital; but it

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definition of the polis *qua* state, which originates with Weber, is an institution endowed with sufficient and legitimate authority to enforce laws in a territory and over a population (see Hansen 2000: 13). In general, Hansen and those associated with the Copenhagen Polis Project (as Aristotle before them) tend to emphasize the political dimension of the polis, to the exclusion of other considerations like territoriality and space (see Hölkeskamp 2004), religion, and economics (though see Hansen 2000: 168-70). Xenophon's use of the term "polis" in 4.49-50, then, undermines Hansen's claims that the Classical sources apply the term only "to a town which was also the political centre of a *polis*."

[89] See 4.45 with Gauthier 1976: 182-3. For the importance of a walled urban center with a hinterland for the Greek polis, see Hansen 2000: 152-6. It is noteworthy that Xenophon uses the noun πολυανθρωπία and the adjective πολυάνθρωπος only in regard to poleis (*Hellenica* 5.2.16; *Anabasis* 2.4.13) and, most notably, to Athens itself (*Hellenica* 2.3.24).

has already been shown that it generally makes but a small part, and always the most unprofitable part of it."[90] The idea that wealth and money are not synonymous is apparent throughout the *Poroi*. The goal of Xenophon's economics is not just to create a surplus of money to be stashed away for emergency expenditures but rather to be invested in labor, commerce, industry, and infrastructure. "When start-up capital is sufficient," Xenophon argues, "it would be fine and good to build for ship-owners inns around the harbors in addition to the current ones, and it would also be good to construct for *emporoi* places suitable for buying and selling and public inns for visitors; and if you were to erect houses and shops for the retailers both in the Piraeus and in the city, they would be an ornament to the city, and much revenue would be generated from them" (3.12-3). In addition to public housing, the polis will also use surplus monies to buy merchant vessels and, most importantly, slaves for the mines (3.14; cf. 4.35). By leasing these out, the state will generate even more income, out of which it will reinvest part for the purchase of additional slaves and, presumably, more ships and buildings (4.23-4). Moreover, Xenophon promises that with the expansion and intensification of the mining industry in Laurion, those who own estates (χῶροι) in the region will also find their land-values increasing to the same levels as those who own land in the suburbs of Athens itself (4.50). Xenophon thus envisions a rise in both public and private fortunes!

Xenophon's thoughts on war finance further evidences this reorientation in values toward money. Again, the views of Adam Smith offer an enlightening comparandum. In

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[90] Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* IV.1.17 = Smith 1981: 438. Cf. J.S. Mill, *Political Economy* (Vol. 1, *Preliminary Remarks*, § 9): "To mistake money for wealth, is the same sort of error as to mistake the highway which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands themselves."

the following passage, he challenges the facile mercantilist credo that prevailing in war was contingent upon the accumulation and stock of gold and silver.

> It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver in order to enable a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and silver, but with consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, and consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there.[91]

That such a mercantilist notion about war prevailed in Greece, especially from the Peloponnesian War onward, is evident in Thucydides' *History*. The historian notes repeatedly the importance of money, surplus of money, and expenditure for success in war.[92] For example, the Spartan king Archidamus asserts famously that "war is not a matter of men, but of expense, which allows manpower to be put to use."[93] Xenophon, on the contrary, holds that with a vibrant commercial and industrial economy, Athens is better equipped to defend itself in war, not because it will have a surplus of money, but rather because it will have a surplus of human capital in the form of slaves. "For what," Xenophon asks, "is a more useful possession to conduct war than men?" (τί γὰρ δὴ εἰς πόλεμον κτῆμα χρησιμώτερον ἀνθρώπων;) (4.42). Given that Xenophon constantly reassures his readers that his program will yield a surplus of revenues, it is surprising that he mentions nothing about the use of these monies for war, especially since he recognizes the importance of money in the conduct of war elsewhere in his

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91 *Wealth of Nations* IV.1.20 = Smith 1981: 440-1.

92 Thucydides 1.80.2, 83.2, 141.5, 142.1; 2.13.2; 6.22. On this theme of money and war finance, see Kallet-Marx 1991: 38, 118-19 and 1994: 239-46.

93 Thucydides 1.83.2 with Kallet-Marx 1994: 242-3, who observes that the Spartan view of war focused exclusively on manpower (cf. 1.81.1).

writings.[94] It would be rash, however, to conclude that his understanding of war is naïve or utopian. When Xenophon speaks of war in the *Poroi* he is thinking exclusively about "defensive" wars, in which Athens' enemies invade Attica (4.41-48, 52; 5.13).[95] Here manpower decides the outcome more than money. History taught Xenophon that overseas, imperialistic wars imposed heavy burdens on the exchequer and consequently on the Athenian people (4.40; 5.11-12; 6.1). Yet, at 5.13 Xenophon does mention the possibility of taking vengeance on an aggressor, which could lead to a foreign war, thus necessitating a ready supply of money. Although Xenophon does not specifically address this scenario, it is reasonable to assume that just as, patrollers, targeteers, and those on garrison duty perform their tasks better when they are supplied with *trophe* (4.52), so too the rest of the citizenry could serve abroad because they will be provided with a daily *triobolon* with which to purchase victuals. If Xenophon was thinking along these lines, then he clearly was moving in the direction of Smith and other modern thinkers, who privilege the financing of war with the annual revenue arising out of a nation's lands and industry.

4C. Xenophon's Providentialism

One significant factor that motivates Xenophon to reorient the Athenian economy from consumption to production is his desire to bring Athens into line with the providential ordering of the universe. Scholars have completely overlooked this aspect of Xenophon's *Weltanschauung* and its relation to his economic vision for Athens. When Xenophon says, "it is plain to see that Attica is veined with silver because of divine

94 E.g., *Hellenica* 4.1.32; 6.2.1; *Hiero* 4.11; *Cyropaedia* 6.2.9; *Agesilaus* 2.25.

ordering" (καὶ μὴν ὑπάργυρός ἐστι σαφῶς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ), he is essentially arguing that the world is divided into distinct "shares" or "provinces," of which Athens received as its portion land rich in silver, whereas its neighbors received "not even the smallest vein of silver ore." The idea that the world is divided into provinces is an old one, for the Greeks believed that during the creation of the world, the gods, either by the random selection process of the *Moirai* or by the providence of the gods themselves, divided the world into separate spheres, allotting to each god and goddess his/her own particular province.[96] Here Xenophon uses the specific locution θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, "divine ordering," but this seems to be virtually synonmous with his other designations for the agency behind the allocation elsewhere in the chapter: "nature" (1.3: φύσις, πέφυκεν; 1.4: πέφυκε) and "the gods" (1.3: οἱ θεοί). What is different in the *Poroi* from earlier accounts is the notion that during creation the gods purposefully allotted to *poleis* resources or products of the earth particular to their territories. For Athens' share, she received silver ore, which arguably was not unique to Attica, but in respect to quantity and quality, it certainly was exceptional.[97] Because the presence of silver ore in Attica is not the result of chance according to Xenophon, it serves a specific function. This reading is recommended, because he believes that an immanent teleology exists in the

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95 Rightly noted by Gauthier 1976: 214-5.

96 See, for example, Homer, *Iliad* 15.187-95; Hesiod, *Theogony* 390-415, 881-85; Pindar, *Olympian* 7.54-68; Aeschylus, *Persians* 762-64; Sophocles *Aegeus* Fg. 24; Plato, *Critias* 109b-c; *Politicus* 271d; Varro in Augustine, *City of God* 18.9. In general, see Cornford 1991: 15-31.

97 The same is true of Attic marble. The geological conditions were right for the production of marble all around the Mediterranean, but most places only had thin veins or small lumps of marble: "much rarer are the massive beds from which can be extracted the great blocks needed for the major architectural members of temples and other large buildings. In this too Attica is exceptionally favored. More than one huge layer

order of world, which articulates and assigns a purpose to everything, even down to the specific functions of human body parts.[98] Given the placement of this idea in the context of foreign demand for Athenian products, which Athens gives in exchange for food, we may reasonably assume that Xenophon thinks the gods allotted silver ore to the Athenians specifically so that they would exploit the mines and export silver abroad in exchange for needed goods. The gods thus ordered the universe so that states would have to trade with each other. Xenophon does not address explicitly the reason why the gods want Athens to trade, but he does assert repeatedly how commerce fosters peaceful relations between Athens and other states, and so it is quite possible that Xenophon saw divine providence favoring trade as a means of promoting friendly bonds between peoples (3.4; 5.1; 6.1). This particular notion is explicit in Libanius, who may have had the *Poroi* in mind: "God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but distributed his gifts over different regions, to the end that all men might cultivate a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another. And so he called commerce into being, that all men might be able to have common enjoyment of the fruits of the earth, no matter where produced."[99]

These two related ideas, namely that providence 1) assigns special products to different peoples of the earth to induce them to trade with each other and 2) favors commerce as a way to cultivate ties of friendship between them, have an important

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runs through the fabric of both Pentelikon and Hymettos; and other extensive beds lie near the southern tip of Attica" (Wycherley 1974: 54).

98 *Memorabilia* 1.4.4-19; 2.3.18-19; *Symposium* 5.6-7. Xenophon probably owes his understanding of providence and teleology to Prodicus et al.. Xenophanes *DK* B 25 and Herodotus 3.108.1 express similar views.

Nachleben in the history of economic thought, as the economic historian Jacob Viner has demonstrated.[100] Viner traces them from Libanius and the early Church Fathers, through the Middle Ages, when they were invoked largely in liturgical and scholastic contexts, to the early modern period as they became increasingly converted into "functional" ideas "to influence national economic policy."[101] Opponents of extreme mercantilism, for example, used the idea to support the liberalization of restrictions or even outright prohibitions on foreign trade.[102] Viner doubts the extent to which these ideas had any material consequences, but he points out that their intent to trouble the consciences of rulers and legislators who were advocating colonialism and other aggressive trade policies was effective.

That Xenophon also promotes the idea of providential commercialism to challenge the hawkish policies of the Athenians is an attractive idea. Xenophon tells us that during the debate about the terms of the alliance between Athens and Sparta in 369, Procles the Phliasian used a providential argument to persuade the Athenians to retain their hegemony at sea: "It has been proposed by your council that you should have the leadership by sea and the Lacedaemonians leadership by land. This arrangement seems to me to be not so much the result of some human agency but naturally the consequence of providence or fortune (ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ μᾶλλον ἢ θείᾳ φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ διωρίσθαι). In the first place, you occupy a position most

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99 *Oration* 59.169.11 quoted in Viner 1972: 36-7. Cf. *Oration* 5.21 for Libanius' familiarity with Xenophon's works.

100 Viner 1972: 27-54; cf. Hirschman 1977: 59-60.

101 Viner 1972: 40. See, for example, Davenant, *Essay on the East-India Trade* (= Davenant 1771: 104).

102 Viner 1972: 42.

suitable by nature for naval supremacy. For most states that are dependent upon the sea live around your city, and all these are weaker than you are."[103] Procles then goes on to mention twice how the god(s) granted many naval successes to the Athenians, which indicates to him that they should remain thalassocrats (7.1.5, 9; cf. 6.5.41).[104] Interestingly, however, this argument did not persuade the Athenians on this occasion. The Athenian Cephisodotus won the day by underscoring how the treaty designates that both parties are to be equals, suggesting that the Athenians and Spartans should hold joint leadership on land and sea by exchanging the leadership position with each other every five days (7.1.14-4). The reason Procles' providential argument does resonate with the Athenians has nothing to do with the argument per se but with Procles' application of it to a situation involving two equal parties. As evident from the passage, Procles invokes the providential view of Athenian thalossocracy to legitimate the Athenians' rule over states that are "weaker." For Cephisodotus, the Spartans are not the inferiors of Athens but equals and co-hegemons. Cephisodotus' riposte notwithstanding, it is unlikely that he or any other Athenian would have objected in principle to Procles employing the providential view of imperialism to justify Athens' rule over its subjects. Such a double standard was essential to the ideology of empire, as demonstrated, for example, by the Athenian adherence to the principle of justice applying only in cases involving two equal parties (Thucydides 5.89; Demosthenes 15.28).

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[103] *Hellenica* 7.1.3. A recent instantiation of this idea comes from the current Vice President of the United States, who said in a meeting of the Cato Institute in 1998: "the good Lord didn't see fit to put oil and gas where there are democratic regimes friendly to the United States" (Guardian Unlimited, 4/5/2004). It was unclear at the time whether Cheney invoked the providential idea to promote peaceful trade with the Middle East and Eurasia or to advocate a more aggressive strategy for the acquisition of their oil.

[104] Cf. Plato, *Critias* 113b-e, who seems to be parodying the providential view of empire in this passage.

Viewed in light of this passage, Xenophon's understanding that Attica contains silver because of divine providence is yet another salient example of his manipulation of the rhetoric of empire. Xenophon challenges the contention that the gods allotted to the Athenians a geographic disposition suitable for naval empire by proposing an alternative, anti-imperial reading of the gods' dispensation: they allocated a land rich in produce, marble, and silver, which is geographically well suited for exporting these goods abroad and importing necessities (1.7). In the former view, the gods intend the Athenians to rule over Greeks, but in the latter, to trade with them for peaceful ends. In the prologue, Xenophon asserts that maintaining the Athenians from their own resources would be the "most just" solution to Athenian imperialism, and now we are in the position to appreciate fully why this is so. The gods ordain what is just for humans in Xenophon's worldview, and justice itself is rooted in the very soil of Attica itself. In the *Oeconomicus*, "the earth is a goddess who willingly teaches justice to those who can learn" (5.12; cf. *Memorabilia* 4.4.25). The presence of silver in the soil is a veritable sign from the gods that also teaches the Athenians that the path to justice lies in the peaceful exploitation and trade of their indigenous goods. Xenophon assumes the role, then, not only of a savvy financial advisor but also of a *mantis*, "prophet," who reveals the divine will to humanity. Accordingly, he recommends sending an embassy to Dodona and Delphi to ask the gods "if it is fine and good for the city to execute the plan both now and in the future" (6.2). Xenophon is indeed looking for their direction, but he also wants their blessing.[105]

[105] See the excellent note of Gauthier 1976: 220-1; cf. Higgins 1977: 142.

4D. Xenophon's Anti-imperialism in the Context of Athenian Political Thought

Historians have long pointed out that Xenophon's attitude toward the Athenian empire in the *Poroi* is not novel, for Isocrates and Thucydides also demonstrate the "unjust" nature of Athenian imperialism.[106] Moreover, Xenophon was not the only Athenian calling for peace around the time of the Social War; in *On the Peace* Isocrates pleas impassionedly to the Athenians to make peace with the allies and to eschew their heavy-handed imperial policies. Some scholars even maintain that a "peace party" existed in Athens at the time, of which Eubulus was the most high-profile figure.[107] Accordingly, there has been a tendency to label Xenophon's thinking as unoriginal and derivative.[108] A closer scrutiny of Xenophon's views on peace and imperialism, however, reveals that he was radically out of sync with his Athenian contemporaries. In this last section, I argue that Xenophon was unique among Athenian intellectuals and philosophers as a true-blooded anti-imperialist thinker, who opposed not just the particular instantiations of imperialism (e.g., Athenian, Spartan, etc.) but the very idea of empire itself.[109]

It is important to stress from the outset that in the *Poroi* Xenophon concerns himself primarily with Athens and makes no overt generalizing or philosophical statements about imperialism. Nonetheless, as noted in Section 2E, Xenophon frames the

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[106] E.g., von der Lieck 1933: 7-8, Jaeger 1938: 53, de Romilly 1963: 318-21, Breitenbach 1967: 1754, and Gauthier 1976: 42.

[107] E.g., Cawkwell 1963 and Mossé 1973 : 55.

[108] E.g., Müller 1971: 198-9, Thiel 1922: xxiv, Andreades 1933: 390, Delebecque 1957: 471, Schütrumpf 1982: 3, and Gauthier 1976: 42-4.

prologue in the context of a Socratic discussion about τὸ δίκαιον, which strongly enjoins the interpretation that Xenophon's analysis of Athens' political and economic situation proceeds, in part, from general principles formulated through philosophical examination and historical inquiry.[110] Such a perspective invites us to look to his other works composed during the period 362-355 in order to contextualize his thoughts on empire and imperialism.[111] A salient point of departure is Xenophon's claim that the "most just" (δικαιότατον) way to remedy the poverty of the Athenian multitude is that they "be maintained from their own territory" (διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν), or perhaps translated better, "from their own domestic resources" (1.1).[112] Conversely, the most unjust solution to feeding the masses, it may be presumed, is appropriating goods from territories not belonging to Athens. In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates makes this point as he challenges Aristippus' claim that life in a polis is neither necessary nor desirable:

> ἢ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καὶ φυτευσάντων τόν τε σῖτον τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν πείσωσιν ἑλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι; καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται;

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109 That Xenophon is an anti-imperialist is a view I share with the following scholars: Giglioni 1970: xiv-xxix, Higgins 1977: 99-127, 140, Schütrumpf 1982: 3, n.6, Dillery 1993, Tuplin 1993, and Nadon 2001: Chapters 3 and 5.

110 Contra Gauthier 1976: 43.

111 Unitarians like Higgins 1977 and non-unitarians like Delebecque 1957 and Tuplin 1993 generally agree that *Hellenica* 2-8, *Hipparchicus*, *On Horsemanship*, *Agesilaus* and most of the *Cyropaedia* and *Memorabilia* were composed post-Mantinea.

112 Contrary to Gauthier 1976: 40 and Schütrumpf 1982: 77, I do not take the feminine pronoun in the phrase ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν to refer to πόλεως, which they argue is implied in the subject οἱ πολῖται, but to the subject of the following sentence ἡ χώρα (cf. von der Lieck 1933: 18, Marchant 1925: 193, Giglioni 1970: 19, Waterfield 1997: 169, and Doty 2003: 19).

> Has it escaped your notice that there are people who reap the grain from others who have sown and planted it, cut down their fruit trees, and besiege the weaker in every way because they do not wish to serve them, until the belligerents prevail upon them to choose slavery instead of facing war with the stronger? Indeed, in domestic affairs too don't you know that brave and powerful men reap profits from the cowardly and weak by enslaving them? (2.1.13).[113]

Socrates goes on to proclaim that such predatory actions of the stronger in both domestic and international affairs are "unjust," employing the verb ἀδικεῖν no less than six times (2.1.14).

Nevertheless, Xenophon recognizes the role played by necessity in foreign relations, especially when a people's *trophe* is at stake: "Even on land piracy, though not for those who reap what they have sown, is the natural resource of men deprived of their sustenance. For either men must work or they must eat the fruits of other men's labor: otherwise it is no easy thing to have a livelihood and to obtain peace (προσήκει γε μὴν καὶ κατὰ γῆν οὐ τοῖς καρπουμένοις τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλὰ τοῖς στερισκομένοις τῆς τροφῆς λῄζεσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ἐργαστέον ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰργασμένων θρεπτέον· ἄλλως δ′ οὐ ῥᾴδιον οὔτε βιοτεύειν οὔτε εἰρήνης τυχεῖν) (*Hipparchicus* 8.8). This passage from the *Hipparchicus*, reminiscent of the end of Herodotus' *History* and Hobson's "choice of life" (see Introduction above), evidences the critical choice that Xenophon envisages *all* states must make concerning their *trophe*: "For either men must work or they must eat the fruits of other men's labor." This gnomic statement brings us directly back to the prologue of the *Poroi*: because the masses were deprived of sufficient

trophe, the Athenian political leadership felt "compelled" to treat the allies unjustly. The intertext enjoins the idea that Xenophon thought the Athenians were acting like pirates, a sentiment about imperial states that Augustine echoes centuries later: "Take away justice, and what are governments but brigandage on a grand scale? And what are robber bands but small governments" (*remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia? Quia et latrocinia quid sunt nisi parva regna*).[114] Xenophon's emphasis on maintaining the masses "from their own domestic resources," therefore, is a consummate rejection of the politics of imperialism and expansionism and an exhortation to a new politics of peace based on justice.[115]

Xenophon elaborates fully his peace policy in Chapter 5, where he aims to persuade the Athenians to reject their bellicosity and realize the financial benefits of peace. To summarize: Athens cannot receive the fullest measure of revenues unless peace exists (ἡ πόλις εἰρήνην ἄγουσα; cf. 5.3: ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης τῆς πόλεως); consequently, a board of guardians of the peace (εἰρηνοφύλακες) should be created (5.1); such a board will make the city more popular (προσφιλεστέρα) and increase the number of visitors (ship owners, merchants trading in grain, wine, and olive oil, intellectuals, investors, sophists, philosophers, poets, and tourists) who will benefit the city both economically and culturally (5.2-4); those cities who enjoy the longest period of peace are the most prosperous (εὐδαιμονέσταται), and Athens is by nature of all cities

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113 Cf. *Anabasis* 5.6.32.

114 Augustine, *City of God* 4.4; cf. Isocrates, *On the Peace* 90; Cicero, *Republic* 3.14.24.

115 Breitenbach 1967: 1754; cf. Gauthier 1976: 212-3, who calls Xenophon's policy "pacific hegemony" and Delebecque 1957: 475, who applies the unfortunate tag "new imperialism."

the most well suited "to flourish in peace" (ἐν εἰρήνη αὔξεσθαι) (5.2); those who desire to win back the hegemony for Athens by means of war are mistaken, as Hellenic history demonstrates repeatedly that treating the Greeks in a peaceful and beneficent manner resulted in Athens' exercise of hegemony (5.5-7); now that the Greek world is in a state of confusion (ταραχή), Athens has it within her power to win back the Greeks, not by engaging in wars but by reconciling warring states and making peace between factions within states (5.8); Athens therefore should take the step to end the Sacred War (5.9); if people saw Athens striving to make peace in every land and on every sea, they would include Athens' safety first in their prayers after their own (5.10); those who think war more profitable than peace once again should look to the past, because state revenues have always been exhausted in times of war, especially during the recent Social War, whereas in times of peace revenues have increased (5.11-12); lastly, a state of peace (εἰρήνην ἄγειν) does not entail refraining from avenging oneself on an enemy when wronged; in fact, by not initiating injustice Athens will avenge itself more quickly on its enemies who will be bereft of allies (5.13).

Chapter 5 is an impressive piece of Xenophon's anti-imperialist rhetoric, which, as we have seen, contests the very nature of the Athenian empire by "employing *topoi* familiar from the world of the *arche*" and applying them to a new form of hegemony based in peace.[116] The phrase εἰρήνην ἄγειν is fundamental to this interpretation, which means "to be at peace," whereas τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν means "to observe the terms

[116] Dillery 1993: 2.

of a particular peace," say, for example, the Peace of Philocrates.[117] This latter usage is precisely what we find in Isocrates' *On the Peace* (8.71), the occasion of which is ostensibly a meeting of the assembly concerning the peace proposals with the allies in 355 (16). Xenophon, by contrast, advocates not the adoption of a specific peace but the acceptance of a universal and lasting peace with the entire world. He emphasizes the permanent nature of his peace proposal by twice employing the words διατελής, "lasting" or "perpetual," and διατελεῖν, "to last in perpetuity" (5.2). Because the benefits of peace are to be enjoyed by *all* peoples (5.1: πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις), who *in toto* (5.10: πάντας) will express their gratitude in prayer to the Athenians for promoting peace throughout *every* land and on the sea (ἀνὰ πᾶσαν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν εἰρήνη), Xenophon clearly envisions a universal peace. The closest parallel to Xenophon's peace is the so-called "common peace" (κοινὴ εἰρήνη) arranged repeatedly in the fourth century by the king of Persia.[118] A return to the first peace of this kind, the Peace of Antalcidas in 387, is ultimately what Isocrates urges the Athenians to accept in 355 in order "to have peace" (ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην) "with all of humankind" (πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους) (8.16). It is unclear, however, if by "peace for all" Xenophon hopes to include additional states, such as the Greeks of Italy and Sicily and the Carthaginians, who were not customary signatories to the common peaces. The phrase ἀνὰ πᾶσαν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν εἰρήνη is unparalleled in any contemporary

[117] Seager 1969: 134; cf. Gauthier 1976: 196, who translates the phrase as "state of peace."
[118] In general, see Ryder 1965.

documents and therefore suggests that Xenophon was thinking of a peace even more comprehensive than the ones brokered by the Persian king.

To ensure this new state of peace Xenophon proposes creating an office of *eirenophylakes*, the very name of which evokes such Athenian imperial institutions as "the garrison" (οἱ φύλακες) or the "guardians of the Hellespont" (ἑλλησποντοφύλακες). Instead of acting as a guardian or an outpost of empire, the function of this office is to promote peace. How Xenophon expected the *eirenophylakes* to accomplish this task is debated. Thiel submits two readings: 1) the office was either to settle disputes between Athens and other Greek states; or 2) to settle disputes between warring states and reconcile factions within states, that is, what Xenophon actually urges the Athenians to do at 5.8.[119] The first interpretation is unsound because Xenophon expects many foreigners, not just those reconciled with Athens, to visit the city because of these magistrates' efforts.[120] Thiel's second interpretation is supported well by the text itself, but Gauthier objects to this reading because such a permanent, elected board of magistrates devoted to diplomacy has no parallel in the international arbitration practices of the Greeks.[121] Momigliano and Giglioni offer a different perspective, interpreting the *eirenophylakes* as "panhellenic magistrates," elected by the Athenians, but recognized by the allies, to ensure a "common peace."[122] The problem with this view is that it would be strange to find a panhellenic board of magistrates entirely of Athenians.

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[119] Thiel 1922: 33.

[120] Gauthier 1976: 196; cf. Cawkwell 1963: 56 who argues that it would be strange for Athens to be the arbiters of peace when the city itself is party to the peace.

[121] Gauthier 1976: 197.

[122] Momigliano cited in Gauthier 1976: 197 and Giglioni 1970: xxxi-xxxiv.

Cawkwell's reading is more persuasive. Privileging Xenophon's comments that immediately follow his proposal for the creation of the office, namely, that the *eirenophylakes* will make the city more attractive to trade, he contends that they would have been domestic financial officers exclusively.[123] He cites Aeschines 3.159, where the orator claims that after Chaeronea Demosthenes returned to the city and urged the Athenians "to elect him guardian of the peace" (εἰρηνοφύλακα ὑμᾶς αὐτὸν ἐκέλευε χειροτονεῖν). In that Demosthenes was elected to the Theoric Commission in 337/6, Cawkwell interprets Aeschines' comment as a sarcastic reference to this office, "and he chose as a sneer the word used twenty years earlier by Xenophon in proposing a new office to make the most of the peace. Here perhaps as elsewhere in the *Revenues* what Xenophon proposed, Eubulus enacted."[124] Gauthier endorses Cawkwell's thesis and adds the following three points: 1) the *eirenophylakes* would have been Athenian magistrates, elected by Athenians, to take care of domestic affairs on analogy with Agathocles of Syracuse, who was elected "general and guardian of the peace" (στρατηγὸς καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης) in 317 (Diodorus 19.5.5); 2) they would have been charged with the task not to establish but to *maintain* peace; and 3) the office would have been the antipode of the *stratiotika*, which was oriented to financing war and imperialism.[125]

Attractive as this interpretation is, I offer another solution. While Agathocles of Syracuse may evidence a domestic role one "guardian of the peace" played at the end of

[123] Cawkwell 1963: 56.
[124] Cawkwell 1963: 56.

the fourth century, the most relevant example that the aforementioned scholars have failed to identify is the Persian king, whom Isocrates conspicuously deems "the guardian of peace" (φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης) for his part in brokering common peaces (*Panegyricus* 175). His policy was exclusively international, both maintaining and establishing peace throughout the Greek and non-Greek worlds. That Xenophon is assigning such a diplomatic role to his *eirenophylakes* is supported by a later usage from the Roman period. Plutarch labels the Roman priest-hood of Fetiales *eirenophylakes*, because "they settled disputes by parley, not allowing a hostile expedition until every hope for peace had been cut off. For the Greeks call it peace whenever two parties settle their quarrels by conference and not force."[126] The diplomatic character of these *eirenophylakes* corresponds to Xenophon's foreign policy recommendations at 5.8-9: to reconcile warring states, to resolve civil strife, and to make "the Delphic shrine autonomous, as it was in the past, not by joining in war, but by sending embassies up and down Greece." Reconciling warring states, ending civil war, and ensuring autonomy were the defining features of the common peaces negotiated by the Persian king. It is quite possible, then, that Xenophon is proposing a permanent office of diplomats charged with these very same foreign policy objectives. The key difference, of course, being that Xenophon substitutes Athens for Persia in the role of the guardian of peace.[127]

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[125] Gauthier 1976: 198.

[126] *Numa* 13.3-4; cf. *Camillus* 18.2-3. The word εἰρηνοφύλακες is extremely rare, occuring only in Xenophon, Aeschines, Philo, and here in Plutarch. Since it is unlikely that Plutarch found the word in Philo he probably got it from either Xenophon or Aeschines.

[127] Consequently, one should be wary of assimilating Xenophon's peace proposal with Eubulus', whom historians (Cawkwell 1963: 52-3, Ryder 1965: 92-3, and Dillery 1993: 6-7) believe made a return to the King's Peace of 387 a cornerstone of his foreign policy.

Whatever the precise role of the *eirenophylakes*, the new state of peace that they help establish and maintain will undoubtedly engender the goodwill of the entire world (5.1; 6.1) to such an extent that all peoples will include the Athenians in their prayers for "salvation" (5.10), thus reversing the Athenians' former imperial policies, which produced suspicion among the Greek world (1.1). This practice promises to reverse the imperial perversion of the "dialectic of *charis*."[128] Athenian imperial ideology, as articulated by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, boasted that the Athenians were the benefactors of world, to whom the allies owed debts of gratitude.[129] But according to Theopompus, after the Athenians had alienated all her former allies save the Chians, who alone offered military assistance in time of war, they rewarded them by offering prayers of "health and salvation" (*FGrH* 115, F104; Aristophanes, *Birds* 878-80 with scholium). To the contrary, Xenophon envisions a world where *everybody* will pray for the safety of Athens because she promotes a state of peace that has real economic, cultural, intellectual, and religious benefits. Indeed, it is with some reason that Cartledge deems Xenophon's state of peace a "new world order."[130] But is Xenophon's attitude to war, peace, and empire original, as this phrase certainly implies? Or did a competing, anti-imperialistic ideology exist in Athens, which inspired and shaped Xenophon's thinking?

Some historians have identified a "quietist" ideology among the wealthy and oligarchic leaning Athenians, who were politically and economically opposed to the

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128 The phrase is that of Oliver 1960: 109.

129 Thucydides, 2.38; 2.40.4-41.1 with Loraux 1986: 81-2 and Plato, *Menexenus* 237c; cf. Veyne 1990: 109-10. See also *Cyropaedia* 1.1.5; 5.1.1, where Xenophon notes how Cyrus arouses in his subjects a desire to "gratify" him because he is "thirsty" to gratify them.

130 Cartledge 1997: 227.

empire, the so-called *apragmones*.[131] Dillery argues that the phrase Xenophon uses to describe his peacetime hegemony, ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης τῆς πόλεως, specifically evokes this ideology of *apragmosyne*.[132] According to Isocrates, the Athenian leadership at the end of the Social War was divided between those who advocated the recovery of empire and those who thought it "necessary that the city observe peace" (ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν δεῖ) (8.6). He also claims that the Athenians' difficulties will not cease "until they are persuaded that quietude is more beneficial and profitable than meddlesomeness" (πρὶν ἂν πεισθῆτε τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν ὠφελιμωτέραν καὶ κερδαλεωτέραν εἶναι τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης) (26). The contrast here between external peace (*hesychia*) and meddlesomeness (*polypragmosyne*), Dillery points out, is similar to the one Pericles makes in the Funeral Oration, where he also attacks the Athenian quietist as being "useless" (ἀχρεῖος) for not participating in politics. Dillery adduces numerous passages from Xenophon demonstrating his affinity with just such a political quietism, thus linking Xenophon's views on Athenian foreign policy with his domestic philosophy of *apragmosyne*.[133] A much-neglected passage from Plato's *Politicus* recommends this interpretation:

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131 E.g., Nestle 1926, Ehrenberg 1947, Adkins 1976, and Carter 1986. It is the contention of de Romilly 1954 (followed by Mossé 1962: 407-9, Giglioni 1970: xix, Payrau 1971: 50ff., and many others) that there existed a group of "moderates" in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries who "opposed the politics of extreme democracy, imperialism, and war" (327). She is concerned primarily with the fourth century, for which she limits her discussion to Isocrates, Xenophon, and Aeschines. In the following discussion, I argue that Xenophon does not espouse the values of this group.

132 Dillery 1993: 7-9; cf. Ehrenberg 1947: 46 on the virtual synonymy of *hesychia* and *apragmosyne*.

133 Dillery 1993 7-8 citing *Memorabilia* 1.6.10; 2.6.22; *Cyropaedia* 1.6.4; and the *Oeconomicus* generally.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ δὴ διαφερόντως ὄντες κόσμιοι τὸν ἥσυχον ἀεὶ βίον ἕτοιμοι ζῆν, αὐτοὶ καθ' αὑτοὺς μόνοι τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν πράττοντες, οἵκοι τε αὖ πρὸς ἅπαντας οὕτως ὁμιλοῦντες, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἔξωθεν πόλεις ὡσαύτως ἕτοιμοι πάντα ὄντες τρόπον τινὰ ἄγειν εἰρήνην· καὶ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα δὴ τοῦτον ἀκαιρότερον ὄντα ἢ χρή, ὅταν ἃ βούλονται πράττωσιν, ἔλαθον αὐτοί τε ἀπολέμως ἴσχοντες καὶ τοὺς νέους ὡσαύτως διατιθέντες, ὄντες τε ἀεὶ τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων, ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες καὶ σύμπασα ἡ πόλις ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων πολλάκις ἔλαθον αὑτοὺς γενόμενοι δοῦλοι.

> Men who are notable for moderation are always ready to support peace and tranquility. They want to keep to themselves and to mind their own business. They conduct all their dealings with their fellow citizens on this principle and are prone to take the same line in foreign policy and preserve peace at any price with foreign states. Because of their indulgence for this passion for peace at the wrong times, whenever they are able to carry their policy into effect they become unwarlike themselves without being aware of it and render their young men unwarlike as well. Thus they are at the mercy of the chance aggressor. He swoops down on them and the result is that within a very few years they and their children and all the community to which they belong wake up to find that their freedom is gone and that they are reduced to slavery (307e trans. Skemp).

Plato states explicitly that those who "keep to themselves and mind their own business" (τὰ σφέτερα πράττειν = ἀπραγμοσύνη)[134] hold the same ideological position in both domestic and foreign affairs. The cornerstone of this ideology is "to preserve peace at any price." The phrase Plato employs here, ἄγειν εἰρήνην, may very well be a reference to and criticism of Xenophon's peace policy in the *Poroi*.[135] It thus seems reasonable to conclude that Xenophon's esteem of the quiet life, a value he shares with other Athenians, informed his views on peace and war. But does this interpretation

[134] Adkins 1976: 301.

explain sufficiently Xenophon's attitude to the Athenian empire and imperialism more generally?

According to Ehrenberg's analysis of the word, *apragmosyne* necessarily "involved anti-imperialism, non-aggressive policy, quiet attitude and therefore peace."[136] The locus classicus for the *apragmon's* view of the Athenian empire is Pericles' final speech in Thucydides, which may be the inspiration for the just-cited passage from the *Politicus*.

> ἧς οὐδ' ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται· ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον. τάχιστ' ἄν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑτέρους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν καὶ εἴ που ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι οἰκήσειαν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀρχούσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν.
>
> It is no longer possible for you to give it up [sc. the empire], if somebody in the present circumstances who is afraid because of their quietism offers even this fine gesture; for you rule your empire as a tyrant, which may have been wrong to take, but dangerous to let go. And such men persuading others of their views would quickly destroy the city, even if they were to live somewhere by themselves and independently; for the quietist is not secure unless he is protected by someone who is willing to act, and he brings no advantage to an imperial city, though in a subject state he is safe but a slave (2.63.2-3).

This passage, vague as it is, seems to imply that there were politically active *apragmones* in Athens who advocated giving up the empire and tried to persuade others to do so.[137]

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135 The precise date of the *Politicus* is unknown but can "generally be dated to the period immediately following Plato's third visit to Sicily (361); hence, before the final crisis of the Athenian empire" (Vidal-Naquet 1978: 139, n. 57).

136 Ehrenberg 1947: 52.

137 Carter 1986: 39.

This conclusion, however, is complicated by the phrase καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς, which suggests that it was only the immediate context (i.e. the Spartan invasion of Attica and the plague; cf. 2.59.1) that "might induce some to consider even this (καὶ τόδε), resigning the empire."[138] As Andrewes contends, "[s]ince they could cover their fear with a cloak of virtue, Perikles goes on to consider that virtue and its unsuitability in a ruling city; but nothing that he has here been given to say encourages us to ascribe to any group or individual a settled policy of abandoning the empire when not under duress."

Challenging this interpretation, Carter adduces Thucydides 2.64.4, which he claims demonstrates clearly that "there were men in Athens, and men whose opinions had to be reckoned with whether in politics or not, who were, and had long been, opposed to the creation of the Empire."[139] Yet, the passage in question says nothing about opposition to the creation of the empire, but rather it attests to how "the quietist would censure these things" (καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαιτ' ἄν), namely, that "Athens ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic states; held their own in the greatest wars against either the combined forces of their enemies or each individually; and inhabited the greatest city that had more resources than any other." To understand Pericles' remarks better, it is helpful to view them through the lens of the rhetoric of praise and blame, for he attributes the *apragmon's* censure not to their opposition of

[138] Andrewes 1978: 4; cf. Gomme 1956: 177.
[139] Carter 1986: 39-40.

empire but rather to their "jealousy" (φθόνος) of not possessing the rewards of empire that the avid imperialists had acquired (2.64.5).[140]

Adkins' study of *apragmosyne*/*polypragmosyne* elucidates well this dynamic of praise and blame, which situates these concepts in the context of the workings of *arete*. For all Greeks, *arete* "had denoted and most highly commended those activities which were held to contribute most to the continued existence of the unit [*oikos* or *polis*]…and it had commended 'competitive' excellences, since these were held to contribute most."[141] *Arete* also denoted and commended the attributes of a particular social class, whose members referred to themselves as *agathoi* and/or *kaloi kagathoi*, the "good" and "gentlemen" respectively. The *agathoi* traditionally claimed the right to hold a monopoly on *arete*, because it was largely because of their competitive excellences, serving as hoplites and in the cavalry, for instance, that the polis was preserved. Occasionally, these competitive excellences led to civil strife and conflict between *poleis*, because "[e]ach contender has a sphere of influence, *oikos* or *polis*, within which he will brook no interference," but as long as the competitors are "equals," Adkins argues, "some kind of equilibrium will be maintained."[142]

> But suppose one of the contenders, whether individual, group in the *polis*, or *polis*, acquires greater power and resources than the others. He will be able to exercise his power and resources to meddle in the affairs of others without effective opposition. Even if such meddling causes no material damage, the person (or group) affected by it, if he supposes himself to possess *arete*, will resent it and regard it as placing him in a subordinate position, as rendering him less free (*eleutheros*); and he is likely to treat *any* encroachment on freedom as slavery (*douleia*). Free Greeks…were

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[140] See Rusten 1989: 206.

[141] Adkins 1976: 313-4; cf. Adkins 1960: 226ff.

[142] Adkins 1976: 314.

> very sensitive to the slightest restriction upon their freedom of action. We may find the attitude difficult to understand; but the emotional response of the Greek *agathos* to the idea of "being beholden to anyone" is very well attested, and the Greek cities responded similarly.

Accordingly, those individuals or groups within the polis who felt that they possessed *arete* would employ the term *polypragmosyne* "to censure the activities of anyone else (or any other group or *polis*) who was acting outside his own proper sphere of influence (*oikos*, group, or *polis*)." In Athens the democratic revolution of the fifth century engendered just such a situation, in that the demos began to acquire more political power than the *agathoi*, which significantly challenged their traditional *arete*-based value system.[143]

Furthermore, because an active foreign policy, conducted and ensured by the navy, further increased the power (politically and economically) of the demos, it was a natural target of reproach for Athenian *agathoi*. They deemed Athenian imperialism *polypragmosyne*, not necessarily because they were expressing their solidarity with fellow *agathoi*, though this was a part of it (cf. Ps.-Xenophon, *Athenaion Politeia* 1.14), but because the domestic power of the demos was derived from the navy, which democrats like Pericles privileged strategically in war and publicly acknowledged as the source of Athens' greatness and safety.[144] What some *agathoi* seem to have condemned, therefore, was not empire per se but the hyper-aggressive *thalassocracy* that concentrated excessive power and resources in the hands of the demos, which is precisely what Pericles says brought the condemnation of the *apragmon*: "the greatest city that had more

[143] The fifth and fourth centuries are replete with anti-democratic diatribes expressed in such terms; see, for example, Adkins 1976 and Ober 1998.

resources than any other" (πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην). In the zero-sum game of Athenian politics, many *agathoi* chose to retreat from politics to live the quiet life, pursuing a variety of activities, such as farming and contemplation, whereas others stuck it out to challenge the foreign policy of the democrats.[145]

Now this group of *agathoi*, Thucydides would like us to believe, could potentially get caught in the moment and advocate the resignation of empire, but there is no evidence to lead us to believe that this was a regular feature of their foreign policy. In fact, two oft-quoted passages from Thucydides strongly suggest the exact opposite. In Book 8 Thucydides attributes to Phrynichus the view that "the cities of the empire thought that the *kaloi kagathoi* would be no less oppressive than the demos in the handling of their affairs, since they were the ones who were the financiers and proposers of the evils done by the demos, from whom they derived much profit" (8.48.6). These ideas, it must be remembered, Phrynichus expresses to counter the pro-oligarchic arguments of Alcibiades, who wished to subvert the democracy and install limited government. Once this limited government of *kaloi kagathoi* came into power, they had no intention of getting rid of the empire, for when they began to fear that the demos was ready to depose them, they decided to make peace with Sparta according to the following set of preferences: "to have the oligarchy without giving up the empire; failing this to keep their ships and walls and be independent; while, if this also were denied them, sooner than be the first victims of the restored democracy, they were resolved to call in the enemy and

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144 Adkins 1976: 315. Cf. the sentiments of the Old Oligarch, for example, who decries that the navy "imparts far more power (*dynamis*) to the polis than the hoplites, the high-born, and the good men" (1.2).

145 For these alternatives to the political life, see Adkins 1976: 319 and Carter 1986: Chapters 4-7.

make peace, give up their walls and ships, and at all costs retain possession of the government, if only their lives were assured to them" (8.91.3). If even these revolutionaries, the most extreme of the oligarchs, desired to retain the empire, it is unlikely that more moderate *kaloi kagathoi* would ever advocate giving it up, unless, as Pericles remarks suggest, dire circumstances demanded it. What appears then to have been the defining foreign policy objective of Athenian *kaloi kagathoi* was to retain and rule the empire for their own political and economic benefit. When and if that policy ever precipitated conflict with Sparta, however, they were "quick" (according to Plato's representation) to make peace, but a peace that more or less conformed to the set of preferences outlined in Thucydides 8.91.3.[146]

In conclusion, I see no reason to trace back Xenophon's peace policy and his attitude to empire to the elite ideology of *hesychia* and *apragmosyne*. While there may be some affinities, Xenophon goes much further in his condemnation of empire than any of his fellow Athenian *kaloi kagathoi*, among whom historians are wont to place him.[147] A thorough analysis of this aspect of Athenian political thought is badly needed, but my impression is that Xenophon stood alone in his stout opposition to expansionism and

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[146] In *On the Peace* 51, Isocrates actually tries to dispel the stereotype that oligarchs were supporters of peace. Lévy 1976: 147-69 argues that after 404, the Athenians became disaffected with the essence of imperialism, what he calls the "ideology of power" (150). This ideology of power continued in the fourth century only in the form of aggression against the non-Greek world, namely, the Persians. This constituted a kind of "imperialistic revival" but one that Lévy treats as distinct from the fifth-century empire, because it was meant not to "satisfy the Athenians' appetite for power" or their material interests, but rather to serve the common interests of Greece and the allies (164). This Panhellenism he views as being distinct from imperialism. Needless to say, Lévy's exclusive focus on the concept of power ignores the other motivations of Athenian imperialism discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3D. Panhellenists such as Isocrates veiled many of their sinister motives in the rhetoric of *homonoia* and Panhellenism (see Green 1996: 21-23).

[147] E.g., de Romilly 1954, Ste. Croix 1981: 121, Anderson 1974: 40-5 and 1982: 347-8, Carter 1986: 76, Dillery 1993: 8, and Johnstone 1994.

imperialism.[148] A brief examination of Plato and Isocrates' attitudes to empire strongly supports this interpretation, because scholars often herald these two contemporaries of Xenophon as vehement anti-imperialists.[149]

In the roughly twenty-five years between *Panegyricus* and *On the Peace*, Isocrates' views on the Athenian empire and peace changed dramatically. In the previous chapter, I have had the occasion to document Isocrates' condemnation of Athenian imperialism in *On the Peace*. Athens' behavior to her allies was so criminal that Isocrates even advocated a return to the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas (8.16), which is a stark about face from the cocksure Isocrates of the *Panegyricus*, where he says the King's Peace was the "beginning of evils for Greece" (119). There Isocrates laments the internecine wars of the Greeks and calls famously for a great Panhellenic crusade against the "barbarians" (15.173, 187). Only by warring against the Persians and plundering their territory to relieve their "poverty" (ἀπορία), Isocrates promises, can the Greeks hope to have a secure peace (εἰρήνην βεβαίαν ἀγαγεῖν) (*Panegyricus* 173). In other

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[148] Originally, I intended to flesh out my investigation of anti-imperialist thought in Athens by examining individual authors, but Balot 2006: 138-76 has recently provided a useful survey of this subject. With the exception of Aristotle, whom for chronological considerations I do not consider relevant to my argument, Balot's analysis confirms my general impression that most Athenian intellectuals were not genuinely opposed to empire. Thucydides was a consummate imperialist, though of a moderate type (Zimmern 1928: 81-104, Ehrenberg 1947: 52, Balot 2006: 171). Aristophanes and Euripides were vehement critics of the Peloponnesian War and advocates of peace, but their plays present no clear anti-imperial vision. Balot 2006: 175-6 rightly argues that they tried to persuade the Athenians "to hit the golden mean between a tame pacifism and rampant imperialism (cf. Lévy 1976: 150 and Ste. Croix 1996: 45, 52 who contend that Aristophanes supported the double hegemony of Cimon and Andrews 1978: 4 who opposes the view that Aristophanes' *Babylonians* was a tract against Athenian oppression of allies). The Old-Oligarch was patently opposed to the Athenian empire and yet enamored of it at the same time, and it seems to me that he is addressing disgruntled allies abroad and not Athenian oligarchs (Frisch 1942: 88-105 and Cole 1991: 102-3 contra Ober 1998 14-51). On the issue of Andocides supposed "anti-imperialism," see above.

[149] For Isocrates, see Mathieu 1925: 22-3, 118-22, de Romilly 1954: 345, Mossé 1962: 412-3, Bringmann 1965: 21-7, 33, 109, Schütrumpf 1982: 2-3, and Davidson 1990; for Plato, see Treves 1937: 136-40, Mossé

words, Isocrates envisions perpetual war against the barbarians for perpetual peace in Greece.[150] Yet, according to the orator, "this war alone is better than peace, because it is more like a sacred mission than a military expedition." "Hence the Pan-Hellenism of Isocrates," one scholar explains, "required as a corollary an imperialistic war which would unite all Greeks against a common foe and which would depend on a common feeling of Greek superiority to other, non-Greek peoples."[151]

Isocrates' marked change in *On the Peace*, however, should not disguise the fact that an imperialistic *Tendenz* is present in all his writings. The most obvious point is that Isocrates never gives up his dream for a Panhellenic crusade against the Persians, calling upon Philip to command the expedition shortly after the Peace of Philocrates (346) (5.9). While Isocrates does not directly mention the crusade in *On the Peace*—Athens being in no position to lead such a campaign in 355—he is still troubled by the poverty running rampant in Greece and offers a solution not very different from the one of the *Panegyricus*. He urges the Athenians to appropriate land from the Thracian Chersonese to alleviate the poverty of the Athenians and other Greeks (24). In 353 the Athenians took Isocrates' advice, dispatching Chares to Sestos, who took the city, slew the adults, and enslaved the remaining inhabitants.[152] Perhaps Isocrates disapproved of Chares' brutal methods but he did not question the idea motivating them. As Davidson convincingly argues, Isocrates never abandons the idea of empire in *On the Peace* but

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1962: 255, Barker 1960: 307-11, de Romilly 1963: 362-8, Morrow 1993: 96-100, Dusanic 1999: 15, and Balot 2006: 193-4.

[150] The phrase "perpetual war for perpetual peace" is that of the American historian Charles Beard.

[151] Hammond 1948: 112; cf. Fuks 1972: 28, 38 and Balot 2006: 153.

rather promotes a new notion of empire based on the ideals of monarchy.[153] He criticizes Athenian imperialism not because he is against empire but because it is tyrannical (114-5). Isocrates is confident, as he is in all his protreptic works addressed to kings and potentates, that he can reform the despotic Athenians and instruct them to become just rulers, who will establish a "kingly empire" for all time. Jaeger astutely summarizes Isocrates' imperialistic vision:

> It was the demos that had made Athens the mistress of Hellas; and, despite all the anxiety with which he gazes into the future, Isocrates still believes that she is destined to be the ruler, not only of the other Greeks, but of the whole world. This is the last time in Athenian history that Periclean imperialism…raises its voice to demand, in the name of Athenian claims to hegemony, a reformation (μεταβάλλειν) in the political education of the citizen body—a reformation which will make the country and the people capable of successfully maintaining the historical role which they have inherited from their forefathers.[154]

Xenophon and Isocrates could not be further apart in their orientation to peace and empire. Whereas one proposes to alleviate the poverty of the masses through better financial management and increased economic productivity, the other promotes war, expansionism, and a racist ideology to remedy the socio-economic problems of Greece.[155]

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[152] In *Antidosis* 112-3 Isocrates also approves of Timotheus' campaign in the Chersonese, where he took both Sestos Crithote—an event which caused the Athenians to pay attention to their interests there, Isocrates boasts.

[153] Davidson 1990: 31-2, 35-6; cf. Jaeger 1944: 129.

[154] Jaeger 1944: 124.

[155] Xenophon's attitude to the Persians is somewhat ambiguous but generally favorable (see Hirsch 1985). He never advocates for a Panhellenic holy crusade against Persian. In the *Anabasis* 3.2.26, Xenophon the commander does mention as a possibility staying in Persian territory and colonizing it in order to alleviate the poverty of Greeks. Some scholars take this statement as proof positive of Xenophon's Panhellenism of the Isocratean sort (e.g., Mossé 1962: 444 and Dillery 1995: 76), but as Rood 2004 demonstrates, Xenophon's comments must be put into the context of what needed to be said at the time: "Xenophon mentions the possibility of staying in Mesopotamia precisely in order to reject it, because his comrades do

Ambiguity also surrounds Plato's attitudes to war and empire. On the one hand, Plato developed a theory of ethics that opposed all forms of injustice and greed (*pleonexia*). In the *Republic*, Plato analyzes these themes as they relate not only to the individual polis but also to the relationships between poleis. Injustice in Socrates' hypothetical city originates in the human desire to have more than necessary or deserved; *pleonexia* triggers the unlimited demand for luxuries, which in turn necessitates an unsustainable rise in population; unable to feed itself, the "feverish" city turns to conquest and expansionism to solve its food shortages (369bff). Plato's "healthy city," built on a foundation of justice, is a counterpoint to this imperialistic city because its only acquisitive impulse is to satisfy necessary desires.[156] At numerous points in his works, Plato's theory of the origins of imperialism in the *Republic* intersects with his analysis of Athenian imperialism. In the *Gorgias* for instance, Socrates impugns the statesmen Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles for not making the Athenians "more just" (516b) but rather for being "caterers of their desires" (ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστάς) (518c; cf. 517b). "For with no regard for temperance and justice," he bemoans, "they have stuffed the city with harbors, shipyards, walls, tribute, and all such nonsense" (519a).[157]

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not want to stay" (319). For Rood, the Ten Thousand is a microcosm of Greece and "a paradigm of Panhellenism," which Xenophon uses to analyze the weakness of that concept (cf. Hornblower 2004: 182).

[156] In addition to his philosophical solutions in the *Republic* that aim to curb the *pleonexia* of citizens, Plato offers practical recommendations as well, such as delimiting the size of the citizen population to ensure that a city's territory can support it (*Laws* 740a-e; cf. Aristotle's criticism of Plato in *Politics* 1265a12-20 and his own recommendations for population and territory sizes at 1326a6-27a40).

[157] Plato's *Menexenus* is also in many ways a condemnation of Athenian imperialism, because, like all funeral orations of this type, it constructs "a city in speech" that aims to represent the city not as it is but as an idealization. Contrary to Socrates' "city in speech" in the *Republic*, which exposes the feverish city for what it is, an unjust expansionist behemoth, the Athens of Socrates' funeral oration is the unquestioned champion of liberty, the protector of the week, and the guarantor of justice. By glossing over its brutal imperialist track record, the rhetoric of the funeral oration distorts reality and is thus an easy target for

Plato's obvious dislike for hawkish politicians like Pericles and Athenian *pleonexia*, however, did not give way to an outright condemnation of imperialism and empire as one might expect. As discussed above, Plato does not approve of a foreign policy based in *apragmosyne* and *hesychia*, because he thinks it leads inevitably to the loss of freedom and to slavery (*Politicus* 307e). In some respects, Plato shares Thucydides' realism, since he believes in the inevitability of war, especially between Greek states (*Laws* 626a), and espouses the same classic Greek chauvinism toward the "barbarians," against whom the Greeks were in a constant state of war (*Republic* 470c-d). Plato endorses a vigorous militarism for his ideal states which are beset by enemies on all sides in both the *Republic* and the *Laws*. He patently does not share Xenophon's optimism for a state of peace in the Greek world.

Moreover, like Isocrates Plato avers in the direction that a "just empire" is theoretically possible. In Book One of the *Republic*, Socrates tries to get his interlocutor, Thrasymachus, to admit that every form of rule (ἀρχή) considers what is best for the ruled and not what is advantageous or profitable for the ruler (342e, 345d-e). "To assert that rulers *qua* rulers always seek the good of their subjects," Adam explains, "is in reality to set before us a political ideal, and Plato's Ideal Commonwealth is intended to be its embodiment in a state."[158] Thrasymachus famously objects to this proposition because he sees reality in a different way: each kind of rule governs for its own advantage (338e), and this, he maintains, is why justice is the advantage of the stronger (338c). Stephen White argues persuasively that scholars have misunderstood Thrasymachus'

Plato's criticism. As one commentator notes, the *Menexenus* calls into question the "Thucydidean myth of Pericles" (Monoson 1998).

statement because they assume he is speaking normatively when, in fact, his initial explication of this thesis and his responses to Socrates' questions suggest that "his claim is only descriptive, an empirical generalization of what he sees happening everywhere: the stronger simply *do seek* their own advantage."[159] Thrasymachus thinks this principle operates not only within cities but also between cities and he attempts to shift the discussion away from Socrates' ideal world to "the brutal realities of fifth-century power politics" and to Athenian imperialism particularly.[160] When Thrasymachus speaks of "the rulers in our cities, I mean the ones who truly rule" (τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν) he is referring to both local rulers and the Athenian magistrates serving abroad in the interests of Athens (343b); for these are the ones "capable of complete injustice, being strong enough to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men" (348d). Socrates eventually notices that Thrasymachus is extending his proposition that every form of rule (ἀρχή) governs in the interests of the ruled to include the ultimate ἀρχή itself, empire. Socrates asks:

> "Would you agree that it is wrong for a city to undertake to enslave other cities wrongly and to subjugate them, and also to hold sway over many cities after enslaving them?
> "Of course I do," he said. "And that is exactly what the best and most completely unjust city will do best of all" (καὶ τοῦτο γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος).
> "I understand," I said, "that this was your claim" (351b; trans. S. White).

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158 Adam 1902: 33, note to 341a.

159 White 1995: 321. White depicts Thrasymachus not as an immoralist sophist but a critic of *Machtpolitik* and a staunch defender of local autonomy against Athenian encroachment.

160 White 1995: 322-3.

Thrasymachus' smug response is clearly directed at imperial Athens, for all empires maintain as a matter of principle that they alone possess virtue (*arete*) and are entitled to the claim of "the best."[161] This aspect of Athenian imperial ideology corresponds too closely in Thrasymachus mind to Socrates' paternalistic ideal city, which is composed of only "good men" (πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν) (347d). White rightly points out that Socrates' "question and response acknowledge that Thrasymachus has grounds for complaint," but Socrates' refusal to retreat from his principal thesis that rulers govern for the good of their subjects suggests that Plato believed a just empire was not only within the realm of possibility but a political ideal.

Admittedly, Plato does not theorize about the just empire in any of his works, but this is exactly what Xenophon does in the *Cyropaedia*, which in my opinion explains the comment of Aulus Gellius that Xenophon wrote the *Cyropaedia* in response to Plato's *Republic*.[162] Indeed, Cicero remarks that the *Cyropaedia* gives the reader "the image of a just empire" (*imago iusti imperii*) (*Epistulae ad Quintum* 1.1.23). But contrary to traditional interpretations of the work, I do not subscribe to the view that Cyrus is an ideal ruler, whose empire is worthy of emulation.[163] To be sure, like Plato's philosopher

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161 White 1995: 323; cf. Adkins 1976: 314. Herodotus says, "they [sc. the Persians] consider themselves the best of all humankind in every way and that others have virtue in proportion to their proximity so that those who live the farthest away from them are considered the worst" (νομίζοντες ἑωυτοὺς εἶναι ἀνθρώπων μακρῷ τὰ πάντα ἀρίστους, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους κατὰ λόγον τὸν λεγόμενον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντέχεσθαι) (1.134); cf. *Cyropaedia* 7.5.78.

162 Aulus Gellius 14.3.3. Tatum 1989: 39 dismisses the idea of the *Cyropaedia* as a "dialectical response to the *Republic*." My point is not that Xenophon responds philosophically to every one of Plato's contentions in the *Republic*, but that he takes Plato's ideal king as his point of departure for an analysis of the limitations of a just empire.

163 Newell 1981 and Nadon 2001 have significantly shaped my reading of the *Cyropaedia* that is presented here. Nadon, elaborating and advancing the ideas of Tatum 1989 and Gera 1993, has thoroughly

king, Cyrus rules over willing subjects because of his knowledge and virtues, but unlike the philosopher king, Cyrus does not aim to make his subjects virtuous but rather wealthy and luxurious. The checks and balances Plato integrates into his small republic to create concord between the orders of his society do not work within the context of a world empire. For example, Cyrus needs a warrior class to continue his expansionist and imperialistic goals, but elements within this class need something more than monetary rewards to follow Cyrus to the ends of the earth; they require honor and respect too. But Cyrus alone is entitled to virtue, because it is *his* virtue that holds the empire together, and thus anyone who tries to compete with Cyrus for virtue is a threat to his rule. Paradoxically, as long as he is alive, he cannot cultivate virtue in others, which jeopardizes a successful imperial succession and the long-term cohesion of the empire. As the epilogue underscores, when Cyrus dies the empire begins to disintegrate, leaving the reader with the strong impression that Cyrus' attempt to create a just empire was a failure.[164]

The *Cyropaedia* therefore nicely complements the *Poroi*, and had the space permitted I would liked to have examined this work more thoroughly. On the one hand, it certainly seems to be a negative commentary not only on Plato's *Republic* but also on Isocrates' *On the Peace*, which too promotes the ideal of a just empire. On the other hand, the *Cyropaedia* also appears to contest the very ideological suppositions of the elite that many scholars believe Xenophon himself championed. As I argued above, the *kaloi*

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established that Xenophon presents an ambiguous and disquieting image of Cyrus and his empire. The idea that Xenophon does not present Cyrus' regime as a model was first proposed by Strauss 2000: 181.

164 On the authenticity of the epilogue, see Delebecque 1957: 405-10, Gera 1993: 16-22, Tatum 1989: 220-5, and Nadon 2001: 139-46.

kagathoi did not oppose the empire. What they contested was the right of the Athenian demos to monopolize the economic and political rewards derived from empire because they believed that their *arete* entitled them alone to possess these. What they wanted above all else was to administer the empire themselves. In many respects, the kingly sort of empire that Plato and Isocrates envision is the embodiment of the Athenian elite's longing for imperial power. The picture of Athenian political culture that emerges from this discussion is one of a public fully entrenched in their devotion to the imperial idea. But whereas most Athenian statesmen ultimately caved in under the pressure of the imperialists, becoming "caterers," as Plato would say, of the Athenians' desires, Xenophon stood up to them and offered a vision of Athens' future that was truly an alternative to empire.

Conclusion

In the beginning of the *Laws*, Plato states that the normal attitude of the Greek polis to the rest of the world was one of "undeclared war" (626b). Indeed, the Athenians were at war on average more than two out of every three years from the Persian Wars (479) to Chaeronea (338) and "never enjoyed a period of peace for as long as ten consecutive years."[165] Yet, even during times of formal peace, open conflict often prevailed. Thucydides says as much about the Peace of Nicias to argue against those who did not reckon the length of the Peloponnesian War at twenty-seven years (5.26.2; cf. 5.115.2). One should not forget that between the conclusion of the Peace (422/1) and the Sicilian expedition (415), the Athenians reduced the poleis of Scione and Melos, putting

[165] Finley 1987: 67.

to death all the adult males and enslaving the women and children. Moreover, the Athenians fought and died in wars all over Greece and the Mediterranean. A casualty-list of the Erechtheid tribe attests to 180 casualties "in the war in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, Halieis, Aegina, and Megara *in the same year* (ca. 459)."[166] Even in the fourth century, Isocrates exclaims that the Athenians "attempt to wage war on practically the whole world" (8.44). According to George Norlin, the translator of the speech, "[b]etween 363-355 B.C. Athens made war on Alexander of Thessaly, King Cotys in the Thracian Chersonese, Amphipolis, Euboea, Chios, Byzantium, and Potidaea—to mention only the chief campaigns."[167] If we include all campaigns, Sestos, Crithote, Methone, Torone, Pydna, Heraclea, Ceos, and Hellespontine Phrygia should be added to the list.

The great frequency of wars and the extent to which the Athenians fought them had significant consequences on the Athenian way of life, contributing in no small degree to the political, social, economic, and cultural identity of the city, its institutions and values. It is no wonder, then, that many scholars have deemed Athens and, indeed, every ancient state with such designations as "garrison state," "warfare state," "military association," "guild of warriors," etc. While some nuance is needed, it is difficult not to draw the conclusion that war for the ancients was both "a natural condition of human society" and a "normal structural component of ancient society."[168] This goes a long way in explaining why Aristotle does not think twice about categorizing warfare as a

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166 *IG* I^3 1147 = *ML* 33. The number is astonishing, as indicated by the heading "in the same year," whose letters are much larger than the rest. Bradeen 1964: 24 estimates conservatively that 550 Athenians died in this year.

167 Norlin 1929: 35.

168 Finley 1987: 68, 74. In contrast, Megara in the fourth century appears to have lived in a continual state of peace (Isocrates 8.118).

"natural" form of wealth acquisition, no different from hunting and household management (*Politics* 1256b23-6). Many modern economic historians and theorists, those writing both from liberal and Marxist perspectives, have followed suit, affirming that war was *the* primary mode of economic acquisition among ancient and pre-modern peoples.[169] In the previous chapter, I adduced a rich array of evidence in support this thesis: the Athenians simply could not maintain themselves without imperialism and expansionism.

The *Poroi*, then, shows just how radically out of step Xenophon was with his fellow Athenians and Greeks. He was not a pacifist, as some maintain, but a staunch anti-imperialist who demonstrates that Athens does not need empire to survive.[170] Again, to quote Polanyi, the *Poroi's* originality "lies in the thought that wealth, power, and security can be the product of peace rather than war."[171] Yet for all of Polanyi's admiration for the work, he failed to underscore the historical significance of this revolutionary change in economic consciousness. Though the ideas motivating the transition from a parasitic, imperial economy to one based on peaceful commerce and production may not qualify as a "great transformation"—to use Polanyi's phrase to describe the advent of the modern market economy—they nonetheless anticipate some of the major developments in modern economic thought, which helped occasion the

169 For example, Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* III.4 (= Smith 1981: 411-27) with Dickey 1993: 243-5, Marx cited in Finley 1987: 73-4, and Weber 1947: 331; cf. Hasebroek 1965: 131-36; Vidal-Naquet and Austin 1977: 6, and Finley 1982: 41-61 and 1999: 156-61, 169-76, 204-207.

170 Von der Lieck 1933: 10 and Rostovtzeff 1941: 1358, n. 4.

171 Polanyi 1977: 196; cf. Bresson 2000: 250.

emergence of modern free-market capitalism.[172] Indeed, for Weber, who understood the workings of ancient capitalism better than any, saw an irreconcilable difference between the two forms of capitalism vis-à-vis their modes of acquisition:

> We will define a capitalistic economic action as one which rests on the expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange, that is on (formally) peaceful chances of profit. Acquisition by force (formally and actually) follow its own particular laws, and it is not expedient, however little one can forbid this, to place it in the same category with action which is, in the last analysis, oriented to profits from exchange.[173]

While Weber acknowledges that acquisition by force follows its own "laws" and even intimates that such a mode of acquisition can be rationally pursued to a certain extent, only profit-making built upon the principle of peaceful exchange can achieve a high degree of economic rationality because chances for profit are calculable and thus predictable as the market begins to regulate and set prices according to observable and measurable laws. Consequently, if Xenophon fully embraces the idea of such peaceful market-based transactions, how far would he move in the direction of a rational economic capitalism as a means of promoting the economic and financial recovery of Athens? In the next chapter, we will attempt to answer this question.

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[172] For many classic liberal thinkers, such as Hume and Smith, the growth and improvement of peaceful trade and manufacture mark the momentous change from the bellicose feudal age to the modern, civilized world (see for example, Smith, *Wealth of Nations* III.4 (= Smith 1981: 411-27, esp. 412) and Hume's essay *Of Commerce* (= Hume 1994: 93-104). In general, see the excellent discussion of Hirschman 1977). But much more than that, commerce and manufacture for these thinkers are the motor forces of economic development and sustained economic growth.

[173] Weber 1958: 17-8 with Love 1992: 46-9.

Chapter 5: The Liberalization of Athens and Economic Rationalism

> Men put an end to darkness, and search out to the farthest bound the ore in gloom and deep darkness.[1]

Introduction

"[The] dominant thought of [the Greeks] and their everyday aim was war. All of their passions and feelings responded to the war cry, and their strongest emotion sprang out of love for the fatherland and hatred for the foreigner. Go through Greece…and you will hear nothing but the noise of arms."[2] Though hyperbolic the judgment of Saint-Simon is not that far from the mark, conforming essentially to Plato's view that the normal attitude of the Greeks to the rest of the world was one of "undeclared war" (*Laws* 626b). It is not our place to pass moral condemnation on the Greeks for their bellicosity, but we are in a position to underscore how devastating their belligerent and somewhat xenophobic *Weltanschauung* was on the development of their economy. Runciman explains: "The reason for which none of the Greek *poleis*, even Athens, achieved sustained economic growth is not the idea that it was either inconceivable or distasteful to them. It was, rather, that their mode of production prevented them from seeing that profit…is not zero-sum: one person's gain need not be entirely at another's expense."[3] Their "mode of production," of course, being war and imperialism rather than trade and industry for productive ends.[4] That is not to say that I endorse Runciman's thesis that the

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[1] Book of Job 28.3

[2] Saint-Simon in Iggers 1958: 17.

[3] Runciman 1991: 351. Runciman, of course, is speaking "typologically" and therefore he, like Weber, Hasebroek, and Finley before him, admit that there are exceptions to the rule. His "even Athens" suggests that this polis was somewhat exceptional. As my discussion below bears out, some groups in Athens, those who were a part of the "world of the *emporion*," challenged this dominant ideology.

[4] Runciman 1991: 352-3.

Greek polis was therefore "doomed to extinction," an "evolutionary dead-end." The Athenians in particular had the expertise (though perhaps not the gumption) to organize their fifth- and fourth-century empires in rational capitalistic ways to achieve sustained economic growth such as we find during Imperial Rome.[5] Yet this growth was minimal, paling in comparison to even modest growth rates achieved in the modern age through peaceful, market capitalism.[6]

As argued extensively last chapter, all this—Athens' war economy, imperialism, etc.—was anathema to Xenophon, who envisions a new Athenian economy, one that is essentially anti-imperialistic because it challenges the basic assumption that war is a legitimate means of satisfying human needs and wants. He boldly suggests that the Athenians reorient their economic energies away from parasitic consumption to production and conduct peaceful market exchanges with the rest of the world as means of maintaining themselves. For Xenophon, trade is not zero-sum. And so we must pose the following question: if Xenophon embraces the idea of a peaceful, productive economy in which market-based transactions are necessary for augmenting the polis' wealth, how far would this radical change in economic consciousness take him? That is to say, by embracing and promoting ideas that will be rearticulated in the modern period, becoming some of the main tenets of free-market capitalism, can we detect any other aspects of Xenophon's thought that anticipate later developments? The answer to this question is in

[5] The notion that sustained economic growth was achieved during Imperial Rome is the provocative thesis of Hopkins 1980 and 2002. Even Weber was forced to admit that Roman tax-farming was organized (partly) on the principles of rational capitalism (e.g., Weber 1976: 62; cf. the excellent discussion of Love 1991: 44-55, 176-9). Nonetheless, Weber contends that such politically oriented capitalism is inimical to the development of market capitalism, a claim that is very difficult to dispute.

the affirmative, and thus one of the goals of this chapter is to highlight those points of contact between Xenophon and modern thinkers on economic theory and practice. Overall, I submit two central claims that are historically significant.

First, in order to promote the economic activity of metics and foreign traders (Sections 5A and 5B), Xenophon breaks down many barriers to trade and manufacture, advocating in essence a policy of economic liberalization, which results in the (partial) erosion of the status-divide separating citizens from non-citizen outsiders.[7] Our author does not advocate a relaxation in citizenships laws or anything so radical as Hyperides' proposal of enfranchising metics and emancipating slaves, a measure, it must be remembered, formulated during the crisis immediately after Chaeronea.[8] Rather, he maintains simply that outsiders whose economic activities promote the welfare of all Athenians should partake in many of the same honors and privileges that citizens do. The great historian of status, Moses Finely, reminds us that "citizenship entailed a nexus of privileges and obligations in *many* spheres of activity, juridically defined and jealously protected"[9] Participation in the political process was just one privilege (perhaps the most important) among many that the citizen claimed the right to possess and even

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6 So Saller 2002: 257-61 (cf. Millet 2001: 29-31, 35), who endorses Hopkins' model but demonstrates that a growth rate of 25% over three centuries amounts to less than 0.1% growth per year, which compares (abysmally) to modern (post-1500) "modest" growth rates of 1-3%.

7 It goes without saying that one of the tenets of modern liberalism is the promotion of equal status among all members of a community; see, for example, Yushi 1998: "Under liberalism, each and every individual within a group enjoys the same status. No one is above or below the others…Under liberalism, each individual respects everyone else's freedom…Liberalism implies that there are no privileged individuals within a group who have the right to maintain their own freedom at the expense of that of others. Therefore, those who are against liberalism are in favor of privileges, whether they are motivated by the desire to expand their own freedom without limitation, or wish to use other people as tools to achieve their own objectives." Needless to say, Xenophon's prescriptions go only so far, as he still endorses the use of slaves to further his objectives.

8 Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 41; Hyperides Fg. 18; Demosthenes 26.11.

monopolize.[10] One of these prerogatives was the ownership of land, which Finley says "was a universal rule."[11] Xenophon's recommendation to grant the right of landownership (*enktesis*) to metics (3.6) would have reversed this policy, allowing them to share in many other privileges belonging to the citizen, such as inheritance rights (*anchisteia*), which was "effectuated exclusively through the *oikos*."[12] In Section 5A, I argue that metic industry was largely attached to the household, and thus the right of bequeathing real estate would have ensured the long-term integrity and survival of metic family businesses. In short, Xenophon advocates a liberalization process to realize Athens' full economic potential as an open society.[13]

Second, and perhaps of greater significance for the history of economic thought, Xenophon frames his proposals for the creation of the capital fund (*aphorme*) (Section 5C) and the mines (Section 5D) in accordance with "income maximizing instrumental rationality." As understood in the social sciences, "instrumental rationality" is the form of rationality that motivates economic actors to choose the most efficient or cost-effective

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9 Finley 1999: 47 (emphasis mine).

10 For these other civic, collective activities, see Schmitt-Pantel 1991.

11 Finley 1999: 48.

12 Cohen 2000: 41.

13 Cf. Giglioni 1970: lv-lvi. The notion that Athens was an open society is the thesis of Popper 1962: I, 169-201, though the interpretation goes back at least to late 18th-century France when liberals like Desmoulins and Constant promoted the idea of a "bourgeois Athens" (see Vidal-Naquet 1995: 82-140). Like Popper these thinkers attach great importance to the role of commerce in the development of open, liberal societies. Had space permitted, I should have liked to examine further Xenophon's contribution to the development of liberal thought among the Greeks (for a step in the right direction, see Newell 1981). Havelock's (1957) masterful study of Greek liberalism (what he calls the "liberal temper") deserves more attention than it gets today. Part of the reason for this is that Strauss' forceful rebuttal (1968: 26-64) seriously called into question Havelock's methodology. However, it should be noted that Strauss himself did not deny outright the possibility of liberal thought among the Greeks and speculated that Herodotus and Thucydides would be the place to look (33). To this short list Xenophon must be added, whom Strauss ignores. His failure to treat the *Poroi* seriously in his writings is indicative of Strauss' prejudices and therefore calls into question his assessment of ancient liberalism.

means of achieving desired ends.[14] The "end" that has preoccupied economic actors in the modern world above all is income maximization. An individual who therefore chooses the most efficient way(s) to maximize his profits is said to act rationally and is alone deserving of the designation *homo economicus*. Yet one of the central tenets of substantivist historians is that *homo economicus* did not exist in the ancient world because the domination of the political life rendered the Greeks and Romans incapable of expressing themselves rationally in economic matters. Building upon Paul Christesen's recent study of economic rationalism in fourth-century Athens, I call this thesis into question. Xenophon's proposals presuppose that both he and members of his audience not only valued income maximization as a desirable end but also tried to effect that end in an instrumental rational manner.[15] In particular, Xenophon endeavors to mitigate risk so that the risk-reward balance may become acceptable to Athenian investors and entrepreneurs whose money and participation are indispensable for the creation of the capital fund and the exploitation of the mines. After all, these are the ingredients contributing to the success of his entire financial program for maintaining the poor and increasing revenues.

5A. Metics and Athenian Industry

Of all Xenophon's prescriptions for increasing revenues those pertaining to the metics are perhaps the least appreciated and understood. Indeed, it is precisely his

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[14] For a concise introduction to economic rationalism, see Heap 1993: 69.

[15] I do not mean to suggest that instrumental economic rationality was pervasive throughout Athenian society. As will be demonstrated below (Section 5D), only among wealthy investors and entrepreneurs, who made up less than five percent of the population, did economic rationality obtain. What is significant

thoughts about the metics that elicited Finley's comment: "Xenophon's ideas, bold in some respects, never really broke through the conventional limits."[16] To adjudge whether Xenophon's proposals touching the metics ever "broke through the conventional limits," a brief discussion of the historical and ideological background of this Athenian institution is in order.[17]

The origin of metic status is obscure. It was probably the invention of Cleisthenes, but a mid fifth-century origin cannot be ruled out.[18] In either case, metic status must be understood in the context, not just of polis ideology, but also of Athenian democratic ideology.[19] Athenians prided themselves on being open and friendly to foreigners, but for those who settled in Athens for longer than a month, the state created institutional safeguards to keep the line between citizen and foreign immigrant clearly demarcated.[20] First, these foreigners were required to register as metics in a deme of their choice, though they did not become *demotai*, and to take on a *prostates*, "guardian," who served as their advocate in civic and judicial life.[21] Second, adult male metics were required to pay the *metoikion*, a poll tax of 12 drachmai a year, whereas independent

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about the *Poroi*, then, is that Xenophon applies this kind of economic rationality, which had hitherto functioned solely in the private investment decisions of the elite, to polis finance.

16 Finley 1999: 163; cf. Whitehead 1977: 129 who approvingly quotes this line at the end of his discussion on Xenophon's contribution to *metoikia* in political thought.

17 In the following paragraphs, I make extensive use of Whitehead's masterful study (1977) on the metics. For recent discussions of metics, see Sinclair 1988: 28-30, McKechnie 1989: passim, Hansen 1991: 116-20, Millett 1991: 224-9, Cohen 1992: 101-10 and 2000: 19-22, 50-63, 70-78, Todd 1993: 194-9, and Patterson 2000.

18 Whitehead 1977: 140-8 (Cleisthenic); Figueira 1991: 250 (mid-fifth century invention).

19 Whitehead 1977: 2-4.

20 For the openness of Athens, see, for example, Thucydides 2.39.1; Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 258-91. Whitehead 1977: 7 prefers the term "immigrant" to the traditional "resident alien." The length of the grace period in which a xenos was not required to register as a metic is unknown, but the consensus is a month (Whitehead 1977: 9 and Hansen 1991: 117).

women metics paid 6 drachmai.[22] This direct tax was not so much a financial burden as it was "stamp of metic-status, and a constant reminder of the citizen/metic divide."[23] There was also the enigmatic ξενικὰ τέλη, "foreigner's tax," which allowed *xenoi* and perhaps metics to conduct business in the agora.[24] Third, metics were debarred from owning real estate (*enktesis*) in Athens, an exclusive privilege of the citizen, though the Athenians occasionally awarded it to polis benefactors.[25] Fourth, the metic enjoyed no political rights: he was not a "quasi-citizen," as Wilamowitz once deemed him, but the anti-citizen, a *homo apoliticus*.[26] Metics nonetheless did serve in the military and often contributed to the financial needs of the city.[27] Lastly, while the Athenians granted metics certain judicial privileges not shared with non-resident foreigners (e.g., access to the polemarch), these did not amount to much in comparison to the free citizen.[28] For example, Athenian law made no distinction between the murder of a metic and a non-resident foreigner, and the premeditated killing of a metic by a citizen could bring the

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21 Whitehead 1977: 72-5, 89-92 and Gauthier 1972: 126-36.

22 Harpocration *s.v.* with Boeckh 1976: 329-3 and Whitehead 1977: 73-6.

23 Whitehead 1977: 76; cf. Clerc 1979: 15 and Finley 1999: 164, who notes how such direct taxes were anathema to free Athenian citizens.

24 Demosthenes 57.31, 34 with Clerc 1979: 21-2, Andreades 1933: 279, Hasebroek 1965: 24, n.1, and Whitehead 1977: 77-8.

25 Whitehead 1977: 70-71: "The metic is always a lodger, living in rented (or leased) accommodation, and *enktesis* must be recognized as a potent social division between citizens and metics."

26 Whitehead 1977: 70.

27 Poorer metics rowed in the fleet, whereas wealthier ones served regularly as hoplites, though they were excluded from riding with the cavalry (Whitehead 1977: 82-6). Metics were required to contribute to *eisphorai* and the trierarchy and to pay civic and religious liturgies (e.g., the *choregia* and *gymnasiarchia*). Whitehead 1977: 81 is adamant that metics were formally debarred from the serving as trierarchs, though some metics may have been de facto commanders (e.g., Pamphilus in Demosthenes 21.163). By the fourth century, when the institution was reformed, it seems that metics contributed often to trierarchic *symmories* (Sinclair 1988: 30, n. 33 and Cohen 2000: 73-4, n. 164).

28 Whitehead 1977: 89-96; cf. Todd 1993: 194-9.

maximum penalty of exile, whereas the premeditated murder of a citizen could bring the death penalty.[29]

Metics therefore were anything but "privileged" aliens. In Athenian literature, they are depicted as pathetic creatures, excluded from the good life of the citizen, as Whitehead ably demonstrates.[30] The epigraphic evidence confirms this conclusion; the epitaphs of metics do not refer to their metic status in Athens but rather universally record their ethnics or citizen status elsewhere.[31] Apparently, metics had little pride in being "Athenian" metics. Whatever privileges and honors the Athenians did accord them were undermined by barriers and prejudices that reinforced the divide between citizen and metic. The sole exception to this rule obtained for wealthy metics, men such as Cephalus and his sons Polemarchus and Lysias, who traveled in educated circles of the elite citizenry (Plato, *Republic* 327bff.). For these metics, their wealth helped cut across the status divide or what Whitehead calls the "vertical" demarcation of citizen/metic.[32] Such social connections were invaluable, as they afforded rich metics distinct advantages over their poorer counterparts in the Athenian legal system. For instance, if a metic was suspected of not paying his/her *metoikion*, s/he could be dragged to the magistrate (*apagoge*) and sold into slavery if the official records did not corroborate payment.[33]

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29 Whitehead 1977: 93.

30 Whitehead 1977: 34-59.

31 For the evidence, see Whitehead 1977: 27-34.

32 Whitehead 1977: 19: "if we call the citizen/metic division a 'vertical' one, other criteria too are 'vertical' and tend to reinforce it [e.g., race and servile origin]…Other divisions are 'horizontal', cutting across the 'vertical' demarcations; notably the economic criteria…" Cf. p. 82 on the wealthy metic's participation in liturgies: "at the elite end of the status hierarchy, liturgies played their part in the ideology of the metic by inviting him to affirm his acceptance of the ideology of the *polis* itself." Cf. Ehrenberg 1962: 161-3, Hansen 1991: 87, and Cohen 2000: 20-2.

33 Demosthenes 25.57 with Boeckh 1976: 330 and Whitehead 1977: 48, 77.

Along the same lines, if a metic was found to be without a *prostates*, any citizen could charge him/her with a *graphe aprostasiou*, the penalty for which, if convicted, was confiscation of property and slavery.[34] For the vast majority of metics lacking meaningful and lasting social ties with Athenian citizens, justice was a rare privilege; most did not stand a chance against such draconian measures.[35] The threat of slavery was very real for metics, potentially coming at the hands not of some distant, foreign enemy but of the Athenians themselves, who treated them as enemies within.[36]

For Whitehead, *metoikia* did not become what it was by accident; rather the Athenians constructed this status to further their own interests. What were these interests? It would be no oversimplification to say that these were largely economic and fiscal. The lexigraphical tradition attests to the fiscal benefits metics offered their host cities. Pollux defines the metic simply as "one who pays the *metoikion*" (μέτοικος ὁ τὸ

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34 Harrison 1968: 189-90 and Isager and Hansen 1975: 76.

35 Note the conclusion of Patterson 2000: 101, who provides the most thorough analysis of the metic's disadvantages in court: "the profoundly different basis of participation of the metic in the social organization of the polis—no tribe, no deme, and for most aliens a minimal *anchisteia*—would have significantly undermined that access and protection within a judicial system in which kin, family, deme, and tribe played an essential role."

36 Patterson 2000: 97-8. The attempt of Cohen 2000: 49-63 to assimilate metics into the category of *astoi* (i.e., "locals" who were not *xenoi*) and thus potentially into the category of *politai* via Pericles' citizenship law is not without serious problems (see Osborne 2002b). For example, the orator Lysias was born in Athens in 459/8 after his father Cephalus had already been a resident in Athens for some time. According to Cohen's interpretation, Cephalus would therefore have been an *astos*. Moreover, because Lysias was born before Pericles' citizenship law of 451, which stipulated that both parents had to be *astoi* in order for their children "to partake in the polis" (i.e., to be *politai*) (*Athenaion Politeia* 26.3, 42.1; Scholium to Aeschines 1.39), the nationality of his mother would have been a moot point in determining Lysias' status (cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 1278a30-35). If Cohen is correct, then, Lysias should have been a citizen (*polites*), but we know that he most certainly was not (Plutarch, *Moralia* 835F). Even if we accept that metics belonged to the category of *astoi*, there is no guarantee that many of them would have become *politai*. Again the case of Lysias is cautionary. Indeed, he was wealthy, educated, and traveled in elite circles (see above). However, when it came to his marriage, no citizen dared to offer his daughter's hand to Lysias; rather, he married his sister's daughter (Demosthenes 59.22). We hear of no children from this union, but assuming that children did exist, it would have marked three generations of Lysias' family that would have been debarred from being enrolled as *politai*. If such a rich and cultured metic family could not produce

μετοίκιον συντελῶν) (3.55). Aristophanes of Byzantium deems "a metic [as] anyone who comes from a foreign place of origin and lives in a city, paying a tax toward certain assigned needs of the city" (μέτοικος δέ ἐστιν ὁπόταν τις ἀπὸ ξένης ἐλθὼν ἐνοικῇ τῇ πόλει, τέλος τελῶν εἰς ἀποτεταγμένας τινὰς χρείας τῆς πόλεως) (Fg. 38 Nauck). In addition to the *metoikion*, Athenian metics contributed to *eisphorai* and numerous liturgies and tended to fill the occupations supposedly anathema to free citizens, that is, they were the bankers, financiers, traders, wage earners, service providers, and manufacturers.[37] In Whitehead's estimation, metics were simply *homines economici*.[38]

That Xenophon too looks to the metics as important sources of revenue is evidenced from the beginning of his analysis: "for this revenue (πρόσοδος) is one of the finest in my opinion because they do not receive state pay for the many benefits they render to cities, all the while supporting themselves, but pay the *metoikion*" (2.1). Their "care" (ἐπιμέλεια) is a priority for Xenophon, who offers five recommendations to increase revenues: 1) remove (unnamed) measures which bring them *atimiai* (2.2); 2) release them from the burden of serving as hoplites (2.2-4); 3) grant them privileges, such as service in the cavalry (2.5); 4) allow "worthy" metics the right of *enktesis* (2.6); and 5)

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politai, one must have severe reservations about the chances of middling and poorer metics of securing citizenship for themselves and their offspring.

[37] Clerc 1979: 387-418, Hasebroek: 1965: passim, Amit 1965: 18, 56, Isager and Hansen 1975: 70-4, Whitehead 1977: 116-121, Montgomery 1986, Millett 1991: 224-9, and Cohen 1992. To say that many or most metics were traders, manufacturers, etc., however, does not necessarily mean that all or most traders and manufacturers were metics (Whitehead 1977: 117). For reassessments of the old Hasebroekean interpretation of citizens absent from the Athenian economy, see Isager and Hansen 72-3, M. Hansen 1984, and Cohen 1992.

[38] Whitehead 1977: 59, 70.

establish a magistracy concerned with metic affairs (μετοικοφύλακες) on the model of the *orphanophylakes* (2.7). He then caps his discussion, as he began it, by noting the fiscal potential of the metics with the phrase τὰς προσόδους ἂν αὔξοιεν, "revenues would increase."[39] The financial importance he attaches to the metics, therefore, is beyond question. Yet scholars disagree vigorously over the reasons why the metics were one of the best sources of revenue.

At first glance, Xenophon appears to be concerned only with the *metoikion*, as his recommendations are designed, in part, to increase overall metics numbers and consequently the amount of *metoikia* paid to the state. In particular, the *metoikophylakes*, charged with the specific function of registering metics, are to be awarded prizes for enlisting "the most metics" (πλείστους μετοίκους).[40] Because of this office, he promises, "it is reasonable to assume that all those who are without cities would want to

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[39] It is noteworthy that he also employs the verb ὠφελεῖν, "to benefit" or "to profit," three times in this chapter.

[40] It is difficult to determine the precise nature of this magistracy, because the office of the *orphanophylakes*, to which Xenophon likens it, is itself somewhat of a mystery. Indeed, there is copious evidence for officials charged with the supervision of orphans (i.e., the Archon and his *paredroi*), but the sources do not use the term *orphanophylakes*, which is attested for Athens only here in the *Poroi*. There are three possible interpretations: 1) the *orphanophylakes* formed a separate *arche* from the Archon (Thiel 1922: 46-7); 2) the *orphanophylakes* formed an intermediate position (between the Archon and the orphan's legal guardian) as guardians of war orphans, who made sure the orphans received their public maintenance (*trophe*) (Thiel 1922: 46-7); and 3) the term *orphanophylakes* was the unofficial title of the Archon and his *paredroi* (Stroud 1971: 290 and references cited therein). The problem with the first choice is that it creates redundancies in the functions of the Archon and the *orphanophylakes* (Gauthier 1976: 70). The second option, as Thiel himself admits, weakens the cogency of the parallel with the *metoikophylakes*, because the office would have been concerned only with a sub-group of orphans. Thus, the third option is the least offensive. At any rate, with the exception of the second interpretation, the duties of the *orphanophylakes* under both (1) and (2) were probably the same: to protect the patrimony of the orphans (by serving as a check on their legal guardians) until they came of age. Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture that one of the functions of the *metoikophylakes* was to protect metic economic interests (more below). Gauthier 1976: 72 suggests they would have formed a college of ten members on analogy with the *sitophylakes*.

come to Athens to become metics."[41] In Chapter 5, we get a better sense of how many different kinds of would-be metics he wants to attract to Athens: craftsmen, intellectuals, investors, sophists, philosophers, and poets (5.2-4). How much revenue did the *metoikion* bring in? Based on an adult male metic population of 10,000, which was the census number of Demetrius of Phaleron (though pre-Social War levels may have been much higher, perhaps 20,000), and 1000 independent adult females, Boeckh estimates that the *metoikion* produced on average 21 talents a year.[42] Every increase in 500 metics would have yielded an additional talent of revenue.[43] It is certainly possible, then, that by re-attracting metics to the city, who had fled in significant numbers both before and during the Social War, Xenophon expects that the state would gain in neighborhood of 20 talents.[44]

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41 Gauthier 1976: 72 interprets this sentence as proof that Xenophon wants only Greek metics to settle in Athens: "Men deprived of a city, which [Xenophon] hopes to draw to Athens, could have only been Greek: only *politai* were able to become *apolides*" (cf. Whitehead 1977: 126). Though the *comparanda* he cites are, no doubt, apropos (e.g., Lysias 20.35), we are not compelled to interpret *apolides* in such a narrow, political sense, as Xenophon in the *Poroi* often uses the word polis as a territorial and spatial concept (see 4.49-50 with Chapter 4, Section 4C).

42 Boeckh 1976: 333; cf. Andreades 1933: 385, Gauthier 1976: 57, and Whitehead 1977: 76. Thür (cited in Cohen 2000: 17) conjectures that in the early fourth century there were in the neighborhood of 100,000 metics. This seems exceptionally high. Isager and Hansen 1975: 12-14 estimates more reasonably, putting the total metic population between 31,900 and 56,800 and Hansen 1991: 92-3 argues that 20,000 was the fourth century average (cf. Gomme 1933: 20: "considerably more than 10,000").

43 Whitehead 1977: 76.

44 According to Isocrates in *On the Peace*, the Social War had made the city "devoid of metics" (μετοίκιων ἐρήμη) (8.21). The orator is probably exaggerating somewhat for rhetorical effect since metic numbers seem to have been in the decline since the end of the Peloponnesian War. To quote Whitehead 1977: 159-60: "Absolute numbers…are unattainable until Demetrius' census; nevertheless, while it is fair to assume that some who left after 404 later returned, I believe that Clerc was right to claim that numbers never again reached the fifth-century level. Certainly in the 350's Isocrates was declaring, however melodramatically, that Athens was 'deserted' by *emporoi*, *xenoi*, and *metoikoi*…; and Xenophon's object in *Vect*. 2 and 3 was to attract more of all three. Either, therefore, their numbers never again reached the pre-432 peak or some returned only to leave again." The reason for this, in my opinion, was post-Peloponnesian war Athens was a difficult place in which to do business: manufacturing slaves were hard to come by (see below) and long-distance trade was too often disrupted by wars in the east.

Nevertheless, it is not exactly clear how some of Xenophon's other measures would have occasioned similar increases in metic numbers. With the exception of grants of *enktesis*, which he says will increase both the quantity and quality of metics seeking residence in Athens (2.6), the rest seem to concern only a small percentage of metics. For instance, opening cavalry service would have affected only those metics with the resources to buy a horse. In the *Hipparchicus*, he makes the same suggestion in the context of keeping the cavalry corps at the full complement of 1000 riders (9.6). Two hundred of these, he adds, should consist of "foreign horseman" (ἱππεῖς ξένους) (9.3). These are not the same as the metics though, whose numbers would probably not have exceeded those of this foreign contingent. At most, then, this recommendation would have touched a maximum of 200 metics, yielding the polis only 2400 drachmai per year in *metoikia*. This revenue, however, would have been consumed ten times over after taking into account fodder payments, and so the proposal of opening up the cavalry to metics makes no financial sense if Xenophon is thinking about augmenting metic revenues strictly by means of the *metoikion*.[45] We must conclude, therefore, that this poll tax was not the only source of revenue he expects to generate from metics.[46] Whitehead argues that Xenophon is considering "metic revenues in the widest sense, arising from both metic-status itself (*metoikion*, *eisphorai*, liturgies) and metics' economic activities (such as the *xenika tele*, and not least the harbour dues from a

[45] Riders received a 4-obol *trophe* payment per day for their horses (cf. *Hipparchicus* 1.19); see Kroll 1977: 97-8, n. 36 and Rhodes 1981: 303-4.

[46] The notion that the *metoikion* was the only source of metic revenue has been a serious failure of the scholarship on this section of the *Poroi*; see, for example, von der Lieck 1933: 20, 29, Cawkwell 1963: 64, Hasebroek 1965: 26, Gauthier 1976: 57, Schütrumpf 1982: 4-5, and Finley 1999: 163-4.

revitalized Piraeus."[47] *Eisphorai* and liturgies notwithstanding, which were not technically *prosodoi*, Whitehead's suggestion of income derived from the economic activities of metics, especially those working in the commercial sector, deserves further examination.

At 3.5 Xenophon states that a rise in residents (εἰσοικίζοιντο) and visitors (ἀφικνοῖντο) will lead to a corresponding rise in imports and exports, sales, rents, and custom dues (ἂν πλέον καὶ εἰσάγοιτο καὶ ἐξάγοιτο καὶ ἐκπέμποιτο καὶ πωλοῖτο καὶ μισθοφοροῖτο καὶ τελεσφοροίη). He does not specifically mention metics, but the verb εἰσοικίζοιντο, which contrasts with casual, short-term visitors implied by ἀφικνοῖντο, certainly signifies resident aliens.[48] He insinuates the connection between metics, trade, and revenue more explicitly at 4.40: "with peace and the care of metics and traders and with the growth of imports and exports because of a larger population and the increases in market and harbor dues [i.e. *pentekoste*]…the greatest amount of revenue will be created" (διὰ τὸ εἰρήνην τε εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ θεραπεύεσθαι μετοίκους καὶ ἐμπόρους καὶ διὰ τὸ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων πλείω εἰσάγεσθαι καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὸ <τὰ> ἐλλιμένια καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς αὐξάνεσθαι…ὡς ἂν πλεῖσται <αἱ> πρόσοδοι γίγνοιντο) (4.40). This sentence forms a logical chain of events: peace and good treatment attract metics and traders to the city, who occasion increases in exports

[47] Whitehead 1977: 126; cf. Giglioni 1970: lxii who also notes the metics' role as investors.

[48] Giglioni 1970: lxxviii-lxxxii, Gauthier 1976: 86, and Whitehead 1977: 126. The connection between visitors and revenues was understood well by the Old Oligarch (*Athenaion Politeia* 1.16-18).

and imports, which in turn lead to more taxes and thus greater revenues.[49] There can be little doubt, then, that Xenophon considers the economic activity of metics to be an excellent source of revenue. Unfortunately, he does not say what that activity precisely is. Should we make what appears to be the natural inference and assume that the *metoikoi* and *emporoi* are identical, which is to say, that metics contributed to Athenian revenues solely through trade and trade-related activities?

The common assumption of historians notwithstanding, nothing in the *Poroi* indicates that Xenophon considers long-distance trade to be the sole function of metics. In fact, the textual evidence compels us to look to their role as artisans and manufacturers also. In addition to removing certain measures that the metics think are *atimiai* to them, Xenophon suggests absolving them from hoplite service, "for great is the risk to be away on campaign, and leaving their trades and workshops is also a big deal" (μέγας μὲν γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος ἀπόντι· μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι) (2.2). Unfortunately, this is not the *lectio* of the manuscripts, which read ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν.[50] The problem with this reading, however, is that τῶν τέκνων makes little sense in the context of Xenophon's desire to release the metics "from measures that do not profit the state (viz. produce revenues)" (ὅσα μηδὲν ὠφελοῦντα τὴν πόλιν; cf. 2.3: ἡ πόλις γ' ἂν ὠφεληθείη) (2.1). The particle γάρ that introduces the sentence is "explanatory," and thus the "danger" of which Xenophon

[49] Thiel 1926: 62-7 and Gauthier 1976: 173.

[50] Adopted in the OCT and other editions of the text (e.g., Waterfield 1997 and Doty 2003; cf. Herzog 1914: 470).

speaks must be understood as an explication of this central idea.[51] Furthermore, the articular infinitival phrase τὸ…ἀπιέναι is epexegetic. As such, the idea of leaving one's children hardly explains why serving as a hoplite is both dangerous to the metic and unprofitable to the polis. Besides, οἰκίαι, which means both "house" and "household" (including all human members) in Xenophon's works renders τέκνα otiose.[52] Because the ancient evidence attests overwhelmingly to metic participation in the arts (*technai*), whereas very few sources actually speak to their role as long-distance traders, the Renaissance scholar Castalio appropriately changed τῶν τέκνων to τῶν τεχνῶν in the 1553 Basel edition of Xenophon's works.[53] This parsimonious emendation has gained many converts and is adopted here.[54]

To complicate the interpretation of this passage further, Dindorf's old emendation of οἰκείων for οἰκιῶν has persisted, being adopted in Marchant's Loeb, Rühl's Teubner,

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[51] Such an interpretation is supported by 4.28, where Xenophon employs similar phraseolgy to describe the great financial risk one takes in making "new cuttings" in the mines (κίνδυνος δὲ μέγας τῷ καινοτομοῦντι).

[52] E.g., *Memorabilia* 2.7.6: "By making bread Cyrebus feeds his whole family (*oikia*)."

[53] E.g., Old Oligarch, *Athenaion Politeia* 1.12 ("the city needs metics on account of their many different trades and the fleet" (*nautikon* ≠ commerce or navigation; see Frisch 1942: 211 and Whitehead 1977: 85); Plato, *Laws* 850a-b; Diodorus 11.43.3; Plutarch, *Solon* 24.2 and *Lycurgus and Numa* 2.3. To my knowledge, the only explicit reference to metics as traders outside the inscriptional record is the late gloss of Hesychius, who equates the ἐμπόριος with μέτοικος. The 20.9% figure of Gerhardt (cited in Davies 1981: 50) for metic participation in trade (compared to 48.4% in *technai*) is misleading because he does not distinguish between retail and long-distance traders. Moreover, most of the references to *emporoi* in inscriptions (e.g., *IG* II^2 1557, 59; 1559, 37) are, in fact, manumitted slaves (who became de facto metics; see Whitehead 1977: 16-7, 114-6) and thus are not representative of the metic population (Davies 1981: 50). Furthermore, men like Heracleides of (Cypriot) Salamis (*IG* II^2 360), a wealthy *emporos*, may not have been a metic because there is nothing to suggest that he settled in Athens for any length of time. The evidence for metic financing of trade is more abundant (e.g., Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1347a1 and Demosthenes 35.51 and the other reference in the Corpus of Demosthenes cited in Isager Hansen 1975: 72, n. 79; though note Whitehead 1977: 49, who claims that the only "unambiguous status-designation in all these speeches…is Theodotus the '*isoteles*'" in 34.18, 44 and 35.14).

and Gauthier's commentary.[55] Dindorf justified this change by citing *Cyropaedia* 4.3.12, where Cyrus anticipates certain objections to his proposal of creating a Persian cavalry: "nor again are we like other men for whom farming, the arts, and other domestic labors leave no leisure time" (ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνδράσι τοῖς μὲν γεωργίαι ἀσχολίαν παρέχουσι, τοῖς δὲ τέχναι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλα οἰκεῖα). Though there is some similarity between this passage and the one in the *Poroi*, I fail to see how the contexts are "identical," as Gauthier contends.[56] The inclusion of farming in this triad, in which he mistakenly assumes metics did not engage because they did not have the right to own land, speaks strongly against the appropriateness of this passage to justify such an emendation.[57] Zurborg's defense of οἰκείων is perhaps a bit more persuasive: "metics could hardly have been vexed at abandoning their homes because they were deprived of their own domicile."[58] In other words, because renters and leasers have less or no attachment to their abodes than owners do, they cannot count it a "great thing" (μέγα) to go out on campaign. Be that as it may, what is so perplexing about these scholars' insistence on retaining Dindorf's emendation is that the reading of the manuscripts nicely compliments τῶν τεχνῶν, which is the very reading each of them advocate in their texts, commentaries, and translations.

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54 Thiel 1922, Giglioni 1970, Schütrumpf 1982, and Audring 1992; cf. Moyle 1697: 47, Whitehead 1977: 122, n. 30, and Gauthier 1976: 62.

55 Dindorf 1866 (N.B. in the second edition of his *Xenophontis opuscula*, Dindorf returned to the reading of the mss.), Marchant 1925, Rühl 1912, and Gauthier 1976: 62-3; cf. Zurborg 1874: 23.

56 Gauthier 1976: 62

57 For metics in farming, see, for example, *IG* II^2 10, 2, 5, 9 and *IG* II^2 1553, 24-5 with Cohen 2000: 122, n. 104.

58 Zurborg 1874: 23.

In both Xenophon's works and the contemporary sources, οἰκίαι are often workplaces and centers of production, which manufactured goods for the market.[59] Thiel notes rightly that *oikia* may indicate a dwelling, a family, and/or workshop ("locum ipsum τῆς τέχνης" = *ergasterion*).[60] He adduces Demosthenes' speech *Against Aphobus*, where the orator describes the two *ergasteria* his father left him; one was a sword factory, employing 32 or 33 slaves; the other a couch factory, employing 20 slaves (27.9). Here the word *ergasterion* signifies not only the slaves but also the dwelling (*oikia*) where they worked (11, 25, 32).[61] Therefore, "the appearance of the word *ergasterion*," explains Finley, "does not necessarily indicate the existence of a workshop as a distinct building. It may mean a group of slaves employed in one place [sc. *oikia*] in the production of goods."[62] Similarly, in the speech *Against Olympiodorus*, the identification of *oikia* with *ergasterion* is discernible: "…I divided the property into two shares, men of the jury; one share consisted of the *oikia* in which Comon himself had lived and the slaves who were sailmakers, whereas the other share consisted of another *oikia* and the slaves who were color-grinders" (48.12). In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates recommends to his friend Aristarchus, whose household was reduced to poverty because

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59 On the market orientation of these household *ergasteria*, see Harris 2002.

60 Thiel 1922: 8; cf. Lauffer 1955-56: 83, n. 4 and Schütrumpf 1982: 122.

61 In Athenian law, οἶκος, "property" or "estate," was carefully distinguished from οἰκία, "dwelling-house" (*LSJ s.v.* οἰκία), which Demosthenes follows in this speech (4). In the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon too observes this distinction (1.5; cf. *Hellenica* 3.1.25). But elsewhere in the work, οἶκος denotes "household" or "family" with all its human members including slaves (Pomeroy 1994: 214). In this sense, *oikos* is virtually synonymous with *oikia*.

62 Finley 1952: 67. Finley perhaps underestimates the number of *ergasteria* separate from *oikiai*, basing his claims largely on the documentary evidence from the *horoi* inscriptions: "Eight [sic. "ten"; Lalonde 1991: 46 = *Agora* XIX, H112 and *SEG* 21, 655] out of a total of 154 [*horoi* mentioning *ergasteria*] is a small proportion and the ratio sinks even further when the mining and quarrying operations are eliminated"

of the Peloponnesian War, that he turn his *oikia* into a center of production on the model of five named Athenians who produce enough not only to feed their families but also to live luxuriously and to pay for liturgies (2.7.3-6). Aristarchus reminds Socrates that these entrepreneurs employ "artisan slaves" (τεχνίται), not "free" Athenians whom he retains in his household and are above such work (2.7.4, 6). While this passage evidences the prejudice of Athenian elites toward banausic occupations, it also attests well to the existence of Athenian *oikiai* as *ergasteria*. A household that employ craftsmen is later described specifically as "a house bringing in revenue" (οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα) (3.11.4). If such was the case for Athenian citizens, then *a fortiori* the same for metics. For example, Demosthenes calls the *oikia* of Neaera, an Athenian metic and courtesan, an *ergasterion* (59.67). Hyperides describes the metic perfumer Athenogenes' place of work an *ergasterion*, which the orator intimates was his *oikia*, employing three slaves.[63] According to Aeschines, whenever one person rents and occupies a dwelling, the Athenians called it an *oikia* (naturally all metics belong to this category); when he plies a trade and occupies one of the *ergasteria* on the streets, the dwelling takes the name of the person's trade (e.g., where a "smith" (χαλκεύς) works is called a "smithy" (χαλκεῖον))

(66). For example, Lysias' *oikia* clearly included a separate *ergasterion* (12.8-12); cf. *IG* II^2 2496, 9-11 and Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 12.1.

63 Hyperides, *Against Athenogenes* 6, 10 with Finley 1952: 68-9.

(1.123-4).[64] In these specific contexts, then, *oikia* may refer specifically to *ergasterion*: *oikia* and place of business were practically indistinguishable.[65]

In sum, reading μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι in 2.2 makes perfect philological sense. With the *lectio* on firmer ground, we are now in a better position to understand Xenophon's proposals for the metics. The reason he advocates removing the burden of serving in the infantry is that campaigning was particularly risky to the metic's livelihood, because the metic's *oikia* was his business. Time away from his *oikia*, even for a couple of weeks, would have seriously jeopardized his business operations. Moreover, because metics were disqualified from serving in the cavalry, Xenophon may be thinking in particular about the deleterious effects of hoplite service on rich metics who were indiscriminately conscripted together with their less well-off counterparts. These metics, perhaps representing ten percent of the total adult male metic population (ca. 1-2,000), would have operated large *oikiai*/*ergasteria* (employing ten or more slaves).[66] Time away would have necessitated retaining slave *epitropoi*, "foremen," to oversee the work of the other slaves and to continue business

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64 Aeschines' testimony substantiates the documentary evidence, which indicates that the vast majority of metics settled in the city: 3 of 5 lived in urban/suburban demes; 1 of 5 in Piraeus; and rest were scattered throughout Attica (Whitehead 1986: 82-5 and Sinclair 1988: 29-30). Most metics were thus occupied in urban trades (cf. Harris 2002: 70).

65 Harris 2002: 81-3. That the *oikos* was the locus of production elsewhere in the Greek world seems certain (see Cahill 2002: Chapter 6).

66 From the epigraphical record, Gerhardt (cited in Davies 1981: 50) estimates that 8.5% of metics were "industrial entrepreneurs." For the size of the metic population, see above n. 42. On the issue of slaves, the Athenian peasant probably owned on average at least three slaves; wealthy proprietors owned around ten domestic slaves (Garlan 1988: 61-2). Numbers for the industrial sector range from lows around a dozen (e.g., Aeschines 1.97) to 20-30 in the middle range (e.g., Demosthenes 27.9-11) and to 60-100 on the high end (e.g., Demosthenes 36.11; Lysias 12.8, 19) (see Davies 1981: 41-44 for additional references). The numbers Xenophon gives for slaves who worked the mines (Nicias: 1000; Hipponicus: 600; Philemonides: 300) were abnormally large (4.14-5).

operations.[67] However, even *epitropoi* needed constant supervision (*Oeconomicus* 12.19; 13.1), and unlike the Athenian citizen who was in much the same position, the metic lacked the social and kinship network on which he could otherwise rely during his absence. Furthermore, because metics could not own real property, financial losses that mounted while on campaign would have been compounded by the necessity of having to continue with rental payments for their *oikiai*/*ergasteria*.[68] If these problems were serious for wealthy metics, then they were even more so for small-time metic entrepreneurs of the hoplite census, men like Simias of Alopece who worked alongside his five slaves.[69] The greater number of metic hoplites probably consisted of these working entrepreneurs, and we can crudely estimate their numbers to be in the range of 2-3,000.[70] Because not all of these worked in their *oikiai* (some would have practiced their

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[67] E.g., *Oeconomicus* 12-13; Aeschines 1.97. See the additional references in Cohen 1992: 93. Many of these slaves paid their masters a fixed rate of the profits made from their businesses.

[68] The inscriptional evidence provides us with some numbers. For *oikia*, *IG* II^2 1590 shows rents ranging between 126 and 175 dr. per annum. Finley 1952: 255, n. 73 suggests that these rents were high but they may represent the median. According to *IG* II^2 2496, 9-28, a workshop and adjoining house in the Piraeus (τὸ ἐργαστήριον τὸ ἐν Πειραεῖ καὶ τὴν οἴκησιν τὴν προσοῦσαν αὐτῶι) was leased out in perpetuity for 54 dr. per annum. It also gives the valuation (τὸ τίμημα) of the property at seven mnai (28). This number is significant because it demonstrates that the rent was based on 7 5/7% of the total valuation. This percentage is close to the 8% average capitalization rate for land (Jones 1957: 30, Cooper 1978: 169, n.38, and Millet 1991: 232-5) and thus shows that dwellings fetched about the same rate. Accordingly, if we take the loan amounts given in the *horoi* for *ergasteria*, which could represent as much as half the value of the property (Harris 1988: 263 and 2002: 81), and multiply them by 8%, we get the following (absolute minimum) rental amounts: *horoi* nos. 87 and 88 = 480 dr.; *horos* no. 90a = 136 dr.; *horos* no. 86 = 64 dr.; *horos* no. 7 = 60 dr.; *horos* no. 90 = 56 dr.; *horoi* nos. 92a and b = 40 dr.

[69] *IG* I^3 476, 87-93 with Randall 1953: 199-200, 202 (Table 2). Of course, there is no way of knowing if Simias ever served as a hoplite, but the fact that he owned five male slaves suggests that he was at least of the zeugite census and thus eligible to be called up if necessary (Garlan 1988: 61). For the practice of Athenians buying slaves as "helpers" in industry and manufacture, see *Memorabilia* 2.3.3 with Jones 1957: 15-6.

[70] According to Thucydides 2.31.1-2, in 431 metic hoplites were "at least three thousand strong." Gomme 1933: 5 and Jones 1957: 164-5 argue that this number does not take into account reservists (e.g., those over 50 years). Gomme puts the total at 5,000-5,500 (but see Whitehead 1977: 98). Subtract the 1-2,000 wealthy metic hoplites deduced above from 5,000 (Gomme) and 3,000 (Thucydides) and we get the range of 2-3,000. Theoretically, these metic hoplites would have been compensated with *misthoi* or *trophe*.

trades in the agora or outdoors in places like the mines and quarries), we can now appreciate the appropriateness of the phrase μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι.[71] Whereas the term *oikiai* pertains only to those metics who used their homes as centers of production, *technai* would cover all metics in manufacture, whether they worked at home or elsewhere.

Some scholars have detected what they see as a contradiction in Xenophon's proposal to remove the metics from hoplite service while at the same time opening up the cavalry (2.5).[72] Given my interpretation above, the paradox seems real and raises the question: why does cavalry service not bring "danger" to wealthy metics' business operations? For starters, we must respect the syntax of the passage and recognize that the grant of this privilege is precisely that, a "privilege" (καλόν). This right is categorically different from the other *atimiai* he recommends "removing" (i.e., hoplite service). Consequently, we are not compelled to identify potential metic *hippeis* with those occupied in *technai*. These metics probably leased land in the *chora*, possessed many

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However, unlike in the fifth century, and especially before 413, when pay could have amounted to 2 dr. per day (Thucydides 3.17.4), hoplite pay in the fourth century probably averaged around 3 obols per day, but 2 obols were also common (for the whole question, see Pritchett 1971: 14-21 and passim). In 351 Demosthenes, for example, suggests that the Athenians pay their hoplites 2 obols a day and intimates that they make up the rest of their pay from booty raids (4.28-9). These low payments contrasts sharply with the 1.5 to 2 dr. a day a skilled metic could have made in the labor market.

[71] For the high concentration of workshops in and around the agora, see Lysias 24.20, *IG* II^2 1013, 9, and Camp 1986: 135-47. While Demosthenes mentions some temporary stalls in the agora made of wicker (18.169), some workshops and stores were made of stone and other durable materials (Harris 2002: 75; cf. Wycherley 1978: 98-100). Xenophon remarks how Agesilaus once turned the whole city of Ephesus into an "arms factory" (πολέμου ἐργαστήριον), where the market was full of horses and weapons for sale, copper-workers, carpenters, smiths, leather-cutters, and painters (*Hellenica* 3.4.16-7; cf. *Agesilaus* 1.26). For workshops in the Piraeus, see Garland 1987: 68-9.

[72] Gauthier 1976: 65 and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 366; cf. Whitehead 1977: 127-8.

slaves that worked the soil, and owned a number of horses.[73] Their life would have been not much different from that of Ischomachus, as depicted in the *Oeconomicus* (11.14-18). Furthermore, the number of metics eligible for cavalry service could not have numbered more than 200, as argued above. We are dealing then primarily with a small number of elite metics "with whom Xenophon himself might readily mix, socially and intellectually."[74] Supposing the proposal attracted some wealthy metic entrepreneurs and financiers (which seems likely), service in cavalry need not have been a detriment to their businesses.[75] Though the cavalry was taking a more prominent role in offensive campaigns, especially after Mantinea, it was nonetheless a largely defensive corps charged with the protection of the Attic *chora*.[76] Lastly, it is important to note how this particular measure, though touching only a small number of metics, would have had trickle-down effects by endearing Athens to *all* metics, thus helping to increase overall numbers (εὐνουστέρους ἂν ποιεῖσθαι; cf. 2.7: καὶ τοῦτο εὐνουστέρους ἂν τοὺς μετοίκους ποιοίη). For example, the cavalry served important religious functions and was a vehicle for displaying wealth and status (*Hipparchicus* 3.1-14). Seeing their fellow

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73 About one of five metics lived in non-urban regions of Attica (Whitehead 1986: 82-5 and Sinclair 1988: 29-30), dwelling in more than forty separate demes (many of them rural) (Whitehead 1986: 83-4) and even non-deme areas good for farming (e.g., Oropos) (Cohen 2000: 122-3, n. 106). The long lease periods and the high rents attested for these lands (see Walbank 1991: 152-65) made them available to only the richest metics.

74 Whitehead 1977: 128.

75 Besides, it is important to note that Xenophon proposes to "share" this privilege with the metics, not to make cavalry service mandatory for them. Perhaps, the wealthy metics, whom this honor would have attracted to Athens, would have been more interested in it for their sons than themselves.

76 See *Poroi* 4.47 and *Hipparchicus* 7.2-7 with Spence 1993: 16-17.

metics honored by the state during religious ceremonies would have given many the hope of increased social mobility.[77]

Xenophon's proposal for granting the right of *enktesis* is similarly targeted at a minority of metics because the state must first deem them "worthy" (οἳ ἂν αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι)—a stipulation that probably refers to a vote by the demos in the assembly.[78] "[T]he beneficiaries," Whitehead contends, "would be individuals who ask for it and are adjudged worthy (*axioi*) to receive it—not the 'the metic population' but a veritable 'metic aristocracy'."[79] Indeed, Xenophon does say that the right of *enktesis* will cause "more *better* metics to desire to live in Athens" (διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως).[80] But what kind of metics does βελτίους connote? Let us take a closer look at the proposal: "Then again, since there many vacant sites and building plots within the walls, if the city were to grant to those applicants who are deemed worthy the right to buy these plots and build houses on

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[77] Just because Xenophon suggests removing the duty of hoplite service, he gives no indication that metics were to be debarred entirely from service. Metics willing to serve presumably still had that right.

[78] Gauthier 1976: 68.

[79] Whitehead 1977: 127, invoking Clerc 1979: 440.

[80] Contrary to all the commentators and translators, I interpret the phrase πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους as hendiadys. Gauthier 1976: 63-4, 72-3 and Whitehead 1977: 126 both take βελτίους to mean that Xenophon wished to attract only Greek metics, because there were too many barbaroi metics living in Athens (cf. 2.3: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἡ πόλις γ' ἂν ὠφεληθείη, εἰ οἱ πολῖται μετ' ἀλλήλων στρατεύοιντο μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ συντάττοιντο αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ νῦν, Λυδοὶ καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Σύροι καὶ ἄλλοι παντοδαποὶ βάρβαροι). What they fail to explain, however, is if Xenophon is playing the racial card with his audience, why would he then turn around and advocate opening up the cavalry to metics, among whom certainly numbered the same Lydians, Phrygians, and Syrians? In the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon advocates establishing a foreign contingent of 200 riders (7.3-4). Here *xenoi* could refer to just Greek *hippeis*, but he goes on to say that the fame of the Spartan cavalry dates to the inception of foreign riders, which Bugh 1988: 156 argues refers to Agesilaus' use of barbaroi (including Phrygians!) riders in 395 during his campaign in Asia (*Hellenica* 3.4.15; 4.1.3, 21; *Agesilaus* 1.23-4; cf. *Anabasis* 1.8.5).

them…" (εἶτα ἐπειδὴ καὶ πολλὰ οἰκιῶν ἔρημά ἐστιν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν καὶ οἰκόπεδα, εἰ ἡ πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησομένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι οἷ ἂν αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι).[81] As the commentators correctly point out, Xenophon is specifically advocating the grant of οἰκίας ἔγκτησις (the right of owning a house) not γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις (the right of owning both (agricultural) land and house), which is presumed to be greater privilege.[82] This grant in and of itself was nothing new, as the polis periodically granted *enktesis* of both varieties to benefactors of the polis well before Xenophon wrote the *Poroi*.[83]

Xenophon says nothing about the metics' qualification for *enktesis* other than that they be deemed *axioi*, which, I suggest, refers not to their status as benefactors or potential benefactors, but rather to their revenue-generating potential. In other words, under Xenophon's plan all a metic would have to do is convince the assembly, perhaps with help of the *metoikophylakes*, that he was a *homo economicus* capable of contributing to augmentation of the polis' revenues.[84] Pecirka astutely observes that this proposal is "a very serious—and I should say very enlightened—attempt to change, though very partially, the legal situation of the metic population according to their real economic role

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81 There is a dispute about the punctuation of this sentence, as some want to place a comma after τῶν τειχῶν (Thiel 1922, Marchant 1925, Gauthier 1976: 67, and Audring 1992). As this does not affect my interpretation, I have followed the text of the OCT.

82 Thiel 1922:10, Gauthier 1976: 68, and Whitehead 1977: 127. For *enktesis* in general, see Pecirka 1966 and Henry 1983: Chapter 7.

83 See the chronological table in Pecirka 1966: 152-6.

84 Whitehead 1977: 129 argues that "[t]hose considered 'worthy' would be men who had performed substantial *euergesia*." This interpretation cannot stand, because it completely ignores the fact that the sentence is an unreal condition and thus indicates that Xenophon is introducing something new. Under his

in Athens."[85] Whitehead and others, however, have strongly objected to the notion that this measure was both progressive and economically oriented.[86] Because Xenophon does not propose to grant γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις to the metics, he is guilty of maintaining the legal and economic divide between metics and citizens. Only landed property constitutes real estate, it is believed, and the metic's separation from the land was a major "economic disability."[87] This interpretation of Xenophon's proposal is an example of missing the forest through the trees. It behooves all those wishing to understand the significance behind the grant of *enktesis oikias* to explain *first* what the measure would have done for metics before describing what it would not have done.

The fact of the matter is that Xenophon provides sufficient information for determining the true intention of his proposal. The phrase πολλὰ οἰκιῶν ἔρημά ἐστιν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν καὶ οἰκόπεδα takes us back to the thought expressed in 2.2: μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι. As argued above, metic hoplites count it a "great thing to leave their trades and homes" because their *oikiai* were loci of production and manufacture and thus the bases of their livelihoods. Xenophon's measure to grant the right to construct houses and/or buildings on vacant plots within the city walls is directed at these metic industrial entrepreneurs. "Inside the walls" (ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν) is also a dead giveaway, since it denotes the urban sector of Athens, where

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plan, for the first time, a whole status group would have become eligible for *enktesis*, not just a small class of benefactors.

85 Pecirka 1967: 24-5.

86 Whitehead 1977: 127, Finley 1952: 77-8 and 1999: 163-4, Gauthier 1976: 68, and Schütrumpf 1982: 4-5.

there was the highest concentration of workshops. Xenophon is probably thinking particularly of the *asty*, which, less populated than the Piraeus, seems to have had more vacent sites than the rest of the city.[88] This is significant because the statistics from the epigraphical record place three out of every five metics in the *asty*.[89] Consequently, Xenophon's proposal to grant *enktesis oikias*, like the one for removing hoplite service, is "economic" because it aims to promote metic household businesses. Increasing polis revenues for Xenophon, then, is contingent upon the economic activity of individuals.

Moreover, the privilege of *enktesis oikias*, contrary to Finley and Whitehead, would have bridged the legal and economic divide between metics and citizens in one very significant way: those possessing the right of *anchisteia* could have bequeathed their *oikiai* and concomitantly their businesses to their sons, thus ensuring the long-term continuance of both. Without this entitlement, metics came and went, staying in Athens only very rarely past the first generation.[90] The grant of *enktesis oikias*, therefore, would have lent a greater permanency to the status of resident aliens. Xenophon is not concerned with measures that bring short-term gain but with ones that guarantee long-term economic success and growth (see below Section 5D). A more permanent and productive resident alien population is essential to realizing this goal.

Before moving on, we must briefly examine one more way *enktesis oikias* would have benefited Athenian economy and society. Xenophon wants to attract not only productive metics but also metic philosophers, sophists, and poets (5.4). Leiwo and

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87 Finley 1952: 77, 264 n.17; cf. Whitehead 1977: 129 and Cartledge 1997: 222.
88 Thiel 1922: 9 citing *Aeschines* 1.81-4; cf. Gauthier 1976: 67-8 and Cartledge 1997: 222.
89 See above, note 72.

Remes' recent analysis of the will of Epicurus demonstrates well that metic intellectuals who wished to establish permanent schools or Athenian philosophers who aspired to bequeath school to metics (as was the case with Epicurus) were severely handicapped by the law forbidding metics from owning property.[91] A convoluted solution to this problem was discovered, citizen go-betweens, but there was always the danger that these *de jure* custodians of the school would not carry out the stipulations of the will, which might lead to the dissolution of the institution altogether. Xenophon's plan would have prevented such a "brain-drain" from taking place. Consequently, the retention of intellectual capital would have also had a palpable impact on the Athenian economy, helping to sustain economic growth.[92]

Let us now summarize and clarify exactly how Xenophon expects his proposals to increase Athens' revenues. The creation of the office of *metoikophylakes*, whose members vie with each other to register the greatest number of metics, is directed at increasing the numbers of metics paying the *metoikion*. All those "without a city" (e.g., political exiles, refugees, etc.) are welcome in Athens under his plan. Our author also speaks of removing certain *atimiai*, about which he is frustratingly silent. Perhaps not wishing to introduce too much controversy into his work, Xenophon wisely leaves it up to his readers to decide what *atimiai* to remove. Scholars have speculated endlessly

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[90] See the excellent analysis of Patterson: 2000: 98-102.

[91] Leiwo and Remes 1999.

[92] Such is the postulate of contemporary developmental economists who stress the importance of education and training in sustaining economic growth (see Saller 2002: 261-2).

about what these *atimiai* could have been, but no consensus has been reached.[93] The most plausible suggestion is that he is referring to the *prostates* obligation because the *metoikophylakes* would have assumed many of their prerogatives.[94] Whatever these *atimiai* were, they certainly concerned all metics (ὅσα…ἀτιμίας δοκεῖ τοῖς μετοίκοις παρέχειν), and so their elimination probably indicates a desire on Xenophon's part to boost overall metic numbers.[95]

The three remaining recommendations (removal of hoplite duty, the privilege of cavalry service, and *enktesis oikias*), which concern only a minority of metics, aim at augmenting revenues by promoting economic activity in *technai* and *oikia*/*ergasteria*. In the two passages discussed above (3.5; 4.40), Xenophon enumerates three potential sources of metic revenue under the general of rubric of imports and exports (3.5: εἰσάγοιτο καὶ ἐκπέμποιτο; 4.40: εἰσάγεσθαι καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι): harbor dues (τὰ ἐλλιμένια/τελεσφοροίη) (i.e. the *pentekoste* on imports and exports), rents (μισθοφοροῖτο), and taxes in the agora (τὰς ἀγορὰς) (including those from sales; cf. πωλοῖτο). In respect to the latter two types, it is easy to see how metic production in the *technai* would have occasioned increases in these sources of revenue. More goods

93 For the possibilities, see Thiel 1922: 45-6 (exclusion from religious life: sacrifices, festivals, etc.), Giglioni1970: lxiv (judicial inferiority at the hands of the polemarch), Gauthier 1976: 57-9 (*apagoge* and exclusion from certain gymnasiums and festivals); cf. Whitehead 1977: 126-7.

94 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 366 and Whitehead 1977: 127.

95 A majority of these metics would have been wage earners (*misthotai*), poor, and thus rowers in the Athenian fleet (Amit 1965: 30-49). Because Xenophon is rather silent about them, Gauthier 1976: 62 takes this as a sign of his disinterest in naval affairs: "For a man of his time and education, the only soldier was a hoplite." This cannot be right because he does show some interest in the navy at 4.42, where he advocates putting the mining slaves on the ships as rowers. Moreover, these poorer metics, while, no doubt, valuable

produced for sale means more goods that can be taxed in the agora.[96] If the ξενικὰ τέλη, "foreigner's tax," which allowed foreigners to conduct business in the agora, also applied to metics, then this was another source of revenue.[97] Furthermore, because a majority of metics would not be "worthy" of *enktesis oikias*, many would still need to rent out houses and other dwellings. Some of these would be state owned (3.12-3); others privately owned; but both kinds of rental property would have been taxed.[98]

The last source of revenue, harbor dues, while, no doubt, pertaining to foreign traders, also concerns the metics in two fundamental ways. First, metics in the *technai* often needed imported goods to manufacture their products. For example, shield makers and cobblers required hides from regions around the Pontus and Cyrene.[99] A mass amount of wood was also needed to make charcoal, without which the mining, ceramic, and metal working industries could not have functioned.[100] Consequently, increased imports from the expansion of metic industry would have led to greater harbor traffic and thus more income.[101] The second way the metics would have played a part in augmenting harbor dues is through the export of domestic products and manufactured

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to the Athenian economy, for revenue purposes were important only for the *metoikia* they paid. Athens received this income from them whether they went on campaign or not.

96 On the sales tax, see Boeckh 1976: 329-3 and Andreades 1933: 144-5.

97 Demosthenes 57.31, 34 (see above). These two taxes would have applied also to traders, especially to those who personally brought their goods to the market for sale.

98 For the "tax on rents" (τέλος ἐνοικίων), see Andreades 1933: 151-3.

99 We learn from Demosthenes 34.10 that in addition to many other goods, one ship was carrying 1000 hides from the Pontus to Athens before it capsized. Cf. Hermippus Fg. 63 (Edmonds): hides from Cyrene.

100 See Isager and Hansen 1975: 29-30, Meiggs 1982: 188-217, esp. 203-5, and Olson 1991(though he diminishes the extent to which the Athenians had to import wood for charcoal).

101 Cf. Plato, *Republic* 370e-71b with Harris 2002: 77 who asserts that a city should be established in a region where it can acquire imports, and he says this in the context of raw materials needed for domestic manufacture.

goods. That Xenophon is looking to exploit this source of revenue is certain. First, Xenophon explicitly mentions "exports" no less than ten times in the *Poroi* (1.7; 3.2 (4x); 3.5 (2x); 4.21 (2x); 4.40; cf 1.3-5). In addition to silver, he claims that "Athens has a great amount of goods for export that humans need" (ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πλεῖστα μὲν ἔστιν ἀντεξάγειν ὧν ἂν δέωνται ἄνθρωποι) (3.2). Unfortunately, Xenophon does not adumbrate for us here the goods that πλεῖστα denotes, but at 1.3-4 he does mention agricultural produce and marble.[102] Judging from the epigraphic record, not a few metics worked in the quarrying industry as stonecutters.[103] Moreover, while metics undoubtedly produced an abundance of manufactured goods for local consumption, they also made wares for the export market (e.g., ceramics), though some historians have denied vehemently that the Athenians ever exported their manufactured goods in great quantities.[104] However, the point is not whether the Athenians actually exported manufactured goods in vast quantities; rather, it is a question of what Xenophon prescribes to stimulate metic manufacturing so that the Athenians may significantly increase the number of domestically produced goods for export and consequently collect greater revenues.

To further the claim that Xenophon is thinking of products for foreign markets, we can bring in a passage from the *Cyropaedia*, which has escaped the attention of those

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[102] There is much evidence to support Xenophon's claim that Attic marble was exported (viz. in demand) throughout the Mediterranean. For example, temple builders at Epidaurus paid 100 mnai for Pentelic marble for several buildings (Burford 1969: 173-4) and Pentelic marble has been found in the temple of Zeus at Olympia, the tholos at Delphi, a frieze of the Mausoleum in Halicarnassus, and two sarcophagi in Sidon (Ober 1985: 30, n. 30 citing an unpublished paper by H.A. Thompson).

[103] See, for example, the references in the table of Clerc 1979: 450-6.

[104] See Chapter 4, Section 4B.

scholars who deny that goods were ever manufactured for external markets in the ancient world. After Cyrus captures Sardis, the king seeks Croesus' advice about whether to pillage the city, which is teeming with luxury goods. Croesus recommends sparing the city because "whatever fine possession that a man or woman has here will come to you; and next year you will find the city once again full of many fine things as it is now; but if you plunder it completely, even the industrial arts (αἱ τέχναι), which they say are the fountains of all fine things (ἃς πηγὰς φασι τῶν καλῶν εἶναι), will be utterly destroyed" (7.2.12-3). Cyrus wisely decides to spare the city, because, as we later find out, he needs these goods to distribute to his friends in Babylonia and Persepolis. Consequently, cities like Sardis began to produce goods for external markets: "they would send [sc. to Cyrus] whatever fine thing they have in their land, whether it was grown, raised, or *manufactured*" (πέμψειεν ὅ τι καλὸν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἢ φύοιτο ἢ τρέφοιτο ἢ τεχνῷτο) (8.6.22-3). This passage is significant for our analysis of the *Poroi* because it demonstrates well not only Xenophon's interest in goods manufactured for external markets but also his awareness of the connection between war and the demise of *technai*.[105] War, as we have seen, brings a sharp decline in revenues (5.12). Croesus' advice to Cyrus, then, parallels nicely Xenophon's counsel to the Athenians. Both

[105] Because the *Cyropaedia* was written before the Social War, it is likely that Xenophon's understanding of the effects of war on industry is due to his personal experience with the disastrous effects the Peloponnesian War had on Attic industries. According to Macdonald 1981, the Attic pottery industry drastically declined during the war because of a waning labor market (especially slaves), which resulted in the massive emigration of potters and other craftsmen from Athens, especially after 413 with the occupation of Decelea (see Section 5D). A vast majority of these, Macdonald argues, were metics (166-7). After the war, though the labor market improved, many skilled potters and painters did not return, leading to the production of cheaper, massed produced pots. Because these were not in high demand, overall production never matched fifth-century levels. Again, Xenophon's desire to attract "better" metics reflects

advisors exhort imperialists to turn away from war and the practice of depredatory economics to the cultivation of the *technai*, which are the bedrock of the state's long-term economic and fiscal sustainability.

In sum, Xenophon's proposals for the metics are not prescriptions for social and political change, but rather for financial and economic growth. It is a mistake to criticize him for not going far enough in dismantling the political and legal barrier between citizens and metics. Xenophon could have offered more, no doubt, particularly the privilege of *enktesis ges*. But when we look at the specifics of his program for financial recovery, such a grant would have contributed little, because, as demonstrated last chapter, agriculture from an economic and fiscal point of view was not lucrative. Besides, it is unlikely that many metics would have turned to farming had they the opportunity to own land, because those wishing to farm probably did so as tenants, and the percentage of these was very small.[106] Moreover, scholars like Finley also take Xenophon to task for not offering more incentives to the metics to promote trade and industry. In particular, Xenophon should have given tax breaks, such as the removal of the *metoikion* and export duties.[107] This is a red herring because it ignores many other types of incentives that Xenophon does suggest to promote trade and industry.[108] In addition to the benefits noted above, the right of *enktesis oikias* for those in manufacture would have also allowed them to use their homes as security, thus putting them on an

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this need to encourage skilled workers to return to Athens. Many of them who returned during the middle part of the fourth century probably left during the Social War (cf. Isocrates 8.21).

[106] 8.5% according to Gerhardt cited in Davies 1981: 50.

[107] Finley 1982: 53-4 and 1999: 164; cf. Hasebroek 1965: 26-7, 100-103.

equal footing with Athenian citizens.[109] Such loans would have been indispensable for maintaining and growing a business.[110] And if we add to this the elimination of hoplite service, a good number of metic entrepreneurs would have had a distinct advantage over their citizen counterparts. For instance, as Ehrenberg reminds us, the citizen who had to close his shop occasionally to fulfill his political (and military) duties would have lost "customers to the man whose shop was always open."[111] Had the Athenians carried out Xenophon's proposals for the metics (there is no evidence to support the notion they did), it is difficult to escape the conclusion that many of them would have prospered immensely.[112] Accordingly, increased wealth would have eroded further the status-

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[108] The *metoikion* was a meager sum, especially for those metics who were industrial entrepreneurs, and though the evidence is not rich, the *pentekoste* was either the going rate or below average for the larger Greek world. There is no indication that such low taxation levels inhibited trade or manufacture.

[109] For *oikia* as security, see Finley 1952: 55-6, 60-5.

[110] For a refutation of the old orthodoxy on the supposed non-productivity of Athenian loans (e.g., Finley 1999: 141, 208 and Millet 1983: 42-7), see Cohen 1992: 30-6. For instance, loans are attested for providing funds for the continued operation of a perfumery (Lysias, Fg. 38.1); for the purchase of mining concessions and processing mills (Demosthenes 37 and 40.52); for establishing a cloth-making business (*Memorabilia* 2.7.12); and for the financing of the import of wood (Demosthenes 49.35-6).

[111] Ehrenberg 1962: 163. Perhaps this was not so much of an issue for entrepreneurs with larger establishments that required capable foremen.

[112] Cawkwell 1963: 64 (cf. Giglioni 1970: lvii-lviii, Burke 1992: 209, and Engen 1996: 376-8) argues that the Athenians (through the initiative of Eubulus) adopted Xenophon's proposal of *enktesis*: "whereas before the Social War the conferment of γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις appears to have been very rare, after that war it is conferred, to judge by our epigraphic evidence, very freely indeed. This of course affected only privileged individuals, but suggests that Eubulus had taken Xenophon's advice, in part, about how to attract metics." Whitehead 1977: 128-9 draws attention to many problems with this interpretation: "There are indeed numerous *enktesis* grants from the second half of the fourth century, but: (a) there are also substantial grants before ca. 350; (b) there is no demonstrable cluster after 354 [cf. Pecirka 1966: 152-9]; (c) the status of the honorands, as always, is problematical; and (d) most of these grants (as ever) are of *ges kai oikias enktesis.*" Cf. Gauthier 1976: 223-5 who argues much the same. However, just because the specifics of his program were not carried out, we should not underestimate the broader influence Xenophon exercised on his contemporaries concerning metics. The metic population, if there is any truth to Isocrates 8.21, had been in decline for some time. But by the end of the century, the adult male metic population was at least 10,000 strong. Cawkwell and Burke 1984: 114-15 attribute this sharp rise to the efforts of Eubulus, whose indebtedness to Xenophon, though often overdrawn, is undeniable. Moreover, what is absent from the discussions about grants of *enktesis* is that only after ca. 350 do we find individuals receiving this privilege for economic activity, which is precisely the kind of pursuit Xenophon intends to honor in the *Poroi* (*IG* II^2 342+, 337, 351+624, 360b, 343; *Hesperia* (43) 1974: no. 3). As Engen 1996: 375 stresses: "It

divide between metic and citizen, a phenomenon to which the Old Oligarch attests as early as the late fifth century (1.12).[113] Though it cannot be ascertained for sure from the text whether Xenophon intended to contribute to the erosion of the boundaries separating metic and citizen (though see next section), judging from his other works where the divisions between slave/free, man/women, and Greek/barbarian are often blurred, it is a likely prospect.[114] Although he may not have revolutionized metic/citizen relations to the liking of modern historians, much of what he recommended to the Athenians did, in fact, "[break] through the conventional limits."[115]

5B. Commerce and the Liberalization of Trade Relations

Xenophon begins his section on commerce by explaining why "the city is the most agreeable and profitable for those engaged in trade" (ὥς γε μὴν καὶ

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is apparent that Athens adapted its practice of granting ἔγκτησις for political and military services to meet specific needs involving trade and the acquisition of revenue as they arose" (more below).

113 On this "new social structure based on economic wealth and not bound to status" see Pecirka 1976: 28; cf. Mossé 1962: 24-8; Humphreys 1978: 72, and Cohen 1992: 88, n. 134.

114 For Xenophon's rather "enlightened" attitude of the barbarians, see Hirsch 1985. For Xenophon's rejection of a natural hierarchy among human beings, especially his views against natural slavery, see the excellent analysis of Pomeroy 1994: 65-7. For Xenophon, what seems to have counted the most is efficiency and results. In other words, he was a consummate believer in a meritocracy, which he treats theoretically in Books 3 and 4 of the *Cyropaedia* (Newell 1981: 121-50 and Nadon 2001: 71-4).

115 Once again, Xenophon's ideas clash strongly with Plato's in the *Laws*. While Plato apparently got rid of the *prostates* obligation and the *metoikion* and, like Xenophon, absolved metics from serving in the infantry, he had no intention of even attracting metics to Magnesia in the first place by these "privileges" (see Morrow 1939: 102-3 and Whitehead 1977: 131, 133). In fact, metics were required to leave after twenty years (*Laws* 850b). This time limit contrasts with Xenophon's plan to foster long-term settlement under the grant of *enktesis oikias*. As in Athens, only citizens can own real estate in Magnesia (737e; 738d; 740b-741a). But Plato's legislation goes one step further by outlawing the alienation of land, which as Morrow 1939: 101 correctly points out, would have rendered special grants of *enktesis* by the assembly impossible. Citizenship itself could not even be secured by *euergesia*! (Whitehead 1977: 139, n. 64). In short, the judicious remarks of Whitehead 1977: 135 are worth quoting: "Plato saw to it that, *in his place*, the Magnesian metic would enjoy a freedom from burdens, financial and military, and (above all) a degree of legal protection for which his Athenian counterpart might well have envied him. But rights and duties alike seem to add up to more social prejudice, less security, and less integration than was the case in Attica."

ἐμπορεύεσθαι ἡδίστη τε καὶ κερδαλεωτάτη ἡ πόλις) (3.1). He then expands on this statement with two salient examples: Athens has the finest and safest places to moor, especially during bad weather; and, unlike other *poleis*, she possesses both a great variety of goods people need and a valuable silver currency, which allow traders the choice of returning to other ports with either; and those who choose to return with silver are guaranteed a profit on their investment (3.1-2). What is so remarkable about these straightforward yet often misinterpreted propositions is that Athens is a pleasant and profitable place for *non*-Athenians to conduct commerce.[116] Indeed, Athens gains from increased commercial activity, but she does so only by benefiting others in the process. As discussed in the last chapter (Sections 4A-B), Xenophon's program to transform the Athenian economy away from consumption to production is predicated upon reciprocity and the notion that profit derived from trade is not zero-sum. Thematically, then, these illustrations are akin to the other "natural" advantages Attica enjoys, which Xenophon adumbrates in the opening sections of the work: the land has the potential to produce "great revenues" by satisfying other peoples' needs for produce, manufactured goods, and viable currency (1.2, 4, 7; cf. 3.2).

Xenophon proposes three measures, which have as their aim the increase in the number of traders visiting the Piraeus and concomitantly the augmentation of sales, rents, and custom dues (3.5). The first of these suggestions is the establishment of rewards for the magistrates of the emporium to speed up the adjudication of disputes among merchants: "If prizes were offered to the magistrates of the emporium who settled

[116] Take, for example, the translation of Waterfield: "I shall now explain why maritime trade is a

disputes in the most just and quickest manner so that the merchant who wished to sail would not be hindered, the result would be that a far greater number of merchants would trade with us and with much more satisfaction" (εἰ δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ ἆθλα προτιθείη τις ὅστις δικαιότατα καὶ τάχιστα διαιροίη τὰ ἀμφίλογα, ὡς μὴ ἀποκωλύεσθαι ἀποπλεῖν τὸν βουλόμενον, πολὺ ἂν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ ἥδιον ἐμπορεύοιντο) (3.3). The proposal itself is unambiguous, paralleling the one calling for creation of the *metoikophylakes* who receive rewards for increasing the numbers of metics (2.7). It is well acknowledged that maritime cases (*dikai emporikai*) could be painfully drawn out.[117] For example, Lysias mentions one defendant who had been disputing a maritime case for three years (17.8)! A system of rewards, as elsewhere in Xenophon's works, is designed to increase competition (*philoneikia*/*philotimia*) among groups of individuals (e.g., in the army) so that greater efficiency is achieved.[118] In the *Hiero*, Xenophon even professes that rewards engender the excellent performance of public affairs (9.4-7). Though such rewards may seem counterproductive to Xenophon's wish to increase revenues, since it would cost the state money to dispense prizes to these various officials, it is likely that he is thinking only of "small prizes."[119] For Xenophon,

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particularly agreeable and profitable pursuit *for Athens*" (emphasis mine).

117 See Cohen 1973: 10-12.

118 See the citations in Gauthier 1976: 83 and *Cyropaedia* 1.6.18; *Oeconomicus* 12.6.

119 Cf. *Hiero* 9.11: "In case you fear, Hiero, that the cost of offering prizes for many subjects may prove heavy, you should reflect that no commodities are cheaper than those that are bought for a prize. Think of the large sums that men are induced to spend on horse-races, gymnastic and choral competitions, and the long course of training and practice they undergo for the sake of a paltry prize (μικρὰ ἆθλα)" (trans. Marchant). Gauthier 1976: 83 also adduces *IG* II^2 1629a, 190-204, which mentions prizes of gold crowns of 500, 300, and 200 drachmas for trierarchs. If Xenophon is thinking of a few prizes around these amounts, then the net gains would clearly outweigh the costs.

then, offering rewards to the magistrates of the emporium to speed up the legal process is a simple cost-effective remedy.

One interpretative challenge remains: to which magistracy is Xenophon referring? His terminology (τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ) regrettably does not match up with any known contemporary office. Scholars have offered two solutions. The majority identify τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ with the enigmatic ναυτοδίκαι, "maritime judges."[120] Very little is known about them, however, and what is mentioned in the historical sources, especially in the lexicographers, is contradictory.[121] Cohen, who has devoted the most attention to the *nautodikai*, argues that they were the dicasts that judged maritime cases (*dikai emporikai*).[122] Yet if the *nautodikai* were dicasts, then Xenophon's τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ cannot possibly refer to them, because dicasts, technically speaking,

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120 Moyle 1697: 41, Herzog 1914: 479, von der Lieck 1933: 39-41, Gernet 1955: 180, Giglioni 1970: lxxix-lxxx, and Cohen 1973: 184.

121 For example, Hesychius refers to them as δικασταί, whereas Harpocration calls them an ἀρχή and Pollux speaks of them as magistrates οἱ εἰσάγοντες. For the ancient sources of the *nautodikai*, see Cohen 1973: 162, n.11. It is notable that Lysias 17.5-6, 8 is the only classical forensic text that attests to this magistracy. *IG* I^3 41, 90-2 is a worthless source, as it is based entirely on reconstructions:

[……16……ἐσαγόντον τὲν δίκε]ν τοῖ αὐτοῖ μενὶ hοι ναυτοδ[ί]
[και ……..……24……καὶ τ]ὸ δικαστέριον παρεχόντον πλ-

122 Cohen 1973: 163-86, esp. 164-5, n.14. The contradictory testimony in the sources, I believe, stems from the ambiguous use of the verb δικάζειν in these legal contexts. The verb can be used both of a jury adjudicating a case (e.g., ἐξεδίκασαν of Lysias 17.6) and the magistrates introducing and presiding over the case (e.g., Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 52.3: οὗτοι [sc. εἰσαγωγεῖς] μὲν οὖν ταύτας δικάζουσιν ἐμμήνους εἰσάγ[ον]τες); here δικάζειν has the sense of "to preside" (Rhodes 1981: 586-7). Such usages in the speeches of the Attic orators to which the lexicographers had access probably led to some confusion, the solution of which was the conflation of the presiding magistrates and the dicasts and thus the identification of the magistrates οἱ εἰσάγοντες with the *nautodikai*.

were not magistrates.[123] Following the lead of Thiel, Gauthier takes τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ as a reference to the ἐπιμεληταί τοῦ ἐμπορίου, "the superintendents of the emporium."[124] This interpretation is certainly correct. First, Xenophon's τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ, as a circumlocution, corresponds nicely to ἐπιμεληταί τοῦ ἐμπορίου, who conducted their activities in the port at the Piraeus. Secondly, unlike the *nautodikai*, the *epimeletai tou emporiou* formed a magistracy (ἡ ἀρχή), which matches up well with Xenophon's τῇ ἀρχῇ.[125]

This identification is significant because it demonstrates that Xenophon's desire to speed up disputes among traders anticipated the judicial reform involving *dikai emporikai* that took place shortly after he composed the *Poroi*.[126] Sometime after 355, the Athenians turned *dikai emporikai* into "monthly cases" (δίκαι ἔμμηνοι), which, as Cohen convincingly demonstrates, means that maritime cases were accepted every month during the winter in the hopes that they would be completed before the summer sailing season.[127] Until the discovery of the Athenian law on silver coinage of 375/4, the

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123 Rightly noted by Gauthier 1976: 82. Moreover, rewarding dicasts with speedy judgments does not make any sense, because once a case came before a jury, decisions were often reached very quickly. Besides, prizes for dicasts would have been seen as a form of bribery.

124 Thiel 1922: 47-8 and Gauthier 1976: 80-3; cf. Cartledge 1977: 223. The sources for these magistrates are *Hesperia* (43) 1974: 158, lines 21-22; Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 51.4; Demosthenes 35.51; 58.8-9; Dinarchus 2.10; Harpocration *s.v.*; Lexica Segueriana *s.v.*

125 Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 51.4 with Gauthier 1976: 80-1 and Rhodes 1981: 579.

126 Boeckh 1976: 604, Herzog 1914: 479, Andreades 1933: 385-6, von der Lieck 1933: 40-1, Cawkwell 1963: 64, Giglioni 1970: lxxx, Cohen 1973: 22, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 367, Whitehead 1977: 128, Mossé 1983: 53, Burke 1984: 115 and 1992: 210, and Cartledge 1997: 223.

127 Cohen 1973: Chapter 1, esp. 23-59.

judicial functions of the *epimeletai tou emporiou* were not well understood.[128] The law has been rightly considered a "legal tender act," which makes it an actionable offense for an Athenian not to accept genuine Athenian currency.[129] The part of the law that articulates the judicial procedures for those who break the law is insightful: "Let denunciations for offences (*phaseis*)…in the emporium and in the Piraeus be laid before the *epimeletai tou emporiou*…For [all those] denunciations which are up to ten drachmai the magistrates [are to be] competent to give a verdict; for those over ten drachmai let them bring them into the law court (ἐσαγόντων ἐς τὸ δικαστήριον) and let the *Thesmothetai* assist them by allotting a court whenever they request one…" (23-28, trans. Stroud). The procedures outlined here (*phasis* and the right of introducing cases to court) dovetail with those attested in the forensic speeches concerning the role of the *epimeletai emporiou* in *dikai emporikai*. An injured party to a maritime contract (*symbola*) registered a denunciation (*phasis*) and a deposition (*apographe*) with the secretary of the *epimeletai emporiou*, who was responsible for keeping such contracts (Demosthenes 35.51; 59.8 with Aristotle, *Politics* 1321b 13-15, 34-6). The secretary then publicly displayed the denunciation until it was investigated by the *epimeletai emporiou* (Demosthenes 59.8-9). These magistrates ultimately decided whether to hold a preliminary hearing (*anakrisis*) or not (Demosthenes 59.8; cf. Lysias 17.8). If there was

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[128] *GHI*[2] 25 (cf. the *editio princeps* in *Hesperia* (43) 1974: 158-9). Though Gauthier 1976: 80-4, 225-6 was aware of this inscription, he ignores the most valuable information it provides for understanding Xenophon's proposal. In particular, he argues that the *epimeletai* had limited judicial functions, being restricted to the *phasis* process. From this, he argues that Xenophon's advice to grant rewards to the *epimeletai* has nothing to do with *dikai* and thus should not be connected with the subsequent judicial reform of the *dikai emmenoi*. But as the inscription bears out, these officials did have the right of introducing *dikai* into court.

[129] Buttrey 1979: 44.

sufficient evidence to initiate a case, they convened a court of special jurors (perhaps with the help of the *Thesmothetai*), who then adjudicated the case.[130] Viewed in light of this judicial procedure, we can now better appreciate Xenophon's intentions. By granting rewards to the *epimeletai*, he hoped they would initiate legal proceedings more quickly, that is, they would speed up their investigation of the publicly displayed denunciations and introduce cases into court in a timely fashion. Because the *Thesmothetai* eventually took over this prerogative of introducing *dikai emporikai* from the *epimeletai*, it is tempting to speculate that the *epimeletai* did not expedite maritime cases to the liking of the Athenians and foreign traders.[131] In this case, had the Athenians taken Xenophon's advice, perhaps such a transfer would have been unnecessary in the first place.

The second piece of advice Xenophon offers to increase revenues from trade is to "reward merchants and shipowners with honorific seats in the theater and to occasionally invite them to partake in public hospitality, whenever they benefit the state because of the high quality of their ships and merchandise. For when they are honored with these things, they would be eager to make us friends not only for the sake of profit but also for honor" (προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένιά γ' ἔστιν ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολόγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. ταῦτα γὰρ τιμώμενοι οὐ μόνον τοῦ κέρδους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς

130 Lysias 17.5-6, 8 makes it certain that these magistrates were distinct from the *nautodikai*, who were probably the dicasts of the *dikai emporikai* (see above).

131 Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 59.5 with Cohen 1973: 195-8. Cohen dates this transfer to 330-26 during the notorious grain shortages, because the *Thesmothetai* were seen as "special-crisis officials" (198). This is a plausible suggestion, and I would add that judicial speed and efficiency probably played a role in their ability to solve such commercial crises.

τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ὡς πρὸς φίλους ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν) (3.4).[132] The comments of Austin and Vidal-Naquet are a useful point of departure for the analysis of this passage:

> These proposals are…deeply subversive: honorific seats in the theatre were normally reserved for magistrates and for the highest priests. Xenophon is in fact suggesting that one should invite traders to the prytaneum—an exceptional honour—simply in relation to the importance of their cargo. A quarter of a century after the publication of Xenophon's pamphlet Athens passed a fourfold decree in honour of Heracleides, a merchant from Salamis in Cyprus, who in difficult circumstances during the famine of 330-331, had provided Athens with cheap corn. This inscription…grants a series of honours to this man (a crown, presentation to the people, etc.), but not explicitly hospitality in the prytaneum. Xenophon's proposal goes further as it is based on strictly commercial criteria.[133]

Engen's recent study of the honors and privileges bestowed on individuals for trade-related services between 415-307 B.C. substantiates this interpretation. His survey yields 36 examples of individuals to whom the Athenians granted honors (e.g., gold crowns, bronze statues, tax exemption, *proxeny*, etc.) for their commercial activities.[134] Ten instances predate the *Poroi*, and of these for which we can determine the motivation behind the privileges, there are a total of five.[135] But the trade-related services provided in these particular cases are traditional in nature (e.g., gifts of grain and timber) and thus

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[132] The fact that Xenophon is recommending *xenia* proves that the traders involved are *xenoi*; foreign honorands awarded citizenship received *deipnon*, which was a greater honor because only citizens attended this kind of meal (see Henry 1983: 262-75).

[133] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 367 (the decree in honor of Heracleides = *GHI*^{2} 95). Cf. Miller 1978: 4, who notes: "to invite someone into the prytaneion for entertainment at the expense of the city was of the highest honors paid by a Greek city to an individual." See also the excellent comments of Engen 1996: "In providing many of the same honors and privileges for whose who had performed trade-related services as for those who had performed political and military ones, Athens was elevating trade, certain forms of which had been traditionally socially and morally unesteemed, to a level formerly occupied only by political and military matters. Moreover, the foreigners who performed trade-related services now had access to the τιμή formerly reserved for citizens or foreign benefactors who had performed political or military services."

[134] The evidence is conveniently tabulated in Engen 1996: 43-6.

not apropos to Xenophon's recommendations, which are aimed at honoring traders and shipowners not for their euergetism, but rather for "the high quality of their merchandise and ships." For such cases, in which the Athenians granted privileges to traders for the simple importation of goods (and for whom "profit" was probably the main consideration for trading with Athens), we have six examples, all occurring after 350.[136] Interestingly, one of these honorary decrees actually grants both *xenia* and a seat in the theater (θέα) to a Sicilian trader sometime between 331-24 for importing grain to Athens.[137] Because other examples for such *xenia* grants to traders exist after ca. 350, we are on firmer ground to declare that the Athenians in all likelihood followed Xenophon's advice.[138]

Nevertheless, as far was we can tell, the Athenians never granted προεδρία for trade-related services.[139] The grant of θέα differed from προεδρία in that the latter was a permanent seat in the front row, whereas the former was only a guarantee of a seat in the theater for one festival only. Though this honor was not as prestigious as προεδρία,

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135 *IG* I^3 182 (a), 117; *IG* II^2 212 (cf. Isocrates 17.57; Demosthenes 20.29-41) (Satyrus and Leucon); *IG* II^2 207.

136 *IG* II^2 342+, 409, 407; *Hesperia* (43) 1974: no. 3; *Hesperia* (9) 1940: no. 39; *Athenaeus* 3.119f-120a. Engen 1996: 178 notes that "[t]he honorands were professional traders who personally transported their goods to Athens and sold them at the market price." These seem to be the *emporoi* whom Xenophon says will trade with Athens "not only for the sake of profit but also for honor" (οὐ μόνον τοῦ κέρδους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκεν).

137 *Hesperia* (43) 1974: no. 3, ll. 9-12, 24-9. This decree was published after the first French edition (1973) of Austin and Vidal Naquet and thus was not taken into consideration in their analysis. Cf. Miller 1978: 146-61 who collects some 102 instances of *xenia* and *deipnon*. Of these only about half reveal anything about the motivation for such invitations, and the vast majority of these are for political and military services.

138 *IG* II^2 81, 212. However, I am not convinced *IG* II^2 81, which dates between 390-378/7, qualifies as a grant of *xenia* for trade-related services. Engen 1996: 89-90 argues that the reference to *asulia* on the goods of the honorand (6-7) indicates that he was a trader, and thus the honors he is given must be for trade-related services. Yet on p. 312 he is forced to admit that there is only "one example of an Athenian

it nonetheless was in the spirit of Xenophon's proposal and radical in its own right. Engen explains: "by granting a seat for the Dionysia at state expense, Athens was at least providing the non-citizen honorand with a unique opportunity to receive [sc. the equivalent of] the θεωρικόν, a state subsidy originally intended to cover the cost of theater tickets, which otherwise was an exclusive privilege of Athenian citizens…In order to ensure trade-related services from foreigners, Athens was willing to chip away, even if only for a little, at the barriers between citizens and non-citizens to include a foreign trader in some of the citizens' former exclusive rights."[140]

We can push the "subversive" reading of Xenophon's proposals further by considering them in the context of the dynamics of ritualized friendship (*xenia*): "for when they [sc. *xenoi*] are honored with these privileges, they would be eager to treat us as *friends* (ὡς πρὸς φίλους ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν)." What has escaped the attention of commentators is that with this thought, Xenophon hopes to bring those who conduct short-term, market exchanges into the orbit of traditional long-term *xenia* relationships. According to Herman, exchanges of goods within the context of ritualized friendship are diametrically opposed to market exchange:

> [I]n trading relationships, the exchange is a short-term, self-liquidating transaction. Once the benefits are obtained, the social relationship is terminated. The transaction does not create moral involvement. By contrast, within the framework of amiable relations (kinship, friendship, ritualized friendship), exchanges have a long-term expectancy. Gifts beg counter gifts, and fulfill at one and the same time a number of purposes:

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invitation for ξενία or δεῖπνον in the Prytaneion before the end of the fourth century that we can be certain was motivated solely by trading interests, namely Camp (1974) no. 3 [=*Hesperia* (43) 1974: no. 3]."

139 Engen 1996: 318.

140 Engen 1996: 319.

> they repay past services, incur new obligations, and act as continuous reminders of the validity of the bond.[141]

Throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, examples abound of *xenia* relationships between Athens and foreign traders and grain producers.[142] The most notorious, perhaps, is that between Athens and the Spartocids of the Bosporus, who traded with the city not only in commodities but also in gifts: the Athenians received the "gifts" (δωρειαί) of tax-exemption, grain, and priority in loading grain, whereas the Spartocids were bestowed with the "gifts" of statues, gold crowns, honorary citizenship, and tax-exemption in Athens.[143] "Apparently, there was no limit to what a *xenos* could do for another," Herman contends. "Yet one type of human activity is conspicuously absent from the list: low-class activities most immediately concerned with getting a livelihood. To be sure, *xenoi* did provide each other with grain and some other necessities of life. But they were not dependent for their survival on such provisions. Ritualized friendship was concerned with extracting spoils for people situated high above the subsistence level."[144] But when it came to grain the Athenians, collectively speaking, were well below the subsistence level, as three quarters of their grain came from abroad, and much of this was transported to Athens via foreign traders and shipowners whose motives were largely governed by profit. The problem with these transactions, as Herman rightly notes, is they do not "create moral involvement," which could lead to potentially

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141 Herman 1987: 80. Cf. Bloch and Parry 1989 on the difference between the long-term and short-term transactional orders.

142 E.g., *IG* I^3 117, 23; *IG* II^2 360b, 363; *Hesperia* (9) 1940: no. 42; Athenaeus 586d, 596b.

143 Demosthenes 20.29-40; Dinarchus 1.43; *GHI*^{2} 64. Demosthenes 20.33 and *GHI*^{2} 64, 20-3 specifically use the language of gift-exchange. For a good analysis of Athens' relationship with the Spartocids in terms of ritualized friendship, see Rosivach 2000: 40-3.

disastrous consequences, especially for a city like Athens which was not self-sufficient in grain. For instance, when market prices fluctuated because of droughts or manipulation, merchants sometimes disposed of their cargos in countries where prices were the highest, even though this meant breaking their legal contracts with the Athenians.[145]

Moreover, according to Aristotle, in "market trade" (ἡ πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα), which he considers a type of *philia* (in particular, one based on τὸ χρήσιμον, "utility"), disputes (ἐγκληματικαὶ) often arise: "for because the two parties associate with each other for profit they always want more, and they think that they are getting less than their due; and they find fault because they do not get as much as they need or feel they deserve; and they who perform services can never satisfy all the needs of the ones who receive them."[146] Consequently, these relationships often dissolve quickly because they are not based on equality and proportion (1162b24-8). Interestingly, in the companion piece in the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle recommends that one way to restore equality and proportion in these relationships is "honor" (τιμή): "the profit must be made equal to the honor" (δεῖ δὲ ἰσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμήν) (1242b18-20). Now profit and honor are precisely what Xenophon wishes to

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144 Herman 1987: 128.

145 Such is the case of Demosthenes' speech against *Dionysodorus*, which recounts the tale of the eponymous merchant who sold his shipment of grain at Rhodes when he heard prices in Athens had dropped, even though he contracted a loan on the condition that he return to Athens with the grain (56.3, 8-10). Cf. *Oeconomicus* 20:28: "Whenever merchants need money, they do not unload their cargos of grain anywhere they happen to be, but wherever they hear that the price of grain is the highest and the people value it the most, to these places they deliver their shipments."

146 *Nichomachean Ethics* 1162b17-27. Usually translated as "friendship," the meaning of the word *philia* in Aristotle has a semantic range that extends beyond intimate familial relationships and includes civic and business relations like the ones described by Xenophon in the *Poroi* (see Cooper 1980: 301-2).

grant foreign traders. The former entices traders to come to Athens; the latter keeps them coming back. In other words, by guaranteeing not only profits, but honors as well, Xenophon hopes to obligate traders to repay these honors in the future, which may entail nothing more than forming a strong and lasting trading partnership with the city. Thus, in order to protect the Athenians from the vagaries of the market, on which the Athenians had to rely to a much greater extent after the Social War, Xenophon, I submit, "moralizes" commercial transactions by introducing traditional, long-term friendship categories into short-term, market-based relationships. With the bestowal of privileges like *xenia* and *prohedria*, which in the realm of ritualized friendship are tantamount to "gifts," Xenophon hopes to engender enduring relations with foreign traders that do not dissolve after each self-liquidating transaction. What is so subversive about this advice is not so much that Xenophon insinuates a connection between two transactional orders that the Greeks thought of as functionally and ideological separate, but rather that he envisions a kind of amiable relationship between Athenians and foreign traders that was analogous to the one existing between citizens. For Aristotle, and probably for most Athenians, the quintessential type of *philia* based on utility and equality was "political friendship" (φιλία ἡ πολιτική) (1242b22).[147] Xenophon is in a sense "politicizing" trading relations.

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147 The comments of Cooper 1977: 646 are insightful: "In a community animated by civic friendship, each citizen assumes that all the others, even those hardly not known at all to him, are willing supporters of their common institutions and willing contributors to the common social product, from which he, together with all the citizens, benefits. So they will approach one another for business or other purposes in a spirit of mutual goodwill and with willingness to sacrifice their own immediate interests to those of another, as friendship demands." It is worth noting that Xenophon envisions a good amount of association between citizens and *xenoi*, as he also recommends that *xenoi* subscribe to the capital fund along with citizens (3.11) and commends the city's policy of opening up the mining industry to *xenoi* on the same terms as granted to citizens (4.12). I do not think that Xenophon expects all *xenoi* to subordinate their individualistic drive for

Before turning to the last of Xenophon's recommendations for promoting trade, it is necessary to consider briefly the motivations behind his specific choice of grating *xenia* and *prohedria* to traders and shipowners, because a whole host of other monetary and non-monetary privileges was available to our author.[148] While it is undeniable that Xenophon foresaw and even intended the social consequences of granting *xenia* and *prohedria* to foreign traders, financial considerations must have been the prime motivating factor. In the turbulent years in which he was composing the *Poroi*, a "fiscal anxiety" consumed the Athenians.[149] In 356 they passed two decrees and one law in the hopes of increasing revenues.[150] They authorized Androtion to collect arrears of *eisphorai*, which promised to bring in fourteen talents but yielded only seven (Demosthenes 22.44, 48-9, 63); Aristophon moved a decree appointing a commission of inquiry to receive information about sacred or public monies in private hands (Demosthenes 24.11); and Leptines, an associate of Aristophon, proposed a law that "no one, whether citizen, alien with fiscal equality, or foreigner, shall be exempt [sc. from liturgical obligations]…except the descendents of Harmodius and Aristogeiton…nor shall

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profit to the common good of the city to the same extent as Athenian citizens. Yet I also do not consider such individualistic values and those concerning the common weal to be mutually exclusive. Such was the view of the Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylonia (Cicero, *De officiis* 3.50-3), whose views about disclosure in commercial transactions invoked the ire of Antipater and Cicero. Xenophon's view is no different in this respect from Aristotle's, who argues that in the moral (ἡ ἠθική) *philia*, "one gives a gift, or does whatever it does, as to a friend (ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται); but one expects to receive as much *or more*, as having not given but lent (*Nichomachean Ethics* 1162b31-32). In other words, just because a transaction entails a moral commitment does not mean that it has to be unprofitable. The foreign traders whom Xenophon is trying to entice may occasionally have to reduce their profit margins in order to remain friends with the Athenians, but they still will profit from the relationship.

148 Monetary: gold crowns, bronze statues, inscribed stelai, *ateleia*, *isoteleia*, and *hyperesiai* (i.e. slaves); non-monetary: proxeny, *euergesia*, *enktesis*, and citizenship.

149 Sealey 1993: 113.

150 On the dating of these three pieces of legislation, see Sealey 1955: 78. The order of legislation presented here does not reflect a chronological sequence.

any such exemption be granted in the future" (μηδένα μήτε τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε τῶν ἰσοτελῶν μήτε τῶν ξένων εἶναι ἀτελῆ…πλὴν τῶν ἀφ' Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος…μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξεῖναι δοῦναι) (20.29, 160). The intent of this law was ostensibly to increase state revenues because the treasury was nearly bankrupt—a statement Xenophon himself corroborates (24-5; cf. *Poroi* 5.12).[151] In the midst of this fiscal crisis we must imagine Xenophon contemplating his proposals for traders. Because Leptines' law was probably still in effect, he was not in a legal position to advocate *ateleia*, and given the hysteria over the decline in public revenues, he wisely avoided proposing grants of costly monetary privileges and honors, such as gold crowns and bronze statues. Instead, he chose the two most cost-effective measures available. Seats in the theater ran about two obols in the fourth century, but those granted *prohedria* probably paid nothing.[152] As far as *xenia*, we cannot calculate its costs, but such one-time dining events could not have been expensive; rather, what was pricey were the "social costs": "[t]he foreigner who had performed trade-related services would be put on

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[151] Demosthenes, who spoke against the legality of the law in the following year (355/4), argues that expenditure on agonistic liturgies had nothing to do with public revenues or surpluses, because the festivals were not the concern of the city, but of smaller associations within it, namely, the demes and phylai (25); and besides, exemption from the financial obligations that were a public concern, *eisphora* and the *trierarchy*, simply did not exist for anyone (not even the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton) (18, 26, 28, 129). Because Demosthenes believes passionately that the monetary privileges and honors that the state grants to foreigners provide far more fiscal benefits than the potential loss in revenues, he is willing to bend the truth a bit in stating his case, and some scholars have gullibly followed him (e.g., Sealey 1993: 113, 126). We know for a fact that Athens awarded exemption from *eisphora* to foreign traders, and though much of the funding for festivals came from private funds, the state did finance them partly with public monies. The rider of the decree for Strato, king of Sidon (ca. 378-6 = *GHI*^{2} or 364/3 = Mosey 1976) makes it certain that he and all the citizens of Sidon received *ateleia* from Athens and in particular exemption from *eisphora* (*IG* II^2 141, 29-36 = *GHI*^{2}). On the question of public finance of festivals, see *IG* I^3 82 (421/0); Demosthenes 24.27 (ca. 355); *Agora* I, 7495 (355/4) (discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3A); and *Agora* XIX, L 7 (ca. 338/7).

par with foreign ambassadors and benefactors who had performed more traditional political or military services for Athens."[153]

Unlike the previous two recommendations, which Xenophon says can be implemented with the help of "benevolent legislation and attention" (ψηφίσματά τε φιλάνθρωπα καὶ ἐπιμελείας), the last two proposals require "start-up capital" (ἀφορμή) (3.6). In Section 5C below, I discuss the inner workings of the capital fund, but suffice it to say Xenophon conceives of this scheme as an investment program, which bears little similarity to *eisphora* and other forced contributions. Even though start-up costs are involved, the monies in the fund will form a new source of revenue apart from existing ones, and so Xenophon does not need to be as sensitive here to the fiscal concerns of the likes of Aristophon and Leptines. The first of these suggestions is to build 1) public hotels for shipowners near the ports (in addition to the ones that already exist) and hotels for other visitors (i.e., tourists); 2) convenient places of exchange for traders; and 3) dwellings and shops for retailers in the Piraeus and in the city.[154] As stated previously, Xenophon intends to lease these hotels, dwellings, and shops to individuals (3.5), which explains why "large amounts of revenue would accrue from

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[152] For price of seats, see Demosthenes 18.28 with Ulpian on Demosthenes, *Olynthiacs* 1.1 and Csapo and Slater 1994: 288. The lease of the deme of the Piraeus for the theater there (ca. 324/3), stipulates that those with *prohedria* are to be exempt from paying the entrance fee (*Agora* XIX, L13, 10-11).

[153] Engen 1996: 311, 315.

[154] καλὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ναυκλήροις οἰκοδομεῖν καταγώγια περὶ λιμένας πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἐμπόροις [ἐπὶ] προσήκοντας τόπους <ἐπ'> ὠνῆ τε καὶ πράσει, καὶ τοῖς εἰσαφικνουμένοις δὲ δημόσια καταγώγια. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀγοραίοις οἰκήσεις τε καὶ πωλητήρια κατασκευασθείη καὶ ἐν Πειραιεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄστει. Gauthier 1976: 105 is certainly right to interpret δημόσια in the penultimate line as referring to all the individual parts of the passage: the state will own all these buildings and lease them out.

them" (πολλαὶ ἂν ἀπὸ τούτων πρόσοδοι γίγνοιντο) (3.13). Moreover, with permanent places of trade in the agora and the Piraeus, it is reasonable to assume a further augmentation in the volume of trade and consequently increases in sales from which the state would derive even more revenue. Did the Athenians ever follow these suggestions? Though the evidence is not particularly decisive, it seems that they did, but not to the extent that Xenophon envisions here.[155]

The last of Xenophon's proposals, the creation of a merchant marine (ὁλκάδας δημοσίας), which the state would lease out to private individuals, we know the Athenians never implemented (3.14).[156] Some historians have chalked this failure up to Xenophon's naiveté.[157] The maintenance of such a fleet alone, it is argued, would have cost the state dearly. Gauthier rightly challenges this baseless assumption by drawing attention to the phrase ὥσπερ τριήρεις δημοσίας, "just as they do with public triremes." Xenophon intends to lease out these public trading ships to private individuals

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155 Cawkwell 1963: 64 (cf. Giglioni1970: lxxxii, Burke 1984: 115 and Garland 1987: 43) claims that Eubulus "provided the trading facilities and hostels that Xenophon had demanded," citing Dinarchus 1.96 and *SIG*^{3} 1216 = *IG* II^2 2496. However, the former source mentions nothing specifically about καταγώγια or πωλητήρια or even trading in general, whereas the latter is a record of leases for the deme of the Piraeus (mid-fourth century), which mentions οἰκήσεις, but nothing about Eubulus' initiative (rightly noted by Lewis 1990: 251). The evidence for Lycurgus' role in promoting commerce is better attested, as his epitaph mentions specifically "the construction of harbors" (Hyperides, Fg. 118); he was also the mover of the decrees honoring the traders Heracleides of Salamis (*GHI*^{2} 95) and Sopatros (*Hesperia* (43) 1974: no. 3). We can infer from Plutarch 841d that among "the many projects that were half-finished (πολλὰ δ' ἡμίεργα)," which Lycurgus completed, were publicly owned housing. That the state owned dwellings which they rented out is assured (see *IG* II^2 1183 28-9 (after 340) and 2496, 10). Cf. Demosthenes 18.309, who makes ἐμπορίου κατασκευήν a key function of the useful statesmen (he implies that he has improved commerce, whereas Aeschines has not).

156 ἀγαθὸν δέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι πειραθῆναι, εἰ καὶ ὥσπερ τριήρεις δημοσίας ἡ πόλις κέκτηται, οὕτω καὶ ὁλκάδας δημοσίας δυνατὸν ἂν γένοιτο κτήσασθαι καὶ ταύτας ἐκμισθοῦν ἐπ' ἐγγυητῶν ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα δημόσια. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο οἷόν τε ὂν φανείη, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων πρόσοδος γίγνοιτο. Cf. Gauthier 1976: 107-8 and Cartledge 1997: 224.

in a manner analogous to state-owned triremes, which the individual trierarch was responsible for maintaining while it was in his care.[158] Cartledge suggests that the Athenians did not follow Xenophon's advice because it "offended against the Athenians' entrenched notions of what it was proper for the state to do economically, and what should be left to private enterprise."[159] However, he is forced to admit that the state *did* lease out immovable property (e.g., sacred and public lands, dwellings, and theaters) and farmed certain taxes themselves (cf. *Athenaion Politeia* 47). Whatever the reason(s) for which the Athenians decided against Xenophon's plan, we should not ignore the important implications it has for the study of the ancient economy: the proposal is aimed primarily at Athenian citizens.

The key phrase is καὶ ταύτας ἐκμισθοῦν ἐπ' ἐγγυητῶν ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα δημόσια, "to lease the ships out under guarantors just like our other public property." As far as we can tell, only Athenian citizens and metics could lease out public property, and judging from the leases themselves, only Athenian citizens could be guarantors.[160] One guarantor was needed for leases involving rents less than 600 drachmai, two guarantors for those between 600 and 1200, and so on.[161] Considering that the property in this case would have been both movable and probably very expensive, more than two guarantors would have been required who had the wherewithal to pay the state back in

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157 Boeckh 1976: 605, Andreades 1933: 386, and Cawkwell 1963: 64.

158 Gauthier 1976: 107. For the responsibilities of the trierarch for the maintenance and upkeep of his ship, see Amit 1965: 112-3 and Gabrielsen 1994: 126-145.

159 Cartledge 1997: 224.

160 Walbank 1991: 163, 165.

161 Walbank 1991: 163.

the event of a default (e.g., because of a lost or damaged ship).[162] While this leasing system in theory would have been open to the metics, in practice very few would have had the social networks from which they could garner guarantors (see above Section 5A). In short, we have yet another example of potential citizen involvement in trade and commerce, which should be added to the growing list of evidence contradicting the old Hasebroekean thesis that Athenian citizens abstained from trade.[163]

In conclusion, Xenophon's recommendations for increasing revenues from trade were radical in some respects but not altogether out of the mainstream of Athenian values and fiscal practice. With the exception of the merchant marine, the Athenians enacted in one form or another all of Xenophon's proposals.[164] Of course, we cannot ascribe these changes in commercial policy entirely to his direction and initiative: rewarding magistrates, granting *xenia* and *prohedria* to benefactors, and leasing public property were all traditional practices. The "world of the *emporion*," with all its values,

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[162] The ὁλκάδες Xenophon intends to lease were probably the large 120-ton ships, which could carry up to 3,000 medimnoi of grain (Casson 1971: 183-4). Demosthenes mentions a merchant ship (*neos*) selling for 40 mnai, which was smaller than a ὁλκάς. As a basis of comparison, the hull of a trireme probably cost a talent (*Athenaion Politeia* 22.7) but completely outfited (i.e. with bronze ram, sails, etc.), probably two talents (Casson 1995: 242).

[163] Hasebroek 1965: 22-43. For recent restatements of Hasebroek, see Hopper 1979: 109, Millet 1983, Morris 1994, and Finley 1999: 60, 144-5. Polanyi 1977: 198 took this thesis and applied it wholesale to the *Poroi*: "Nowhere in this discussion is there as much as a hint that the Athenians themselves are involved in trade" (cf. von der Lieck 1933: 43). For the evidence of the Athenian citizens engaged in trade, see Isager and Hansen 1975: 72, Thompson 1982, M.V. Hansen 1984, Montgomery 1986, and Cohen 1992: passim (though see pp. 27-30 on the perils of drawing conclusions from cliometric analysis). Indeed, though Xenophon is talking prescriptively here, his proposal to lease merchant ships to citizens would make no sense if they were not actively involved in trade.

[164] It should be noted that the polis of Olbia in the late third century had a fleet of *ta ploia ta demosia* used for the transport of blocks of stone (*SIG*^{3} 495, 146-51). Gauthier 1976: 108 erroneously thinks that these ships are warships (see Lewis 1990: 254). While we cannot insist on a genetic connection between Xenophon's suggestion and this particular episode, it does support the conclusion that Xenophon's proposal was practicable.

ideologies, and business practices, existed well before Xenophon composed the *Poroi*.[165] Traditionally, this space was both physically and ideologically separate from the city (*asty*), which was the center of political deliberation and action; even the world of the agora, a business center in its own right, was considered separate from the *emporion*.[166] However, as Gernet argues, with the emergence of *dikai emporikai*, and especially when they became "monthly" suits sometime after 350, commercial law, for the first time, entered into the law of the city.[167] The key historiographical question that has occupied the attention of scholars is the extent to which this entrance of commercial law into the law of the city concomitantly brought the larger world of the *emporion* into the political and social life of the city. In particular, did the "market mentality" of the *emporion* penetrate into the consciousnesses of Athenian citizens and transform their values in the process? For Gernet and many others, the *dikai emporikai* represent nothing other than the city's desire to ensure its own food supply and to raise revenues. They reveal the existence of a "professional circle" but nothing of a "merchant class which played an

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165 The phrase "world of the *emporion*" is that of Gernet 1955: 185, n.5. As Cohen 1992: 39, n.38 explains, the term "has become scholarly shorthand for the physical, financial, and ideological sphere encompassing businessmen involved in maritime trade and finance" (cf. Vélissaropoulos 1977: 61-85).

166 Cohen 1992: 48, n.25 citing the Athenian law on silver coinage of 375/4 (*GHI*^{2} 25), which stipulates "parallel but separate provisions for the *emporion* at the Piraeus and the agora in the city…Special provision is made even for the placement of the inscribed text of the decree separately at the two centers;" and *Poroi* 3.13: καὶ πωλητήρια κατασκευασθείη καὶ ἐν Πειραιεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄστει. To be sure, the boundaries between the *asty* and the Piraeus were transgressed on a number of occasions for political reasons. The council, assembly, and courts occasionally met in the Piraeus (for the evidence, see Garland 1987: 81-2), but topics of discussion were strictly political and military in nature (e.g., dockyard business).

167 Gernet 1955: 185-6. Gernet's thesis that *dikai emporikai* were introduced only after ca. 350 is probably wrong (see Cohen 1973: 158-83). By "commercial law" Gernet is referring to the supranational character of *dikai emporikai*, which afforded to foreigners who entered into contracts providing for the Athenian market the right to bring suits without *symbola* arrangements (bilateral treaties). While *symbola* sometimes touched upon commercial cases (e.g., Phaselis (*IG* I^3 16) and Selymbria (*IG* I^3 118); see Gauthier 1972: 158-63, 198-205), these were by and large political agreements, following civil legal procedures, not "separate" commercial procedures. According to Cohen 1973: 59-70, Athens' "open"

active role in the affairs of the state or even which exerted influence over legislation."[168] Mossé even goes so far as to contend that "the world of the *emporion* remained marginal in relation to the city during [the] second half of the fourth century…because 'trade and politics' belonged to two mutually impenetrable domains."[169]

To be sure, Xenophon's interest in the world of the *emporion* centers largely on its revenue-generating potential, but we cannot ignore the evidence in the *Poroi*, which also demonstrates his desire to promote the interests of traders and commerce more generally. Xenophon wants to reward traders with honors, which, it must be remembered, required the approval of the assembly, not for their *euergetism* of provisioning Athens with free grain, but rather for the "high quality of their merchandise." The fact that all six examples of the Athenians granting such honors and privileges to traders for simple market transactions occurred in the decades following the publication of the *Poroi* suggests strongly that the world of the *emporion* was making significant inroads into the political world of the Athenians. Another example can be adduced. Sometime between 346 and 344/3, the Athenians passed a comprehensive decree, proposed by the politician Moerocles, protecting traders from false denunciations (*phaseis*) and creating a police force, comprised of Athenians and allies, to guard traders from piracy.[170] As Burke notes well, "[t]he decree was no mere window-dressing, for

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commercial policy was not unique and probably was a later development, following the normal procedure in most Greek states where citizens of foreign states could litigate freely in local commercial courts.

168 Gernet 1955: 186 (quoted from the English translation of Mossé 1983: 53). Of course, Gernet's analysis bears the stamp of Hasebroek 1965; see also, Humphreys 1978: 71-2, Finley 1982: 53-4 and 1999: 162, Mossé 1983, and Garnsey 1988: 139-42.

169 Mossé 1983: 63.

170 Demosthenes 57.10-3, 53-6. The terminus ante quem is the date of this speech 344/3 (Burke 1984: 115, n.24). Demosthenes 12.2 provides a terminus post quem of 346, the date of the Peace of Philocrates,

we learn subsequently, according to its terms, the island of Melos was to be fined ten talents for harboring pirates."[171] The scope of the decree militates against the view that this was passed strictly to ensure revenues or to secure the food-supply. In protecting traders to such an extent, the Athenians were true to the spirit of Xenophon, who aimed to keep the city "the most agreeable and profitable for those in trade."

5C. *Eisphora* and *Aphorme*

In order to execute the aforementioned proposals (the construction of hotels, places of exchange, merchant marine, etc.) and to purchase the requisite number of slaves for reconstituting and expanding the mining industry (see next section), the polis, Xenophon assures his readers, will require *aphorme* (3.6). Often translated as "capital" (e.g., Marchant and Giglioni), *aphorme* in its most basic sense denotes "something to start with," and hence "the initial monies needed for a business," but "in practice the word came to denote the funding necessary for continuing operations, in Athenian terms a 'provision for functioning' or 'for earning a living,' akin to Anglo-American 'working capital'."[172] Because Xenophon considers these monies to be not only start-up capital but also working capital to cover future expenditures (e.g., for the purchase of more hotels, ships, slaves, etc.), *aphorme* is best rendered simply as "capital fund."[173] The

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which included a stipulation about the suppression of piracy; it is doubtful that the Athenians passed the law before this time, or else Philip would have surely mentioned it in his letter when he accuses the Athenians of looking the other way when pirates sought refuge in Thasos. As 57.10 makes clear, the law went further than existing legislation, since the person found guilty of making a false denunciation was liable not only to pay a 1000 drachma fine (for not securing a conviction), but also to arrest and imprisonment.

171 Burke 1984: 115 citing Demosthenes 58.6.

172 Cohen 1992: 184.

173 Marchant 1922 translating *aphorme* at 3.9, followed by Waterfield 1997: "state capital fund." Gauthier's *mise de fond*, "capital outlay" does not quite capture the full range of the word (1976: 89).

suggestion is undoubtedly a risky one, for it comes right on the heals of the losses suffered in the Social War, which was financially devastating for both the state and private citizens who contributed much to the war effort (cf. 4.40; 5.11-2). But such expenditure is not a cause of concern for Xenophon; rather it is a source of hope that the Athenians will contribute freely and generously to his proposed capital fund:

> οὐ μέντοι δύσελπίς εἰμι τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ προθύμως ἂν τοὺς πολίτας εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰσφέρειν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἰσήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ὅτε Ἀρκάσιν ἐβοήθει ἐπὶ Λυσιστράτου ἡγουμένου, πολλὰ δὲ (8) ἐπὶ Ἡγησίλεω. ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ τριήρεις πολλάκις ἐκπεμπομένας σὺν πολλῇ δαπάνῃ, καὶ †ταύτας γενομένας†, τούτου μὲν ἀδήλου ὄντος εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε κάκιον ἔσται, ἐκείνου δὲ δήλου ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἀπολήψονται ἃ ἂν εἰσενέγκωσιν οὐδὲ (9) μεθέξουσιν ὧν ἂν †εἰσενέγκωσι†. κτῆσιν δὲ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ἂν οὕτω καλὴν κτήσαιντο ὥσπερ ἀφ' οὗ ἂν προτελέσωσιν εἰς τὴν ἀφορμήν·
>
> However, I am hopeful that our citizens will contribute eagerly to fund such things [sc. revenue-producing projects], when I recall how much money the polis gave when we came to the aid of the Arcadians under the command of Lysistratus [364/3], and again when it provided much for Hegesileos' campaign [363/2]. I know also that triremes are often sent out with much expense [to individuals], and when they do this, it is unclear whether the mission will be for the better or for the worse, but what is certain is that those who participate will not recover the money they contributed nor share in the profits from the war they helped fund.[174] Yet, they would receive no finer return on their money than the one they would get by investing in the capital fund.

What differentiates Xenophon's *aphorme* from funds established for the maintenance of war is contributors will receive a "return" (κτῆσις) on their money. While the proceeds of war (viz. booty) were often distributed among the participants of campaigns, no

[174] On the translation of the phrase οὐδὲ μεθέξουσιν…, see Gauthier 1976: 91 citing Herzog 1914: 472-3.

system was in place to guarantee those funding expeditions (through *eisphorai*, *trierarchies*, *epidoseis*, etc.) a share of the profits, though occasionally financiers and commanders were one and the same. Under his scheme, profits are all but "certain" (δῆλος) for every subscriber.

More specifically, Xenophon proposes a three-tiered investment system in which every subscriber to the fund receives a daily triobolon (180 dr. per year) no matter the amount given: subscribers of ten minai (1,000 dr.) will receive "almost 20%" on their investment (18% to be exact), which Xenophon likens to the rate of return from "nautical loans;" subscribers of 5 minai (500 dr.) will get "more than a third" of their money back (i.e., 37%); but subscribers of one mina (100 dr.), "a majority," he asserts, "will get more money in a year than they put in because a payment of one mina will yield a return of nearly two" (i.e., 183%) (3.9-10).[175] "And what is more these returns are guaranteed by the polis, which is the most secure and enduring of human institutions" (καὶ ταῦτα ἐν πόλει, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀσφαλέστατόν τε καὶ πολυχρονιώτατον εἶναι).[176] With this *gnome* Xenophon underscores the major difference between his polis-administered capital fund and other investment opportunities. Unlike the placement of monies in private banks, which were ephemeral by nature, or loans contracted to finance risk-laden activities like long-distance commerce, monies advanced to the state

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[175] ᾧ μὲν γὰρ ἂν δέκα μναῖ εἰσφορὰ γένηται, ὥσπερ ναυτικόν, σχεδὸν ἐπίπεμπτον αὐτῷ γίγνεται, τριώβολον τῆς ἡμέρας λαμβάνοντι· ᾧ δέ γ' ἂν πέντε μναῖ, πλέον ἢ ἐπίτριτον. οἱ δέ γε πλεῖστοι Ἀθηναίων πλείονα λήψονται κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ ὅσα ἂν εἰσενέγκωσιν. οἱ γὰρ μνᾶν προτελέσαντες ἐγγὺς δυοῖν μναῖν πρόσοδον ἕξουσι.

[176] For the translation of this phrase, I follow Marchant 1922, endorsed by Gauthier 1976: 95-6; cf. Waterfield 1997.

have a much greater likelihood of "returning" to their donors according to Xenophon. In the next section, we will see how the polis is able to mitigate risks more efficiently and successfully than private investors, but for now it is important to stress the vital role the state plays as a guarantor of private investment. By stressing the durability and permanence of the polis, Xenophon hopes to assuage the fear of potential subscribers who may have anxiety about the long-term commitment to the capital fund, in which it might take decades to see any return on their investment. Interestingly, for this reason Xenophon also recommends that foreign poleis and potentates, such as kings, tyrants, and even Persian satraps, be permitted to invest in the fund, as they would be encouraged by the prospect of "being enrolled as benefactors *for all time*" (ἀναγραφήσεσθαι εὐεργέται εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον) (3.11).[177]

A number of interpretive challenges present themselves in regard to the creation and implementation of the *aphorme*. First, it is unclear how Xenophon intends to finance the capital fund. Beyond the idea that individual Athenians who contribute (εἰσφέρειν) money in amounts of either 100, 500, or 1,000 drachmai will receive a constant rate of return on their investment in the form of a daily triobolon payment, Xenophon says nothing of the inner workings of the system, which has inevitably led scholars to read between the lines of his presentation. A number of commentators, transfixed by Xenophon's comparison of the "nearly twenty percent" rate of return for ten-minai subscribers to the interest rate on nautical loans, construe Xenophon's *eisphora* as a kind

[177] It is unclear if foreigners under Xenophon's scheme would be entitled to receive the triobolon; see Gauthier 1976: 100-1. My own feeling is that they would not.

of "forced loan granted by the citizens to the state."[178] There are nonetheless a number of problems with this interpretation, least of which is the fact that subscribers never get back their "principle" in the end.[179] The comparison is strictly notional, serving the purpose of putting a new and unfamiliar investment opportunity into terms familiar to wealthy Athenians.

For Gauthier, the repetitive employment of the noun εἰσφορά (once) and the verb εἰσφέρειν (six times) in the context of the military expeditions of the 360s suggests that Xenophon is indeed thinking of some kind of forced payment, but one that is analogically similar to an extraordinary wartime tax, which the Athenians levied directly on citizens to finance military operations.[180] In particular, Gauthier contends that Xenophon envisions his *eisphora* as an obligatory contribution, which a majority of citizens pay, but in amounts proportionate to their fortune: the "rich citizen" will pay ten minai; the "well-to-do" five minai; and the "less fortunate" one mina.[181] Gauthier is careful though not to push the analogy too far, as he notes three key differences between

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[178] Giglioni 1970: lxxxiv; cf. Thiel 1922: 48-50: "mutuatio publica", Pöhlmann 1984: 243: "Anleihe," von der Lieck 1933: 41, "Schaffung von Staatsrenten durch eine Anleihe," Andreades 1933: 389: "a sort of loan on a lifetime annuity."

[179] Gauthier 1976: 95, 103-4. For Greek notions of lending and interest, see Millett 1991: 24-52, 91-108 and Cohen 1992: 41-60. The loan interpretation of Giglioni 1970: lxxxiv-xc leads her to hold some very peculiar ideas about the triobolon, namely, that the proposal at 3.9-10 has nothing to do with the one at 4.17, which aims to create three slaves for every Athenian and consequently three obols per day in *apophora*. Giglioni sees the latter as realizable only in the distant future, whereas the former is to be collected immediately by subscribers of the capital fund. As Gauthier 1976: 103-4 and Schütrumpf 1982: 72-4 ably demonstrate, such a view is untenable, since Xenophon is quite clear that the monies in the capital fund are to be available for the purchase of slaves and not to be distributed prematurely to those who contribute to the fund (4.34-6). Moreover, it is "absurd" to imagine that Xenophon would advocate in a work devoted to alleviating the poverty of the masses the distribution of monies to wealthy individuals, who have no pressing need for the triobolon.

[180] Gauthier 1976: 88-97, 90-1. For similar interpretations of the campaigns of Lysistratus and Hegesileos, see Thomsen 1964: 228-9, Brun 1984: 43, Migeotte 1992: 16, n.17, and Cartledge 1997: 223.

[181] Gauthier 1976: 89-90, 93-4.

Xenophon's *eisphora* and the Athenian wartime tax: 1) the inclusion of foreign contributors; 2) the disbursement of a daily, fixed rent; and 3) the ideological affiliation with peace.[182] Yet even with these caveats Gauthier's interpretation of an obligatory tax runs into some major obstacles upon further consideration.

First, the contributions to Lysistratus and Hegesileos' campaigns of the late 360s need not refer exclusively to war taxes, since the terms εἰσφορά and εἰσφέρειν are often employed in relation to voluntary public subscriptions known as *epidoseis*.[183] Accordingly, some historians take these references to *eisphorai* as examples of voluntary, not compulsory contributions.[184] Second, Xenophon's three-tiered contribution rates do not correspond to those of the *eisphora*-tax system. While our understanding of the *eisphora* is frustratingly incomplete—"a lake of crocodiles" according to one noted scholar—it is generally agreed that *eisphorai* were levied directly on the capital (both moveable and immovable) of individual citizens according to the value (τίμημα) of their property.[185] Consequently, the financial burden on individual taxpayers varied

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182 Gauthier 1976: 97; "an *eisphora* of peace" (99, 101, and 107).

183 Kuenzi 1923: 16, n.1 and Wyse 1904: 460 citing Isaeus 5.37; Lysias 30.26, 31.15; Demosthenes 45.69. Gauthier 1976: 98 objects to this interpretation, arguing that whenever the substantive (εἰσφορά) and verb (εἰσφέρειν) are used together, "it is always a question of *eisphora*-tax." The examples he cites in favor of this interpretation are inconclusive, and he even acknowledges that Isaeus 5.37 does not support his thesis. Besides, even if he were correct, we simply do not find εἰσφορά and εἰσφέρειν being used together in 3.7-8. Xenophon employs εἰσφορά once (3.9) but this is in reference to his system, not to the war financing during the campaigns of Lysistratus and Hegesileos, which is really what is at issue here.

184 Ste Croix 1953: 52 and Pritchett 1991: 474-5. For the *epidosis*, see Andreades 1933: 349, Veyne 1990: 90-100, Pritchett 1991: 473-85, and above all Migeotte 1992. Hommel in Pritchett 1991: 473-4 offers a succinct definition of the *epidosis*: "A collection of voluntary contributions, which are ordered by a decree of the assembly, in which an individual who lives in Athens, whether a citizen or foreigner, is invited, if he is willing and able, to contribute a sum of money for the purpose determined by the people, which is either an amount as big as the contributor pleases or varying in amount within fixed limits." The procedure is nicely summarized by Pritchett 1991: 475.

185 Pritchett 1991: 474, n. 707. On the τίμημα, see Ste. Croix 1953 and Thomsen 1964.

significantly, and thus there was no uniformity in the contribution rates such as we find in Xenophon's scheme.[186] A uniformity of payment rates, however, is well attested in *epidoseis*. When the assembly invited the citizenry to make subscriptions, they often set minimum and maximum amounts.[187] Xenophon modifies this practice slightly by also including a median amount (500 dr.) alongside the 100 dr. minimum and 1,000 dr. maximum. Overall, these figures appear to be generic, resembling *epidosis*-amounts attested both in Athens and elsewhere in the Greek world.[188] What is more, the total amount of money needed for the capital fund can be estimated somewhere between 30 and 40 talents.[189] As far as the evidence permits us to conclude, the Athenians did not levy *eisphorai* for less than 1% of the total valuation of Attica, that is, 60 talents.[190] Yet

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186 Gauthier 1976: 98 argues against this objection: "in order not to get lost in a diversity of sums, which each person would have to pay, [Xenophon] was compelled to calculate in round numbers." But this argument is a red herring because if Xenophon is truly thinking of an *eisphora*-tax, then all he had to do was simply state the percentage (1%, 2%, etc.) of the assessment, as was common practice (e.g., Demosthenes 14.27).

187 See Migeotte 1992: 316-19. For example, an *epidosis* of 247/6 sets the minimum at 50 dr. and the maximum at 200 dr., whereas the only other amount attested is 100 dr. (*IG* II^2 791, 19-20, 33-81). With the exception of 50 dr., all other numbers are in whole-minai denominations.

188 For 100 dr., see *IG* II^2 791, 49-50, 74, etc.; for 500 dr., *SIG*^{3} 976; for 1,000 dr., Isaeus 5.37.

189 At 4.23 Xenophon suggests starting with 1,200 slaves, which, as we will see below, he estimates to cost between 158 and 195 dr. apiece. For the latter amount we get 32 talents; for the former, 38 talents. He then recommends implementing his proposals for the mines, merchant marine, and rental projects piecemeal: "but if some were proceeded with and others delayed, the income realized would help in establishing what remains to be done" (4.36-38). If we read this passage in conjunction with 4.24, where Xenophon suggests using 40 of the 60 talents made from the leasing of 6,000 slaves "for what ever purpose that is necessary" (εἰς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ), it would seem that he intends to fund the construction of the merchant marine, markets, and rental properties with the revenue generated from the leasing of the slaves. Thus, we may conclude that the total amount needed for the *aphorme* is equivalent to the cost of purchasing the initial 1,200 slaves. For a different interpretation, see Gauthier 1976: 156, who takes the phrase εἰς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ as referring to the distribution of the *triobolon*. I do not think this reading is supported by Xenophon's egalitarian view of the triobolon at 4.33, where "all Athenians" are to receive "sufficient *trophe*." Besides, 40 talents would have guaranteed a triobolon payment for only 1,300 people. Such a premature distribution hardly seems to be worth it.

190 Ste. Croix 1953: 50, Brun 1984: 62, and Osborne 2002a: 125 speculate that a ½ percent *eisphora* was within the realm of possibility, but such a *diakosioste* is unattested. The rate of taxation was set by the assembly, varying between one and two percent of the total valuation of taxable capital in Attica, which

Xenophon's 30 to 40-talent *eisphora* is commensurate with known amounts for *epidoseis*, which generally range between 6 and 50 talents.[191]

Furthermore, two of the three distinctive aspects of Xenophon's *eisphora* to which Gauthier calls attention, the inclusion of foreigners and the ideological orientation to peace, are precisely the distinctive features of *epidoseis*. In fact, Migeotte, the author of the definitive study on the *epidosis,* considers public subscriptions to be "a sign of peace and prosperity."[192] While Athens certainly employed *epidoseis* to finance war far more frequently than other poleis, generally speaking, public subscriptions were the most common means for financing peacetime, civic projects during the late classical and Hellenistic periods, most notably for our purposes, to set up public funds to buy grain for public distribution or reduced sale.[193] Concerning the inclusion of foreigners, it should be emphasized that subscribing to an *epidosis* brought great honor to the donor.[194] Those who promised to contribute had their names and pledges written on tablets, which were placed in front of the statues of the Eponymous Heroes. Sometimes we even find the names and pledge amounts of subscribers inscribed on ornate stelai.[195] Contributions to *eisphorai*-taxes, on the other hand, brought no such distinction—a point well underscored

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was estimated to be 6,000 talents in the fourth century (see Demosthenes 14.19; Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 46; Polybius 2.62.7).

191 For amounts, see Migeotte 1992: 349-50. For example, at Cos we find an *epidosis* yielding as little as 17 talents (Paton-Hicks, I. of Cos 10); but for higher figures, see Plutarch, *Moralia* 849F (Migeotte 5) = 40 talents (with Pritchett 1991: 478, 484), and Migeotte 86 = 52-55 talents. Migeotte estimates that about 80% of the total attested *epidoseis* were of a rather limited amount, that is, in the 20-30 talent range (350).

192 Migeotte 1992: 348.

193 On Athens' use of the *epidosis* to finance war, see Migeotte 1992: 376; cf. Pritchett 1991: 480 and Harris 1994: 106; for the use of the *epidosis* to finance civic projects, see Migeotte 1992: 327-37, 341-56. For the connection between the *Poroi* and the development of grain-funds, most notably at Samos in the late 3rd c. BC, see Bresson 2000: 249-53.

194 For foreign participation, see Garland 1988: 67 and Migeotte 1992: 358-63.

by Croiset: "The sacrifice…of the citizen who contributed to the *eisphora* brought no immediate results and carried with it no honors; his very name, in fact, probably remained unknown to the many."[196] Thus, Xenophon's suggestion to open the subscription up to foreigners so that they may become inscribed as "*euergetai* for all time" accords well with the ideology of the *epidosis*. In short, while none of these objections by themselves speaks against Gauthier's interpretation, taken together they seriously call into question the idea of Xenophon's *eisphora* being an obligatory *eisphora*-tax. Rather, for all the reasons underscored above, the kind of contribution Xenophon has in mind bears a striking similarity to the *epidosis*, and so it must be concluded that participation in the capital fund was not compulsory.[197]

Having established the voluntary nature of Xenophon's *eisphora*, I now turn to the question of who would have contributed to the capital fund. The issue is important because it is often assumed that Xenophon's proposals had as their aim the amelioration of the financial condition of the wealthy (*plousioi*).[198] Given the close relationship between Xenophon's *eisphora* and the *epidosis*, which was theoretically open to any citizen, one might reasonably conclude that all but the poorest citizens would have

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[195] Most notably, see *IG* II^2 791 with Meritt, *Hesperia* 11 (1941): 287-92, which includes over 130 names; cf. also plates I-V in Migeotte 1992.

[196] Croiset quoted in Andreades 1933: 341-2. On direct taxation being anathema to rich citizens, see Andreades 1933: 126-30, Finley 1985: 95 and 230, n.1., and Christ 1990: 152-60 who also treats liturgical oblligations.

[197] In fact, the only thing that differentiates Xenophon's *eisphora* from the *epidosis* is the expectation of a monetary return in the form of a daily *triobolon*. But even in this respect we are not too far from the ideology of the *epidosis*. A public subscription was perceived as a kind of gift to the state, which demanded a return favor, usually in the form of public honor and praise bestowed on the contributor by the rest of citizenry. While this transaction cannot not be considered economic in its strictest, modern sense, it nonetheless conforms to the reciprocal principles of a gift economy, in which one gift, favor, etc. obligates a return from another.

[198] E.g., Schütrumpf 1982: 32, 51-2, 65, Vannier 1988: 186-9, and Veyne 1990: 98.

participated. This seems to be the view of Gauthier, who argues that under Xenophon's plan the "rich citizen" will pay ten minai; the "well-to-do" five minai; and the "less fortunate" one mina. Unfortunately, Gauthier's terminology is not very descriptive, failing to correspond to existing Athenian socio-economic categories. If we assume that the group of "less fortunate" is not a subcategory of the "rich" (*plousioi*), it would appear that he assumes that those of the middle rank, that is, of the hoplite census, would have subscribed to the capital fund. This interpretation is not surprising given Gauthier's understanding of Xenophon's *eisphora* as a compulsory *eisphora*-tax. Some historians, most notably Thompsen in his study of the *eisphora*, contend that the minimum requirement for the *eisphora* was 2,500 drachmai, which was the cutoff mark for the value of an Athenian hoplite's estate, whose numbers in the fourth century were somewhere between 6,000 and 9,000.[199] However, other scholars, especially those of the opinion that the *eisphora* symmories after 378/7 were identical to those for the trierarchy, have contested this view, arguing that only the wealthy (those owning perhaps a minimum of 8000 dr.), representing some 1,200 citizens after the reforms of Periander in 358/7, paid *eisphorai* and state liturgies.[200] Based on this evaluation of Athenian tax

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[199] Thomsen 1964: 194-203, esp. 200-2; cf. Ste. Croix 1953: 45, Jones 1957: 28, Brun 1984: 21-2, Markle 1985: 295-7, and Gabrielsen 1994: 189-90. That the hoplite census was reckoned at a minimum of 2,500 dr. is the thesis of Jones 1957: 9-10, which is endorsed by Ste. Croix 1953: 33, Markle 1985: 292, 295-7, and many others. For hoplite numbers in the fourth century, see Chapter 3, Section 3B.

[200] Ruschenbusch 1978 and 1987, Davies 1981: 34-5, and MacDowell 1986: 438-41 contra Rhodes 1982: 5-11, Brun 1984: 20-1, 30, and Gabrielsen 1994: 182-90, who argue that the symmories established by the trierarchic reform of 358/7 were organized differently from the *eisphora*-symmories of 378/7. A variety of figures have been proposed for the minimum property value of the liturgical class, but those of Davies 1971: xx-xxiv and 1981: 9-37 are generally accepted: "during the fourth century men whose property was worth less than 3 *tal.* were free from liturgical obligations, while men whose property was worth over 4 *tal.* were very unlikely to escape such obligations" (xxiv). He estimates their numbers at 300 to 400 but notes (1981: 19-20) that between 357 and 340 (the year of Demosthenes' reforms) the liturgical class would have also included those of the "leisure class" (those whose estates were valued at a minimum of one talent; see pp. 29, 34-5) and numbered between 1,200 and 2,000 (cf. Casson 1976: 30, Ruschenbusch 1978: 279, n.17,

obligations, only the 1,200 richest citizens would have subscribed to Xenophon's *eisphora*. There are three compelling reasons why the latter view is preferable.

First, like liturgies, *epidoseis* were largely, if not exclusively, the concern of the wealthy and were frequently utilized to supplement trierarchic contributions.[201] Our author is probably alluding to this practice when he mentions that "triremes are often sent out with much expense…" (3.8). Again, after 357 only the 1,200 richest citizens were liable to the trierarchy, and as far as the evidence permits, only those on the trierarchic register made voluntary contributions when the assembly called for subscriptions to finance naval expeditions. Second, the inclusion of Athenians of moderate means creates an impossible situation in which thousands of Athenians would have been encouraged to pay sums well beyond their financial means. For instance, the income generated from a hoplite estate valued at 2,500 drachmai at the customary rate of 8% was 200 drachmai. Considering that a family of four needed somewhere between 366 and 488 drachmai per year to maintain itself, even a 100-drachma contribution would have broken the backs of most Athenian hoplites.[202] On the other hand, the income generated from an estate of a "poorer" rich person (i.e., one possessing an estate valued at a minimum of 8,000 dr.), would have yielded just enough to make such a minimum contribution. Third, commentators have failed to take notice of Xenophon's call to implement his slave-buying program with 1,200 slaves (4.23). This number, which is the same as the

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Rhodes 1982: 8, MacDowell 1986: 444, Ober 1989: 128-9, Christ 1990: 149, and Gabrielsen 1994: 45-53 who argues convincingly that 8,000 dr. is a more likely figure for the minimum property value of liturgical class at this time).

201 Pritchett 1991: 474, 478-9, 485, Migeotte 1992: 338-9, 377-8, and Gabrielsen 1994: 199-206.

202 On these numbers, Chapter 3, Section 3B. For a similar argument, see Ober 1989: 128-9, n. 59. Demosthenes 42.44 is often cited in this regard to demonstrate that some Athenians considered an estate

trierarchic register, cannot be a coincidence. Xenophon, I submit, chose this figure because it introduces a simple calculation in the minds of his wealthy readers vis-à-vis the financial burden they are expected to bear. Whatever happened to be the current market price for a mining slave would have represented the average rate of contribution per individual subscriber. As we will see below, Xenophon himself estimates that each mining slave will cost somewhere between 158 to 195 dr. Considering that individual expenditure for the trierarchy, and even for the syntrierarchy, usually amounted to thousands of drachmai, the average payment of less than 200 drachmai per contributor would have appeared quite reasonable to the wealthy Athenian.[203]

Despite what appears to be nominal contribution amounts, the timing of his proposals, coming as they do a few years after the burdensome *eisphorai* of the Social War, causes Xenophon to fear that many Athenian elites will be financially incapable of subscribing to the capital fund (4.40). To remedy this situation, he proposes the following measure:

> ὑμεῖς δὴ ὅσα μὲν πρὸ τῆς εἰρήνης χρήματα ηὕρισκε τὰ τέλη, ἀπὸ τοσούτων καὶ τὸ ἐπιὸν ἔτος διοικεῖτε τὴν πόλιν, ὅσα δ' ἂν ἐφευρίσκῃ διὰ τὸ εἰρήνην τε εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ θεραπεύεσθαι μετοίκους καὶ ἐμπόρους καὶ διὰ τὸ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων πλείω εἰσάγεσθαι καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιμένια καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς αὐξάνεσθαι, ταῦτα λαμβάνοντες κατασκευάζεσθε ὡς ἂν πλεῖσται <αἱ> πρόσοδοι γίγνοιντο.
>
> Keep the cost of city administration for the coming year to the amount that the taxes brought in before the peace; then take any surplus monies that will accrue to you because of the peace, because of your concern for the

valued at 4,500 dr. insufficient to live on as a rentier (e.g., Jones 1957: 135, n. 1, Davies 1981: 28-9, and Gabrielsen 1994: 51-2).

[203] For some figures, see Gabrielsen 1994: 49-50 and passim.

> metics and traders, because of the growth of imports and exports due to a growing population, and because of the augmentation in market and harbor dues, and invest it [in the capital fund] so that the greatest amount of revenue will be created.[204]

With these remarks, does Xenophon mean that the Athenians should postpone the *eisphora* and for the present simply use the surplus revenues as *aphorme*? Does he intend therefore to give the wealthy a temporary reprieve from their financial burdens? To answer these questions it is imperative that we read the above passage in conjunction with Xenophon's recommendations at 4.36-8: "for if all these schemes were put into effect at the same time, it would be necessary for you to furnish all of the money at once" (ἔτι δὲ πάντων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡμᾶς ἂν ἅπαντα δέοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι). In other words, a gradual implementation of his projects would avoid the necessity of demanding an excessively high *eisphora* at the start.[205] The point of 4.40, then, is not that the employment of surplus revenues will make the *eisphora* unnecessary to execute from the beginning, but rather that with the use of the surplus revenues the total amount of money that the wealthy will have to contribute will be reduced.[206] Thus, in the event that the

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[204] The commentary of Gauthier 1976: 172 is excellent: "In order to comprehend [Xenophon's] proposal it is necessary to remember that taxes were farmed out at the beginning of each year (summer) for predetermined sums which the *telonai* had to settle at fixed dates (at the beginning of certain *prytanies*). Essentially the revenues of the city were not able to grow in the course of a year but only from one year to another. Writing during the winter of 355/4, [Xenophon] foresaw that with the return of peace the taxes farmed out in summer of 354 would yield sums much higher than the preceding year. His reasoning then is as follows. At present (355/4), it is "the sums produced by the taxes" farmed out in the summer of 355 that the Athenians will use to "administer their city." The total of these sums is undoubtedly mediocre. The next year, after better auctions, the total of sums to be collected will be higher. [Xenophon] recommends that the Athenians use for the administration of the city in 354/3 only a sum as large as the one employed in the previous year, and then use the difference as *aphorme* for the realization of his projects."

[205] Gauthier 1976: 169.

[206] Contra Vannier 1988: 188. Naturally, it is impossible to determine the exact amount of surplus revenues that would have offset the cost of the *eisphora*. But if we take Demosthenes' claim that city revenues increased from 130 talents at the end of the Social War to 400 talents by 341 (10.37), we can *exempli gratia* estimate a maximum 20-talent increase from 355/4 to 354/3. Considering that the purchase

wealthy are unable to contribute as generously as they had during the Social War, Xenophon suggests using public monies to offset the initial cost of the *eisphora*.

In sum, Xenophon's *eisphora*, through which will be realized an *aphorme* sufficient to implement his proposals for the financial recovery of Athens and the maintenance of all Athenians, is a kind of contribution that is functionally and ideologically related to the public subscription (*epidosis*). For this reason, we must conclude that participation would have been strictly voluntary and that only the wealthy, practically speaking, would have contributed to the funding of the *aphorme*. Xenophon's major innovation vis-à-vis this quasi *epidosis* is the promise that every subscriber will receive a return on their contribution in the form of a daily triobolon. To be sure, under his plan *every* Athenian will receive the same triobolon regardless of whether they contribute to the capital fund or not. Yet the fact that he concentrates on the wealthy, framing his discussion in terms of the rates of return each of them will receive on the money they contribute (i.e., ὥσπερ ναυτικόν, σχεδὸν ἐπίπεμπτον, ἐπίτριτον, etc.), suggests strongly that Xenophon views each contributor not as a political animal who willingly sacrifices his resources for the benefit of the state, but rather as an investor who when confronted with a number of investment opportunities chooses the one that brings him the greatest return. It is often denied that there was any kind of economic rationality

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of 1,200 slaves would have cost between 30 and 40 talents (see above), the use of these surplus monies could have potentially reduced the cost of the *eisphora* by half to two-thirds. In the following table, I propose a hypothetical payment schedule for the *eisphora* based on Xenophon's contribution rates:

10 minai subscribers (100): property valued 4+ talents (100) = 16 2/3 T
5 minai subscribers (200): property valued at 3-4 talents = 16 2/3 T
1 mina subscribers (900): property valued at 1 1/3-3 talents = 15 T
Total subscribers: 1,200 = 48 1/3 T + metic and foreign contributions of 11 2/3 T = 60 T

Thus, with the use of the surplus revenues, only about a third of the 1,200 richest Athenian citizens would have had to participate in the *eisphora* to finance the capital fund.

in terms of profit maximization in classical Athens, but as my discussion of the Laurion mines in the next section bears out, Xenophon's proposals presuppose that not only did such *homines economici* exist but that Xenophon himself was one of them.

5D. Mining and Economic Rationalism

"Xenophon's project concerning the mines is more important than all his others and by far the most audacious."[207] So begins Gauthier's analysis of the *Poroi's* longest and most complex chapter, and it is difficult not to agree with his appraisal. Here we quickly learn the details of what Xenophon promises at the start: "the earth…when mined feeds many times more people than if the same land produced grain" (1.5). In particular, Xenophon intends to provide the Athenians with sufficient *trophe* by leasing out a cadre of publicly owned slaves at an obol a day to those exploiting the mines until there are three for every citizen, which is to say, until every Athenian collects a daily triobolon (4.13, 17, 33, 48). This is Xenophon's bold, long-term goal, one which may take two to three decades to realize (see below). But the exploitation of the mines also contributes to the realization of his short-term goals: achieving fiscal solvency so that the Athenians can, among other things, celebrate their festivals more magnificently, restore temples and

[207] Gauthier 1976: 110; cf. Cartledge 1997: 167. The most comprehensive studies on the Laurion mines are Conophagos 1980 and Kalcyk 1982, which have replaced Boeckh 1976: 613-76 and Ardaillon 1897, though the latter is still useful. For concise general introductions, see Hopper 1961 and 1979: 170-89, Cunningham 1967, Ellis-Jones 1982, Isager and Hansen 1975: 42-50, and Osborne 1985: 111-26. For discussions on the technical side of silver mining and production, see Conophagos 1980: 125-372, Rihll 2001, and Christesen 2003: 39-46. For the texts of the mine leases, see Langdon 1991: 70-143, which supercedes the earlier work of Crosby 1950 and 1957. For analysis of the mining leases, see Crosby 1950 and 1957, Hopper 1953 and 1968, Conophagos 1980: 428-39, Rhodes 1981: 552-5, Langdon 1991: 57-62, Vanhove 1996, Aperghis 1998, and Shipton 1998 and 2000. Lauffer 1955-6 is still the best study for slavery and the mines, though see Morris 2001 for a recent discussion of archaeological evidence.

repair the walls and naval yards, and restore the ancient privileges to the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry (6.1).[208]

To be more clear, in addition to the revenue that will accrue from the leasing of slaves, other revenues will be generated from the mines as a result of the intensification and expansion of the mining industry: "As for the silver mines, if they were organized properly I think that a great amount of money would come from them apart from any other revenues they may produce" (τά γε μὴν ἀργύρεια εἰ κατασκευασθείη ὡς δεῖ, πάμπολλα ἂν νομίζω χρήματα ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων προσόδων προσιέναι) (4.1).[209] He does not elaborate the point, taking for granted that his audience knows what these other sources of revenue are. Historians have speculated that he is referring to the monies the state received from the mining leases, but the use of the plural τῶν ἄλλων προσόδων indicates that Xenophon is not thinking of these exclusively.[210] At 4.49 he provides some insights when he says that the leasing of slaves will cause a large populous city to grow in Laurion: "much revenue would be generated from the market there, from the publicly owned houses, *from the furnaces* (ἀπὸ καμίνων), and all the other sources (τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων)." The *kaminoi* of which he speaks are probably the publicly owned furnaces, which the state leased out to

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208 To restate a point from an earlier chapter, I do not think Xenophon intends to stop the payment of civic *misthoi* once all citizens begin collecting their daily three obols (cf. Thiel 1922: 55, Wilhelm 1932: 43-4, and Andreades 1933: 389, n.7).

209 Based on their translations, it seems that Giglioni1970 and Marchant 1925 construe that phrase καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων προσόδων προσιέναι as refering to non-mining revenues. This is certainly not correct, as 4.49 demostrates that there were, in fact, other sources of revenue from the mines. See Thiel 1922: 16 and Gauthier 1976: 112-5, 187-8 with the better translations of Schütrumpf 1982 and Waterfield 1997.

concessionaires for the smelting of silver ore.[211] Yet the phrase τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων suggests that the polis derives even more revenues from the mines in addition to those from the furnaces. Some evidence for these revenues exists outside the *Poroi*, but a number of interpretive obstacles stand in the way.[212] Due to the complexity of the subject, we must refrain from speculating on the nature of these mining revenues for now. But whatever their precise nature, it is quite certain that the mines had great fiscal "potential" (δύναμις) (4.1)—a remark that harkens back to Aeschylus' contention that Laurion's "font of silver" (ἀργύρου πηγή) is "treasure trove of the earth" (θησαυρὸς χθονός; *Persians* 238).

In order to appreciate fully Xenophon's proposals vis-à-vis the mines, it is necessary to examine first the history of the Laurion mining industry in the fifth and

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210 E.g., Thiel 1922: 16 and Gauthier 1976: 112-3 contra Crosby 1950: 203-4.

211 Gauthier 1976: 187-8.

212 For instance, there is the enigmatic "five-drachma tax" (see Crosby 1950: 203, n.44, Hopper 1953: 216, n. 114, and Shipton 1998: 58-9) and a 1/24th mentioned in Suda ἀγράφου μετάλλου δίκη *s.v.*: "Whenever those who worked the mines wished to open a new mine they made a declaration to those put in charge of such matters by the people and registered it for taxation purposes (the people having decided that each new mine should pay a 1/24th). Thus, if someone was caught secretly working a mine, it was open to any interested party to initiate a suit and bring forth evidence against him who did register his mine" (οἱ τὰ ἀργύρεια μέταλλα ἐργαζόμενοι ὅπου βούλοιντο καινοῦ ἔργου ἄρξασθαι, φανερὸν ἐποιοῦντο τοῖς ἐπ' ἐκείνοις τεταγμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ ἀπεγράφοντο τοῦ τελεῖν ἕνεκα τῷ δήμῳ εἰκοστὴν τετάρτην τοῦ καινοῦ μετάλλου. εἴ τις οὖν ἐδόκει λάθρα ἐργάζεσθαι μέταλλον, τὸν μὴ ἀπογραψάμενον ἐξῆν τῷ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν). Momigliano 1932: 258 (cf. Crosby 1950: 203, n. 44) argues that this 1/24th was a tax on the ore produced but one that was in existence only in Roman imperial times (cf. Codex Justinian 11.7.2). Other scholars, e.g., Ardaillon 1898: 199-91, Hopper 1979: 184, 186, and Aperghis 1998: 17, consider this tax to be of a fourth-century origin. I see no good reason to doubt the relevance of Suda's testimony for fourth-century mining practices, as it is doubtful the Athenians would have imposed a 1/24th tax on new mines at a time when, by all accounts, mining activity was virtually non-existent (Conophagos 1980: 121-24). The 1/24th may have been a tax on the total ore produced, collected by treasurers of the mines (e.g., *IG* I^3 444, 249; 445, 294; 465, 126) at the furnaces (*Poroi* 4.49), or it may represent a minting fee.

fourth centuries.[213] Let us begin with the period immediately following the infamous "lucky strike" of the 480s when Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to use a surplus of mining revenues to build a fleet of triremes.[214] Though the literary and epigraphic sources touching the exploitation of the mines from ca. 479 to 424 is not particularly rich, the numismatic record supports overwhelmingly the conclusion that silver was produced at a high level between 479 and ca. 450.[215] For the period down to the Peloponnesian war, we have the building accounts for the Propylaia and the Parthenon for the years 439-7 and 434/3, which attest to monies "from the treasurers of the mine Hephaistikon in Laurion" ([παρὰ ταμ]ιῶν hεφα[ισ]τικοῦ ἀπὸ Λαυρε[ίου]).[216] The fact that one mine and, perhaps, more had treasurers assigned to them suggests that revenues from

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213 For discussions of Bronze Age mining in the Laurion region, most notably at Thorikos, see Hopper 1968: 293-4, Mussche et al. 1975, Conophagos 1980: 58-65, and Ellis Jones 1982: 170 with references to the archaeological reports. Much of the evidence for the exploitation of the mines in the archaic period comes from the numismatic record (see the summary in Kroll and Waggoner 1984). Xenophon knew well that the mines had been exploited for some time (*palaia*) but was unable to fix a point in time for their discovery (4.2).

214 Herodotus 7.144; Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 22.7; Plutarch, *Themistocles* 4.1; Polyaenus 1.30.6. Herodotus' contention that Themistocles' proposal was geared to the war with Aegina (cf. Thucydides 1.14.3), which he dates to shortly before 490, seems unlikely. A date after 487, that is, after Marathon, accords better with what we know about Athenian history at this time (see How and Wells 1928: 49). Ps.-Aristotle dates this event specifically to 483/2 and places the discovery at Maronea; he also gives a specific figure of 100 talents. That Laurion silver was used in Athenian and even Corinthian coins as early as ca. 500 belies the notion of a "lucky strike" in a single year (Howgego 1995: 25). Hopper 1961: 141 and Kraay 1976: 62 speculate that the loss of the Thracian mines to the Persians in 512 necessitated the exploitation of Laurion; Picard 2001 dates the discovery of the silver-laden "third vein/contact" to ca. 515. The 100 talents, therefore, probably represents the accumulation of mining revenues in the state treasury over a two-decade period. For the difficulties in accessing the historicity of Ps.-Aristotle and Herodotus' claims, see Hopper 1961: 140-4, 1968: 302-4, and especially 1979: 172-3 and Rhodes 1981: 279.

215 The literary and epigraphic sources, to my knowledge, are limited to Plutarch, *Pericles* 12.6; *Aristides* 5.8; Nepos, *Cimon* 1.3; Aristophanes, *Knights* 362; Pherecrates Fg. 108-11 (Kock); *IG* I^3 90, 11; 444, 249; 445, 294; 465, 126; and Thucydides 2.55.1. The numismatic evidence is summarized in Figueira 1998: 180-97.

216 *IG* I^3 444, 249; 445, 294; 465, 126; cf. Plutarch, *Pericles* 12.6. The exact figure for this contribution is missing, but the mysterious fraction of "five-sixths" (τῶν πέντε μερῶν) is preserved. Fornara 1977: 129 speculates that the five-sixths represents the percentage of silver from the mines, but this seems unreasonable, for very little would be left over for the concessionaire. Perhaps, it is simply five-sixths of

Laurion regularly flowed into the state's coffers at this time. Furthermore, during the first invasion of Attica in the summer of 430, Thucydides says the Spartans proceeded "as far as Laurion, where the Athenians have their silver mines" (2.55.1). Ostensibly, the purpose of venturing so far south was to disrupt mining operations by encouraging the slaves in the mines to defect.[217] Lastly, we have good evidence indicating that two prominent Athenians, Callias of Alopeke and Nicias, made huge amounts of money from the mines at this time.[218] It is therefore reasonable to assume that the Athenians derived a significant amount of revenue during the *pentecontaetia* from this vigorous mining activity.

From the loss of Amphipolis to the occupation of Decelea (424/3-413/2), the mines seem to have been exploited to their full potential. In the *Knights* (424), Aristophanes has the Sausage-Seller declare that he will "purchase mines," implying that he will become a rich man like Callias or Nicias.[219] A decade later, the Chorus of the *Birds* ask Pisthetairos, who is trying to convince them to build Cloudcuckooland as a rival city to Olympus, why humans would choose to worship them instead of the gods. To which he responds:

Pisthetairos: All good things (ἀγάθ′ πάντα) will be laid at their feet.

"payments" from the rents, which the Athenians decreed be paid directly to these two projects, as opposed to some other use.

217 On this occasion, however, the Spartan invasion did little to upset the mining industry (Lauffer 1955-6: 220). See Hornblower 1991: 328 who notes the difficulty in destroying mining infrastructure; cf. Gomme 1956: 162 and Ober 1985: 30. Xenophon's thoughts about fortifying the mining district support this interpretation (*Poroi* 4.43-8). He says nothing of invading armies destroying props, *ergasteria*, etc. Rather, they would hypothetically seize grain, wine, and cattle but nothing else. Hornblower 1991: 328 also speculates that the reference to Laurion may be a scholiast's gloss.

218 For Callias and Nicias' mining activity, see Plutarch, *Nicias* 4 and the *Comparison of Nicias and Crassus* 1; *Memorabilia* 2.5.2, *Poroi* 4.14; Nepos, *Cimon* 1.3 (for the meaning of Callias' nickname of *Lakkoploutos*, "rich in mining pits," see Hopper 1961: 142); and Davies 1971: nos. 7826 and 10808.

219 *Knights* 362 with Sommerstein 1981: 163.

> **Leader of Chorus**: Tell me about one of these "good things."
> **Pisthetairos**: Well, first of all, locusts will not devour their vines. One levy of owls or hawks will utterly destroy them. Nor will there be any ants or gall-bugs wasting their figs. One flock of thrushes will pick all of them up clean.
> **Leader of Chorus**: But from what sources shall we give them wealth (πλουτεῖν)? For this is what they particularly want.
> **Pisthetairos**: The birds will give them oracles to those who seek divinations about the mines (τὰ μέταλλ' αὐτοῖς μαντευομένοις οὗτοι δώσουσι τὰ χρηστά) (586-93).

Remarkably, "all good things" defined in terms of agricultural success has little value in the Chorus' estimation. What matters to them and the Athenians is wealth, which comes, not from traditional economic pursuits like farming, but from mining silver. The equivalence of τὰ μέταλλα with πλουτεῖν suggests that the mines were still very lucrative by 414. Later in the play, the Chorus again promises ἀγάθα to humans, declaring that "the little owls from Laurion will never stop flowing. They'll dwell inside your house, build nests inside your wallets, and leave little owls behind. Then you will live in your houses as if they were temples" (γλαῦκες ὑμᾶς οὔποτ' ἐπιλείψουσι Λαυριωτικαί / ἀλλ' ἐνοικήσουσιν ἔνδον, ἔν τε τοῖς βαλλαντίοις / ἐννεοττεύσουσι κἀκλέψουσι μικρὰ κέρματα. / εἶτα πρὸς τούτοισιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἱεροῖς οἰκήσετε (1106-9). It is noteworthy that the Chorus vows not to usher in a new era of prosperity but to ensure that current levels are maintained and augmented. These lines undoubtedly reference "the importance to the Athenian economy and money supply of the Laureion silver and of confidence in the continuity of that supply."[220]

[220] Rankin 1988: 196.

Furthermore, in 415/4 Alcibiades counsels the Spartans to occupy Decelea, "because the Athenians will be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurion and from the land and law courts that presently profit them so much, and especially from the revenue of their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they will consider it no great matter when they see war being fought with much vigor in the Athenians' own territory" (6.91.7).[221] When the Spartans invaded Attica the following summer, Thucydides asserts that "more than 20,000 slaves defected, of which the greater part were craftsmen (πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες ηὐτομολήκεσαν, καὶ τούτων τὸ πολὺ μέρος χειροτέχναι) (7.27.5).[222] Traditionally, χειροτέχναι has been taken to mean slaves working in the mines, but a number of historians have resisted this identification.[223] Most notably, Lauffer argues that these χειροτέχναι were both workshop slaves from the agricultural settlements and skilled craftsmen from the mining

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221 It is truly perplexing that Westermann 1940: 465 and Lauffer 1955-6: 141 think that Alcibiades' advice to deprive the Athenians of their revenues from the mines has no connection to the Spartans' occupation of Decelea.

222 I follow the OCT and most commentators who read τὸ πολὺ μέρος with manuscript B against the πολὺ μέρος reading of the other manuscripts (cf. Budé and Jameson 1976: 136-7). Moreover, it must be noted that some historians (e.g., Westermann 1955: 8, Gomme et al. 1970: 403, and Finley 1999: 24, 72) round down the number Thucydides gives and write "20,000," forgetting that he states πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες. On the veracity of Thucydides' figure here and elsewhere in the *History*, see Hanson 1992. I would also add that the number Thucydides supplies here was probably calculated (albeit crudely) according to the same method used by Xenophon at *Poroi* 4.24-5, that is, by employing taxation figures (see below). We know that the Spartans collected a *dekate* for Apollo on all property (including slaves) seized during the Decelean occupation (*Hellenica* 3.5.5, Justin 5.10.12, and Plutarch, *Lysander* 27.2 with Pritchett 1991: 373-4). The Thebans, in particular, made a killing buying Athenian slaves on the cheap (Oxyrhynchus Historian 17.3-5). All Thucydides would have needed, then, to estimate the number of slaves that defected was the total figure brought in by the *dekate* (easily attained from temple records) and the approximate, average price the Thebans paid for the slaves (tithe ÷ .10 = total profit from sale of booty ÷ average slave price = total number of slaves sold). Perhaps, the records of sale also included designations of slave occupation, such as οἰκέτης or χειροτέχνης.

operations (*qualifizierte Werkstättenarbeiter aus den Bergbaubetreiben*).[224] Lauffer astutely distinguishes between those working in the shafts and those slaves employed in the *ergasteria* (i.e., in dressing, smelting, and cupellation of the ore).[225] Nonetheless, he contends that the fortifications at Thorikos, Sunion, and Anaphlystos prevented these slaves from escaping to Decelea, whereas their counterparts working in the open *chora* easily escaped.[226] Lauffer believes that the Athenians did, in fact, lose a significant number of mining slaves, but this happened not because of defection but as a result of slave casualties suffered at Arginusae and the mass emancipations carried out afterwards (406).[227] The major problem with this interpretation, however, is that the Athenians did

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[223] For those who interpret χειροτέχναι as mine-workers, see, for example, Ardaillon 1897: 95, Andreades 1933: 270, Hopper 1953: 248, n. 345, Ehrenberg 1962: 185-6, Gomme et al. 1970: 403, Isager and Hansen 1975: 43, Jameson 1976: 136-7, Wood 1983: 19, Strauss 1986: 46, and Sallares 1991: 428-9.

[224] Lauffer 1955-6: 141-2.

[225] This point is lost on Ste. Croix 1981: 506 and Hanson 1992. Both interpret χειροτέχναι to mean agricultural specialists (e.g., vine dressers) because, as Ste Croix believes, "they would have [had] better chances for running away than e.g. mine slaves." Hanson, in particular, claims that the mining slaves worked in chain gangs (219), whereas agricultural slaves were not (sic. Menander, *Dyskolos* 412-16 mentions chains on agricultural workers). The evidence for this claim (which he incidentally does not cite) is meager. Iron fetters have been found in the galleries (Ehrenberg 1962: 186), but this tells us nothing about the extent to which these were used or at what period of exploitation they belong (they may, in fact, be from the Hellenistic era). Plutarch says that some of Nicias' slaves "were bound" (ἐνίων δεδεμένων) (*Comparison of Nicias and Crassus* 1), which demonstrates, at least, that not all slaves were fettered (see Ardaillon 1897: 94-5 who argues that the accounts of poor mining conditions (e.g., Diodorus 3.13; 5. 38) are stereotypical exaggerations and not applicable to classical Laurion). Moreover, while homes excavated at Thorikos exhibit increased security measures, these steps were taken not to keep the slaves in but the silver from walking out (Jones 1975: 121-2). Even assuming that the slaves working in the pits were chained, they represented only about 40% of the total number of slaves working the mines; at least an equal percentage of slaves were skilled (Conophagos 1980: 348; cf. Hopper 1961: 151 who considers even the diggers skilled workers). These were free to move about and thus could easily escape in the event of an opportunity like the occupation of Decelea.

[226] Lauffer 1955-6: 220-24. For the evidence of these fortifications in the fifth century, see Ober 1985: 192-4.

[227] Lauffer 1955-6: 224-6. For slave participation in this battle and emancipations, see *Hellenica* 1.6.24; Aristophanes, *Frogs* 33-4, 190, 693 with scholium (= Hellenicus *FGrH* 4 F 171); Justin 5.6.5; and Garlan 1988: 164-67 and Hunt 1998: 87-95, who argues that the slaves were also given Athenian citizenship (see 93, n. 57 for others with this view). According to Lauffer, because Xenophon says the Athenians "put on board *all* those of military age whether free or slave," then these must have included slaves working in the mines. While it is reasonable to believe that the Athenians followed through on their promises, it is hard to

not fortify the mining district until 409 (*Hellenica* 1.2.2), and thus a considerable number of mining slaves could have defected between 413/2 and 410/09 if not entirely in the former year.[228]

In regard to numbers, it is unclear how many slaves the phrase πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες denotes, the answer to which inevitably influences our reading of τὸ πολὺ μέρος. Naturally, πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες cannot signify a number greater than 30,000 (or else Thucydides would have written πλέον ἢ τρεῖς μυριάδες), and we are probably on safe ground to assume no more than 25,000.[229] Accordingly, the expression τὸ πολὺ μέρος, "the greater part," recommends a figure of at least 12,000 but probably not greater than 15,000.[230] It is important to stress that whatever the number of mining slaves that deserted to Decelea this figure need not correspond to the total number of slaves working in the mines, since not all would have defected. Accordingly, historians' estimates of total slave numbers in the mines vary widely, reaching as high as 54,000 total slaves before the occupation of Decelea.[231] Fortunately, Xenophon provides a check on modern estimates. After introducing the idea that within ten years the

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imagine that all slaves were emancipated (Garlan 1988: 165). For what it is worth, the scholium on Aristophanes, *Clouds* 6 preserves or confuses a tradition that only those who tried to recover the bodies after the battle were granted their freedom. If *IG* II^2 1951is really an honorary inscription for those who fought at Aegospotami, then it is certain that mass emancipations were not carried out, as the inscription attests to hundreds of slaves rowing with their masters in 405.

228 Strauss 1986: 26. The view of Westermann 1940: 465 (followed by Hanson 1992: 210-1, n. 1) that the pluperfect ηὐτομολήκεσαν must refer to whole Decelean War 413-404 is unconvincing (see Ehrenberg 1962: 185, n. 8).

229 Ste Croix 1981: 506.

230 Lauffer 1955-6: 142-3; cf. Gomme 1933: 20.

Athenians may attain a total of 10,000 slaves, he promises "the mines would receive many more times this number (ὅτι δὲ δέξεται πολλαπλάσια τούτων), as anyone who is old enough to remember will testify to the amount the slave tax brought in before Decelea. And further proof comes from the fact that throughout the history of the mines countless numbers of men have worked them, and yet there is no difference between the mines today and in the past, as our ancestors remember them" (4.25).[232] While πολλαπλάσια is not precise, it suggests a figure much higher than 10,000. Lauffer's figure of 25,000 is perhaps the most reasonable estimate for the total number of slaves working in the mines before 413.[233]

With the loss, then, of more than half of the mining workforce (and maybe even more if Lauffer's thesis about mass emancipations after Arginusae is correct) and the continued occupation of Decelea throughout the remainder of the war, silver production went into a serious decline if it did not come to a halt altogether. Consequently, revenues from the mines plummeted.[234] We also learn of dramatic losses in personal fortunes of

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231 E.g., Conophagos 1980: 347-9 = 11,000; Ardaillon 1897: 92-3 = "more than 20,000" (in time of Pericles); Lauffer 1955-6: 144-5 = 20,000-30,000 (cf. Osborne 1995: 31); Isager and Hansen 1975: 43 = "more than thirty thousand"; Gomme 1933: 40-50,000; Kalcyk 1982: 110-4 = 54,100.

232 Reading τὰ ἀργύρεια, not τὸ δημόσιον, as the implied subject with Thiel 1922: 24 followed by Lauffer 1955-6: 144 and Gauthier 1976: 156. There are three possibilities on the identity of the tax to which Xenophon refers: 1) a head tax, paid annually by the master of the slave (for the scant evidence, see Andreades 1933: 283-4): 2) a two percent tax paid on the entry and departure from the Piraeus (e.g., Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1349b17-8 with Gauthier 1976: 157); or 3) a sales tax (Andreades 1933: 154, 281-2 and Lauffer 1955-6: 72 and 144). The first can be ruled out because no known slave head tax is attested in Greece proper. While the other two taxes are better evidenced, a sales tax seems to have been more common elsewhere in Greece.

233 Lauffer 1955-6: 162 (Table 11); cf. Gauthier 1976: 156.

234 *Memorabilia* 3.6.12 is often cited in support of this claim. Here Socrates asks in vain if Glaucon knows "why the revenue from the mines is less than it was before." The dramatic date of the conversation is post-Decelea. Some scholars have interpreted this passage as evidence for a general decline in mining activity during the first half of the fourth century as well (e.g., Hopper 1979: 179 and Ober 1985: 29-9).

Athenians occupied in mining. The defection of 12,000 slaves represents a cost of 300 to 400 talents in real capital and countless talents in opportunity costs.[235] The drop in silver production was so precipitous that the Athenians resorted to minting gold coinage in 407/6, made from the dedications to Nike on the Acropolis, and even introduced silver-plated bronze coinage a year later.[236] Both issues were meant to replace or supplement Athenian silver owls, but the former was used primarily as a foreign exchange currency, whereas the latter circulated domestically, freeing up silver coins for use abroad.[237] These silver-plated coins were probably discontinued shortly after the end of the war, but the Athenians did not strike a new issue of silver tetradrachms until the late 390s.[238] Laurion may have been the source of silver for these coins, but the Athenians most likely obtained their silver from Conon's personal expenditures, Persian subsidies, the *eikoste* and *dekate* imposed by Thrasybulus on the Greek poleis of Asia ca. 391-87, and their own harbor dues.[239] Nonetheless, the total amount of silver put back into circulation was modest, as Lysias still speaks of a "shortage of money" in 389 (19.11).[240]

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235 This figure is based on a 150-200 dr. average for mining slaves (see Lauffer 1955-6: 65; cf. Gauthier 1976: 155-6). Cf. Strauss 1986: 53 who rightly stresses the negative consequences the defection of slaves had on the Athenian economy in terms of opportunity costs.

236 Aristophanes, *Frogs* 718-25 with scholium; Hellenicus *FGrH* 323a F 26; Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 141. See Kroll 1996 who argues conclusively that the πονηρὰ χαλκία in line 725 are silver-plated bronze coins and not simply coppers, as sometimes believed.

237 Thompson 1966: 342-3

238 Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazusae* 815-22 with Kroll 1976: 338-41 and 1883: 8. I follow Sommerstein 1998: 1-8 for a 391 production date (cf. Seager 1967: 107, n. 110) against the traditional 393 date of Rogers 1919 and Ussher 1973.

239 Isager and Hansen 1975: 43 assume the silver came from Laurion, whereas Kraay 1968: 7, Hopper 1979: 179, and Kroll 1993: 8 speculate it was obtained from Persia through Conon (e.g., Nepos, *Conon* 4 mentions 50 talents). It must be noted that Conon also spent his own personal fortune on rebuilding the long walls, which must have put a lot of silver back into circulation (Isocrates 5.64; Demosthenes 20.72-4; Diodorus 16.85.3). For the *dekate* and *eikoste* in the early fourth century, see Appendix 2.

240 Stroud 1974: 171, n.45 and Kroll 1993: 8 also point out that the small number of dies used during the first half of the fourth century indicates a sharp decline in silver production.

The Athenians undoubtedly recognized the need to jump-start the mining industry, but without slaves to work the mines, any discussion or proposal for improving them must have been viewed as moot.[241] The examples of Nicias and the younger Callias were cautionary. As Xenophon tells us, Nicias and Hipponicus, the father of Callias, made huge sums of money by hiring out slaves to concessionaires of mines (i.e., those who leased mines from the state and mined the ore) and to proprietors of *ergasteria* (i.e., those who owned workshops that dressed, smelted, and refined the ore) (4.14-5).[242] This practice of leasing out mining slaves (*apophora*) was lucrative, as the slave-owner collected one obol a day net from the lessee, who contracted to pay such a rate for 360 days, provide *trophe* and lodging, and assume all risks (e.g., losses incurred from sickness, injury, death, etc.).[243] Nicias owned a whopping 1000 slaves and Hipponicus 600, which yielded them yearly revenue of ten and six talents respectively. It is quite reasonable to assume, then, that the defections resulting from the occupation of Decelea caused the sharp declines in the value of their estates and of men like them (Xenophon

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241 See *Poroi* 4.5 with Andreades 1933: 270 who recognizes well that the decline in productivity in the first half of the fourth century was the direct result of the lack of slaves.

242 Gauthier 1976: 113, 134, 151, following Hopper 1968: 320 (cf. Osborne 1985: 117-8), argues that Xenophon's distinction between *kataskeuazomenoi* and *ergazomenoi* (cf. 4.11, 22, 28) reflects a general division in the mining industry between concessionaires who worked the mines (*ergazomenoi*) and proprietors of the land (*kataskeuazomenoi*), who built and owned washeries, *ergasteria*, furnaces, etc. on their land for processing the ore. This bipartite organization of the mining industry is, no doubt, correct, but it is not necessarily accurate to say that the proprietors of the land built or even owned all the *ergasteria* on their property. The operations of Pheidippos of Pithos are instructive, as he was an owner of lands (*edaphe*), a frequent registrant in the leases, and owner of *ergasteria* (see Ito 1986 and Aperghis 1998: 16-7). For instance, one of his *ergasteria* was located on the land of Lysitheides (P28, 4-8), whereas his other was situated on land that he may have owned but where he certainly was a registrant in the mine (P27, 70-2). This latter example should caution against maintaining a strict division of labor between proprietors and concessionaires. Ito argues reasonably that the evidence permits the interpretation that Pheidippos began his career in the mining industry as a concessionaire, who then took the profits earned therein to purchase land on which he built his *ergasteria*.

243 For the inner workings of this system, see Gauthier 1976: 138-43.

intimates there were others).[244] Consequently, finding the private capital to replace these slaves was the main obstacle to the recovery of the mining industry in the fourth century. Strauss' thoughts are insightful: "When peace came, the slaves were not replaced quickly. Not that there was any shortage of candidates: wars in Asia Minor and Sicily would soon provide a market. But Athenian capital was in short supply, and investors probably preferred to put their capital in maritime loans. Not only were these loans generally more lucrative than the mines, but they were easier to hide from the tax collector—no small consideration after 405, when there was no longer any imperial tribute to protect the affluent from *eisphora*."[245]

When did the Athenians decide to make a concerted effort to exploit the mines again? According to Strauss, it was not until Sparta's land power was broken at Leuctra (371) that mining began to appear less risky to Athenian investors. This dating has two advantages. First, the threat of Spartan invasion was so acute during the 370s that the Athenians had to guard constantly their territory, which is one of the main reasons they sued for peace in 375/4 (*Hellenica* 6.2.1). Secondly, 370/9 probably marks the year in which the Athenians first began to inscribe the mining leases sold by the *poletai*.[246]

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[244] For instance, Nicias' estate, once valued around 100 talents, was worth some 14 talents when his son Niceratus died; the younger Callias, whose grandfather's property was rated at 200 talents, had an estate valued at a meager two talents (see Lysias 19.47-8 with Rankin 1988: 198-9).

[245] Strauss 1986: 46.

[246] Since the first, and only complete, stele of the *poletai*, which dates to 367/6, speaks of an earlier stele (P5, line 50), scholars have argued rightly that the publication of the mining leases predates 367/6 (e.g., Crosby 1950: 190 and Hopper 1953: 250-4). Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 47.2 mentions two distinct lease periods (three for *ergasima* and [ten] years for *sunkechoromena*). Unfortunately, the papyrus reading for *sunkechoromena* is uncertain. Editors have read both 'Γ' (three years) and 'Ι' (ten years). If gamma is the correct reading, then a scribal error is most certain because the repetition of the phrase τὰ εἰς τρία ἔτη would be otiose. Crosby, preferring neither three nor ten years, proposed seven, a number she reaches through an idiosyncratic interpretation of the leasing procedure (Crosby 1950: 199-200). Hopper and others have followed suit (Hopper 1953: 237, Rhodes 1981: 554, and Langdon 1991: 60), but Hopper does

While the publication of the leases probably does not indicate a change in mining procedures from fifth century practices, it nonetheless represents a desire to streamline the administration of the mines in the anticipation of increased mining activity.[247] Indeed, at this time there is evidence to support the notion that wealthy Athenians began to invest in the mines again: the first and only complete stele of the *poletai* (367/8) contains seventeen leases, of which seven were contracted by elites.[248] This number is significant because it is more than double the average attested for elite participation in mining activities for the fourth century.[249] In other words, after Leuctra wealthy investors seem to have been reasonably confident that the mines would give them a good return on their investments.

We must be cautious, however, and not push this interpretation too far. While mining activity seems to have been on the rise during this period in comparison to

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not dismiss outright the possibility of ten years. Some more recent studies have argued persuasively that ten years is the most likely reading (Conophagos 1980: 432, Aperghis 1998: 13, and Shipton 1998: 60-1). Accordingly, three dates are possible 377/6, 374/3, or 370/69. Aperghis 1998: 13 (cf. Gauthier 1976: 161) opts for 377/6, which corresponds to the foundation of the Athenian Sea League and the reorganization of finances—"a time when 'openness' of Athenian finances was an issue." As the League was a response to Spartan aggression, I strongly doubt the Athenians would have made a significant move to exploit the mines in this year when invasion was possible. A date of 374/3, coming soon after peace with Sparta, has prima facie plausibility, but this was an uneasy peace. Moreover, the arguments for a seven-year lease period, as just stated, are weak. This leaves 370/69 as the most plausible date for the inception of inscribing the mining leases.

247 Langdon 1991: 60-1 and Crosby 1950: 191, n.5 (citing Aristophanes, *Knights* 362) argue contra Hopper 1953: 253 that the *poletai* were responsible for leasing out the mines during the fifth century and according to the same procedures attested in the fourth. Langdon speculates that the leases from the fifth century would have been written on wood tablets (see Sickinger 1999). He offers two explanations as to why the Athenians decided to publish the leases on stone: 1) to achieve transparency and administrative efficiency; and 2) to assist the scrutiny of public officials during their *euthynai*. These are not mutually exclusive, but I prefer the latter interpretation, because it dovetails with the changes in public finance attested at this time (see Rhodes 1980: 309-11).

248 P5, 40-83 = *Hesperia* 10 (1941): 14-17. Shipton defines "elites" as those who were liturgists (agonistic and trierarchic) or descendants of liturgists.

249 See Shipton 2000: 133-3 with Table 8.1 and 2001: 31-37 with Appendix 1 p. 97 (cf. Crosby 1941: 26-27 for a précis of the prosopography). The average percentage of elites in mining for the fourth century is 19%. The percentage of elites in P5 is just over 40%.

previous decades, historically speaking, the activity attested for 367/6 was abysmal.[250] With the defeat of Sparta in 371 Athens only exchanged one potential threat to their mining interests for another. The Thebans, it must be remembered, were responsible for most of the miseries suffered during the Decelean occupation and profited handsomely from the cheap prices of deserted slaves.[251] Not only did they successfully invade the Peloponnesus on three occasions during the 360s but they also succeeded in detaching the border area of Oropos from the Athenians in 366.[252] Even after their resounding defeat at Mantinea, the Thebans were still considered a threat to Athenian territory throughout the 350s.[253] It is likely, then, that the Athenians did not run back to Laurion in any significant numbers or with any zeal until after 362. This date makes the most sense of Xenophon's comment that "only recently have the Athenians begun to exploit [the mines] again" (νεωστὶ γὰρ πάλιν κατασκευάζονται) (4.28).[254] While mining operations certainly started up again shortly after 371, it is probable that only a few concessionaries ventured back to the mines, and thus silver production remained low throughout the 360s.

In the *Poroi*, Xenophon corroborates this dismal picture of the mining industry in the first half of the fourth century and diagnoses the two main, interrelated reasons for its

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250 For instance, in the *poletai* records for 342/1, we find 61 recorded leases, but the stele is damaged, and may have originally contained ca. 141 (Crosby 1950: 203, n. 46, 245, 289-90.

251 Oxyrhynchus Historian 17.3-5; Demosthenes 18.96; Isocrates 14.31.

252 *Hellenica* 7.4.1; Diodorus 15.76.1.

253 In the *Hipparchicus*, which was composed after Mantinea but before 357 (see Chapter 1, note 40), Xenophon claims that the Athenians have on their borders hostile cavalry as numerous as their own (7.2), which he later identifies as the Boeotians (7.3). In the sections of *Poroi* in which Xenophon discusses defensive strategies for the *chora* (4.43-8), he underscores the relatively close distance between Laurion and Thebes.

254 Xenophon employs the adverb νεωστὶ six times in his works, and when specific times are indicated (e.g., *Hellenica* 4.7.5; Cyropaedia 3.3.36), it indicates a time not more than a few years prior to that of the reference point. The contention of Gauthier 1976: 161 that νεωστὶ harkens back to the 370s is unlikely.

poor state: a lack of capital investment and a deficiency of labor. Slaves were being hired out on the *apophora* system in the 350s, for Xenophon says "many men in the mines today are leased out in this way" (καὶ γὰρ νῦν πολλοί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀργυρείοις ἄνθρωποι οὕτως ἐκδεδομένοι) (4.16). However, it is imprudent to read too much into πολλοί and assume that it represents any kind of return to the slave levels of the fifth century.[255] The point of this sentence is to remind his readers that the old *apophora* system was still in practice. If any of Xenophon's contemporaries had owned and leased out slaves in numbers approximating those of Nicias and Hipponicus, he surely would have mentioned them.[256] In fact, Xenophon asserts that "all those involved in the mining industry today say that they are in need of workers" (4.5). That Athenian citizens themselves worked in the mines further substantiates the claim that there was a shortage of slave labor during this time. Xenophon alludes to them when he claims that "many of

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[255] As does Lauffer 1955-6: 153-61, who estimates 5,000 slaves for 367/6 and some 20,000-30,000 between 360 and 350. His methodology is faulty, since he bases his calculations on a number of groundless assumptions. For instance, he assumes that the "typical" mine employed 50 slaves and that *ergasteria* ordinarily employed 30-35 slaves (cf. Ardaillon 1897: 97). As Hopper 1979: 180 correctly points out, "there is no such thing as "an average mine'." Furthermore, he also presumes that 2/3 of the total number of slaves in the mines worked in the actual production of silver (160). Even if we play this numbers game, we must base our calculations on more "scientific" data. Conophagos' study is the only one that comes close to achieving this criterion. While his calculations substantiate the 30-35 slaves per *ergasterion* figure of Lauffer, they also seriously call into question the idea that 50 slaves were normally employed in the extraction of ore, as each mine (1,000 total during maximum production) require only four slaves to achieve their potential (see 343-8). He never explains how he reaches the figure of 1,000 mines, and I think the number is better put at 500-600 for the highest level of exploitation in the fourth century (see Aperghis 1998: 18-19). Given this adjustment, we are probably talking of no more than ten slaves per mine on average. If we assume, then, that 51 mines were in operation in 367/6 (Lauffer 1955-6: 158), then we reach a total of 510 slaves working in the mines proper. For slave numbers in the production of silver, Conophagos estimates about 90% of the total of slaves working in the extraction of ore. Thus, employing Conophagos' adjusted figures we reach around 970 slaves. This figure must be considered a maximum though, as it is doubtful that concessionaires in 367/6 put the optimal number of slaves in the mines so soon after they opened.

[256] It must be emphasized that the large slave holdings of these men were abnormal, and that the vast majority of slaves were leased out by individuals who owned no more than a few slaves. We know of one Diocleides who actually let out a single slave to work in the mines ca. 415 (Andocides 1.38).

those who are now in the mines are getting old" (πολλοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις γηράσκοντες) (4.22).[257] Because the Greeks reckoned "old age" (τὸ γῆρας) at sixty years, these miners were probably working in the galleries since the early 390s, when the mines were first reopened after the Peloponnesian War.[258]

In respect to the capital situation of the concessionaires, Xenophon offers a nuanced appraisal. In the following passage, he anticipates an objection to his idea that unexplored regions of Laurion may contain more silver than in areas currently under exploitation.

> τί δῆτα, φαίη ἄν τις, οὐ καὶ νῦν, ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν, πολλοὶ καινοτομοῦσιν; ὅτι πενέστεροι μὲν νῦν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ τὰ μέταλλα· νεωστὶ γὰρ πάλιν κατασκευάζονται· κίνδυνος δὲ μέγας τῷ καινοτομοῦντι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὑρὼν ἀγαθὴν ἐργασίαν πλούσιος γίγνεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εὑρὼν πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν ὅσα ἂν δαπανήσῃ. εἰς τοῦτον οὖν τὸν κίνδυνον οὐ μάλα πως ἐθέλουσιν οἱ νῦν ἰέναι.
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> Why then, one may ask, are there not as many new cuttings being made now as in the past? The reason is simply because those currently working

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257 Most commentators interpret πολλοὶ…γηράσκοντες as referring to Athenian citizens and not slaves (e.g., Ardaillon 1897: 90, Thiel 1922: 23-4, Lauffer 1955-6: 10-13, and Gauthier 1976: 152-3 contra Giglioni1970: cxiv-cxv). Lauffer 1955-6: 12, citing *Memorabilia* 2.8 (Socrates' conversation with Eutherus on the nobility of supervisory work), argues that they were specifically "wage-earners" (*Lohnarbeiter*). Gauthier 1976: 153-5, however, has vigorously challenged this interpretation, arguing that these old miners were small, self-employed concessionaires. The similarity between the two passages is striking though (see the list of scholars Lauffer cites on p. 12, n. 1 who also agree), and Gauthier's attempt to severe the connection between the two is feeble. Essentially, he argues that because the passage from the *Poroi* says nothing explicitly about *misthos*, it is not relevant to Eutherus' situation. But what seems to me to speak decisively against Gauthier's interpretation is that it makes nonsense of Xenophon's reasoning in 4.22. Here Xenophon is answering the imagined objection of those who think that not enough employers will be found to lease the public slaves. He answers first by claiming that there will be many concessionaires with sufficient funds to lease them, because, as I argue below, they will have extra capital from the *triobolon*. Why would he then introduce a separate, sub-category of concessionaires, whose small-time operations make them unlikely to lease large quantities of slaves? On the other hand, highlighting the fact that a large percentage of the labor force is soon to retire and in need of replacement makes much better sense.

258 Perhaps these *gerontes* were the sons of those freed and enfranchised (so Hunt 1998: 92-5) after Arginusae.

> in the mines are poorer. For only recently have the Athenians begun to exploit [the mines] again, and for him who makes a new cutting it is a very risky enterprise. For if he discovers a good gallery he becomes rich, but if he discovers nothing, he loses everything that he has spent. Therefore, I suppose that people today are quite reluctant to take such a risk (4.28-9).

First, it is important to stress that the phrase πενέστεροι μὲν νῦν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ τὰ μέταλλα refers to the whole class of mining concessionaires. These men are not "poor" per se but have fewer financial resources than their counterparts had in the past, that is, during the period of exploitation before Decelea. This financial handicap prevents them not from exploiting existing mines but from making "new cuttings" (*kainotomiai*). Modern research has substantiated Xenophon's claim of the risk involved in making *kainotomiai*. Conophagos estimates that it would have taken at least six slaves (working around the clock and in twelve hour shifts) digging with a hammer and chisel to burrow nine meters a month (mine depths in Laurium range from 30 to 119 meters and average around 50).[259] For a six-person crew, maintenance expenses amounted to 110 drachmas per month.[260] The digging of a single 50-meter mining shaft, then, would have cost just over 600 drachmas. But this does not take into consideration the need for gallery explorations and ventilation shafts, and so "it is unlikely that more than a few mines could have been brought into operation in under a year and most would have required one or two years and sometimes even three."[261] Thus, the financial commitment to undertake *kainotomiai* was enormous, and as Xenophon notes well, there was still no guarantee of

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259 Conophagos 1980: 199-200, 343-4.

260 Conophagos 1980: 351 puts the annual expense for a single slave at 219 drachmas (61 dr. for *apophora*; 122 dr. for *trophe*; 24 dr. for clothing, shoes, and other such expenses; and 12 dr. for depreciation costs).

261 Aperghis 1998: 6.

success. Consequently, most concessionaires during this time were exploiting existing mines, which, though less risky, were probably not very productive.[262] In brief, the example of *kainotomiai* underscores well the major financial problems confronting the mining industry in the first half of the fourth century.

Xenophon's program for reconstituting and expanding the mining industry addresses directly and innovatively the labor shortages and financial woes plaguing the Athenians vis-à-vis the mines. In essence, he makes three suggestions to expand and intensify silver production.[263] The first measure he proposes is the creation of a large pool of publicly owned slaves, which the state will lease out to concessionaries and to owners of *ergasteria* on the *apophora* system (4.17, 49). Xenophon asserts that the only "novelty" of his plan is that "just as private individuals have furnished themselves with a permanent income by owning slaves, so too the polis will own public slaves until there

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[262] According to the most recent and best-to-date reconstruction of the leasing procedure (Aperghis 1998: 6-8, 13), a *kainotomia* (new-cutting) was leased for 1-3 years, at which time, if silver was discovered, the mine was reclassified as an *ergasimon* (a workable mine) and leased for 3 years; after this period the mine was reclassified yet again, becoming an *anasaximon* (a mine that can be equipped again) with a 10-year lease period and perhaps with a renewal option for another 10-year term; if the mine was abandoned or left idle for more than a year and then brought back into operation, it was classified as *palaion anasaximon* (a mine that once had been an *anasaximon*) with a ten 10-year lease period (cf. Crosby 1953: 198 and Hopper 1953: 236). Because most *palaia anasaxima* mines were leased for 20 drachmas (see Shipton 1998: 60, Table 2), it is reasonable to assume that they were generally not very productive (though some like P27, 96 and P19, 26 were certainly very profitable). The preponderance of 20 drachma leases (52% of total prices; see Shipton 1998: 58, though note she does not include P19, 26) "suggests that in the period between 367/6 and c300 BC a considerably greater number of old mines was opened up compared to new ones" (Aperghis 1998: 8). Interestingly, the stele for 367/6 (P5) records 17 leases, of which 12 are priced at 20 drachmas. If these represent *palaia anasaxima* (though we have no way of knowing for sure; see Crosby 1941: 24), it would seem that the vast majority of mines reopened after ca. 370 were once *anasaxima*. According to Conophagos 1980: 196 galleries were typically 0.6 m^2, which would have allowed only one worker to dig on its face. Thus, compared to making new cuttings, reworking an old mine would have been much less expensive to operate.

[263] As is clear from his discussion, Xenophon aims to put "the greatest amount of slaves" not only in existing mines (4.11), but also in new mines (*kainotomiai*) (4.28-32), since areas rich in silver "always extend beyond" those that are exploited (4.3). This point is somehow lost on Samuel 1983: 29, who maintains that Xenophon's proposals are based on what he calls "lateral expansion" (increase in overall activity) rather than "any intensification of production or revenue yield" (cf. Lowry 1987: 63-4).

are three for every Athenian citizen" (4.17). Indeed, the Athenians leased out sacred plots and houses (4.19), and as we have seen, Xenophon recommends the public ownership of hotels, places of exchange, and a merchant marine (3.12-4). The Athenians also possessed a considerable number of public slaves.[264] Technically speaking, then, Xenophon is correct, but what must also be considered an innovation, though he is reticent to admit it, is the scale of the proposal.[265] To be sure, he advises implementing the plan gradually (4.23-4, 36), but "three for every Athenian citizen" suggests slaves numbers somewhere between 60,000 and 90,000.[266] These totals represent a capital investment of at least 1500 talents but perhaps as much as 3000, which is half the total valuation (*timema*) on taxable capital in Attica![267] If Lewis is correct in his estimation that the scale of public property in Athens was somewhere between five and ten percent, Xenophon's suggestion must have been seen as revolutionary.[268]

The inventive and revolutionary aspects of Xenophon's proposal go a long way in explaining why the section on the mines is so much longer than the rest. To convince his readers that his plan to "channel the largest amount of men into the mines" (4.11) is both practical and expedient, he employs many different kinds of arguments. These generally fall under two distinct categories: the historical and the theoretical. In respect to the

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264 In general, see Jacob 1928 and Lewis 1990: 254-8, who conservatively estimates their numbers at "several hundred," but suggests that "there would be nothing particularly surprising if the total ran into four figures" (257)

265 Rightly noted by Gauthier 1976: 144.

266 Fourth-century population numbers probably vacillated between 20,000 and 30,000 (see Section 3D).

267 Based on a price of a 150 dr. per slave, we get 1500-2250 talents; for 200 dr. per slave, 2000-3000 talents. It should be noted that Xenophon's presentation in 4.23-24 implies an average price of a slave at 158 dr. or 195 dr. (depending on whether the Athenians implement the increase of 1200 to 6000 slaves in five or six years). For the calculations, see Thiel 1922: 52-3 and Lauffer 1955-6: 67-8. For Attica's *timema* in 378/7, see Demosthenes 14.19; Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 46; Polybius 2.62.7.

former, Xenophon repeatedly invokes examples from the past, especially from the period of lucrative exploitation before the occupation of Decelea (4.3, 13-17, 25, 28, 43-8). If ca. 25,000 represents a fair estimate of their numbers, it appears that Xenophon envisions at least a two-fold increase in the size of the slave labor force. Since it would take at least a decade to reach 10,000 slaves (4.23-4) and probably another to attain 20-25,000, Xenophon's invocation of the past is a persuasive rationale for the realization of the short-term goals of his proposal.[269]

To support the implementation of his long-term goal of three slaves for every citizen, however, Xenophon employs a theoretical argument, for which he has suffered endless abuse at the hands of modern scholars.[270] After introducing the quasi-empirical observation that the silver at Laurion will never run out (4.2-3, 11), he boldly contends that silver will never lose its value, thus suggesting that the mines can admit a work-force of the magnitude he is proposing without causing a devaluation of silver.[271]

> **(6)** καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ὥσπερ ὅταν πολλοὶ χαλκοτύποι γένωνται, ἀξίων γενομένων τῶν χαλκευτικῶν ἔργων, καταλύονται οἱ χαλκοτύποι, καὶ οἱ σιδηρεῖς γε ὡσαύτως· καὶ ὅταν γε πολὺς

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[268] Lewis 1990: 259.

[269] To be precise, based on his calculations at 4.23-4 an initial investment of 1,200 slaves in ten years would have yielded 10,327. If the Athenians continued to reinvest a third of their earnings into the purchase of additional slaves, as Xenophon suggests, 29,555 slaves would have been realized in 20 years and 87,358 in 30 years. The idea that it would have taken "a hundred years" for the benefits of the program to accrue to the Athenians is thus untenable (Michell 1940: 97, n. 2; cf. Andreades 1933: 389-90).

[270] Bresson 2000: 294-5 and 2005: 53 calls attention to the "theoretical" turn of Xenophon in these sections.

[271] Xenophon has been criticized for being "foolish" and "naïve" in holding the view that the silver in Laurion was inexhaustible (e.g., Boeckh 1976: 608, Andreades 1933: 387, and Gauthier 1976: 116). But as Giglioni 1970: xcix rightly notes, Xenophon is not thinking of an inexhaustible source of silver for all time but rather for the foreseeable future. Lauffer 1975: 174-6 supports this interpretation by citing evidence for the continued exploitation of the mines throughout the Hellenistic era, and we may also point to the modern exploitation of the mines by the Greek Metal Works Company of Lavrio (1873-1917) and la Compagnie Française des Mines du Laurium (1875-1982).

σῖτος καὶ οἶνος γένηται, ἀξίων ὄντων τῶν καρπῶν, ἀλυσιτελεῖς αἱ γεωργίαι γίγνονται, ὥστε πολλοὶ ἀφέμενοι τοῦ τὴν γῆν ἐργάζεσθαι ἐπ' ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας καὶ τοκισμοὺς τρέπονται· ἀργυρῖτις δὲ ὅσῳ ἂν πλείων φαίνηται καὶ ἀργύριον πλέον γίγνηται, **(7)** τοσούτῳ πλείονες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο ἔρχονται. καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἔπιπλα μέν, ἐπειδὰν ἱκανά τις κτήσηται τῇ οἰκίᾳ, οὐ μάλα ἔτι προσωνοῦνται· ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδείς πω οὕτω πολὺ ἐκτήσατο ὥστε μηκέτι προσδεῖσθαι· ἀλλ' ἤν τισι γένηται παμπληθές, τὸ περιττεῦον κατορύττοντες οὐδὲν ἧττον ἥδονται ἢ χρώμενοι αὐτῷ.

For indeed [mining] is not like bronze-working, in which whenever there is a large number of smiths, the price of bronze products drops, and they are forced to quit their businesses; and the same thing happens also with iron-workers. Likewise, whenever there is a surplus of grain and wine, and the prices of these crops fall, farming becomes unprofitable, so that many farmers abandon working the land and turn to trade, retailing, and money lending. However, with silver ore the more of it that is discovered and the greater supply there is of money, the more people pursue this kind of work. For instance, with furnishings, whenever people acquire a sufficient amount in their house, they do not buy any more; but with money no one has ever yet acquired so much that he no longer has the need for more. But if they were to acquire a great quantity of it, they would be no less satisfied in burying the surplus as they would in employing it (4.6-7).

Traditionally, this passage has been quoted to demonstrate not only Xenophon's naiveté, but also the absence of any kind of economic mentality among the ancient Greeks.[272] Yet it must be emphasized that Xenophon does, in fact, observe the law of supply and demand operating in other metallurgical industries and in agriculture.[273] Indeed, he goes on to assert that "gold is no less useful than silver," but "when gold is plentiful it loses its

[272] Jones 1957: 95 and Gauthier 1976: 120. For other similar views on Xenophon's naiveté, see, for example, Thiel 1922: 19, Pöhlmann 1984: 245, Andreades 1933: 387, n. 7, Hopper 1961: 139 and 1979: 188, Cawkwell 1963: 64, Breitenbach 1967: 1757, and Conophagos 1980: 114. Some authors from the Roman period (e.g., Polybius 34.10.10; Suetonius, *Divine Julius Caesar* 54.2; *Divine Augustus* 41.2; Cassius Dio 51.21.5; Josephus, *Jewish War* 6.6.1) seem to establish a direct link between prices and the money supply (Bresson 2005: 51-2).

values, whereas silver gains in value" (χρυσίον μηδὲν ἧττον χρήσιμον εἶναι ἢ ἀργύριον, τούτῳ μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω, ἐκεῖνο μέντοι οἶδα, ὅτι καὶ χρυσίον ὅταν πολὺ παραφανῇ, αὐτὸ μὲν ἀτιμότερον γίγνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀργύριον τιμιώτερον ποιεῖ) (4.10).[274] What Xenophon seems to be arguing in these two passages, then, is that silver, unlike other metals and products, is unique because it does not depreciate with increases in supply.

A handful of historians have given Xenophon the benefit of the doubt, trying to make sense of his remarks in the context of Athenian economic practices and monetary circulation during the fourth century.[275] Most notably, Bresson draws attention to the fact that the word ἀργύριον in 4.6-7 can mean both silver and money, and thus Xenophon's point, he argues, is not that silver always retains its value but that silver money exhibits a peculiar nature in which its value is relatively stable.[276] The reason for this phenomenon, Xenophon explains, is that money has an almost infinite demand: "with money no one has ever yet acquired so much that he no longer had need for more." Moreover, "whenever states are prosperous people have a strong need for money" to purchase luxury goods, and "when states are in crises…they have even a greater need for

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[273] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 318-9.

[274] Cf. 4.36. Research has now corroborated Xenophon's claims about the relative value of gold to silver (see Lauffer 1975: 176-7, Gauthier 1976: 133-4 and the references therein, and Figueira 1998: 511-7, 521-7). Historically, the gold to silver ratio has remained fairly constant, but during periods of increases in the gold supply (e.g., ca. 420-400), the value of gold depreciated and silver appreciated.

[275] Von der Lieck 1933: 47, Giglioni 1970: lxxvii-lxxvii, and Bresson 2005: 52-6.

[276] Bresson 2005: 52.

coined currency" to purchase food and to pay for national defense.[277] Xenophon was not the only Greek to note this unique quality of money, as Aristotle also recognized its relative stability in value.[278] But Xenophon, unlike Aristotle, explains why money is different, expressing, albeit in a rudimentary form, the modern theory of marginal utility:

> The argument is thus that demand for ordinary goods is limited by the satisfaction of the needs of the individual, the marginal utility for those goods decreasing toward zero...In contrast with ordinary commodities, for the individual the marginal utility of money does not decrease toward zero, because money can provide for future consumption and security. Money is a commodity, but a commodity that has characteristics that make it quite different from all other goods…Xenophon's observation is sensible and perfectly right. The contrast he makes between money and other commodities might be seen as an opposition between a commodity and inelastic demand.[279]

Even though money behaves in this way, the law of diminishing returns stipulates that it cannot retain its value ad infinitum. As supplies continue to increase apace, money will

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[277] 4.8-9: καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε εὖ πράττωσιν αἱ πόλεις, ἰσχυρῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀργυρίου δέονται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρες ἀμφὶ ὅπλα τε καλὰ καὶ ἵππους ἀγαθοὺς [τε] καὶ οἰκίας καὶ κατασκευὰς μεγαλοπρεπεῖς βούλονται δαπανᾶν, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες εἰς ἐσθῆτα πολυτελῆ καὶ χρυσοῦν κόσμον τρέπονται. ὅταν τε αὖ νοσήσωσιν <αἱ> πόλεις ἢ ἀφορίαις καρπῶν ἢ πολέμῳ, ἔτι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἀργοῦ τῆς γῆς γιγνομένης, καὶ εἰς ἐπιτήδεια καὶ εἰς ἐπικούρους νομίσματος δέονται.

[278] *Nichomachean Ethics* 1133b with Bresson 2005: 54-6; cf. Gauthier 1976: 67 who also cites this passage in relation to *Poroi* 4.6-7 but fails to draw the necessary theoretical conclusion.

[279] Bresson 2005: 53. Cf. Lauffer 1975: 192, n.10 and Doty 2003: 11-12 who both cite the observations of John Maynard Keynes in *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (= Keynes 1936: 130). There the economist notes that gold does not suffer from the disadvantage of marginal utility. In fact, the principle of marginal utility was recognized much earlier. Most notably, John Baptise Say, *A Treatise on Political Economy* II.4.15 (1803), who discuses the notion in relation to *Poroi*: "The general use of silver amongst all the civilized nations of the world, coupled with its great facility of transport, makes it a commodity of such extensive demand, that none but a very large influx of fresh supply can sensibly affect its value. Thus, when Xenophon, in his essay on the revenues of Athens, urges his countrymen to give more assiduous attention to the working of the mines of Attica, by the suggestion, that silver does not, like other commodities, decline in value with the increase in quantity, he must be understood to say, that it does not perceptibly decline. Indeed, the mines of Attica were too inconsiderable in their product, to influence the value of the stock of that metal then existing in the numerous and flourishing states upon the borders of the Mediterranean Sea, and in Persia and India; between all which and Greece the commercial intercourse was sufficiently active, to keep the value of silver stationary in the Grecian market. The driblet of silver, furnished by Attician metallurgy, was a mere rivulet trickling into an ocean of existing supply."

eventually exhibit a decline in its marginal utility and thus depreciate. His long-term goal of increasing the slave supply to three for every Athenian, therefore, is still problematic because this augmentation quite possibly could have led to a situation in which the supply of silver would have outstripped demand.[280] Xenophon accounts for this paradox by introducing the phenomenon of hording: "if they were to acquire a great quantity of money, they would be no less satisfied in burying the surplus than they would in employing it." [281] According to Bresson, hoarding was *the* mechanism in the ancient world for absorbing the overproduction of currency, and this interpretation is undoubtedly correct, *a fortiori*, because Xenophon's trading peace would have ensured that hoarding became a universal phenomenon by promoting the even wider circulation of Athenian money outside Attica.[282] In other words, widespread hoarding would have

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[280] Bresson 2005: 53 speculates that silver production would have had to be increased between twenty and fifty times to render Xenophon's statements false. These numbers must be viewed as strictly notional, as there is no way of calculating accurately the demand for Athenian silver at this time.

[281] The modern analogy to hoarding is the stockpile of foreign currency reserves. Currently, the US dollar is the world's largest reserve currency (65.7% according to the IMF). As long as nations, especially those in Asia, continue to stockpile dollars and hold them back from the market, the Federal Reserve can continue to print the dollar at unprecedented and somewhat alarming (to this observer anyway) levels, without it plummeting in value.

[282] As argued in Chapter 4, Section 4A, people living on the periphery of the Athenian world in particular have a strong demand for Athenian money, which they obtain through the trading of necessary foodstuffs with the Athenians (cf. 3.2). Thus, we must appreciate Xenophon's notion of the stability of silver currency in the context of a Mediterranean-wide economy, in which money circulates freely and swiftly from center to periphery, where a portion of it is eventually taken out of circulation through the practice of hoarding (contra Gauthier 1976: 132-3). This is more or less the argument of Giglioni, who contends that a large amount of the silver produced at Laurion would have circulated outside of Attica as monetary payments for imports (Giglioni 1970: lxxvii-lxxvii; cf. von der Lieck 1933: 47). Based on my calculations (Section 3D), grain imports would have cost the city somewhere between 800 and 1,200 talents a year. During the fifth century, some 600 talents circulated back to Athens in the form of tribute and other imperial revenues (Thucydides 2.13.3; some states paid tribute in non-Attic coinage, but a majority of payments were made with Athenian owls; see Figueira 1998: 265-85). In the fourth century, many of these imperial revenues still existed but in much smaller quantities, and *syntaxeis* often went directly to pay for combat operations in the field, which kept this money from being repatriated (there is no evidence to my knowledge to support the idea that allies paid their *syntaxeis* with Athenian currency). Moreover, the need for grain-producing states to balance their own payments would have further increased the demand for Athenian currency, as Xenophon suggests in 4.7-8. Indeed, many Athenian coins have been found in

guaranteed that the supply of Attic currency never exceeded demand. Consequently, Xenophon's proposal to "channel the largest amount of men into the mines" is predicated not upon naiveté but rather upon rational economic analysis.[283]

The second recommendation vis-à-vis the mines has yet to be identified by commentators but suggests itself upon careful consideration of Xenophon's remarks at 4.22. There Xenophon answers the imagined objection of those worried that an insufficient number of employers will be found to lease the public slaves: "If anyone is pondering such a thing as this…let him take heart by considering the fact that many of those who exploit the mines will lease the public slaves, since they will have a sufficient amount of capital" (εἰ δ' αὖ τις τοῦτ' ἐνθυμεῖται…ἐκεῖνο κατανοήσας θαρρείτω, ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν κατεσκευασμένων προσμισθώσονται τοὺς δημοσίους, πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα). A majority of translators interpret the phrase πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα as a reference to the financial resources of the concessionaires and proprietors of *ergasteria*.[284] Gauthier objects strongly to this reading because he believes it contradicts 4.28, where those working the mines are said to

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hoards in parts of the world under Persian control (e.g., southern Anatolia and Syria) or where no local currency existed (e.g., Egypt) (for reviews of the evidence, see Schönert-Geiss 1973 and 1974, Isager and Hansen 1975: 42-9, Kraay 1976: 72-77, Howgego 1995: 95-8, Figueira 1998: 21-48, and van Alfen 2000 and 2002; some Athenian silver has even been discovered in Egypt in bullion form; see Kroll 2001; cf. Howgego 1995: 89-90). For instance, Greek cities subject to Persia needed money to make tribute payments, whereas Egypt also required money to pay for mercenaries and to facilitate trade (Figueira 1998: 231-6, 260-5, 529, 535, Kroll 2001: 14, Bresson 2005: 49-50, and Engen 2005). As long as states needed money to conduct trade, to pay tribute and other imperial taxes, and to disburse money to cover the costs of political administration, the transference of specie from Attica to these silver-starved areas of the Mediterranean was all but guaranteed.

283 That Xenophon moves beyond mere "observation" to "economic analysis" in these sections is rightly underscored by Samuel 1983: 22-5, though I find his conclusions much too tentative.

284 E.g., Marchant 1925, Chambry 1958, Giglioni 1970, Schütrumpf 1982, Waterfield 1997, and Doty 2003.

be πενέστεροι. He proposes construing τὰ ὑπάρχοντα alternatively not as "resources in money," but rather "resources in ore available" for exploitation.[285] While this interpretation has some prima facie plausibility, it distorts what Xenophon actually says.

As argued above, πενέστεροι indicates that concessionaires are not poor but "poorer" in comparison to those of the past. The situation envisioned at 4.22, on the other hand, is in the distant future "when the labor force becomes abundant" (ἐπειδὰν πολλοὶ ἐργάται γένωνται), that is, whenever there are three slaves for every citizen (4.17). It is important to note that once slave numbers reach this level, Xenophon promises that all Athenian citizens will be drawing the *triobolon*. This goes a long way in explaining the reason why those working in the mines will have "a sufficient amount of capital" to lease the public slaves.[286] While most Athenians will use this money for food purchases, those above the subsistence level (but not the rich exclusively), Xenophon intimates, will elect to invest their *triobolon* in the mines. For concessionaires

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[285] Gauthier 1976: 152; cf. Moyle 1697: 28, Thiel 1922: 23, and Lauffer 1955-6: 11 who translate τὰ ὑπάρχοντα similarly. Be it noted that Gauthier contradicts himself here because in his commentary of 4.28 he does not read πενέστεροι as referring to the financial condition of concessionaires at all; rather he interprets it as a statement about the productivity of the mines themselves. He concludes from this reading that "in reality, it seems [Xenophon] does not even consider the necessary start up costs of private individuals; for him, the assurance of rapid gains (except in the case of *kainotomiai*; cf. 4.28) renders the problem of initial financial resources a secondary concern ([Xenophon's] attitude, which is the fruit of excessive optimism, is one of the main weaknesses of his program)." Indeed, Xenophon is not too concerned with the "initial financial resources" of the concessionaires because he intends to begin the program with a meager 1,200 slaves (4.23). For the short term, those working the mines must have had the necessary capital to lease these slaves because Xenophon claims that what entrepreneurs required most of all was workers, not an abundance of capital (4.5). The latter was required largely for *kainotomiai*.

[286] It must be remembered that Xenophon introduces these sections about the mines to elucidate his discussion about *trophe*. In fact, the whole discussion between 4.13 and 4.32 is nominally about *trophe* (cf. ἵνα δὲ καὶ σαφέστερον περὶ τῆς τροφῆς εἴπω (4.13) with (4.33): καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ εἴρηται ὡς ἂν ἡγοῦμαι κατασκευασθείσης τῆς πόλεως ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις τροφὴν ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γενέσθαι).

with a limited amount of capital, 180 drachmas would have contributed handsomely to the reduction of labor costs. For instance, in a six-slave mining outfit, a concessionaire would have saved about 15% per annum—a significant amount even by modern standards.[287] For other concessionaires wishing to expand their operations in the event of owning a productive mine, the addition of a single slave to his outfit may have yielded a return of well over 50% on his investment.[288] It is noteworthy that Xenophon recommends that the state also embrace the same entrepreneurial ethic by reinvesting the profits from the *apophora* system into the purchase of additional laborers (4.23-4). As

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[287] For the costs involved, see above, note 260. While there was not such thing as a "typical" mining outfit, Conophagos' figures (1980: 199-200, 343-9) offer the best approximation of ancient employment numbers in the various modes of silver production. He estimates a maximum of three slaves (working 12-hour days) for making the initial cutting. Once ore was discovered, no more than one slave would have been able to work in a gallery at a time due to their small size (cf. Rihll 2001: 116). At this point, perhaps the other slaves began the initial dressing of the ore (Conophagos suggests that three slaves were sufficient to process a ton of ore). As far as the remainder of the silver production process (i.e. the grinding, washing, smelting, and cupellation of the ore) it is uncertain whether concessionaires leased *ergasteria* to process the ore themselves with their own slaves or paid owners of *ergasteria* (maybe a certain percentage (ca. 20%?) of the finished product) to process their ore for them. The latter scenario is much more likely though (see Michell 1957: 105 and Ito 1986: 460), since the production of silver ore required a much higher degree of technical expertise than the average miner possessed. Some concessionaires, such as Pheidippos of Pithos (see above), owned their own *ergasteria* and thus processed their own ore themselves. But he was very wealthy, and it is unknown how typical his case was.

[288] Based on Conophagos' figures (see table on p. 343), a single slave working a 12-hour day for 350 days a year could have extracted 18.5 tons of ore or 5 kg of silver (after possessing), which works out to 1092 dr. of coined money. After subtracting labor costs (243dr.), processing costs (estimating two payments of 20 percent of total silver production—one for dressing and washing the ore in the *ergasterion*, the other for smelting and refining at the furnace; see previous note), state taxes ($1/24^{th}$ of total silver production), and a small amount to cover leasing fees (variable, but averaging just under 450dr., though Aperghis 1998: 17 notes that this figure is a bit distorted, as there are a few leases with extremely high rents), which I take as a per annum payment, we get about 350dr. left in profit (naturally, for those concessionaires who owned their own *ergasteria*, the profit margin would have been much higher). Cf. Aperghis 1998: 18-9 for a similar calculation of mining profits, but one that is lower than mine because he assumes wrongly that the state mining tax was not $1/24^{th}$ of production, but rather $1/10^{th}$ (see above, note 212); Conophagos' estimate of 592 dr. seems rather high; cf. the 400dr suggestion of Osborne 1995: 34. Recently, Christesen 2003: 52-3 has assessed the evidence for investment opportunities in fourth-century Athens and places the annual return from silver mining above all other forms of investment, including maritime lending, which brought an average per annum return of 25-50%.

we shall argue below, the impulse to reinvest income into productive labor is one of the hallmarks of modern capitalist enterprise.[289]

Nevertheless, even with this additional capital available to invest in the mines, *kainotomiai* would have remained a risky venture, and so Xenophon proposes a measure to "make new cuttings as risk free as possible" (ὡς ἂν ἀσφαλέστατα καινοτομοῖτο) (4.30). This is Xenophon's third major proposal. His idea is to create mining syndicates of the ten Attic tribes, in which each tribe receives an equal number of public slaves from the state, so that they may share the risks and the profits of exploitation: "if one tribe discovers silver, all of them would receive a share of the profits, and if two, three, four, or half the tribes find silver, then it is certain that the mining works would become much more profitable." Xenophon then suggests that private individuals should organize their mining operations in the same way (4.32). Yet about the inner workings of this system he says nothing—a silence that scholars have rightly found regrettable.[290] While the operations of tax-farming syndicates and trierarchic symmories afford some parallels, they contribute very little to our understanding of the mining system Xenophon envisions here. Even in the case of private mining partnerships, which seem to have come into existence after the *Poroi* and thus whose origins can quite reasonably be attributed to Xenophon's suggestion, our knowledge is quite limited, and what is known about them

289 *Wealth of Nations* II.3.13-32 = Smith 1981: 337-49 with Dickey 1993: 217.

290 Thiel 1922: 26, von der Lieck 1933: 53, and Gauthier 1976: 163. However, because we are not in a position to assess the workings of this system, I do not think we can draw any firm conclusions about it as does von der Lieck: "The author appears to me to proceed in an illogical manner, and if the charge of utopianism can be leveled at any point it is here in his proposal for tribal associations."

does not seem applicable to public mining associations.[291] The best comparandum to this proposal is the division of the territory of Oropos among the ten tribes sometime after 338, but the evidence for the financial exploitation of this region is frustratingly fragmentary and ambiguous.[292] Despite the shortcomings of his presentation, we must not overlook the significance of the main idea motivating the creation of such a cooperative system in the first place.

It is imperative to underscore that Xenophon sees a direct relationship between employment and income: "for whenever a few dig and look for silver, I think little wealth is discovered; but whenever the labor force is large, many more times the amount of silver ore is brought into existence" (4.4; cf. 4.32). While he makes this observation at the "microeconomic" level of analysis, Xenophon sees the big picture as well, often couching his discussion of the mines in the larger, macroeconomic context of the polis economy. For instance, our author contends that the "concentration of a large population

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[291] For such private partnerships, see Demosthenes 37.38; 42.3; and Hyperides, *On Behalf of Euxenippus* 35. Herzog 1914: 480 (cf. Breitenbach 1967: 1760 and Gauthier 1976: 163) intimates a direct connection between Xenophon's proposal and later fourth century practices.

[292] Hyperides, *On Behalf of Euxenippus* 16-17; *Hesperia* 56 (1987): 47-58 = L8. One insight into the *Poroi* the former text provides involves the nature of the initial disbursement of slaves to the ten tribes. When Oropos was returned to the Athenians in 338, "the tribes formed into groups of two and parceled out the mountains in Oropos amongst themselves [= the entire territory of Oropus, according to Langdon 1987: 55], after the state had granted this to them" (αἱ φυλαὶ σύνδυο γενόμεναι τὰ ὄρη τὰ ἐν Ὠρωπῶι διείλοντο, τοῦ δήμου αὐταῖς δόντος) (16). Xenophon speaks of the grant of slaves in similar terms (εἰ δ' ἡ πόλις δοίη ἑκάστῃ αὐτῶν). Thiel 1922: 26 and Gauthier 1976: 163 interpret the verb δίδοναι as indicating that this dispersal is not a "gracious gift." I do not think this is correct. If Xenophon envisioned leasing the slaves out to the tribes, surely he would have used the verb μισθοῦν, as he does at 4.19, 20, 21, 22. Secondly, I cannot think of any good reason why this would not have been a "free" grant. For the system to have worked, the participation of private financiers was necessary (Thiel 1922: 26 and von der Lieck 1933: 53). By giving the tribes free use of the slaves, the state would have encouraged investors to participate, for they would have saved about 30% on labor costs. The only expense really involved here would have been the maintenance of the slaves. Gauthier 1976: 162 tries to get around the economics of the proposal by assuming that the state would have "forced" the tribes to participate. Since Xenophon recommends forming private syndicates along the same principles as public ones, are we to imagine that the state compelled private citizens to invest in *kainotomiai* as well?

in the mining district" will lead to additional revenues from other sectors of the economy and increases in real estate values in the region (4.49-50). The importance of this point is not lost on Doty, who insightfully draws the parallel to Keynes' formulation in *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*: "The outline of our theory can be expressed as follows. When employment increases, aggregate real income is increased."[293] For Keynes, the father of macroeconomics, "aggregate income" is the total amount of income received by all factors of production in an economy. To maximize the aggregate income of society, then, requires full employment, and to achieve full employment, he famously argues, requires the active participation of the government in the economy, not only as an employer, but also as a promoter of the economic welfare of private investors, whose capital is instrumental in augmenting the labor force.[294] Entrepreneurs, however, incur serious "risks and hazards" when investing, and so "throughout human history…the propensity to save [has been] stronger than the inducement to invest."[295] Thus, "whatever can be done to make profit more certain, or investment less risky, will have the effect of stimulating investment, and, hence, employment and revenue."[296] We will return to this point below.

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293 Doty 2003: 10 citing Keynes 1936: 27.

294 Doty 2003: 11 summarizes Keynes' theory as follows: "when the income of a community is increased, consumption increases also. Moreover, an increase in consumption will cause a proportionate increase in demand as consumed goods are taken out of circulation. If the demand increases faster than the supply of goods, prices will rise, providing a reward for those who invest in producing more goods. To produce more goods will require additional labor, causing an additional increase in the aggregate income, more consumption, and a further increase in the demand for goods."

295 Keynes 1936: 347. As discussed above, at 4.7 Xenophon makes a similar observation. But he also notes that the propensity to save (i.e. hoard) is not necessarily stronger than the inducement to invest (χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ; cf. *Oeconomicus* 11.13) but about the same.

296 Doty 2003: 10. For instance, Keynes 1936: 351 recommends that the state regulate and even cap interest rates to reduce the risk to investors, who, unlike entrepreneurs who front their own money, incur the additional cost of making interest payments (cf. 144-5).

To be sure, Xenophon's discussion in the *Poroi* does not even begin to approximate the level of analytic sophistication and complexity of Keynes' general theory. Our author concerns himself almost exclusively with the particular, the Athenian economy, and consequently has no interest in generalizing the economic principles he observes around him. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the important points at which the economic thought of these two authors converge. Xenophon too proceeds from a general theory, namely, the idea that silver never loses its value. His discovery of the concept of marginal utility contributes significantly to the development of his proposals for reinvigorating the Athenian economy. With virtually an infinite demand for money, the Athenians may safely invest their money into a scheme that aims to increase employment in the mines to the maximum extent. Yet for the program to be fully successful new cuttings had to be made, which were extremely risky ventures. To encourage the private investment of capital into *kainotomiai*, Xenophon recommends that the state take a leading role by facilitating the creation of public and private mining syndicates, whose sole purpose is to create additional outlets for the labor supply so that "these mines become more profitable," not just to investors, but to the entire state as well. Therefore, like Keynes, Xenophon insists that to maximize the total income of society requires not only the greatest amount of workers, but also the synergy of both public and private domains.[297] Indeed, Moyle's observation from centuries ago is not far from the mark: "That admirable Maxim *That the true Wealth and Greatness of a Nation, consists in*

[297] Rightly noted by Schütrumpf 1982: 12-3 contra Breitenbach 1967: 1759.

Numbers of People, well emply'd, is every where inculcated throughout the whole Course of the Treatise."[298]

To sum up what has been a rather complicated and technical discussion thus far. From 413 to ca. 362 the mines of Laurion were in serious decline. The Decelean occupation had a deleterious and lasting impact on mining operations there; not only did a large percentage of mining slaves desert, but the fortunes of many Athenian entrepreneurs working in the mining industry were ruined. As long as Sparta (until 371) and Thebes (until 362) remained a threat to Attica's security, the capital necessary for reconstituting the mines, especially for the purchase of slaves, probably flowed into other, less risky investment outlets. By the time Xenophon began to compose the *Poroi*, mining activity was on the rise, but historically speaking at very low levels of production, especially because those working the mines were poorer than they had been in the past, and consequently very few new cuttings were being made. To remedy this situation, Xenophon makes three separate but related measures: 1) the public ownership of slaves to be hired out on the *apophora* system to concessionaires and proprietors of *ergasteria* at an obol a day; 2) the creation of public and private mining syndicates to share the risks and profits of exploitation in *kainotomiai*; and 3) the employment of the *triobolon* to increase investment in the mines. The ultimate goal of these proposals is to increase employment to its greatest possible extent so that the greatest amount of revenue can be generated from the mines, occasioning an era of prosperity enjoyed by all Athenians.

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[298] Moyle 1697: 7-8. To be sure, Moyle is also thinking of Xenophon's proposals for expanding Attic industry and commerce, sectors of the Athenian economy in which the number of workers is expected to increase (cf. 3.6, 12-3).

At the outset we quoted Gauthier's contention that Xenophon's proposals vis-à-vis the mines are the "most audacious" of the work, and now we are in a better position to assess the validity of this claim. Indeed, many of his recommendations for the mines, like those for the metics and commerce, are rooted in contemporary practices: the Athenians owned hundreds of public slaves; private investors hired out slaves on the *apophora* system; and private investors formed syndicates to spread the risk of such capitalist enterprises as tax farming. Yet what makes these proposals so bold is the extent to which Xenophon adopts these commonplace practices and transforms them into something entirely new. Our author is certainly aware of this when he asserts, somewhat understatedly, that "the only innovation" in adopting the *apophora* system is that the state will follow the example of private entrepreneurs (4.17). In classical Athens, there were certain things the state just did not do economically. To be sure, the polis leased out public and sacred property, farmed out taxes, and spent money on the improvement of infrastructure, especially in the commercial sector of the Piraeus. However, there is no parallel to the state behaving as an investor, appropriating the means of production in a major industrial enterprise and employing these means, not only to generate massive amounts of income for the public sphere, but also to invigorate that industry for the financial improvement of private investors as well. In the previous section, we observed that Xenophon embraces the "world of the emporion," as we find him advocating on behalf of traders and promoting the reciprocal benefits gained from trade. Here we see him going a step further. Under his direction, the polis is to imitate private

entrepreneurial practices and become in the process an integral economic actor in the life of the city.[299]

The most important consequence of this "economization" of the political order is that Xenophon introduces a high degree of rationality into his political economy.[300] Scholars, especially those in Weberian tradition, have long assumed that the Greeks were incapable of economic rationality, because without a "functionally segregated and independently instituted" economy "with its own profit maximizing, want-satisfying logic and rationality," rational decision-making based upon calculation is impossible.[301] A number of recent studies have thoroughly called into question this substantivist supposition, supporting the conclusion that a differentiated market economy did exist in fourth-century Athens.[302] While it was certainly not as developed or complex as the modern, free-market economy, it nonetheless achieved a high degree of functional autonomy with some price-regulating mechanisms. Theoretically speaking, then, nothing

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[299] Long ago Pöhlmann interpreted these measures as an attempt to establish state socialism in Athens, but such a view does not hold up to scrutiny (Pöhlmann 1984: 240-50; cf. Marchant 1925: xxvii; for criticism of Pöhlmann's thesis, see von der Lieck 1933: 51-4, Oertel in Pöhlmann 1984: 566-7, Giglioni 1970: cxxx, and Schütrumpf 1982: 12, n.50). Xenophon does not advocate that the state direct the economy as a whole, but rather that it control the means of production in a single branch of an industry (Schütrumpf 1982: 11-2). It is important to note that the state will not have complete control over the means of production, as private entrepreneurs will still hire out their own slaves 4.19 and the processing plants will remain in private hands, though, as noted above, some furnaces were owned by the state (4.39 with Gauthier 1976: 187-8). Nonetheless, the synergy between public and private spheres in the *Poroi* is salient, and so if we must assign a term to Xenophon's imagined economy, perhaps "mixed economy" is the most appropriate, especially as it is commonly employed today to mean an economy that incorporates elements of privately- and publicly-owned enterprises with some centralized economic planning.

[300] To my knowledge, only Giglioni 1970: cxx, cxxx and Cartledge 1997: 166 have advocated this idea, though they both do not elucidate the point in any detail. Cf. Lowry 1987: 15-26, 45-81, who places Xenophon in the tradition of "administrative rationality" and discusses the *Poroi* passim. As will become clear below, my analysis of Xenophon's economic rationality bears little resemblance to Lowry's.

[301] Cartledge 2002b: 15. For recent discussions of economic rationality among the Greeks, see Davies 2001: 124, Morris 2002, and Christesen 2003: 32-6.

[302] See, above all, Burke 1992, Cohen 1992, Engen 1996, Loomis 1998, and Shipton 2000.

seriously hindered Athenians like Xenophon from thinking in rational ways about their economy (though I anticipate some possible objections below).

Christesen's recent study on economic rationalism in fourth-century Athens contributes significantly to our understanding of this concept and provides a helpful framework for assessing Xenophon's political economy. Like previous works on the subject, Christesen argues that income maximization was "instrumental" in the investment decisions of Greek entrepreneurs and investors.[303] As explained earlier, "instrumental rationality" is the form of rationality that motivates economic actors to choose the most efficient or cost-effective means of achieving desired ends. However, he advances the discussion by emphasizing the importance of choice and calculability in the development of economic rationality, as decision-makers must "possess a well-defined set of preferences, which are consistently employed in selecting the best use of limited resources."[304] One such factor is the demand that profitability be commensurate with risk.[305] But to weigh the risk-reward balance, some form of calculation or accounting (preferably quantitative) is necessary.[306]

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303 See the works, for example, cited in his précis on pp. 34-9. For these Athenian investors and entrepreneurs, see also Thompson 1978 and 1982. While Christensen is concerned largely with instrumental rationality, he also stresses the importance of "expressive rationality" in classical Athens (32-4, 54-6). Whereas instrumental rationality is concerned simply with the "hows" of an action, expressive rationality focuses on the "whys." Simply put, expressive rationality assumes that economic agents are "self-consciously reflective about their preferences and that they are sensitive to societal norms" that define and govern behavior (32). Consequently, an expressive rational agent will not always choose the most cost-effective means of achieving an end if it conflicts with the value system of his/her society.

304 Christesen 2003: 32-6.

305 Christesen 2003: 32, 46; cf. Cohen 1992: 53-4, 140-4.

306 The idea that rational calculation is achievable only with the advent of modern, capital accounting techniques, such as double-entry bookkeeping (e.g., Weber 1958: 21-2 with Love 1991: 247-8, Ste. Croix 1956, and Finley 1999: 110-1, 116-7, 181) has been challenged by Macve 1985.

Christesen's point of departure is the Attic mining industry. Building upon Conophagos' calculations, he underscores the economic significance of the beneficiation stage of production, whereby extraneous minerals were removed (through grinding and washing at the *ergasterion*) from ore with lead contents between ca. 7% and 30% prior to smelting.[307] The process eliminated about 60 percent of the ore's weight and in effect concentrated the lead in the ore to about 50%. From a metallurgical perspective, the stage was unnecessary, as it was possible to smelt ore of all lead-bearing ratios without prior enrichment.[308] Yet because concentrated ore weighed about 80% less than unprocessed ore, beneficiation greatly decreased the amount of smelting and cupellation necessary to produce finished silver and thus helped reduce charcoal costs, which was a rather expensive and scarce resource in Attica. Consequently, if mine operators had skipped this stage, production costs would have increased dramatically, diminishing profits by as much as 70%![309] The profitability of beneficiation goes a long way, then, in explaining why many Athenians built processing plants despite the risk involved in fronting significant amounts of capital.[310] Christesen draws the following conclusion:

> Athenian mine operators were very much aware of the costs of different ways of processing ore. This is because the workshops in which the ore was enriched could only result from a careful cost analysis…Simply put, the numerous workshops in the Laurium region…are without a doubt the

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307 Christesen 2003: 39-46. For a concise description of the beneficiation stage (also known as enrichment, concentration, or dressing), see Rihll 2001: 118.

308 Christesen 2003: 41

309 Christesen 2003: 43-4. Conophagos 1980: 341-59 puts the gross profits of silver mining at about 70 dr. per ton of ore. Expenses for production (with beneficiation) totaled 38 dr. per ton, leaving a profit of 32 dr. per ton; without beneficiation, production costs amounted to 61 dr. per ton, leaving 9 dr. profit per ton.

310 Christesen 2003: 41-2, with note 25: "These sources [*SEG* 32, 236; Demosthenes 37.4, 12-3; and Ellis-Jones and Lambert 1999] indicate that beneficiation workshops were valued well in excess of 6,000 *drachmai*." There are approximately 30 preserved beneficiation workshops in the mining region and some 83 mentioned in the leases.

> product of rational analysis employed in the pursuit of income maximization. Their presence indicates that Athenians weighed different approaches to conducting the mining of silver and were willing to invest time, energy, and money and to utilize relatively advanced technology in order to achieve higher rates of return on their investment. Stronger evidence for the operation of rational decision-making in the pursuit of income maximization would be difficult to imagine.[311]

Having established that Athenian investors acted rationally by carefully evaluating the risk-reward balance within the mining industry, Christesen then demonstrates that such rationality motivated the decisions of individuals when confronted with a number of investment options. For him the presence of a strong correlation between risk and return among all investment opportunities points decidedly in favor of a well-developed economic rationality operating within a society. Though the fragmentary nature of the evidence does not permit an accurate quantitative comparison of risk and return, a qualitative assessment is possible making use of approximate rates of return gleaned from epigraphic and literary sources.[312] The following hierarchy of returns on known investment options emerges:

Risk	Form of Investment	Return[313]
Low	Real Property ……	8%
	Loans, Land/Domestic Commerce ……	10-18%
Medium	Ownership of Slaves ……	15-25%
	Maritime Lending ……	25-50%
High	Silver Mining ……	+50%[314]

311 Christesen 2003: 44-5.

312 As Christesen 2003: 46-7 notes well, risk is very difficult to quantify, and without reliable economic data and statistical and probabilistic methods, quantitative risk assessment is impossible. Needless to say, the Greeks did not have such information and mathematical sophistication to quantify risk. Yet even today many firms use qualitative risk assessment, which relies on the subjective opinions of experts to evaluate the probability and likelihood of certain outcomes.

313 These are only approximate annual rates of return.

314 This table is a slight modification of Christesen 2003: 52 (cf. Casson 1976: 33-47, Thompson 1978 and 1983, Millet 1991: 103-5, 232-5, and Cohen 1992: 53-4 for discussions of these figures), who under silver

Again, Christesen summarizes the significance of these findings:

> This pattern could only come into being as the result of a widespread pattern of economic decision-making in which investors assessed the relative merits of various alternatives open to them and demanded a return commensurate with the anticipated risks. The 'widespread' aspect of this conclusion requires particular emphasis. The correlation discussed above could not have arisen from the actions of a few scattered individuals. It could only have come into being in an economic environment populated by investors employing instrumental rationality with income maximization as a dominant preference.[315]

If Christesen is correct in his conclusion about the pervasiveness of economic rationality in fourth-century Athens, we have an invaluable framework with which we can evaluate Xenophon's proposals for the mines.

First, it goes without saying that Xenophon is, above all, concerned with income maximization (1.2; 2.7; 3.2, 5, 6, 13, 14; 5.1, 12; 6.1), and his proposals for the mines are intended to contribute significantly to achieving this goal (4.1, 17, 31, 38, 40, 49-50). Consequently, it should come as no surprise that Xenophon recommends investing in the mining industry, because the average annual rate of return from the mines was much higher than that of any other investment opportunity. Remarkably, he demonstrates throughout the work his awareness not only of other investment options, but also of just how profitable they are in relation to one another.[316] For example, in his discussion of the capital fund, he compares the "nearly" 20% rate of return subscribers of ten minai

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mining states "too variable to state a meaningful average." Above, I suggest that 50% represents a conservative estimate for the average annual rate of return.

315 Christesen 2003: 53.

316 The catalog of these investment opportunities is impressive: agriculture and fishing (1.3-4; 4.5-6); quarrying (1.4); mining (1.5; 4.1-50); manufacture (2.3; 4.6); maritime loans (3.10); capital funds (3.7-11); leasing lands, houses, apartments, etc. (3.12-4; 4.19); tax farming (4.19, 20); long-distance trade and retailing (4.6); and hiring out slaves (4.14-8, 20-21, 23-4).

will receive to the return generated on maritime loans (3.9). Xenophon's calculations at 4.23-24, as Thiel demonstrates, indicate that he expected the annual rate of return on the leasing of slaves to be between 30% and 38%.[317] More significant still, our author understands the relative risks involved. According to Christesen's hierarchy, investing in slaves and the mines were two of the riskiest investment ventures, and Xenophon's discussion does not betray his awareness of the hazards involved in both. In fact, both his responses to imagined objections and his specific proposals that aim to mitigate risk presuppose that he and his audience were well aware of the risk-reward balance among these investment opportunities. More than that, Xenophon even expects his readers to corroborate his investment choices by means of calculation, to "run the numbers," so to speak (4.18, 34). While the quantitative analyses of the Greeks may seem rather primitive by today's standards, we must emphasize that they calculated nonetheless. "Every owner of cultivable land," Xenophon assures us, "can state exactly how many oxen or laborers are sufficient for the land; but if someone [i.e., a bailiff] puts more to work than the right number, they calculate it as a loss" (4.5).[318] The same holds true for those working the mines, he goes on to say, and the only thing preventing Xenophon himself from calculating the requisite number of laborers for the mines (beyond the generic, "three for every citizen") is that his perspicacious understanding of the marginal utility of money makes such a calculation unnecessary in the first place.[319]

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317 Thiel 1922: 52-3; cf. Lauffer 1955-6: 67-8.

318 For such accounting in estate management, see Pomeroy 1994: 55-7 with references to earlier studies.

319 Xenophon's quantitative turn thoroughly impressed Moyle 1697: 8: "I believe Xenophon was the first Author that ever argu'd by Political Arithmetick, or the Art of Reasoning upon things by Figures."

Xenophon's coupling of the *apophora* system with his plan to reinvigorate the mining industry needs further elucidation, for it would have also been sensible under his scheme to expand manufacturing (see Section 5A above) to lease out slaves to metic entrepreneurs and/or to employ them in a variety of other industries and enterprises (e.g., agriculture, fishing, quarrying, etc.). Xenophon, be it noted, does entertain such eventualities, being fully aware of the benefits and risks involved in each. The main issue is labor, particularly which industry can readily admit a labor force of the magnitude that he proposes. Unlike in other industries, employers in the mines keep adding laborers, for "of all the industries I know only in mining does the expansion of business not lead to jealousy among the entrepreneurs" (4.3-4). By this statement, Xenophon does not mean to imply that competition is a bad thing, but rather that competition in the mines does not lead to animosity among competitors. The reason for this resentment, he explains, stems from the inevitable superfluity of labor that competition brings, which leads to price reductions and consequently to financial losses (4.6-7). While Xenophon mentions this phenomenon operating specifically in agriculture and in the manufacture of iron, copper, and furniture, he cites these merely *exempli gratia*, for his entire discussion presupposes the notion that *every* business enterprise that increases production indiscriminately will sooner or later experience a downturn because of the effects of diminishing marginal utility. However, as we have seen, Xenophon rightly notes the exception the mining industry poses to this rule, as money does not experience the same reduction in its marginal utility as other goods when supply is increased. For this reason, the mines can admit the largest possible labor force without causing a diminution in the value of money. He is thus fully conscious not only of the

risk-reward balance of competing investment opportunities but also of the factors that make each risky and profitable in the first place. "Economic agents" do not simply "maximize," explain the authors of a leading textbook on economics, "[they also] make *optimal* decisions [which] means they use all available information in reaching decisions and that those decisions are the best possible in the circumstances in which they find themselves."[320] What makes the *Poroi* a unique document in the history of economic thought, then, is not so much the wealth of information it provides about the fourth-century Athenian economy, but rather the rare glimpse it offers of *homo economicus* at work, reasoning, calculating, and choosing the most rational means of maximizing Athens' income.

Perhaps one may object that our interpretation of Xenophon's economic rationality is a house of cards because it fails to take into account the classic liberal critique of slave-based economies, which maintains that slave labor is inimical to real economic growth and thus to economic rationality, because *homines economici* desire to maximize profits not just in the short term, but in the long term as well.[321] Though economic historians and theorists have raised a number of criticisms, four in particular seem to be relevant to the slave economy that Xenophon proposes. First, slaves are

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320 Dornbusch and Fischer cited in Davies 1998: 231.

321 This idea is best encapsulated in Weber's proclamation in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*: "Capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit, and forever *renewed* profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise. For it must be so: in a wholly capitalistic order or society, an individual capitalistic enterprise which did not take advantage of its opportunities for profit-making would be doomed to extinction" (1958: 17). By "classic liberal", I am of course referring to the school of thought pioneered by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. In the following discussion, however, I focus almost exclusively on Weber's contribution to the study of slavery and economic rationality (see Love 1991: 39-40, 246-76), which has been extremely influential on contemporary historians, especially those working on Antebellum slavery in the American South (e.g., Genovese 1965).

considered less productive than their free-labor counterparts: output can be increased only through the irrational measures of corporal punishment and/or the fear of such punishment.[322] Second, because slave prices tend to fluctuate erratically in slave societies, costs for a given enterprise are very difficult if not impossible to compute, and thus predictability of future profit or loss—a pillar of *homo economicus'* rationality—is severely hampered.[323] Third, because slave labor is a form of fixed capital, representing a constant, inflexible element of production, no different from tools, land, or factories, it often leads to "overcapitalization" (i.e., an excess of capital necessary for the needs of a business).[324] As market conditions change, especially for the worse, the inflexibility of slave labor becomes stark. Whereas modern capitalists, who purchase labor power rather than the laborers themselves, can quickly lay off workers during downswings in the market, slave-owners must sell their "redundant" slaves or else suffer the financial loss of having to maintain an idle work force until market conditions change.[325] Yet if too many slaves are sold off at once, prices will drop, resulting in further financial losses for the slave-owners. Accordingly, many slave-owners elect to retain their slaves, eating the losses in the hopes that market conditions will improve, a strategy which in the event of a quick turnaround may actually save money because the repurchase of slaves (at likely higher prices) would be circumvented. But such a practice is highly speculative and risky, and if market conditions do not improve fast enough, a slave-owner could bankrupt himself through maintaining his slaves. Consequently, and this is the last major criticism

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[322] E.g., Smith 1981: 387-89, 684-5 and Mill 1904: vol. 1, 233-7.
[323] Weber 1927: 128 and 1947: 276 with Love 1991: 39.
[324] Weber 1927: 128, Philips in Conrad and Meyer 1964: 74, and Post 2003: 311.

of slave economies, the heavy costs incurred from capitalized labor severely restricts the ability of slave-owners to invest in laborsaving technologies. In fact, slavery itself, it is believed, deters the development of technology in the first place, without which real economic growth is impossible.[326]

Let us address each of these concerns in sequential order. While it is prima facie plausible that slaves in classical Greece were less productive than free laborers, without quantitative data to support this conclusion it cannot be stated simply as fact. Comparative data from the Antebellum South suggests caution. Some studies of the period, especially the cliometric analysis of Fogel and Engerman, demonstrate that slaves were not only hard working and efficient but that they outstripped the productivity of their free-counterparts in the North by some thirty-five percent.[327] This thesis is not uncontroversial, and many have contested not only their conclusions but also their methodology and data sets, yet what has remained virtually unchallenged is their central idea that slavery was a profitable enterprise.[328] While profitability is not quite the same thing as productivity, the presence of the former is usually an indicator of the latter, and there can be little doubt that slavery was profitable for the Athenians just as it was for proprietors of plantations in the Antebellum South.[329] Again, we cannot accurately compare the profitability of slavery with free labor overall, but as Osborne reminds us,

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325 Post 2003: 311-2.

326 Genovese 1965: 48-51, Post 2003: 312-3, and the references in Finley 1999: 227, n. 64.

327 See, above all, Conrad and Meyer 1964 and Fogel and Engerman 1974 (cf. Cartledge 2002b).

328 For criticism of the authors cited in the previous note, see, for example, Genovese 1965 and David et al. 1976; for a recent discussion of the profitability of slavery, see Smith 1998: Chapters 5 and 6 (cf. Dowd in Conrad and Meyer 1964 : 93-7).

329 Casson 1976: 35-40, Osborne 1995: 34, Finley 1999: 83-4, and Cartledge 2002b.

Athenian citizens had political, religious, and military obligations that would have kept them from working for perhaps over 25% of the year.[330] Even metics had military duties and frequently attended religious festivals. But slaves could work all year round, which means that in theory they were likely to be more productive than free laborers. As far as punitive measures are concerned, they certainly existed in classical Athens, but Xenophon's advice to employ the mining slaves as rowers in the fleet and infantrymen (4.42)—duties that were almost exclusively the prerogatives of citizens—suggests that the Athenians, for the most part, treated them humanely.

Concerning the non-calculability of slave labor resulting from erratically fluctuating slave prices, Xenophon's own calculations at 4.23-4 confirm the notion that slave prices were not stable in classical Athens. He expects to pay between 158 and 195 drachmai for each mining slave over the course of five to six years. It is important to note, however, that Xenophon contemplates a range of prices, and if we calculate the average of these two figures, we get 176.5 dr. per slave, which is comparable to the 174 dr. average in the Attic Stelai for 414.[331] Thus, despite some fluctuation it is reasonable to assume that prices for mining slaves did not extend much above or below this price band (ca. 150-200 dr.). Xenophon and most Athenians for that matter probably had a good notion of what a "fair" price was for a mining slave, above which they were willing to pay only a certain amount. It is sometimes stated that market forces did not determine prices, but Xenophon's testimony suggests otherwise: "if we seek a huge amount of

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[330] Osborne 1995: 34-5; cf. Markle 1985: 296-7 and Sinclair 1988: 225-7 who estimate that the free workers labored only 260 days a year.

[331] Pritchett 1956: 276-8; cf. Ste. Croix 1981: 585-7 with full bibliography of slave prices in antiquity. For a recent discussion of slave prices in antiquity, see Scheidel 2005.

slaves at once, we will be forced to buy them both in an inferior condition and at a high price" (4.36).[332] "Indeed, in this respect it will be more profitable to proceed piecemeal than to implement everything at once," he recommends. Accordingly, if supply and demand influenced the movement of prices within the range given by Xenophon, then predictability becomes possible.

The overcapitalization of labor charge is a more serious obstacle to the rationality of Xenophon's scheme but one that is not insurmountable. Though he and his fellow Greeks do not conceptualize labor in the same ways as modern economists, they do consider slaves to be a form of fixed capital, speaking of them as "living tools" (e.g., Aristotle, *Politics* 1253b23-54a9). Consequently, they were fully aware of the adverse economic consequences brought on by the overcapitalization of slave labor. Again to quote from the *Poroi*: "Every owner of cultivable land can state exactly how many oxen or laborers are sufficient for the land; but if someone puts more to work than the right number, they calculate it as a loss (ζημίαν λογίζονται)" (4.5). If Athenian farmers had employed free labor, they could have "expelled" redundancies rather easily. But the fact that they (and presumably all employers of slaves) consider excess labor "a loss" demonstrates that they generally retained redundant slaves and ate the losses when prices dropped, a practice which eventually forced many to quit the profession in pursuance of other opportunities, such as trading and money-lending (4.6). Xenophon thus attests well to the "inflexibility" of slave labor, which left Athenian slave-owners little to no cost-saving options during downturns in the market. But such drastic changes in market

[332] Giglioni 1970: cxxvi-vii (cf. Gauthier 1976: 169) contra Wiedemann 1981: 6 who argues that supply

conditions is precisely what Xenophon promises will *not* occur in the silver mining industry, rendering the overcapitalization problem moot.[333] As long as silver money retains its value, which Xenophon claims is both historically and theoretically all but certain, overcapitalization is an unlikely prospect, provided that the Athenians do not acquire more slaves than is necessary for any given year.[334] From the perspective of the individual mining concessionaire or proprietor of an *ergasterion*, the state ownership of the slaves would have completely sheltered them from the risk of overcapitalization.[335] In fact, by contracting slaves from the state on the conditions of a one-obol a day payment and providing for their maintenance (*trophe*), mining entrepreneurs would have actually been purchasing labor power in a manner not unlike that of a modern-day capitalist. Had the Athenians adopted Xenophon's plan, the mining industry would have undoubtedly achieved a higher degree of rationality than it already possessed because investors could have calculated labor costs more accurately and consequently predicted future profit and loss with greater precision.

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and demand did not determine prices.

333 For a similar argument against overcapitalization in the Antebellum South, see Conrad and Meyer 1964: 74-6.

334 At 4.39 Xenophon says that the "greatest fear" people may have about his proposals is that if the polis acquires too many slaves, "the mines may become overcrowded." To prevent such an eventuality, Xenophon suggests that they "put no more men in the mines than is required each year" (εἰ μὴ πλείονας ἀνθρώπους ἢ ὅσους αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα προσαιτοίη κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐμβάλοιμεν). Cartledge 1997: 226 interprets this "fear" as anxiety about "servile insurrection." The problem with this interpretation is that we hear of no slave revolts in Attica until the second century B.C. (Diodorus 34.2.19; Athenaeus 272e-f). The similarity with 4.5 is striking (cf. ἦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἱκανῶν ἐμβάλλῃ τις), strongly suggesting that the "greatest fear" in the minds of the Athenians is overcapitalization.

335 In the event that the Athenians overestimated their labor needs in a given year (see previous note), they could have hired out the mining slaves to anyone that was in need of labor. Given that the state is to purchase slaves directly from the Athenians themselves (4.18-9), the amount of privately owned slaves would have declined and raised demand. If there was still an excess of labor, perhaps they could have followed Xenophon's lead and used the slaves in defensive operations around Attica (4.42; cf. 4.52).

Finally, we come to the issue of slavery as a deterrent to technological development. First, it is important to note that this notion is often stated but rarely proven. Finley, who is perhaps the most sympathetic to the view that there was little to no technological and economic growth in antiquity, understands well how unsubstantiated this contention is, considering it a "pseudo-issue" and "a subject bedeviled by dogma."[336] He calls the whole thesis into question, when he points out that where technological progress did exist to some degree in the ancient world, in the mines, slaves were employed to the greatest extent. Although Xenophon does not seem too concerned with the technological side of the mining industry, he is not ignorant of it, as Gauthier has shown.[337] Besides, today it is by no means a given that central planning is an appropriate or even efficacious way to foster technology.[338] Xenophon perhaps wisely leaves the issue to the private sector. Second, the apotheosis of technological development in models of economic growth is a relatively recent phenomenon, becoming vogue only in the last fifty years.[339] Prior to this, economists from Smith to Keynes underscored capital accumulation and investment in productive labor as determinants of growth. For Smith the two went hand and hand: "The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be increased in its value by no other means, but by increasing either the number of its productive labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers

336 Finley 1999: 83; in general see 1999: Chapter 3 and 198-204 and 1982: 176-95.

337 Gauthier 1976: 166-7.

338 See Rosenberg 1994: 87-108, who argues persuasively that decentralized, free market capitalism historically has been the greatest inducement to technological development in the West.

339 See Millet 2001: 31-2 for a concise review of the literature.

[i.e. through technology] who had before been employed."[340] Though Smith recognizes the importance of technology, his famous discussion of capital accumulation in Book II, Chapter 3 leaves little doubt that he privileges the role of productive labor in the augmentation of national wealth. In particular, Smith lauds the "frugal man" who creates capital by saving money and then (re)invests it in productive labor. Such behavior has a cumulative effect on society, contributing to the stock of "public capital" and thus being the motor force of sustained economic growth.[341] Xenophon's recommendations in the *Poroi* bear a striking similarity to Smith's ideas of capital accumulation. By suggesting that the Athenians reinvest a third of their revenues produced from the *apophora* back into the purchase of additional labor (4.23-4), Xenophon outlines a model of economic growth, whereby the Athenians will acquire 10,000 slaves within a decade and then three slaves for every citizen in the distant future. But more importantly, his plan presupposes that the individual entrepreneurs who hire these slaves will also add to their existing stocks by reinvesting some of their profits and/or their revenue from the capital fund. Because the focus of Xenophon's discussion is on public revenues, it is easy to overlook the concomitant growth that his proposals would have occasioned in the private sector had the Athenians implemented them.[342]

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[340] *Wealth of Nations* II.3.32 = Smith 1981: 343; cf. 676. By "productive labor," Smith means labor that brings in more income to the entrepreneur than he spends on the maintenance of his workers (i.e. wages). While Smith himself consider slavery to be unproductive (387-89, 684-5), his argument rests on the stereotypical and racist idea prevailing at the time that slaves were lazy, who brought in little income above what the master paid for their maintenance. Our discussion above seriously calls into question this interpretation.

[341] *Wealth of Nations* II.3.13-32 = Smith 1981: 337-49 with Dickey 1993: 213-9.

[342] For two excellent, recent discussions on the debate about economic growth in antiquity, see Millet 2001 and Saller 2002. Both follow Hopkins 1980 in distinguishing between per capita growth in production and aggregate growth and privilege the former as a better indicator of "sustained" economic growth. While it is impossible to calculate the potential effects of Xenophon's proposals on sustaining

In short, none of these possible objections to our thesis about the rationality of Xenophon's proposals for the mines holds up under scrutiny. While some readers may find his level of economic rationality paltry by today's standards, our discussion above nonetheless demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that Xenophon's analysis of and proposals for the mines meet the requirements of instrumental rationality, which still factors significantly in contemporary debates about *homo economicus*. Perhaps, a more potent objection to our interpretation would concentrate on the issue of the extent to which this economic rationality pervaded Athenian society. That is to say, if Xenophon's proposals were rational, and the Athenian "economic environment [was] populated by investors employing instrumental rationality with income maximization as a dominant preference," as Christesen maintains, then why did the Athenians not implement his schemes? I have two answers to this objection.

First, we must emphasize that instrumental rationality was a factor solely in the decision making of Athenian investors and entrepreneurs, that is, the elite, who comprised less than five percent of adult male population. A majority of Athenians were peasants (see Section 3B), "and they, like peasants anywhere at any time," Cartledge explains, "pursued minimum-risk strategies in a process that has been labeled 'risk buffering'. Rather than profit-maximization, the overall goal of most peasants was one of

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growth, had they been implemented, we can at least point to five likely outcomes, which developmental economists maintain are necessary for sustained economic growth (see Saller 2002: 261-2): 1) trade; 2) intensification of capital investment; 3) technological development; 4) investment in human capital (education); and 5) demographic transition (i.e., transition from high birth rates and death rates to low birth and death rates) occasioning a move away from a production to a service economy. As our discussion above makes clear, Xenophon calls for increased trade and capital investment (criteria 1 and 2). Because of the trading peace, he promises, an intellectual boom will take place (5.3-4) (criterion 4), perhaps increasing the likelihood of technological development, though Xenophon does not explicitly state this outcome (criterion 3). In respect to criterion 5, it is certainly possible that Athens, after decades or even centuries of

'satisficing': enough was good as a feast, and a lot safer in the circumstances than going for (literally) broke."[343] We must imagine, then, when the Athenians debated fiscal proposals of a seemingly risky nature in the council chamber or the assembly, there would have always been a large contingent of voters inherently resistant to them from the start. That said we must also believe that the numerous strategies Xenophon recommends to mitigate risk were intended to allay the fears of these very individuals. Accordingly, and this is the second point, while the Athenians never implemented Xenophon's proposals for the mines across-the-board, there is some indication that they did at least contemplate it. For Aristotle mentions the attempt of one Diophantus, a likely "coeval" of Eubulus, to establish the public ownership of slaves at Athens 355-50.[344] The exact nature of the proposal is obscure, but the *Poroi* is the most likely source of inspiration.[345] Moreover, in Hellenistic Egypt, where economic rationality reached very high levels, the Ptolemaic kings seem to have followed Xenophon's advice vis-à-vis the leasing of publicly owned capital on the *apophora* system.[346] Keeping these points in mind, we should be cautious and not succumb to the often-drawn conclusion that the Athenians' lack of follow through represents some kind of failure on Xenophon's part, especially

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being a producer economy, would have transitioned into a service economy not unlike Roman Corinth (see Engles 1990) because of demographic changes.

343 Cartledge 2002b: 160; cf. Tandy 1997: 87. For the satisficing methods of peasants, see Scott 1976 and Gallant 1991, esp. 34-59.

344 Aristotle, *Politics* 1267b15 with Gauthier 1976: 228-9 and Lewis 1990: 257-8: "And it is clear from Phaleas' legislation that he makes the citizen-population a small one, inasmuch as all the artisans (τεχνῖται) are to be publically owned slaves and are to contribute to the complement of the state. But if it is proper to have public slaves, it is the labourers employed upon public works (τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους) who ought to be of that status (as it is the case at Epidamnus and as Diophantus once tried to establish at Athens).

345 So Gauthier 1976: 228-9.

because his recommendations are too "impossible," "will o' the wisp" or "utopian."[347] Rather, they are simply rational, and considering democracies, both ancient and modern, do not always act in the most rational ways, should it really come as a surprise that the Athenians in the end failed to implement his plan?[348]

Conclusion

At the outset of this chapter, we posed the question: how far would Xenophon's change in economic consciousness, characterized by a radical departure from traditional militaristic and imperialistic modes of production to ones based on productive industry and peaceful exchange, take him in the direction of modern economic thought and practice? Throughout our analysis of Xenophon's financial proposals, we underscored two historically significant developments: 1) the liberalization of economic relations between Athenians and foreigners, resulting in a partial breakdown of the status divide separating citizen from non-citizen; and 2) the advancement of income maximizing instrumental rationality. In respect to the latter development, our interpretation of Xenophon as a serious economic thinker has the most purchase. A (and perhaps *the*) foundational tenet of the modern economic science is that it starts from the premise that every human being is a *homo economicus*. While some have contested this conception of

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346 See Préaux 1966, who discusses the *Poroi* in connection with the leasing of the so-called "immortal flocks." For economic rationalism in Hellenistic Egypt, see Rathbone 1991 and 2002.

347 E.g., Boeckh 1976: 607-10, Pöhlmann 1984: 245, Schwahn 1931: 253, von der Lieck 1933: 53, Andreades 1933: 388-90, Breitenbach 1967: 1760, Giglioni 1970: cxxxiv, and Gauthier 1976: 165.

348 For instance, at the time of writing this section, the Comptroller General for the United States, David Walker, announced on the TV news magazine "60 Minutes" that the 2003 law enacting the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program was "probably the most fiscally irresponsible piece of legislation since the 1960s" because "we'd have to have eight trillion dollars today, invested in treasury rates, to deliver on that promise," he explains. Asked how much the US actually has, Walker replies, "Zip" (aired CBS,

"man," *homo economicus* nonetheless has been and will continue to remain an important theoretical basis of economics, even if more economists come around to embrace other notions of rationality, such as "bounded" and "expressive" rationality, and countenance sociological conceptions of man that stress humans' predilection for collective action.[349]

Indeed, in the *Poroi*, Xenophon too proceeds from the premise that his audience is comprised of *homines economici*, but this is not the only assumption he makes. He understands well that the Athenians are also political, social, and religious men who want their money to serve communal and civic ends, that is, to feed the poor, to celebrate festivals magnificently, to improve infrastructure, etc. Therefore, in this one important respect, Finley's notion that "Xenophon's ideas, bold in some respects, never really broke through the conventional limits" has some merit. Xenophon is a reformer, not a revolutionary, since *homo politicus* is alive and well in the *Poroi*. This explains in part why he does not always see his progressive ideas to their logical conclusion. Most notably, though he outlines a theory and practice for achieving substantial economic growth, he stops short of making this the ultimate end to which the Athenians should strive: three slaves and thus three obols for every Athenian is sufficient. He does not state why they should be satisfied with this amount, but we can speculate that for Xenophon there are social and political limits to growth. Though he does not see eye to eye with Aristotle on all points of what it means to live the "good life," he is in agreement with the philosopher in acknowledging that life is more than making money. Nevertheless, we should not let this fool us into thinking that Xenophon embraces the

3/4/2007). In fact, the National Taxpayers Union estimates that the program will eventually cost 37% percent of United States' GDP!

backward-looking values of Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle does not think that *homo economicus* is even worthy to live in the same polis, Xenophon assigns him a prominent and indispensable role in his Athens.

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[349] See, for example, the works cited in Christesen 2003: 32-3.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The Relationship Between Xenophon's *Poroi* and the *Oeconomica* of Ps.-Aristotle and Aeneas Tacticus' *Procurement.*

In Chapter 2, Section 2D, I argued that the *Poroi* is a unique document of ancient political economy. The only works that potentially call this thesis into question are the second book of the *Oeconomica* of Pseudo-Aristotle and the lost *Procurement* of Aeneas Tacticus mentioned in *Siegecraft* 14.2. While the former author wrote his treatise a generation after the *Poroi*, the latter may have written *Procurement* within a few years of the *Poroi*. In this Appendix, I examine each of these works and state the reasons why they are fundamentally different from the *Poroi*.

In the theoretical first chapter of *Oeconomica* II, Ps.-Aristotle considers four types of "financial administrations" (οἰκονομίαι): the kingdom (βασιλική), province (σατραπική), polis (πολιτική), and private household (ἰδιωτική) (1345b12-14). Unfortunately, he devotes less than five lines to the political economy of the polis, listing only its four primary sources of revenue: special products of the land, markets, tolls, and every-day transactions (1346a6-9). Later in the chapter, he does mention one additional aspect of polis finance—the importance of a balanced budget—but this element is not unique to this type of administration since keeping expenditure within the limits of revenue is the prerogative of the other three *oikonomiai* as well (1346a14-7). Ps.-Aristotle then concludes his preliminary analysis with a short discussion that suggests that the goal of all four types of *oikonomiai* is the management of revenues and

expenditures (1346a14-24).[1] With this consideration, he segues into the second part of his discussion (II.2), which is a collection of anecdotes of cunning stratagems whereby statesmen, generals, governors, and autocrats increased the revenues of their states during financial crises.

Aristotle's suggestion in the *Politics* about just such a compilation seems to be the source inspiration: "A collection ought to be made of the scattered accounts of methods according to which some people have had success in making money…and statesmen too should find it useful to be acquainted with these financial schemes, for many states are in need of money-making and such ways and means of increasing revenues (τοιούτων πόρων)."[2] Gauthier provocatively argues that this anecdotal material is in essence a collection of *poroi*.[3] However, we must recall that Gauthier distinguishes between two types of *poroi*: 1) *poroi* as ways and means of creating or augmenting existing *prosodoi*, which the polis applies to its regular expenses, such as infrastructure, festivals, and defense; and 2) *poroi* as ways and means of getting money (πόροι χρημάτων) to pay for unexpected or emergency expenditures.[4] Though Ps.-Aristotle occasionally mentions a scheme for augmenting existing revenues (e.g., 1350a16), he recounts mostly emergency financial measures, which explains why he employs the phrase πόρος

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1 So Bresson 2000: 247-53.

2 1259a5, 33-35: ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην, δι' ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματιζόμενοι, δεῖ συλλέγειν…χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς. πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων πόρων.

3 Gauthier 1976: 13. However, I find his suggestion that had *Oeconomica* II.2 appeared separately from II.1, "*poroi* would have undoubtedly factored into the title of the work." Van Groningen 1933: 44-47, 56-57 has argued convincingly for the coherence of both chapters of Book 2.

4 Gauthier 1976: 8-18.

χρημάτων to describe his collection.[5] This concentration on emergency *poroi* is at odds with his analysis in Chapter 1, which promises to treat systematically the regular revenues of the four types of *oikonomiai*.

In the *Poroi*, by contrast, Xenophon makes proposals only for augmenting existing revenues and creating new ones on a permanent basis so that the polis can meet its regular expenses and execute public services. Even his *eisphora*, which in the Greek world was an extraordinary wartime tax, is destined to become a new and permanent source of revenue.[6] Whereas Ps.-Aristotle recommends reducing expenditures as a way to increase revenues—a tactic common to all periods of fiscal crisis—Xenophon makes no such proposal.[7] Thus, while we can reasonably classify *Oeconomica* II.2 and the *Poroi* together because of their affiliation to the same genus of finance (viz. *poroi*), the orientation of the former to extraordinary and emergency financial situations marks it out as fundamentally different from the latter. Moreover, as argued above (Section 2D), the *Poroi* is best categorized as a deliberative discourse of the private or *bouleutic* variety. The measures Xenophon proposes thus speaks to the immediate fiscal circumstances Athens found itself at the end of the Social War; the anecdotal schemes of *Oeconomica* II.2, on the other hand, are "capable of being applied from time to time by others to the

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5 Gauthier 1976: 13. Ps.-Aristotle writes: "We have collected material that we have found noteworthy of the men in the past who have discovered new ways of obtaining money or have administered their states skillfully. For we accept that this historical material is useful in that it is capable of being applied from time to time by others to the circumstances they find themselves" (ὅσα δέ τινες τῶν πρότερον πεπράγασιν εἰς πόρον χρημάτων, εἴ <τε> τεχνικῶς τι διῴκησαν, ἃ ὑπελαμβάνομεν ἀξιόλογα αὐτῶν εἶναι, συναγηόχαμεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἱστορίαν ἀχρεῖον ὑπολαμβάνομεν εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ ὅτε τούτων ἐφαρμόσει τι οἷς ἂν αὐτὸς πραγματεύῃ) (1346a26-31).

6 Gauthier 1976: 14. In Section 5C, I argued that Xenophon's *eisphora* resembles an *epidosis* (voluntary subscription) more than an extraordinary, wartime tax. Nonetheless, the *epidosis* too was an extraordinary way to raise cash to pay for emergency expenditures.

circumstances they find themselves" (1346a29-30). The general applicability of Ps.-Aristotle's collection goes a long way in explaining its popularity in the Hellenistic era. The *Poroi*, however, with its focus on polis finance and Athenian political economy in particular had no such universal appeal.

Let is now turn to Aeneas Tacticus' lost *Procurement* (ἡ Ποριστικὴ βίβλος), apparently the only work written on finance contemporaneous to the *Poroi*. [8] Aeneas mentions this book in a chapter from *Siegecraft* on how to promote unanimity among the citizens of a besieged city. The following passage contains our only information about the work:

> τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς ὁμόνοιαν τέως μάλιστα χρὴ προάγειν, ἄλλοις τε ὑπαγόμενον αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς χρεωφειλέτας κουφίζοντα τόκων βραχύτητι ἢ ὅλως ἀφαιροῦντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς λίαν ἐπικινδύνοις καὶ τῶν ὀφειλημάτων τι μέρος, καὶ πάντα ὅταν δέῃ, ὡς πολύ γε φοβερώτατοι ἔφεδροί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοίδε ἄνθρωποι, τούς τε ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ὄντας τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἰς εὐπορίαν καθιστάναι. καὶ ὅπως ἴσως καὶ ἀλύπως τοῖς πλουσίοις ταῦτ' ἂν γιγνόμενα πράττοιτο καὶ ἐξ οἵων πόρων πορίζοιτο, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐν τῇ Ποριστικῇ βίβλῳ δηλωτικῶς γέγραπται.
>
> As for the mass of the citizens, it is of the utmost importance in the meantime to foster unanimity, wining them over with such means as lessening the burdens on debtors by reducing or completely canceling interest-payments. At times in extreme danger, even the capital sums owed may be partially or, if necessary, wholly canceled as well; there is nothing more alarming than to be constantly under the eye of men in debt. Provide the basic amenities of life for the needy, too. How this could be

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[7] 1346a24; cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1359b23; *Memorabilia* 3.6.4-13.

[8] I depart from the Loeb translation of Ποριστικὴ as "Finance" because, though finance is an important part of providing supplies for an army, it is not the only consideration; hence *LSJ* cites this title under the entry for πορικός, translating it as "treatise on supply." I thus follow Whitehead 1990: 139 who refers to ἡ Ποριστικὴ βίβλος as "my book *Procurement*." Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1366a 37 and *Memorabilia* 3.1.6.

> done fairly and without pains to the rich, and where the money might come from, are amongst the matters clearly explained in my book *Procurement* (14.1-2; trans. Whitehead).

Needless to say, economic and social historians of the fourth century have suffered the loss of this work, especially those interested in class conflict in the ancient world. For students of the *Poroi*, the tantalizing reference marks the loss of what would prove to be an insightful *comparandum* had the work survived. Not only does the title Πορισ τική call to mind the *Poroi* but Aeneas' interest in ways and means is made explicit by the phrase καὶ ἐξ οἵων πόρων πορίζοιτο.[9] Furthermore, Aeneas' advice to "provide the basic amenities of life for the needy" corresponds to Xenophon's primary objective to relive the poverty of the demos by providing them with *trophe*.[10] The key question, then, is whether *Procurement* dealt with financial schemes for generating revenue only during a siege situation or included material that appertained to wartime more generally and even to peacetime conditions.

According to Whitehead, *Procurement* probably would have encompassed all aspects of wartime finance. For instance, *Siegecraft*, while ostensibly about defensive operations, frequently comments on offensive tactics, as Aeneas considers them useful in the defense of a city.[11] On analogy with such a broad-minded understanding of siege warfare, it is reasonable to think that *Procurement* included some general advice about wartime finance. In the passage just cited about a city with a large debtor population, the antithesis between "up to" (τέως) and during "times of extreme danger" (ἐν δὲ τοῖς

9 Whitehead 1990: 138.
10 See, for example, 1.1, 4.51, 6.1.

λίαν ἐπικινδύνοις) certainly recommends this interpretation. However, I do not think this passage supports the notion that Aeneas considered his counsel for debt relief to be applicable to times of peace.[12] The phrase ἐν δὲ τοῖς λίαν ἐπικινδύνοις implies that the city in question, before it falls into "extreme danger," is nonetheless still in danger "up to" (τέως) this point. In other words, the contrast is between two varying degrees of danger in wartime, not peace and war. Hunter and Handford's assessment is therefore correct: Xenophon's ways and means rested "on a broader basis" than Aeneas' because they are predicated on peacetime conditions and aim at fostering a lasting peace.[13] In this important repsect, *Procurement* probably shared the preoccupation of *Oeconomica* II.2 with emergency fiscal measures. In fact, Van Groningen contends that *Procurement* resembled the anecdotal parts of the *Oeconomica* for this reason.[14]

Nevertheless, the case can be made that *Procurement* was "a work more like Xenophon's *Poroi* than like the second book of [Aristotle's] *Economics*."[15] Again, if we assume that *Procurement* resembled *Siegecraft* in its method, Aeneas' use of παραδείγματα drawn from history would have factored less in his work than in Ps.-Aristotle's: indeed, only a third of *Siegecraft* includes anecdotal material, whereas the

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11 Whitehead 1990: 17-25 and *passim.*

12 Whitehead 1990: 138 seems to intimate as much in his commentary on this passage.

13 Hunter and Handford 1927: xiii.

14 Van Groningen 1933: 35, n. 1. Aeneas says he wrote *Procurement* δηλωτικῶς, which is a rare word but seems to be synonymous with παραδειγματικῶς, "by means of examples" (see the passages cited in *LSJ s.v.* 4 with Dionysius Halicarnassus, *On Literary Composition* 16.2, where he uses the adjective δηλωτικά in the sense of "illustrative").

15 Whitehead 1990: 29, n. 84.

rest contains his own prescriptions.[16] Moreover, numerous affinities between *Siegecraft* and the rest of Xenophon's oeuvre suggest that *Procurement* too would have resembled parts of the *Poroi*. Both authors generally agree that military science entails much more than tactics. In *Siegecraft* Aeneas refers not only to *Procurement* but also to works on *Preparations* (ἡ Παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος) and *Encampment* (ἡ Στρατοπεδευτικὴ βίβλος).[17] This broad interest in military affairs is paralleled in *Memorabilia* III, where Socrates sports with one of his companions who wished to learn about generalship from Dionysodorus of Chios but learned nothing except tactics.[18] Socrates argues that tactics is only a small part of generalship, saying that "a general must be skilled in *preparing* the equipment for war and in *procuring* supplies for his troops" (καὶ γὰρ παρασκευαστικὸν τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν στρατηγὸν εἶναι χρή, καὶ ποριστικὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατιώταις) (3.1.6). Furthermore, there are similarities in both approach and emphasis between Aeneas' *Siegecraft* and the *Hipparchicus*.[19] More significantly, *Siegecraft* includes recommendations analogous to advice given in the *Poroi*. Both authors, for instance, propose granting incentives to merchants as a way to increase trade and paying attention to the role of *chora*

16 Whitehead 1990: 38, 138.

17 Aeneas, *Siegecraft* 7.4, 8.5, 21.1-2, 40.8; cf. Aelian, *Tactics* 1.2: Aeneas who "composed a considerable number of military books" (Αἰνείας τε διὰ πλειόνων ὁ καὶ στρατηγικὰ βιβλία ἱκανὰ συνταξάμενος).

18 *Memorabilia* 3.1.1-11 with Delebecque 1957: 430; cf. *Cyropaedia* 1.614-15; Plato, *Euthydemus* 273c.

19 Whitehead 1990: 35-6 and Delebecque 1957: 418, 430. For example, cf. *Siegecraft* 6.3 with *Hipparchicus* 7.15, 16.7 with 4.13, 16.12 with 7.12, 16.19 with 4.6, 16.20 with 4.11 and 8.3, and 40.6-7 with 5.2.

fortifications in the defense of the city.[20] It is reasonable to conclude therefore that *Procurement* would have overlapped with the *Poroi* in some respects. What remains unclear is whether we should ascribe to one the status of innovator and to the other that of imitator or consider the influence as bidirectional.

Unfortunately, there is no way to know when Aeneas composed *Procurement*, especially because the date of *Siegecraft* is far from certain. Whitehead dates the treatise "close to 355" or "in the later 350s," but the work's terminus post quem is debated, and some place the work in the early 340s.[21] Accordingly, Aeneas may have written *Procurement* under the influence of the *Poroi*, which as argued above (Section 2C), is securely dated to 355/4. While agnosticism on the issue may be best, generally speaking, there is much to be said for the idea that Xenophon influenced Aeneas rather than the other way around. First, Aeneas alludes to a specific stratagem from the *Anabasis* on how to quell a panic in the army.[22] Second, and more importantly, Xenophon demonstrates consistently an interest in military procurement and finance throughout his *oeuvre*. In *Memorabilia* II, for instance, which Delebecque dates to 381, Xenophon

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[20] On incentives, cf. *Siegecraft* 10.12 with *Poroi* 3.4; fortresses, cf. 16.16-19 with 4.43-48 (the polis Xenophon is interested in protecting is not Athens per se but the one that would spring up in the mining district (4.49-50) if his plans were implemented).

[21] See the discussion in Whitehead 1990: 8-9, 128-9. For example, Bosworth 1980: 178 dates the betrayal of Chios (*Siegecraft* 11.3) to ca. 346 by linking it with Demosthenes 5.25, where the orator laments the capture of Chios by Idrieus, the satrap of Caria (351/0-344). Whitehead 1990: 129 admits to the "intrinsic attractions" of this identification, but he is unwilling to lower the treatise's terminus post quem by such "an uncomfortable margin" because the next latest secured date for an episode is ca. 359-5. Yet Aeneas mentions that Chios was "at peace" before its betrayal, a fact which is difficult to fit into the events of 364-355 (see Ruzicka 1998). That the event took place before 364 is belied by the vividness of Aeneas' account, which historians generally take as an indication that the betrayal was fresh in the minds of both Aeneas and his readers (see the references in Whitehead 1990: 128). Furthermore, though our knowledge of Chian history is lacunose, Demosthenes 5.25 is our only reference to a betrayal of the city to a foreign army. The island therefore could have been taken anytime between 351 and 346.

pokes fun at Aristippus for not wanting to become a ruler because he must "supply his fellow citizens with the necessities of life" (τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὧν δέονται πορίζειν) (2.1.8).[23] A decade later in the *Cyropaedia*, he stresses the important role of the military commander to procure supplies for his troops and even to have it as "a part of his character the ability to contrive some means of revenue" (καὶ ἤθους ἕνεκα μηχανᾶσθαι προσόδου πόρον) (1.6.10).[24] Xenophon even assumes this role in the *Anabasis*; from his very first speech to the Ten Thousand to the final days of the march, he demonstrates to his readers that he can provide for his men.[25] Lastly, the rhetorical and philosophical rigor of these works betrays an Athenian intellectual provenance. Whitehead explains: "Xenophon was by far the more accomplished writer of the two…and if it is correct to see both Xenophon and Aineias as seeking to inject a human and pragmatic element into sophistic military exposition, it was probably the Athenian who had come face to face with more of what he was reacting against, and certainly he who appropriated more of its rhetorical skills for creating the requisite fusion of empirical military experience with the general lessons and axioms to which it gave rise."[26]

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[22] Aeneas Tacticus 27.12; Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.2.20. Polyaenus (3.9.4) says Iphicrates employed the same technique, but Whitehead 1990: 176-7 argues convincingly that Aeneas' reference is to Xenophon and not Iphicrates, who was often identified (wrongly) as the originator of many cunning stratagems.

[23] Delebecque 1957: 221-3. In the next section, Aristippus reiterates this point again: "states think it necessary that their rulers provide them with the as many good things as possible" (αἵ τε πόλεις οἴονται χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν).

[24] In fact, the entire discussion in 1.6.7-18 is about provisioning; cf. 8.1.13; *Memorabilia* 2.1.8; *Agesilaus* 2.25; and *Hellenica* 5.1.14-17. For the date of the *Cyropaedia*, see Delebecque 1957.

[25] Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.2.21; 5.5.13; 5.6.32; 6.4.9, 12; 6.5.20; 7.6.29-31; 7.7.33.

[26] Whitehead (1990): 37-8. In spite of these objections, some scholars prefer to see mutual exchange, informal or otherwise, between the two authors (see, for example, Anderson and Delatte in Whitehead 1990: 36). After all, if Aeneas the writer of *Siegecraft* is to be identified with Aeneas of Stymphalus, whom Xenophon mentions in the *Hellenica* as general of the Arcadians in 367/6, then it is reasonable to

Appendix 2: The *Eikoste* and *Dekate* in the Fourth Century

In Chapter 3, Section 3C, I discussed several forms of imperial control and dominance the Athenians employed in the fourth century that were economic in nature. Here I provide the evidence in support of the claim that the Athenians imposed both the *eikoste* (five-percent tax) and *dekate* (ten-percent tax) periodically from ca. 391 to at least 357. Let us review briefly the history of these two taxes before examining this evidence.

In 413 the Athenians abolished tribute, levying in its stead a five percent tax (εἰκοστή) on all sea-borne commerce.[27] According to Thucydides, the Athenians levied this tax on their subjects (ὑπηκόοι) because revenues had been decreasing over the course of the war and "they thought more money would come to them" (πλείω νομίζοντες ἂν σφίσι χρήματα οὕτω προσιέναι). Unfortunately, the inner workings of this new tax system are unclear, but a chance remark of Aristophanes provides some insights. In the *Frogs*, produced in 405, the comedian mentions an εἰκοστολόγος, "a collector of the five percent tax," operating in Aegina (363). The scholium glosses

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assume that Xenophon would have been familiar with at least some of his military works (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 7.3.1; Delebecque 1957: 432-57 dates *Hellenica* 7 generally to the period 357-6). Moreover, many of the similarities noted above, may ultimately originate from the two authors' indebtedness to common written sources (e.g., Daimachus of Plataea) or, more probably, to a "common stock of practical military wisdom still disseminated and elaborated orally" (Whitehead 1990: 37). While these explanations may account for the broad affinities Aeneas and Xenophon share in respect to military subjects, I am unconvinced that Xenophon's originality in financial matters is attributable to either Aeneas or a common stock of financial wisdom.

[27] Thucydides 7.28.4 and Aristophanes, *Frogs* 363. In general, see Boeckh 1976: 325, 401, Beloch 1884: 44, Romstedt 1914: 36-46, Gomme et al. 1970: 408-9, Meiggs 1972: 349, and Kallet 2001: 136-40, 195-226. As Kallet remarks, the imposition of the *eikoste* "is nothing short of extraordinary in the history of the *arche*, representing a major overhaul of its financial and economic basis with far-reaching implications for the Athenians' changing conception of their rule" (Kallet 2001: 196). The *eikoste*, above all, indicates to this author that the Athenian empire around 413 "was becoming increasingly economic in nature and purpose" and was regarded by the Athenians "more and more as a revenue generating mechanism rather than strictly a means of military/political rule over other Greeks" (Kallet 2001: 199-200).

εἰκοστολόγος as "he who collects the five percent taxes in a crisis; that is, when the generals demanded the five percents from the harbors and the islands and paid for military expenditures with these monies" (τὰ εἰκοστὰ ἐν τῇ κρίσει συνάγων· ἐπεὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀπήτουν τὰς εἰκοστὰς τῶν λιμένων καὶ τῶν νήσων καὶ οὕτως ἀνήλισκον εἰς τὰ πολεμικά). In the collection of the *eikoste*, then, it appears that the Athenians followed their practice during the Peloponnesian War of sending generals out on "quick ships" "to collect money" (ἀργυρολογεῖν) when needed directly from the allies.[28] Given the financial straits the Athenians found themselves in 413, it is not surprising that they wished the money from the *eikoste* to get into the hands of their generals and soldiers as quickly as possible.[29] Furthermore, it is unknown how the tax was collected locally in the cities of the empire, but on analogy with tribute collection, local officials were probably involved.[30] Assessment would have been simple because each city probably had its own customs officers (ἑλλιμενισταί) who kept record of

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28 *IG* I^3 60 with Meritt 1953: 298-303; *IG* I^3 71, 45-50 = *ML* 69; *IG* I^3 283 col. III, 37; Aristophanes, *Knights* 1071; Thucydides 2.69.1-2; 3.19.1; 4.50.1; Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 24.3 with Rhodes 1981: 307-8; Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 35.6. For an analysis of the evidence, see Kallet-Marx 1993: 136-7, 160-4, 202, who argues convincingly that references to ἀργυρολόγοι νῆες need not necessarily refer to "tribute-collecting ships."

29 For the evidence of generals paying their crews and soldiers directly from the received tribute, see *IG* I^3 281 col. III, 42-53 and *IG* I^3 285 col. I, 107-9; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.1.12 with Ferguson 1932: 41 and 4.8.30 with Pritchett 1991: 392; cf. Gomme 1945: 277-8. Each general and trierarch had a treasurer who kept account of monies received and paid out for *misthos* (Harpocration *s.v.* ταμίαι; Lysias 19.50-51; 29.3; Demosthenes 49.5-10; 50.10; see also Pritchett 1991: 394, 489, n. 743).

30 *IG* I^3 68, 8-9 = *ML* 68; Antiphon Fg. 52 (Thalheim) with Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 187 and Meiggs 1972: 241. Kallet 2001: 203, n. 76 suggests that Athenians would have also been included among those who had the right to bid to collect the tax.

harbor traffic for local taxation purposes.[31] A city's *eikoste* assessment could have been calculated simply by dividing the amount collected from the year's customs dues by the local tax rate, which yields the total taxable income from sea-borne trade, and then multiplying this number by five percent.

In addition to the *eikoste*, the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War levied a ten-percent (δεκατή) transit tax on goods traveling in and out of the Black Sea.[32] In 410 Xenophon reports that the Athenians built fortifications at Chrysopolis on the Asian side of the Propontis "and established a customs house in the city and began to collect a ten percent on ships sailing out of the Pontus" (καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ τὴν δεκάτην ἐξέλεγον τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων) (*Hellenica* 1.1.22; cf. Diodorus 13.64.2). Polybius too attests to this tax but adds: "It was this town [sc. Chrysopolis] which the Athenians once occupied on the advice of Alcibiades when they *first* attempted to levy toll on ships sailing into the Pontus" (ἣν Ἀθηναῖοι τότε κατασχόντες Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμῃ παραγωγιάζειν ἐπεβάλοντο πρῶτον τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας) (4.44.4). Polybius' statement seems to express the idea that the

[31] Demosthenes 34.34; in general, see Andreades 1933: 138-41. Kallet 2001: 202, n. 72 is certainly correct to argue that the imposition of the *eikoste* did not lead locals to abandon the collection of their own harbor dues, which were customarily around two percent (see Andreades 1933: 139). However, I must disagree with Kallet's assessment that evasion of the *eikoste* would have been much easier than evasion of tribute (224-5). Obfuscation would have been completely at odds with the self-interest of the polis. "Cooking the books," so to speak, would have brought with it too many problems for a city in the collection of their own customs dues. For example, falsification of the official records would have offered a ready-made defense to those caught smuggling, who could demand that the records be examined in court; if any falsification was detected at any point, a defendant could rightfully question the integrity of the entire system and the ability of the city to record accurately its trade transactions. Besides, the official polis records could be easily checked with those of the tax farmers. Even if city officials and tax farmers conspired to defraud the Athenians, previous records from the pre-*eikoste* era could be used as a check.

dekate was collected for the "first time" in 410, which suggests that it did not exist prior to this time.[33] But there is good evidence to support the idea that the tax was collected since the beginning of the war.[34] The discrepancy between Xenophon/Diodorus (ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων) and Polybius (τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας) is simply resolved if we follow the natural word order of Polybius' sentence and take πρῶτον as modifying the phrase τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας. In other words, 410 marks the time when the Athenians first imposed a *dekate* on ships traveling *into* the Pontus, whereas previously they had been only taxing the ships sailing *out* of the Pontus. Technically speaking, then, there were two *dekatai* levied in this region. The increased bi-directional trade with the Black Sea evidenced for the last quarter of the fifth century made the imposition of the double-tax a financially savvy move.[35] Given the date of its inception, the *dekate* was

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[32] This transit tax was referred to as either διαγώγιον or παραγώγιον; see *GHI*^{2} 12, 16; Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1346a5-7 with Boeckh 1976: 300 n.17; Polybius 4.46.5-6.

[33] Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 161. Hopper 1979: 76 and Rubel 2001: 40 offer the other interpretation that πρῶτον may only indicate that 410 was the first time the *dekate* was collected *at* Chrysopolis, which does not exclude the possibility of an earlier transit tax at Byzantium (see next note). Walbank's 1957: 497 explanation that Polybius wrote τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας (despite Xenophon and Diodorus' ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου) because he was following another source is unconvincing.

[34] References to several *dekatai* before 410: *IG* I^3 52, 7 = *ML* 58; Harpocration *s.v.* δεκατευταί; Aristophanes, Fg. 449 Edmonds. The provisions regulating foreign trade at Byzantium outlined in the second Methone Decree in 426/5 (*IG* I^3 61, 34-41 = *ML* 65) have led several scholars to speculate that the Athenians did collect a ten percent tax at Byzantium by 426 if not before the war (Beloch 1916: 343-4, Mattingly 1964: 45-6, Hopper 1979: 75-6, MacDonald 1981: 143 and n.24; Romstedt 1914: 22 dates the *dekate* after the capture of Sphacteria in 425). The reference to the *dekate* in the Callias decree (*IG* I^3 52, 7 = *ML* 58) has long puzzled scholars because the funds from it are said to be in the hands of the *hellenotamiai*, who are imperial, not domestic financial officers. According to the traditional date of the decrees (434/3), the *dekate* then is a pre-war measure, which some scholars consider "exceptionally high and barely explicable in peace-time" (Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 161; cf. Rubel, 2001: 49). However, Kallet-Marx 1989: 112 has argued forcefully that the orthodox dating of the Callias decree cannot be maintained on historical and epigraphic grounds, and that a date in the summer of 431 is "the most probable."

[35] Polybius' claim that "the lands which surround the Pontus…absorb the surplus produce of our own countries, namely olive oil and every kind of wine" (4.38.5), is substantiated by the presence of large numbers of fourth- and fifth-century amphorae from Aegean poleis [e.g., from Peparethos] in recent

another measure designed to alleviate Athens' financial straights and therefore is similar in scope to the *eikoste*. Interestingly, the *Lexica Segueriana* links both these taxes together: "*Dekate* and *eikoste*: the Athenians collected these taxes from the islanders" (Δεκάτη καὶ εἰκοστή: οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ τῶν νησιωτῶν ταῦτα ἐλάμβανον) (p. 185, 21 Nauck). I will return shortly to the significance of this gloss.

We know nothing about the amounts collected from these taxes, but their financial profitability can be inferred from Thrasybulus' re-imposition of both in the early fourth century. At the beginning of his infamous voyage in 391, "Thrasybulus sailed to Byzantium and sold the ten percent on ships sailing out of the Pontus" (πλεύσας εἰς Βυζάντιον ἀπέδοτο τὴν δεκάτην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλεόντων).[36] Byzantium held a position more favorable for the collection of such a transit tax than Chrysopolis. As Polybius famously puts it: "On the seaward side it [Byzantium] commands the entry to the Black sea so completely that no one can sail in or out without the consent of the

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nautical archaeological finds. For the evidence, see Rutishauser 2001: 201-2 contra Tsetskhladze 1998, who downplays the amount of trade with the Black Sea region in the fifth century.

36 *Hellenica* 4.8.27; cf. 4.8.31; cf. Demosthenes 20.60: "by putting Byzantium into Thrasybulus' hands, they [sc. Archebius and Heraclides, two Byzantines] made you masters of the Hellespont so that you farmed out the ten percent and thus being well furnished with money compelled the Spartans to make a peace that was favorable to you" (οἳ Βυζάντιον παραδόντες Θρασυβούλῳ κυρίους ὑμᾶς ἐποίησαν τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, ὥστε τὴν δεκάτην ἀποδόσθαι καὶ χρημάτων εὐπορήσαντας Λακεδαιμονίους ἀναγκάσαι τοιαύτην, οἵαν ὑμῖν ἐδόκει, ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην). Cawkwell 1976 has argued convincingly that Thrasybulus' voyage began in 391 and not 390, as argues Seager 1967: 109, n. 127, Funke 1980: 95, n. 27, and Strauss 1986: 150, 167, n. 1. All the sources agree that Thrasybulus "sold" the contract for the collection of the *dekate* to tax farmers. Like the collection of the two percent in Athens, the buyers of the contract would have been responsible for either paying the state up front or providing sureties until the full amount was collected (Andocides 1.133-4). That locals bought the contract and not Athenians is supported by Xenophon's statement that "the ten percent on goods from the Pontus was sold *in Byzantium* by the Athenians" (ἡ δεκάτη τε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πεπραμένη εἴη ἐν Βυζαντίῳ ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων) (4.8.31). Normally, the *poletai* sold taxes in Athens in the presence of the council (Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 47.2). This does not mean that Athenians were excluded from bidding on such contracts, but collaboration with the locals was always politically expedient, and it is likely

Byzantines. Consequently, they have complete control over the supply of those numerous products that the rest of the world needs for everyday life and in which the Pontus is particularly rich" (4.38.1-3). Another aspect of its beneficial position, as Polybius goes on to explain, is that the water currents "carry you to Byzantium whether you like it or not" (4.44.1-2; cf. Cassius Dio 75.10 and Strabo 7.320). As Histiaeus' behavior during the Ionian revolt demonstrates well, a mere eight ships could dominate the Bosporus.[37] The Athenians therefore had no difficulty compelling ships sailing through the Bosporus to put into Byzantium, where the value of their cargo was assessed for payment of the tax. Once the *dekate* was paid, the ship was then free to sail to its destined port of call. Presumably, any belligerent state's goods would have been confiscated in wartime.[38]

Sometime on this same voyage, Thrasybulus also reinstated the *eikoste*, though it is unclear how many poleis were subject to the tax since there are only two surviving

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that Byzantines were given preference (on the "collaborative" nature of the Athenian empire, see Kallet-Marx 1993: 8-9, 27).

37 Herodotus 6.5.3. In 410 the Athenians had 30 ships (50 = Diodorus [Ephorus] 13.64.3) operating at Chrysopolis (*Hellenica* 1.1.22), a number which Rubel 2001: 47 questions needlessly for the control of the straights. The large size of this force was not left behind to enforce the collection of the *dekate* alone, but, as Xenophon says, to "do any harm they could against the enemy." According to Diodorus, the ships were to help in the siege of Chalcedon and Byzantium. Cf. Demosthenes 18.241: "That through the Byzantines he [Philip] gained the mastery of the Hellespont, and the control of the grain-trade of all of Greece."

38 While no evidence bears directly on the workings of the collection of the *dekatai* (as sketched here), the procedure outlined in the Second Methone Decree (*IG* I^3 61) (see below n.59) and the actions of the Byzantines when they left the Second Athenian Sea League in 362 are instructive comparanda. According to Pseudo-Aristotle, the Byzantines levied a ten-percent tax on goods traveling out of the Black Sea: "On one occasion when they [sc. the Byzantines] were in a grain shortage and lacked funds, they detained ships that were sailing out of the Pontus. After some time had past, although the merchants were angry, they taxed them with a ten percent (ἐπιδεκάτους) on their profits…" (*Oeconomica* 1346b30; cf. Demosthenes 5.25; 45.64; 50.6; cf. Cassius Dio 75.12). As these sources make clear, the Byzantines did not regularly impose a transit tax on ships traveling in and out of the Pontus. The grain shortage mentioned here is probably the one of 362/1 and 361/0 (Demosthenes 50.61). Rostovtzeff 1941: 1287 is certainly correct to maintain a date in the fourth century for the financial schemes in *Oeconomica* II.2. The parallels in Demosthenes certainly speak against a date in the fifth century (Van Groningen 1979: 61 and Wartelle 1968: 54) and in the late third (Walbank 1957: 500).

references in the historical sources.[39] The first one comes from Thasos in a fragmentary honorary inscription where Thrasybulus' name is explicitly mentioned in conjunction with the *eikoste*.[40] A better preserved inscription concerning Clazomenae survives (387), which outlines in detail the procedure by which the city became subject to the tax (*IG* II^2 28 = *GHI*^{2} 18). Athens honors the Clazomeneans for their loyalty, grants them the authority to decide about welcoming back hostages and exiles and receiving an Athenian governor and garrison, and allows them to import grain from nearby poleis, as long as they are willing to pay the *eikoste* (4-14). The Clazomeneans reject an Athenian governor and garrison but agree to pay the *eikoste* while being "exempt from other taxes" (τέ]λη οὐχ ὑποτελοῦ[ντας ἄλλα) (23-26). The "other taxes" quite possibly refers to the *dekate*/*dekatai*.[41] The inscription dates to autumn 387, shortly before the King's Peace, which officially stipulated that Clazomenae belong to the king thereafter.[42] What happened to both these taxes after 387?

The only explicit evidence for the *eikoste* after this date is limited to one source. Pollux (9.29) cites the middle comedian Anaxilias, who mentions εἰκοστολόγοι in his play *Glaucon* (Fg. 8 Kock). Unfortunately, there is no way to date this play with any precision, but what little is known about the floruit of his literary activity points to the

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[39] Based on Diodorus 14.94.2-3 it would seem best to put Thrasybulus' visit to the islands before his voyage to the Hellespont and Byzantium.

[40] *IG* II^2 24, 4-6: [Θ]ασίοις εἰκοστὴγ κ[— — — — — — — — — —] είων εἰκοστὴν ὑποτ[ελ-------- 15-------- ἐμ]πορίων εἰκοστὴν τω[— — — — — — — — — —] ν ὅτε [Θρασ]ύβολος ἦρ[χεν — — — — —].

[41] A similar phrase is found in the first Methone decree *IG* I^3 61, 9 = *ML* 95, which also concerns the right to export grain (34-41). As stated above (note 34), there is good reason to think the Athenians were levying the *dekate* at Byzantium in the early 420s (see also Merkelbach 1970: 33).

[42] Merkelbach 1970: 33.

middle of the fourth century. Diogenes Laertius' comment (3.28) that he poked fun at Plato places Anaxilias' squarely in the fourth century, and his lampooning of Demosthenes' Halonnesus politics indicates that he was still producing plays down to the 340s.[43] The earliest historical reference in his plays dates to the mid 370s (Fg. 39 Edmonds), and thus there is a strong possibility that *Glaucon* postdates the King's Peace. Indirect evidence for a fourth-century *eikoste* is furnished by the *Lexica Segueriana*'s gloss of *dekate* and *eikoste* mentioned above. It is significant that these are annotated as taxes collected "from the islanders" (ἐκ τῶν νησιωτῶν).[44] Why just from the islanders? Because the source material from this part of the *Lexica* is taken from an anonymous work on legal terms (the so-called Δικῶν ὀνόματα), which overwhelming concerns fourth-century Athenian practices and procedures, it is reasonable to assume that this gloss derives from authentic historical material.[45] The definition is explicable only if the historical source upon which the author of the Lexicon bases his annotation derives from the period after the King's Peace, when Persia claimed the right to Clazomenae, Cyprus, and all the cities in Asia. Prior to 387, the Athenians levied the *eikoste* on both the islanders and coastal poleis. After this time, the latter would have

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43 Brill's *New Pauly s.v.* Anaxilias (Nesselrath).

44 Recall that the scholium to *Frogs* 363 glosses εἰκοστολόγος as "he who collects the five percent taxes in a crisis; when the generals demanded the five percents from the harbors and *the islands*…"; cf. Demosthenes 18.234, Aeschines 2.71, and Xenophon, *Poroi* 5.6, who refer specifically to the allies of the Second Athenian Sea League as "the islanders."

45 This work cites only fourth-century orators (e.g. Aeschines) and historical figures (Eurybatus *apud* Aeschines 3.137) and gives annotations of terms, which make sense only in fourth and post-fourth century legal contexts. For example, ἐπιστάτης is glossed as "a guardian of public funds and a superintendent of jurors" (φύλαξ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων καὶ ἐπιτηρητὴς τῶν δικαστῶν): as far as we can tell, the *epistates* never had judicial functions in the fifth or fourth centuries (see *Athenaion Politeia* 40 with Rhodes 1981: 531-34).

been off limits to the Athenians but island states in the Aegean, such as Thasos, Paros, and Ceos, theoretically could have been taxed.[46] I suspect that, unlike the fifth-century *eikoste*, the Athenians in the fourth century exacted it on an ad hoc basis.

As for the *dekate*, two explicit references in the historical sources indicate that the Athenians continued to collect this tax after 387, though it is widely believed among historians that the Peace stipulated its termination.[47] Shortly before Chares forced the Thracian king Cersobleptes to conclude a treaty more favorable to Athens in 357, Demosthenes recalls the outrageous terms Chabrias was compelled to accept concerning the Chersonesus: "Consider that he [Cersobleptes] claimed the right to collect the taxes and the ten-percents, and that again he kept talking as if the whole country was his, deeming it right that the tithe-collectors should be his own and in control of the taxes" (ἐνθυμεῖσθ' ὅτι καὶ τέλη καὶ δεκάτας ἠξίου λαμβάνειν, καὶ πάλιν ὡς αὑτοῦ τῆς χώρας οὔσης τοὺς λόγους ἐποιεῖτο, τοὺς δεκατηλόγους ἀξιῶν τοὺς αὑτοῦ

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46 It is unclear whether the imposition of the *eikoste* would have represented a breach of local autonomy and thus of the King's Peace (see next note).

47 Boeckh 1976: 326 and Stroud 1998: 83. This idea implies that that the *dekate* was not only a belligerent measure but also an infringement upon the *autonomia* of the Greeks. While there is much evidence to support the notion that the collection of the *dekate* was considered unjust, nothing indicates that the collection of a transit tax infringed a polis' autonomy (no controversy, for example, is mentioned in the sources about transit taxes collected elsewhere, as in Corinth and Crisa; see Thucydides 1.13 and Strabo 8.6.20, 9.3.4 with Cornford 1907: 34-5). Indeed, the right to levy and collect taxes in one's territory was a mark of a polis' *autonomia*, but this claim did not extend beyond a polis' harbors (Hansen 1995: 26). Grants of autonomy in peace treaties only mention landed territory; see, for example, *I. Priene* 1.2-5; *IG* I^3 66, 11-2; *IG* II^2 43, 10-12; Thucydides 2.71.2; 5.18.2.). For instance, in a letter written to the city of Iasus ca. 300, Aristobolus swears that he will "guard the freedom and autonomy of the people of Iasus, and allow the people of Iasus to collect their revenues—all of them from the city and the harbors" (διαφυλάξω τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτονομία τῷ δημῳ τῶν Ἰασέων, τὰς δὲ προσόδους ἐάσω Ἰασεῖς λαμβάνειν τὰς τῆς πόλεως πάσας καὶ τοὺς λιμένας) (*IK* Iasos 3, 13-15; cf. *Milet* III. 150, 40). Some sources call the collection of these commercial revenues "right" or "just" (δίκαιος) (*IC* III. iii 3A, 66-72; *IScM* II. 67, 31ff., 68, 32ff.). Thus, anyone who deprives a *polis* of these revenues can be said to be "acting unjustly" (ἀδικεῖν) (*IK* Iasus 3, 16). In the famous treaty between Chaleion and Oianthea (ca.

τῶν τελῶν κυρίους εἶναι) (23.177).[48] Given that the Athenians had not yet established cleruchies in the region, it is unlikely that these ten-percents Cersobleptes usurped from the Athenians were taxes on land or agriculture. If however these ten-percents were transit taxes, the use of the plural *dekatai* is puzzling. Does the plural denote two or more than two? The most parsimonious explanation is that *dekatai* refers to two ten-percents collected on goods moving into and out of the Pontus, as argued above.[49] The main difference is that around 358 the Athenians were imposing this tax in the Hellespont off the coast of the Chersonesus, not at Chrysopolis or Byzantium as they had done previously. By 364 Athens' relationship with Byzantium had soured, leading to the ally's defection and open revolt in 357, a fact that explains well the relocation of the tax to the Chersonesus in the 350s. That the Athenians had collected these taxes earlier than the 350s is evidenced in the naval records of 370/69, which state that the trireme Eudoxia "was given to the collectors of the ten percents" (τοῖς δεκατευταῖς ἐδόθη) (*IG* II^2, 1609, 97). While these references to do not necessarily imply that the *dekatai* were collected continuously from 391 to the early 350s, they nonetheless indicate that the Athenians did impose them when given the opportunity.[50]

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450), depredations of foreigners' goods "on the sea" are permitted, whereas seizures "from the harbor" are outlaws and considered "unjust" (ἀδίκω) (*GHI* 34, 4-5).

[48] The τέλη of which he speaks are probably the customs dues from emporia, which in conjunction with revenues derived from ports elsewhere in eastern Thrace fetched more than 200 talents a year (23.110).

[49] Stroud 1998: 83 makes this suggestion in relation to the "twin *dekatai*" (τὼ δεκάτ[.]) mentioned in the Athenian grain tax law of 374/3 (*GHI*^{2} 26, 58-60). Cf. Harris 1999: 269-70.

[50] Indirect evidence for a mid fourth-century *dekate* can be adduced from Chabrias' advice (ca. 362-59) to the Egyptian King, Tachos, to levy a *dekate* on merchant ships as a method of raising cash (Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1350b34-1351b12). Chabrias' activities in the Chersonesus (Demosthenes 23.177) undoubtedly made him familiar with the benefits of such a tax system. Indeed, he may have been responsible for levying the *dekate* in the Chersonesus in the first place. As Will (cited in Davies 2004: 492-3) provocatively suggests, Chabrias' recommendations to Tachos were part of a coherent and appropriate

No direct evidence exists for the reception of these taxes among the allies. However, we can infer a general negative attitude to the *dekate* from the Byzantines' imposition of the tax.[51] As discussed in Section 3C, when the Byzantines revolted from Athens after Epaminondas' naval tour in 364, the Byzantines began to seize grain ships sailing through the Bosporus, forcing the merchants to pay a ten-percent on their goods, which caused consternation among them (τῶν ἐμπόρων ἀγανακτούντων) (Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1346b30-5). Because some of these merchants were bringing grain to Athens, the Athenians became indignant, not enjoying how the tables were turned on them.[52] In the late third century, the Byzantines' re-imposition of the *dekate* actually led to war with Rhodes: "The exaction by the Byzantines of a duty on goods brought from the Black Sea caused great loss and inconvenience to everyone. There was general resentment and all the traders complained to the Rhodians…[and] the Rhodians were roused to action by their own losses as well as by those incurred by their neighbors."[53] The primary reason for these outrages over the *dekate* is that it necessarily involved the forceful escorting of ships in open waters to the harbor at Byzantium. The general Greek phrase for this procedure is κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα, which was closely

plan to apply money-raising techniques, which were developed in Athens, to the largely coinless economy of Egypt.

51 For some suggestions about the reception of the *eikoste*, see Kallet 2001: 204 n. 80 citing Thucydides' cynical reference to the newly-taxed allies as "subjects" in 7.28.4 and Heniochus Fg. 5 Edmonds.

52 See, for example, Demosthenes 5.25; 45.64; 50.6, 17.

53 Polybius 4.47.1-3: μεγάλης δὲ γενομένης τῆς ἀλυσιτελείας καὶ δυσχρηστίας πᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ τέλος πράττειν τοὺς Βυζαντίους τῶν ἐξαγομένων ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, δεινὸν ἡγοῦντο, καὶ πάντες ἐνεκάλουν οἱ πλοϊζόμενοι τοῖς Ῥοδίοις…Οἱ γὰρ Ῥόδιοι, συνεξεγερθέντες ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν σφετέραν βλάβην, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν πέλαςσφετέραν βλάβην…).

identified with piratical practices and considered unjust.[54] Moreover, the Greeks did have a notion of the "freedom of the seas," which banned such seizures on the open seas in peacetime.[55] There may have also been a certain stigma attached to the Bosporus, which according to the myth of Jason and the Argonauts, the gods had opened for safe passage into the Black Sea.[56] Thus, there is very good reason for considering the *dekate* an "extortion-toll," as Boeckh calls it, or even what Gernet deemed a "state organized system of robbery."[57] These characterizations correspond well to Hasebroek's judgment of Athenian thalassocracy as a form of "terrorisation" in which ships were methodically seized and inspected.[58] Ships heading to friends and allies secured safe passage upon

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54 Harpocration *s.v.* κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα: λέγεται ἀντὶ τοῦ λῄζεται [τοῦ βιάζεσθαι] καὶ κακοῦν, καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν τοὺς πλέοντας ὅποι βούλονται πλεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα χωρία τοῖς λῃστεύουσι κατάγειν. Aeschines 2.71-2: "they [the toddies of Chares] exacted sixty talents in contributions a year from the miserable islanders, and seizing merchant ships and Greeks on the open seas. And instead of honor and the hegemony of Hellas, our city was infected with the name of Myonnesia [notorious pirates' den] and a reputation for being pirates" (τοὺς μὲν ταλαιπώρους νησιώτας καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα εἰσέπραττον σύνταξιν, κατῆγον δὲ τὰ πλοῖα καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς θαλάττης. Ἀντὶ δὲ ἀξιώματος καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν τῆς Μυοννήσου καὶ τῆς τῶν λῃστῶν δόξης ἀνεπίμπλατο). Cf. Amit 1965: Appendix 6, Ste Croix 1972: 47 and Appendix 8, and Garnsey 1988: 143. On the injustice of such actions, see Ps.-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* 1347b29-30 and Demosthenes 8.9, 28.

55 Thucydides 4.118; 5.18.2; Andocides 3.19; Demosthenes 17.19-20; Isocrates 4.115; 8.20; Plutarch, *Pericles* 17; in general, see Seager 1969.

56 Apollonius, *Argonautica* 2.604-6. Incidentally, in the fourth century Jason was known for his role in clearing the seas of pirates (Cleidemus, *FGrH* 323 F 5).

57 Boeckh 1976: 325 and Gernet 1909: 356; cf. Romstedt 1914: 33-4, who cites Beloch's erroneous suggestion that the *dekate* was a League creation. For the accusations of piracy against Chares, see Salmond 1996: 49-50.

58 Hasebroek 1965: 143. That is, the Athenians used their sea power not only to benefit financially but also as means to control the flow of grain and other vital resources to loyal and restive allies and enemy states. Control of narrow straights such as the Bosporus or Hellespont was an important Athenian strategy (Miltner 1935: 10-11). As Sealey puts it succinctly: "The peninsula [Hellespont] was well placed for guarding or disrupting the sea route along which the Pontic grain traveled" (1993: 76). This policy was a old as the fifth century: "Wealth they alone of the Greeks and non-Greeks are capable of possessing. If some city is rich in ship-timber, where will it distribute it without consent of the rulers of the sea?...In addition they forbid export to wherever any of our enemies are, on pain of being unable to use the sea. Furthermore, every mainland has either some projecting headland or an offshore island or a strait, so that it is possible for the rulers of the sea to put in there and to injure those dwell on the land" (Ps.-Xenophon,

payment of the tax; the cargoes of ships bounding for enemy territory or those carrying contraband were confiscated.[59]

Athenaion Politeia). One of the strategies of the Peloponnesian war was, in fact, to cut off the Peloponnesus from Sicilian and Italian grain (Thucydides 3.86.4; 6.90.3; cf. 1.120.2). When Perdiccas of Macedon betrays Athens in 417/16 by joining the alliance of Argos and Sparta, "the Athenians blockaded Macedonia" (5.83.4). Even in times of peace, control of the grain trade was critical for securing allegiance from the allies. The inscription concerning Clazomenae (*GHI*^{2} 18) is revealing in this respect because Athens grants the Clazomeneans, per their request, the right to import grain from cities according to the treaty (which demonstrates that it was uncertain whether these rights were automatic!). That these policies were operative throughout the fourth century is evidenced by Isocrates 8.36 and Demosthenes 9.24-5 especially: "All the generals who have ever set sail from your land raise money from the Chians, Erythraeans, from whatever people they can, I mean the Greeks of Asia Minor…And those who pay do not pay for nothing…No, they purchase for the merchants sailing from their harbors immunity from injury or robbery, or a safe conduct for their own ships, or something of that sort. They say they are granting benevolences." On the effectiveness of Athenian naval power in the mid fourth century, see Cawkwell 1984.

[59] The procedure outlined in the Second Methone Decree (*IG* I^3 61) is informative. At lines 40-41, we learn that a Methonaean ship exporting grain from Byzantium is to be "free from injury" (ἀζέμιος), that is, as long as the Methonaeans follow the guidelines set forth in the decree. The procedure is as follows: (i) the Methonaeans must first write ahead to the *hellespontophylakes* requesting the amount of grain to export prescribed by the decree; (ii) during this process the *hellespontophylakes* shall not prevent them from exporting the grain or allow anyone else (a Byzantine, e.g.) to prevent them; (iii) and even the ship shall be ἀζέμιος. Rubel's translation of ἀζέμιος as "steuerfrei" (tax-free), makes little sense of the grammatical and logical sequence of this sentence (2001: 44). The gloss that Suda *s.v.* gives for ἀζέμιος is the most appropriate: ἀβλαβής, "free from injury;" cf Rangabé 1842: 362 and Garnsey 1988: 120-3.

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Vita

Joseph Nicholas Jansen, the son of Ralph and Carol Jansen, was born on November 25, 1972 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where he attended Marquette University High School. Upon graduating in 1991, he entered the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He majored in history and classical humanities, wrote a senior honors thesis on Philo of Alexandria, and earned his B.A. with Distinction in 1995. He reentered the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the fall of 1996 to pursue graduate work in ancient history. After completing a master's thesis on Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and Leon Battista Alberti's *Della Famiglia*, he received his M.A. in 1998. He entered the University of Texas at Austin in 1999 to earn a doctorate in Classics. His main fields of study were Greek and Roman historiography, archaic and classical Greek history, and the ancient economy. In the spring semester of 2005, he began his dissertation research with funding from the William J. Battle Graduate Fellowship. During the 2005-2007 academic years, he was an instructor at Rhodes College in Memphis. In August 2007, he will join the Department of Greek and Roman Studies at Rhodes College as an Assistant Professor.

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